United States v. Mark Spangler

810 F.3d 702, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 681, 2016 WL 191997
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided January 15, 2016·No. 14-30042·Published·Cited by 10 cases

Opinion

OPINION

LEFKOW, Senior District Judge:

Mark F. Spangler appeals his jury convictions on twenty-four counts of wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), seven counts of money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1957), and one count of investment-adviser fraud (15 U.S.C. § 80b-17). We focus on three of Spangler’s arguments raised on appeal: (1) that the district court abused its discretion in barring his expert witness from testifying, and that the exclusion of the expert’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense; (2) that the district court abused its discretion in permitting testimony about his status as a fiduciary; and (3) that the district court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to strike count 33 from the second superseding indictment. 1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND 2

On May 14, 2013, a grand jury returned a second superseding indictment charging Spangler with twenty-five counts of wire fraud, seven counts of money laundering, and one count of investment-adviser fraud. At trial, the government presented evidence of the following:

Spangler was a registered investment adviser and a onetime chairman of the National Association of Personal Financial *705 Advisors. From the early 1980s until 2011, Spangler headed a Seattle investment firm known during the relevant'time period as The Spangler Group, which serviced between twenty and twenty-five client families at any given time.

In 1998, Spangler set up five investment funds, two of which — the Equity Investors Group, LLC (Equity) and the Income + Investors Group, LLC (Income) — are particularly relevant for purposes of this appeal. Spangler’s clients expected that the money they put into Equity and Income would be invested in publicly-traded companies and that investment decisions would be made by an outside investment manager, rather than Spangler. These expectations found support in the private placement memo-randa (PPMs) for the funds. Indeed, the 1998 version of the PPM for Equity, which was drafted by William Carleton, Span-gler’s attorney, provided that “the securities in which [Equity] invests are expected to be traded in public markets” and that Spangler would use Southeastern Asset Management, Inc. to make investment decisions. Both PPMs provided that the funds’ investment objectives could be changed only by a two-thirds vote of the owners.

The PPMs also contained disclaimers, which the defense emphasized at trial. For example, the PPMs warned clients that the investments to be made involved a “high degree of risk” and that “no investment in these securities should be made by any person who is not in a position to lose the entire amount of such investment.” At trial, Carleton described these warnings as “boilerplate.”

In 1999, Spangler and Carleton organized Spangler Ventures, which consisted of a series of investment funds dedicated to startup companies. According to Carle-ton, the purpose of Spangler Ventures was to offer “high-risk venture-style ... start-up company investing” separate from the five funds set up in 1998. Spangler was intimately involved in two of the startups in which the Spangler Ventures funds invested: TeraHop and Tamarac. Spangler served as chairman of both entities and held other positions as well.

Despite his apparent intent to separate the funds invested in public equities from those invested in startup companies, in 2008 Spangler began to move money from Equity and Income into TeraHop and Ta-marac, all without his clients’ consent. Although he sometimes transferred the money directly, he often funneled the money through the Spangler Ventures funds first, largely because he stood to gain 16% of any profits made by Spangler Ventures under the terms of those funds.

Spangler’s diversion of cash from Equity and Income to TeraHop was especially problematic because TeraHop lost more than $50 million between 2001 and 2010. Given TeraHop’s poor financial performance, TeraHop frequently could not make interest payments on loans it had taken from Income. Accordingly, TeraHop borrowed money from Equity and various Spangler Ventures funds to make the payments, and Income, in turn, used the money to pay quarterly dividends to investors. In this way, Spangler operated a'Circular Ponzi scheme, using his clients’ money to generate their interest payments.

To conceal evidence of wrongdoing, Spangler provided his clients with carefully worded quarterly statements titled “portfolio performance analyses.” These statements referred to the funds invested in Equity as “marketable equities” and the funds invested in Income as “specialty bonds.” Investments in “private equities” were listed in a separate category, creating the illusion that only a small percentage of funds was dedicated to private investments such as startup companies. In reality, however, a much larger portion of Span- *706 gler’s clients’ portfolios was invested in private equities, as funds invested in Equity and Income were also being moved into TeraHop and Tamarac. For example, a portfolio report for one of Spangler’s clients from the last quarter of 2010 represented that the client had less than 1% of his portfolio invested in TeraHop when 51% of his portfolio was actually invested in the startup.

In 2008, Spangler sent letters to’ his clients and asked them to sign new PPMs for Equity, Income, and other funds. The letters informed Spangler’s clients of name changes for some of the funds (e.g., Equity became “SG Growth + Investors Group, L.L.C.” and Income became “SG Income + Investors Group, L.L.C.”). The new PPMs gave Spangler discretion to invest funds himself rather than with the assistance of an outside investment adviser. Further, the revised PPM for Equity changed the language of the original PPM stating that securities were “expected to be” traded in public markets to read that securities “may be” traded in public markets. The PPMs did not mention Tera-Hop or Tamarac directly, and Spangler’s clients testified that they did not closely review the new PPMs or seek legal advice before signing them, largely because they trusted Spangler and relied on his, expertise.

Concerned about their investments in the wake of the economic downturn of 2008, some of Spangler’s clients asked him to liquidate their investments in Equity and Income, which Spangler could not accomplish within the time constraints established by the PPMs. When Spangler informed his clients that he needed to seek new investors to liquidate their interests, they told him that the plan sounded like a Ponzi scheme. From there, the situation unraveled, and in 2011 The Spangler Group was forced into receivership. The receiver was able to recover some of Span-gler’s clients’ funds, but many of his clients lost millions.

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United States v. Mark Spangler, 810 F.3d 702, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 681, 2016 WL 191997 (9th Cir. 2016).

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