United States v. Laurienti

611 F.3d 530, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12345, 2010 WL 2473573
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·Decided June 16, 2010·No. 07-50240, 07-50358, 07-50365, 07-50367·Published·Cited by 70 cases

Opinion

ORDER AND OPINION

ORDER

The opinion filed June 8, 2010, slip opinion at 8193, is hereby withdrawn. The *534 attached opinion is ordered filed in its place and constitutes the opinion for the court.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

After the collapse of a securities fraud “pump and dump” scheme, the government indicted the owners, managers, and senior brokers of a securities broker-dealer firm. The owners and managers pleaded guilty to charges of criminal securities fraud, but the senior brokers, including Defendants Bryan Laurienti, Curtiss Parker, Donald Samaria, and David Montesano, pleaded not guilty. Defendants conceded that a fraudulent scheme existed but argued that they had not joined the conspiracy or engaged in fraudulent acts; rather, they were innocent brokers selling stocks to their clients, caught in the government’s overly wide criminal dragnet. The jury found otherwise and convicted Defendants on all counts. Defendants appeal their convictions and sentences. We affirm Defendants’ convictions but vacate their sentences and remand for resentencing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Hampton Porter Investment Bankers, LLC (“Hampton Porter”), was a securities broker-dealer firm registered with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hampton Porter’s owners and top-level managers engaged in what is known as a “pump and dump” scheme. Certain publicly traded companies granted Hampton Porter (or its owners) large blocks of free, or deeply discounted, stock. In return, Hampton Porter drove up the price of these thinly traded stocks by pressuring unsuspecting clients into purchasing shares, by strongly discouraging clients from selling shares, and by refusing in some instances to execute clients’ sales orders. In the meantime, Hampton Porter and others who stood to benefit from the scheme sold their shares at artificially inflated prices. See generally United States v. Zolp, 479 F.3d 715, 717 n. 1 (9th Cir.2007) (describing a “pump and dump” scheme); United States v. Shelly, 442 F.3d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir.2006) (same).

When the stock market fell sharply in 2000, Hampton Porter’s scheme crashed with it. Hampton Porter went out of business in 2001. After an investigation, the government indicted Hampton Porter’s owners, managers, and senior brokers. 1 The indictment alleges that the defendants participated in a securities fraud conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and 15 U.S.C. § 78ff and, by incorporation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The indictment alleges that the “purpose of the conspiracy was to enrich defendants and their co-conspirators by means of the fraudulent sales of securities to the customers of Hampton Porter.” The indictment also alleges additional counts against individual defendants in connection with specified stock purchases for acts committed “in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme.”

The government’s investigation uncovered overwhelming evidence that the criminal conspiracy existed and that the owners and managers were complicit. The owners and managers pleaded guilty to various charges and, in plea agreements, agreed to testify against the senior brokers, who are Defendants here. Defen *535 dants pleaded not guilty, and the district court presided over a 14-day jury trial. 2

Much of the testimony and documentary evidence at trial concerned Defendants’ receipt of “bonus commissions” when a client purchased shares of four targeted stocks, referred to by Defendants as “house stocks.” 3 The commission structure worked in the following manner. On the purchase of all stocks, the client paid a sales commission — typically $100. The brokers fully disclosed that sales commission, and the client’s copy of the transaction ticket reflected the commission. Out of that sales commission, Hampton Porter paid its brokers a predetermined percentage, typically 50%, for a resulting regular commission of $50. As an incentive to the brokers to push house stocks, however, Hampton Porter offered a “bonus commission,” which Hampton Porter paid the brokers in addition to the regular commission. The bonus commission typically amounted to 5% of the purchase price of the house stock. The bonus commissions were paid directly by Hampton Porter, not by the clients. Neither the brokers nor the transaction tickets disclosed to clients the existence of bonus commissions. In summary, for a purchase of non-house stock, a broker received $50; but for a purchase of house stock, a broker received $50 plus 5% of the purchase price.

Two simple examples illustrate the dramatic difference between the broker’s commission on a client’s purchase of a non-house stock and the broker’s commission on a client’s purchase of a house stock. Suppose that a client bought $30,000 worth of a non-house stock and that Hampton Porter charged its standard $100 sales commission. The client would pay $30,100, and the broker would receive a $50 commission. Now assume instead that a client bought $30,000 worth of a house stock and that Hampton Porter charged its standard $100 sales commission. The client again would pay $30,100. But this time, the broker would receive the $50 sales commission plus a bonus commission of $1,500. In summary, a client’s purchase of $30,000 worth of stock would result in either a total commission of $50 or a total commission of $1,550 — depending only on whether the stock purchased was a house stock. 4

Additionally, bonus commissions could be lost. Generally speaking, if the client sold shares of a house stock, the broker would lose the bonus commission that he or she had earned on the original purchase of the house stock. The brokers attempted to avoid the loss of the bonus commission in several ways. First, and most simply, the brokers dissuaded the client from selling the house stock. Second, if the broker could find another client to purchase the house stock, he or she executed a “cross-trade” between clients. Although the specifics of the transaction were unknown to the two clients, the selling client sold his or her shares of the house stock to *536 the purchasing client. In this way, the total number of shares owned by Hampton Porter clients as a group would be unaffected. Third, in some instances, the broker executed unauthorized purchases of the house stock by another, unsuspecting client.

The government introduced overwhelming and uncontested evidence that Defendants knowingly received bonus commissions. Several of Defendants’ former clients testified that Defendants used high-pressure sales tactics to persuade them to buy house stocks and that Defendants strongly discouraged the sale of house stocks.

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United States v. Laurienti, 611 F.3d 530, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 12345, 2010 WL 2473573 (9th Cir. 2010).

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