Opinion by Judge LEAVY; dissent by Judge FARRIS.
OPINION
LEAVY, Circuit Judge:
Mark AJIyn Tory was indicted on five counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). Counts one and four charged armed robbery. Counts two, three, and five charged unarmed robbery. Tory admitted to having committed the robberies but denied being armed during any of them. The jury found Tory guilty of armed bank robbery as alleged in count one and unarmed bank robbery as alleged in counts two, three, and five. On count four, the jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of unarmed bank robbery. Tory argues that four rulings of the court denied him a fair trial on the issue of whether he was armed as charged in count one.
PACTS
The evidence relative to count one was that on January 12, 1993, Tory entered the bank, walked directly to a teller station, and slid a piece of paper across the counter. On the paper, Tory had written “Give me all the cash in your top drawer or I will shoot you in the face.” The teller gave Tory $2,020 cash, and Tory ran from the bank.
1)Before trial, the district court ruled that the government could not introduce evidence of a holster and gunbelt found in Tory’s garage. However, the court said that the government could introduce that evidence if Tory “in some way denies that he ever owned a gun in any fashion.” The government elicited testimony from FBI Agent Dick regarding a toy gun that he saw in Tory’s home. A second FBI agent, Keven Kelly, was asked by Tory’s attorney whether any gun had been found in the search of Tory’s home.1 After Kelly testified that no gun had been found, the court ruled that the door had been opened for evidence regarding the holster and gunbelt. The government later introduced the holster and gunbelt.
2) The teller, Ms. Seholle, on direct examination testified that Tory had raised his shirt to reveal the butt of a gun stuffed in the waist of his pants. Seholle testified on cross-examination, “I never recall him wearing jogging pants, no.... It was my memory that he had on like a white painter — white baggy-jean-like looking pants, like painter pants up here, white in color.” She denied remembering that she had told Agent Dick that Tory was wearing sweatpants, but instead remembered telling him that Tory was wearing “a white type of pant.”
Agent Dick had interviewed Seholle after the robbery. On cross-examination, Tory’s attorney asked Agent Dick whether Seholle had told him that Tory was wearing sweatpants at the time of the robbery.2 The government objected to the question as calling for hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. The court held that the statement to which Agent Dick would testify was not inconsistent with Seholle’s testimony and, therefore, would not be admissible even for the limited purpose of impeachment.
3) During closing argument, Tory’s attorney attempted to argue that if the defendant was wearing sweatpants it would be a reasonable inference that he could not have been carrying a gun because it would have fallen when he ran. The court ruled that there was no evidence as to that matter and prevented the argument.
4) The defense attempted to argue that if the prosecution had presented bank surveillance photographs in its possession, it would have cleared up the question of whether the [210]*210defendant was wearing sweatpants. The trial court again sustained the government’s objection saying that there was no evidence of that fact.
, ANALYSIS
I.Admission of Holster and Gunbelt
The trial court’s finding that the defense opened the door to the introduction of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir.1983). The issue is whether Tory asserted that he never owned a gun by asking Agent Kelly whether he had found a gun at Tory’s residence.
Tory’s examination of Agent Kelly did not amount to an assertion that Tory had never owned a gun. Tory’s questions concerned solely what the government did or did not find in its search of his home. The defendant did not open the door and, therefore, admission of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir.1993).
II.Impeachment of Ms. Scholle
Inconsistent statements are admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 613 for the purpose of impeaching a witness’s testimony. United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 971, 112 S.Ct. 1585, 118 L.Ed.2d 304 (1992). A trial judge, however, has discretion in deciding the preliminary issues of relevance and inconsistency. Fed.R.Evid. Rule 402 and United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975).
Based on his interview report, Agent Dick would have testified that Ms. Scholle had told him that Tory was wearing sweatpants at the time of the robbery. Yet, Ms. Scholle, when explicitly asked whether she had described Tory’s pants to Agent Dick as “sweatpants,” stated that she did not remember describing them in that particular way but did remember describing them “as a white type of pant.”
The trial judge’s ruling that the statement was not inconsistent with Ms. Scholle’s testimony was error. The statements in question are inconsistent and relevant to the ability of the sole prosecution eyewitness on the question of whether Tory had a gun and to her ability to recall pertinent details.3
III.Closing Arguments About the Sweatpants
The court excluded the argument to the effect that a gun would have fallen from the sweatpants as the defendant ran from the bank stating, “There is no evidence of that, counsel. There is no evidence of that. You cannot argue that.” RT at 175.
In excluding this argument, it is unclear whether the judge held that there was no evidence of the defendant wearing sweatpants, (Tory’s position) or that he held there was no evidence that a person wearing sweatpants could not run carrying a gun in the waist of his pants, (the government’s position). In fact, there was evidence that the defendant had been wearing sweatpants. The conclusion that he could not carry a gun in the waistband while running was a plausible inference that the defense should have been permitted to argue. We conclude that exclusion of the argument under either interpretation was error.
[211]*211IV. Surveillance Photographs
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Opinion by Judge LEAVY; dissent by Judge FARRIS.
OPINION
LEAVY, Circuit Judge:
Mark AJIyn Tory was indicted on five counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d). Counts one and four charged armed robbery. Counts two, three, and five charged unarmed robbery. Tory admitted to having committed the robberies but denied being armed during any of them. The jury found Tory guilty of armed bank robbery as alleged in count one and unarmed bank robbery as alleged in counts two, three, and five. On count four, the jury found him guilty of the lesser offense of unarmed bank robbery. Tory argues that four rulings of the court denied him a fair trial on the issue of whether he was armed as charged in count one.
PACTS
The evidence relative to count one was that on January 12, 1993, Tory entered the bank, walked directly to a teller station, and slid a piece of paper across the counter. On the paper, Tory had written “Give me all the cash in your top drawer or I will shoot you in the face.” The teller gave Tory $2,020 cash, and Tory ran from the bank.
1)Before trial, the district court ruled that the government could not introduce evidence of a holster and gunbelt found in Tory’s garage. However, the court said that the government could introduce that evidence if Tory “in some way denies that he ever owned a gun in any fashion.” The government elicited testimony from FBI Agent Dick regarding a toy gun that he saw in Tory’s home. A second FBI agent, Keven Kelly, was asked by Tory’s attorney whether any gun had been found in the search of Tory’s home.1 After Kelly testified that no gun had been found, the court ruled that the door had been opened for evidence regarding the holster and gunbelt. The government later introduced the holster and gunbelt.
2) The teller, Ms. Seholle, on direct examination testified that Tory had raised his shirt to reveal the butt of a gun stuffed in the waist of his pants. Seholle testified on cross-examination, “I never recall him wearing jogging pants, no.... It was my memory that he had on like a white painter — white baggy-jean-like looking pants, like painter pants up here, white in color.” She denied remembering that she had told Agent Dick that Tory was wearing sweatpants, but instead remembered telling him that Tory was wearing “a white type of pant.”
Agent Dick had interviewed Seholle after the robbery. On cross-examination, Tory’s attorney asked Agent Dick whether Seholle had told him that Tory was wearing sweatpants at the time of the robbery.2 The government objected to the question as calling for hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. The court held that the statement to which Agent Dick would testify was not inconsistent with Seholle’s testimony and, therefore, would not be admissible even for the limited purpose of impeachment.
3) During closing argument, Tory’s attorney attempted to argue that if the defendant was wearing sweatpants it would be a reasonable inference that he could not have been carrying a gun because it would have fallen when he ran. The court ruled that there was no evidence as to that matter and prevented the argument.
4) The defense attempted to argue that if the prosecution had presented bank surveillance photographs in its possession, it would have cleared up the question of whether the [210]*210defendant was wearing sweatpants. The trial court again sustained the government’s objection saying that there was no evidence of that fact.
, ANALYSIS
I.Admission of Holster and Gunbelt
The trial court’s finding that the defense opened the door to the introduction of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Segall, 833 F.2d 144, 148 (9th Cir.1987); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 710 (9th Cir.1983). The issue is whether Tory asserted that he never owned a gun by asking Agent Kelly whether he had found a gun at Tory’s residence.
Tory’s examination of Agent Kelly did not amount to an assertion that Tory had never owned a gun. Tory’s questions concerned solely what the government did or did not find in its search of his home. The defendant did not open the door and, therefore, admission of the evidence was an abuse of discretion. United States v. Brooke, 4 F.3d 1480, 1487 (9th Cir.1993).
II.Impeachment of Ms. Scholle
Inconsistent statements are admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 613 for the purpose of impeaching a witness’s testimony. United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 971, 112 S.Ct. 1585, 118 L.Ed.2d 304 (1992). A trial judge, however, has discretion in deciding the preliminary issues of relevance and inconsistency. Fed.R.Evid. Rule 402 and United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 2136, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975).
Based on his interview report, Agent Dick would have testified that Ms. Scholle had told him that Tory was wearing sweatpants at the time of the robbery. Yet, Ms. Scholle, when explicitly asked whether she had described Tory’s pants to Agent Dick as “sweatpants,” stated that she did not remember describing them in that particular way but did remember describing them “as a white type of pant.”
The trial judge’s ruling that the statement was not inconsistent with Ms. Scholle’s testimony was error. The statements in question are inconsistent and relevant to the ability of the sole prosecution eyewitness on the question of whether Tory had a gun and to her ability to recall pertinent details.3
III.Closing Arguments About the Sweatpants
The court excluded the argument to the effect that a gun would have fallen from the sweatpants as the defendant ran from the bank stating, “There is no evidence of that, counsel. There is no evidence of that. You cannot argue that.” RT at 175.
In excluding this argument, it is unclear whether the judge held that there was no evidence of the defendant wearing sweatpants, (Tory’s position) or that he held there was no evidence that a person wearing sweatpants could not run carrying a gun in the waist of his pants, (the government’s position). In fact, there was evidence that the defendant had been wearing sweatpants. The conclusion that he could not carry a gun in the waistband while running was a plausible inference that the defense should have been permitted to argue. We conclude that exclusion of the argument under either interpretation was error.
[211]*211IV. Surveillance Photographs
When Tory’s attorney attempted to argue that if the government had introduced surveillance photographs it would have clarified whether Tory was wearing sweatpants, the court stated: “Counsel, there is no evidence on that subject which you are arguing. Please do not do that.” RT 176.
Again it is unclear exactly what the trial judge held was not in evidence. The judge might have believed there was no evidence as to the sweatpants. As noted, this would be erroneous. On the other hand, he might have believed there was no evidence of surveillance photographs. There was, however, the testimony of Ms. Denice A. Farrar, a bank officer who said she had seen the video of the January 12 robbery (count 1). She had on direct examination identified Tory as the person who robbed the same bank on February 3 (count 3) and February 26 (count 4). On cross-examination she gave the following testimony:
Q. There was a video of the January 12th robbery?
A. We have surveillance film and with what pictures we have on that, we were able to look and see what the camera captured.
Q. And have you seen those photographs?
A. On that day, yes.
Q. Of the January 12th robbery?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How many pictures are there?
A. I don’t know. I mean, it’s a camera that spot checks the lobby. I couldn’t tell you exactly how many there are.
Q. About five or ten, something like that?
A. No, fewer than that.
Q. Fewer than that?
A. Yes.
Q. About three pictures maybe?
A. Maybe.
Q. Do these pictures clearly show Mr. Tory in the bank on January the 12th?
MR. WHITTLESEY [Asst. U.S. Attorney]: I’m going to object on the grounds—
THE COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. WHITTLESEY: —It’s irrelevant. It’s outside the scope of the direct examination.
MS. BARRERA: May I make a proffer, Your Honor?
THE COURT: No.
RT 73-74.
The ruling preventing the argument relative to the photographs was an abuse of discretion. The defense should have been allowed to argue that the government’s failure to produce relevant evidence within its control gives rise to an inference that the evidence would be unfavorable to it. Cf. United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453, 1469 (9th Cir.1984); Dickinson v. United States, 203 F.2d 336, 343 (9th Cir.), rev’d on other grounds, 346 U.S. 389, 74 S.Ct. 152, 98 L.Ed. 132 (1953).
CONCLUSION
We find that the trial court erred in four rulings. We must determine whether they were more probable than not harmless, or whether the error did not have “substantial influence” over the verdict. See United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1415 (9th Cir.1993) and United States v. Webbe, 755 F.2d 1387, 1389 (9th Cir.1985). We conclude that the cumulative effect of the errors deprived the defendant of a fair trial and requires a new trial on count one. See United States v. Green, 648 F.2d 587, 597 (9th Cir.1981).
We find no merit in any of the remaining issues.
The judgment is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for a new trial on count one.