United States v. Mario Gonzalez

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Mario Gonzalez

702 F. App'x 526

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 17, 2017

Docket17-10094

StatusUnpublished

This text of 702 F. App'x 526 (United States v. Mario Gonzalez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Mario Gonzalez, 702 F. App'x 526 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Mario Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following remand. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Gonzalez contends that the district court erred by rejecting his motion and the parties’ joint stipulation for a six-month re-, duction simultaneously. He argues that, once the court decided to reject the stipulation, it should have allowed him to submit further briefing before deciding the motion. Even if Gonzalez were correct that he should have been permitted to withdraw from the stipulation, his claim fails. Gonzalez cites no authority requiring a district court to allow argument on a section 3582(c)(2) motion. To the contrary, the district court has broad discretion to decide how to adjudicate a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See United States v. Mercado-Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2017). Gonzalez’s reliance on cases involving the right to allocute at sentencing is misplaced because a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a plenary resentencing. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825-26, 830, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010).

We also reject Gonzalez’s contention that the district court erred by denying as moot his motion for appointment of counsel. Gonzalez had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel when bringing his section 3582 motion. See United States v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, he was appointed counsel under former Arizona District Court General Order 15-13, and that counsel joined in the stipulation. Gonzalez points to no authority to show that the court was required, by due process or otherwise, to appoint him new counsel on remand.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Mario Gonzalez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) following remand. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Gonzalez contends that the district court erred by rejecting his motion and the parties’ joint stipulation for a six-month re-, duction simultaneously. He argues that, once the court decided to reject the stipulation, it should have allowed him to submit further briefing before deciding the motion. Even if Gonzalez were correct that he should have been permitted to withdraw from the stipulation, his claim fails. Gonzalez cites no authority requiring a district court to allow argument on a section 3582(c)(2) motion. To the contrary, the district court has broad discretion to decide how to adjudicate a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See United States v. Mercado-Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 954 (9th Cir. 2017). Gonzalez’s reliance on cases involving the right to allocute at sentencing is misplaced because a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not a plenary resentencing. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 825-26, 830, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010).

We also reject Gonzalez’s contention that the district court erred by denying as moot his motion for appointment of counsel. Gonzalez had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel when bringing his section 3582 motion. See United States v. Townsend, 98 F.3d 510, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, he was appointed counsel under former Arizona District Court General Order 15-13, and that counsel joined in the stipulation. Gonzalez points to no authority to show that the court was required, by due process or otherwise, to appoint him new counsel on remand.

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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Bluebook (online)

702 F. App'x 526, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-mario-gonzalez-ca9-2017.

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