United States v. Maria R. Lopez, AKA Maria R. Huerta, United States of America v. Jose Eusebio Huerta

104 F.3d 1149, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 346, 97 Daily Journal DAR 537, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 516, 1997 WL 10255

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 14, 1997
• Docket: 95-30230, 95-30236
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Maria Lopez and Jose Huerta appeal their convictions and sentences.¹ Lopez was convicted of money laundering and conspiracy to distribute marijuana and cocaine. Lopez appeals the district court’s refusal to “group” her conspiracy and money laundering convictions for sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

FACTS

A grand jury returned a 26-count indictment against Lopez, Lopez’s common-law husband Tomas Huerta, Jose Huerta and other Huerta family members. Lopez was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and laundering $26,300, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957.

At trial, the government presented evidence that Lopez admitted knowledge of her husband’s involvement in the drug business and that she took messages for him. The government demonstrated Lopez transported two kilograms of cocaine; one from California to Idaho and one from California to Nevada. The government also presented evidence that Lopez laundered drug money by exchanging cash for cashier checks eight separate times. Some of the money for which Lopez obtained cashier’s checks was marked by an undercover informant. Lopez then posed as Gregoria Huerta and used the cashier’s checks to purchase a home for approximately $26,300. The government also demonstrated that neither Lopez nor Tomas had sufficient legitimate income to purchase a home with cash.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We examine de novo the district court’s refusal to group these offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Rose, 20 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir.1994).

ANALYSIS

We conclude that the district court erred in refusing to group Lopez’s conspiracy and money laundering convictions for sentencing under § 3D1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines.

Section 3D1.2 permits grouping of closely related counts. Subsection (b) permits grouping “[w]hen counts involve the same victim and two or more acts or transactions connected by a common criminal objective or constituting part of a common scheme or plan.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2.

Lopez’s crimes satisfy the first requirement of subsection (b) of § 3D1.2. Victimless crimes, such as those involved here, are treated as involving the same victim “when the societal interests that are harmed are closely related.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2, Application Note 2. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the societal interests implicated by drug trafficking and money laundering are not closely related because narcotics distribution “inereasfes] lawlessness and violence” while “money laundering disperses capital from lawfully operating economic institutions.” United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 824 (5th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Harper, 972 F.2d 321, 322 (11th Cir.1992). We disagree. The money laundering prohibition was adopted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See Act of October 27, 1986, Pub.L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. The legislative history of § 1957 demonstrates that Congress’s primary purposes in prohibiting money laundering were to add a weapon to the arsenal against drug trafficking and to combat organized crime. See S.Rep. No. 99-433, at 4, 9-13 (1986); H.R.Rep. No. 99-855, at 8 (1986). The societal interests harmed by money laundering and drug trafficking are closely related: Narcotics trafficking enables traffickers to reap illicit financial gains and inflict the detrimental effects of narcotics use upon our society; money laundering enables criminals to obtain the benefits of income gained from illicit activities, particularly drug trafficking and organized crime. See also Most Frquently Asked Questions About the Sentencing Guidelines 20 (7th ed. 1994) (“[B]ecause money laundering is a type of statutory offense that facilitates the completion of some other underlying offense, it is conceptually appropriate to treat a money laundering offense as ‘closely intertwined’ and groupable with the underlying offense.”).

We do not believe that this position eliminates the money laundering laws as a weapon in the war against drug trafficking. The prohibition against money laundering still stands, and enables law enforcement officials to reach those in a drug conspiracy who clean the proceeds of the illicit activity but do not participate in the underlying criminal conduct. Grouping the crimes of conspirators who engage in both trafficking and laundering merely implements the Sentencing Commission’s direction to group closely related counts.

Lopez’s crimes also satisfy the second requirement of subsection (b) of § 3D1.2. Lopez’s acts of drug trafficking and money laundering were connected by a common criminal objective. Lopez laundered money to conceal the conspiracy’s drug trafficking and thus facilitated the accomplishment of the conspiracy’s ultimate objective of obtaining the financial benefits of drug trafficking.

We reverse the district court’s decision to reject grouping of these offenses under § 3D1.2 and remand for the district court te resentence Lopez.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1 . We address Lopez's sentencing claim in this opinion. Lopez and Huerta also raise several other claims which we address in an unpublished memorandum disposition.