United States v. Marcus Spivey

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: June 26, 2026
• Docket: 25-2670
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

ELD-006 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 25-2670 ___________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARCUS SPIVEY, Appellant ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action No. 2:10-cr-00059-003) District Judge: Honorable Harvey Bartle III ____________________________________

Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 December 8, 2025 Before: SHWARTZ, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed June 26, 2026) _________

OPINION* _________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Marcus Spivey appeals pro se from the District Court’s denial of his serial motion

for compassionate release filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. We will summarily affirm.

Spivey robbed several Philadelphia and Montgomery County McDonalds

restaurants in 2009. Following his arrest, he pleaded guilty in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to four counts of Hobbs Act robbery, one

count of conspiracy to commit the same, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm

in relation thereto. For the last of these offenses, he faced mandatory, consecutive terms

of seven and 25 years’ imprisonment under the version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) then in

effect, resulting in a guidelines range of 471 to 492 months. The District Court departed

from that range and sentenced him to 300 months in prison. Spivey did not appeal.

Spivey’s subsequent attempts to obtain relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were

unsuccessful. While those collateral proceedings were still underway, Spivey filed two

motions for compassionate release based largely upon the length of his sentence, the

purported inadequacy of dental care he received in prison, and his efforts toward

rehabilitation. The District Court separately denied both motions. Spivey appealed the

latter order, but the case was dismissed after he failed to file a brief. See United States v.

Spivey, C.A. No. 24-1713, Doc. 9 (3d Cir. Sept. 16. 2024) (order).

Spivey filed the underlying motion for compassionate release—his third—in May

2025, reiterating many of the arguments he raised in his prior motions. The District

Court again denied relief. To the extent Spivey relied upon changes to Section 924(c)

that would have resulted in a shorter sentence had they applied at the time of his

sentencing, the court explained that they “cannot be considered in the analysis of whether

2 extraordinary and compelling circumstances make a prisoner eligible for compassionate

release.” See ECF Doc. 360 at 2-3 (quoting United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360,

380 (3d Cir. 2024), affirmed, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1326 (2026)). Nor was the court

persuaded that Spivey’s “disadvantaged and misguided youth,” rehabilitation efforts, or

current conditions of confinement warranted a sentence reduction. See id. at 3-4. With

respect to Spivey’s health-related claims, the court gleaned from his medical records that

he generally is in good health and rarely seeks medical treatment; although Spivey

received dental care for cavities on several occasions, the court noted that he also

repeatedly has refused a dentist’s recommendation that one unsalvageable tooth be

extracted. See id. at 4. Lastly, the court found Spivey’s claim that he alone can serve as

caregiver to his middle-aged father as he undergoes treatment for cancer belied by the

sheer number of family and community members who have written on Spivey’s behalf.

See id.

Spivey timely sought reconsideration, “recapping” arguments relating to his

Section 924(c) conviction and highlighting previously submitted documentation

concerning his family members’ health difficulties and his own rehabilitation efforts and

“release plan.” See ECF Doc. 361 at 2-10. The District Court denied his motion without

further discussion. Spivey appealed, and the Government moved for summary

affirmance and to be excused from filing a brief. We held this matter in abeyance

pending the United States Supreme Court’s resolution of Rutherford v. United States, 608

U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1326 (2026), which asked “whether the sentencing disparity

created by Congress’s nonretroactive change to § 924(c)’s mandatory penalties can serve

3 as an ‘extraordinary and compelling reaso[n]’ that ‘warrant[s]’ a reduction.” The

Supreme Court has now clarified that it cannot. See id. Spivey concedes1 that

Rutherford forecloses one of his grounds for relief, but he maintains that other factors

independently justify his early release.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a District Court’s

order denying a motion for compassionate release for abuse of discretion and will not

disturb that decision unless the District Court “committed a clear error of judgment.”

United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Orders

denying reconsideration likewise are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States

v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann,

Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999)). We may summarily affirm a

District Court’s decision if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir.

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Spivey objects that the Government’s request is premature and that summary

action is not appropriate because he has not “had the opportunity to present issues and

supporting arguments in his opening brief.” See C.A. Doc. 10 at 4; see also C.A. Doc. 19

at 4-6 (reiterating demand for merits briefing). Spivey’s objections are misplaced. Our

Local Rules contemplate the summary resolution of appeals on a party’s motion or on the

Court’s own initiative. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(a). The rules also expressly provide that

1 In accordance with our abeyance order, the Government has addressed the impact of Rutherford on this case in a supplemental motion for summary affirmance. We grant Spivey’s motion to accept his response as timely filed.

4 such motions typically “should be filed before appellant’s brief is due.” 3d Cir. L.A.R.

27.4(b). “Before taking summary action, the court will afford the parties an opportunity

to submit argument in support of or in opposition to such disposition if briefs on the

merits have not already been filed.” 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. The Government has adhered to

our Local Rules in filing its motions. And Spivey twice has been afforded an opportunity

to submit argument in opposition to summary disposition; indeed, he has had more than

six months to “present th[e] issues” to which he vaguely refers. See C.A. Doc. 19 at 6.

That he has declined to respond to the Government’s initial and supplemental motions on

their merits is of no moment. We have carefully reviewed the record, and we conclude

that Spivey’s appeal does not present a substantial question.

A District Court may reduce a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) if,

inter alia, “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” In this case,

the District Court assessed the various grounds for relief proffered by Spivey—some for

the second or third time—and found them unavailing. In seeking reconsideration of that

decision, Spivey merely rehashed the same arguments and evidence he already had

presented to that court. We have identified no legal or factual error in the resolution of

Spivey’s latest compassionate release motion, and we discern no abuse of discretion in

the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we grant the Government’s

motions, and we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.