Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN, in which HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge, and WALD, BUCKLEY, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges, concur.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BUCKLEY.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG, in which STEPHEN F. WILLIAMS, SENTELLE, KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, join.
SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge:
Marcos Anderson appealed inter alia from four convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 & West Supp.1995) for using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug trafficking crime. A panel of our circuit rejected appellant’s challenge to the multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions. See United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 357, 359 (D.C.Cir.1994) (Panel Decision), vacated and reh’g en banc granted (D.C.Cir. Feb. 9,1995). Upon rehearing en banc, we reverse three of appellant’s § 924(c)(1) convictions.
I.
Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) (the conspiracy lasting more than six months); using a telephone to facilitate a drug transaction in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988); possession with intent to distribute cocaine and distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988); traveling interstate in aid of racketeering activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1988); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988); and four violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for carrying and using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense.
Each of Anderson’s four § 924(c)(1) convictions was tied to the same predicate offense, the narcotics conspiracy. Anderson’s first § 924(c)(1) charge and conviction was centered on a 9mm pistol; FBI agents seized the gun in February 1989 from two juveniles en route to Los Angeles, where (at Anderson’s direction) they were planning to rob a drug source. The second § 924(c)(1) conviction involved two guns connected to another abortive robbery attempt in March 1989, in which Anderson again sent a coconspirator to Los Angeles to rob a supplier (the guns were seized from the coconspirator). The third and fourth charges and convictions resulted from guns seized simultaneously at the time of Anderson’s arrest on May 16, 1989. The third focused on a Browning .380 semiautomatic pistol seized, along with crack cocaine, cocaine powder, drug paraphernalia, and $1,000 in $1 bills, at the time of Anderson’s arrest at his distribution center in Park Towers. The fourth § 924(c)(1) conviction was based on a 9mm semiautomatic pistol that was seized along with ammunition, [1325]*1325drug paraphernalia, and documents linking Anderson to the location, at the Woodner distribution center on the same day Anderson was arrested at the Park Towers. The later two charges and convictions thus involved simultaneous possession of weapons at two different locations.
Anderson argued on appeal that multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions could not be linked to only one underlying predicate offense. The government claimed that Anderson waived this argument below by failing to object to the indictment before trial or to his convictions and sentences on multiplicity grounds. The government argued that “[a] finding that appellant Anderson has waived his multiplicity objection is particularly appropriate since a timely objection before trial would have allowed the government to obtain a superseding indictment which linked at least two of the 924(c)(1) charges to separate predicate drug trafficking offenses.” The panel denied the appeal with regard to the multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions and sentences. See Panel Decision, 39 F.3d at 357. Rehearing en banc was granted on the limited issue of appellant’s multiple convictions for violations of § 924(c)(1).
II.
Appellant, supported by the court-appointed amicus, contends that he may only be convicted of one violation of § 924(c)(1) for using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime because, although the government charged Anderson with several separate predicate offenses, all four § 924(e)(1) charges were linked only to the conspiracy charge. In the paradigm case of a short duration drug distribution crime or crime of violence, it appears that the government rarely if ever asserts that a defendant carried or used a single gun more than once in relation to a single underlying offense — even if it could be argued that the “carries” or “uses” of the gun were separated in time and place. But cf. United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 988-89 (6th Cir.1994) (two guns brought to one drug sale; one count of possession with intent to distribute, two § 924(c)(1) counts). The dispute over the meaning of § 924(c)(1) more typically arises in cases where the government charges a drug trafficking conspiracy, as in this ease, or possession with intent to distribute — both lasting over a period of time. These sorts of cases often involve multiple guns. The government’s legal position is based on its premise that § 924(c)(1) is a separate crime, not just a penalty enhancement, and therefore it claims the conclusion follows that an unlimited number of § 924(c)(1) violations can be tied to any one drug trafficking crime or crime of violence. The perception of congressional purpose animating the government’s statutory construction is boldly presented in its brief: “[t]he underlying crime, per se, was not the focus of Congress’ concern but rather was used merely as the vehicle, or ‘hook,’ upon which Congress federalized the prohibition against the use and carrying of firearms.”
Amicus quarrels with the government’s premise and joins appellant in challenging the government’s conclusion. Amicus asserts that § 924(c)(1) is a sentence enhancement statute: therefore, the government is obliged not only to tie each alleged § 924(c)(1) violation to a separate predicate crime, but must also convict the defendant of the predicate crime before § 924(c)(1) would be chargeable.
Section § 924(e)(1) states in relevant part: Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, to imprisonment for ten years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to imprisonment for thirty years. In the case of his second or subsequent conviction un[1326]*1326der this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to life imprisonment without release____
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 & West Supp. 1995) (emphases added).1
Amicus, relying heavily on Judge Moore’s dissent in United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461, 1470 (10th Cir.1992) (en banc), presents a respectable argument for its position that § 924(c)(1) is only a penalty enhancement. We think, however, that the majority in Hill had thp better of the case. The majority acknowledged that “[a]t first glance, § 924(c)(1) appears to be a penalty enhancement statute,” id. at 1463, and that various courts have so characterized it. It noted, however, that the Supreme Court had described § 924(c) as creating “an offense distinct from the underlying felony” in Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 10, 98 S.Ct. 909, 912, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978), and that the structure of § 924(c) appears to make out a separate crime. See Hill, 971 F.2d at 1464. We, therefore, hold to our previous view that a § 924(c)(1) conviction stands on its own even if the defendant is acquitted of the underlying offense or the underlying offense is not charged, so long as the government presents sufficient evidence to prove the predicate offense as an element of the § 924(c)(1) violation. See United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 288-89 (D.C.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1069, 110 S.Ct. 1790, 108 L.Ed.2d 792 (1990). Nevertheless, we appreciate that in Simpson both the majority and Justice Rehnquist in dissent seemed to refer to § 924(c) as a penalty enhancement statute; in Deal v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1993, 124 L.Ed.2d 44 (1993), Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, did so again, at least indirectly. See Deal, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1997. Thus, it appears that the statute has a hybrid character, and so the government puts altogether too much weight on its premise.
In any event, the language of the statute does not appear to us to support the government’s conclusion — and certainly not to do so clearly. The crucial question, which has divided the circuits, is the meaning of the phrase “whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm.” The government contends that the statute has a “plain meaning,” and that the interpretive focus should be on the verb “uses” and not on the phrase “during and in relation to” or “crime of violence or drug trafficking crime.” But that grammatical argument is hardly decisive. Cf. Smith v. United States, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2056, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993), reh’g denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 13, 125 L.Ed.2d 765 (1994) (describing the “holistic endeavor” of statutory interpretation) (citations omitted). As one of our colleagues neatly put it at oral argument, the language of § 924(e)(1) can be interpreted in one of two ways: it may mean either that (1) “each time a defendant uses [or carries] a firearm in relation to a crime he commits a separate crime,” or (2) that “if during the course of a crime a defendant uses [or carries] a firearm at any time, he commits a separate crime.” The latter meaning implies that Congress was focusing on the defendant’s employment of a gun for the pmpose of bringing about the crime. In other words, the statute criminalizes the defendant’s advancement of his criminal ends by means of a gun, whether carried or deployed in some more active manner. If it is the latter meaning which Congress intended, of course, only one of appellant’s § 924(c)(1) convictions may stand.
The difficulty with the government’s emphasis on the word “uses” is that, as we have previously recognized, see United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 114-15 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc), cert. granted, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1689, 131 L.Ed.2d 554 (1995), the verb has varying meanings. See also Smith v. United States, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2057. The government’s position would be stronger if the statute employed “use” as a noun, such that “a use” of a gun in relation to a drug crime would be a violation of § 924(c)(1). It appears to us that the drafts[1327]*1327men were not employing the word “uses” to imply that each discrete act that might be called a “use” constitutes a separate crime. Certainly the statute’s pairing of “uses” with “carries” (a juxtaposition which, we note, the dissent essentially ignores) suggests that Congress was not seeking to criminalize every discrete deployment or brandishing of a gun during a period when a drug crime or crime of violence was being committed. “Carries” does not easily lend itself to a meaning that suggests a discrete act; rather, it implies a continuing activity, and the government’s brief concedes as much. Yet, if Congress did not intend a § 924(e)(1) violation to occur on each discrete occasion that a defendant carried a gun during an ongoing drug crime, it follows that Congress would not have intended each deployment or discrete act in the same context to be a separate “use.”
The machine gun clause in § 924(c)(1) also suggests that Congress had in mind the “if at any time” meaning of “uses.” The statute states, “and if the firearm is a machinegun, ... to imprisonment for thirty years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (emphasis added). The employment of the word “the” implies that Congress was thinking of the underlying drug crime or crime of violence whose character is irrevocably changed when the defendant uses or carries a gun. Congress spoke in terms of the word “the” because it did not regard as significant the number of times guns, or the number of guns that were carried or used during and in relation to the predicate crime. Once the defendant used or carried a gun, he violated § 924(c)(1), and if the gun was a machine gun, his penalty at first conviction was a full 30 years. If Congress had intended the “each time” meaning, it surely would have said, if “any such” firearm is a machine gun.
For that matter, if Congress had for a moment contemplated — or intended the prospect — that a defendant would be charged, as was appellant, with four § 924(c)(1) violations appended to one underlying drug crime, we think it virtually inconceivable that Congress would have used the language of § 924(c)(1). It would have been all too easy to have written the words “each time” or “on each occasion” in the section to make that meaning clear. We think it fair to say, therefore, that Congress would have employed the language it did only if it had the “if at any time” meaning in its collective mind. Ambiguities in legislative language typically occur when the draftsmen simply do not imagine the nature of a scenario that subsequently occurs. Accordingly, the most logical explanation of the exact language chosen for § 924(c)(1) is that Congress did not in any way foresee the ambiguity which occupies our attention here (perhaps because it did not contemplate application of the statute to an ongoing crime). And, this situation could arise only if Congress intended that a single defining instance where a defendant uses or carries would have legal significance.
Although the legislative history of § 924(c)(1) is sparse — the section was originally added as a floor amendment by Representative Poff — it is consistent with the “if at any time” meaning. It is simply not true, as the government argued, that Congress was merely seeking “a hook” on which to hang a federalized prohibition against the use and carrying of firearms. (If that were so, Congress would have criminalized the use of guns in relation to any federal crime, not just those involving drugs or violence — an approach it consciously rejected in drafting the legislation, see dissent at 1338-39 n. 3.) Representative Poffs views are “entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision’s sponsor.” Simpson, 435 U.S. at 13, 98 S.Ct. at 913. And he stated that his amendment “targets upon the mminal rather than the gun.” See 114 Cong.Rec. at 22,231 (1968) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Harsha said that “the emphasis should be, and we are in agreement, on the user of the weapon, rather than the weapon itself.” Id. at 22,234. Representative Poff also said that “[t]he prosecution for the basic felony and the prosecution under my substitute would constitute one proceeding out of which two separate penalties may grow,” id. at 22,232, which certainly suggests the “at any time” meaning rather than a multiple “each time” or “each occasion” interpretation. In the same vein, Poff remarked that the amendment was designed to “persuade the man who is tempted to commit a federal felony to [1328]*1328leave Ms gun at home.” Id. at 22,231. Accordingly, the complete § 924(c)(1) crime is committed — the persuasion fails — when the defendant brings the gun (carries it) or uses it in relation to an underlying drug trafficking or violent crime.
Section 924(c)(1) provides very serious penalties for repeated violations. The first conviction requires a five-year sentence, and the second and succeeding violations call for 20 years each. Under the government’s interpretation, then, three or four “uses” or “carries” during one underlying drug crime or crime of violence would, as a practical matter, bring a life sentence. If Congress had intended that result, we would of course honor the choice; but we think that if Congress had wished the statute to operate in that fasMon, it would have used language making it obvious. In that regard, Senator Mansfield, who sponsored an amendment to clarify that a second violation of § 924(c)(1) would result in a mandatory consecutive sentence, said:
[T]Ms bill provides for the first time a separate and additional penalty for the mere act of choosing to use or carry a gun in committing a crime under Federal law. If that choice is made more than once, the offender can in no way avoid a prison sentence regardless of the circumstances.
115 Cong.Rec. at 34,838 (Nov. 19, 1969) (emphasis added). That formulation of the statute’s purpose — to penalize the choice of using or carrying a gun in committing a crime— seems to us to imply that § 924(c)(1) pumshes one and oMy one crucial decision; in other words, the “at any time” meaning.2
Seven of our sister circuits have determined that only one § 924(c)(1) violation can be appended to any single predicate crime. See United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d 1187, 1189 (7th Cir.1994) (citing cases); United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 103, 126 L.Ed.2d 70 (1993); United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1414, 131 L.Ed.2d 299 (1995); United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 312 (10th Cir.1992); United States v. Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346 (11th Cir.1992); United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912, 112 S.Ct. 1279, 117 L.Ed.2d 505 (1992); United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th Cir.1988). Those courts have relied on two strands of analysis. The Sixth Circuit thought Congress’ intent clearly was to limit a § 924(c)(1)’s “umt of prosecution” to the underlying predicate offense. “The purpose of § 924(c)(1) ... is to target those defendants who chose to involve weapons in an underlying narcotics crime or crime of violence. Consequently, the predicate offense, not the firearm, is the object of § 924(c)(1).” Taylor, 13 F.3d at 993-94. The Second Circuit in Lindsay believed that at most (at best for the government) the statute was ambiguous as to the appropriate umt of prosecution, and therefore the rule of lemty was to be applied. Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 673-76.
The government, consistent with its assertion that Congress sought to “federalize the proMbition against the use and carrying of firearms” and that “the underlying crime per se was not the focus of Congress’ concern,” appears to have repeatedly targeted guns as the basis of violations of § 924(c)(1), charging one § 924(e)(1) violation for each gun attributable to the defendant even when the guns were carried or “used” in the same place and at the same time as other targeted guns. But in all of the above cases, the courts of appeals have reversed convictions charged on tMs basis, holding that one predicate crime supported only one § 924(c)(1) conviction,3 [1329]*1329and also requiring that the relationship be precisely stated.4
In perhaps the government’s most ambitious pursuit of guns qua guns, in Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 669, the defendant was convicted of two predicate offenses, a cocaine conspiracy and a CCE. He was also convicted of 14 § 924(c)(1) violations: two different guns were each discharged on separate occasions (each of the two had a silencer, leading to the more severe sentences under § 924(c)(1)), and five guns were found at various locations in the defendant’s home. See Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 672. These seven guns were claimed to have supported 14 convictions because each was allegedly linked to each of the two separate predicate crimes. The court of appeals reversed 12 of the 14 § 924(c)(1) convictions. See id. at 676.
The Eighth Circuit nevertheless in United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1222-23 (8th Cir.1991) rejected the gathering consensus among the circuits. It thought “distinct uses” of firearms were separate violations of § 924(e)(1) even when each was linked to the same predicate crime. In that case (similar to ours), when simultaneous searches . occurred at four locations where the defendants either lived or conducted drug sales, some guns and drugs were found at one house, and other guns, including a machine gun, were found at another location with drug paraphernalia. The court determined that the guns had separate purposes — to protect the different locations — and therefore concluded that these were different, separately chargeable “uses.” The court relied on Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) in holding that two drug sales were two separate offenses because they stemmed from “separate impulses.” See Lucas, 932 F.2d at 1223. The court thought the separate purposes of the guns “constituted separate ‘impulses’ in the Blockburger sense.” Id.
As Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678-79, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) made clear, however, whether common or separate impulses are criminalized is [1330]*1330strictly a matter of statutory interpretation.5 If, for example, Congress positively wished to make each and every gun possessed, carried, or deployed during the commission of an underlying drug crime or crime of violence the basis for a separate § 924(c)(1) violation, there would be no constitutional barrier to doing so. In that sense, the separate impulse (or separate transaction) limitation is quite artificial.
Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit, focusing on the word “a” in “uses or carries a firearm,” did go so far as to hold explicitly that each gun possessed created a separate and distinct § 924(c)(1) violation. See United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 390 (8th Cir.1991). The court flinched though from the sentencing implications of that holding, concluding that when multiple § 924(c)(1) violations arise from a single predicate offense, they are not “second or subsequent” convictions under the statute and thus do not carry the 20-year penalties. See Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 391. Later, however, in a slight refinement that appears to conflate the separate gun and separate “use” approaches, the court suggested that multiple guns involved in the commission of a drug crime, even when possessed simultaneously in the same house, could constitute separate § 924(e)(1) crimes if they could be thought to have “separate uses” in the sense of separate purposes. See United States v. Canterbury, 2 F.3d 305, 306 (8th Cir.1993). There the defendant was charged with one count of a conspiracy to possess and distribute drugs and two § 924(e)(1) violations. The police found a pistol in the defendant’s bedroom, along with a small quantity of drugs and a rifle in another part of the house near drugs and drug-trafficking paraphernalia. The district court dismissed one of the § 924(c)(1) counts, and the court of appeals reversed. The district court was instructed to hold a hearing to determine whether the government could show as a matter of fact that the rifle was intended for a separate “use” (presumably connected to the separate stash of drugs).
More recently, the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion that seems to depart from its circuit precedent, compare United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815, 112 S.Ct. 68, 116 L.Ed.2d 43 (1991), determined that § 924(c)(1) could be employed to provide multiple convictions based on one predicate crime. See United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102, 107 (4th Cir.1994), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 1118, 130 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1995). The defendant was charged with and convicted of eight separate § 924(c)(1) violations appended to a single underlying charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base. (He was, however, sentenced to 45-years’ imprisonment for the § 924(c)(1) violations as if he had only been convicted of three violations, one violation per event involving guns.) On December 23, several of the conspirators (although not Camps) fired guns at a rival drug dealer, and on January 6, two other conspirators again fired at a rival drug dealer. Two days later, the same group was seen passing a rifle in a van and was discovered in possession of several weapons. The government argued on appeal, as it has here, that multiple violations of § 924(c)(1) are made out “whenever there have been multiple, separate acts of firearm use or carriage, even when all of those acts relate to a single predicate offense.” Id. at 106. The government conceded, however, “and for purpose of this case only [the Fourth Circuit] accepted], that a defendant may not be punished multiple times for simultaneous firearm use or carriage.” Id. at 109 n. 9 (emphasis in original), citing cf. United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.1991). (In light of Canterbury, 2 F.3d at 306, it is not at all clear what the government means by “simultaneous.”) The Fourth Circuit thus upheld the § 924(c)(1) convictions as if there were only three violations rather than eight. It [1331]*1331disagreed with all circuits other than the Eighth based on its reasoning that § 924(c)(1) “does not criminalize the underlying predicate offense. Section 924(c)(1), rather proscribes, as a separate and distinct offense, the use or carry of a firearm during the commission of ... these predicate offenses.” Camps, 32 F.3d at 108, citing Simpson, 435 U.S. at 10, 98 S.Ct. at 911. Thus, “[t]o base a statute’s unit of prosecution on an offense that the statute does not prohibit is illogical....” Id. at 109, 98 S.Ct. at 911.
With due respect, we do not follow the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning. The underlying drug offense or crime of violence is already made a federal crime under another section of the federal code. To be sure, if § 924(c)(1) was merely a penalty enhancement — that did not apply unless and until a defendant was convicted of the main crime— these sorts of cases would not arise at all. But it is surely not illogical for Congress to make § 924(c)(1) a distinct crime tied to a predicate crime, and yet to treat it as a course of conduct or state of being armed. The result is that the government need not convict of — but it must prove — the predicate crime (which is why § 924(e)(1) has a hybrid character).
As is apparent, the government’s litigation position regarding the meaning and application of § 924(c)(1) is rather plastic. In various appeals, the government has adopted different positions to support somewhat different charging decisions in district courts. Before us, the government contends that § 924(c)(1) “permits multiple convictions and sentences for each separate use [apparently meaning a separate act] ... particularly in cases such as this, where the defendant has used a firearm (or different firearms) on different occasions for distinct purposes.” (emphasis added). The government does not exclude, as it did on appeal in Camps, simultaneous “uses” — presumably because here we do have two convictions of § 924(c)(1) attributable to the same moment in time (ie., the two seizures at the time of Anderson’s arrest). The third charge in this case, it will be recalled, was based on the presence of a Browning .380 semiautomatic pistol that was seized, along with drugs and money, at the Park Towers distribution center when Anderson was arrested. The police simultaneously seized a 9mm semiautomatic pistol with drug paraphernalia at the Woodner distribution center on the same street as Park Towers (16th Street, N.W. in Washington) along with documents linking Anderson to that location.6
It seems particularly anomalous for the government to assert that in a situation such as this, where a defendant is storing drugs with the intention of distributing at two locations, placing a gun at each location gives rise to separate § 924(c)(1) violations. After all, it has been held that possession is a continuous act, and that therefore the government may not charge two simultaneous counts of possession with intent to distribute based on two separate caches of drugs. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509, 513-14 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972, 98 S.Ct. 1614, 56 L.Ed.2d 64 (1978). The government has apparently acquiesced in that interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), but nevertheless claims that the simultaneous “use” by possession — in a strategic location — of guns at two,different locations gives rise to two separate § 924(c)(1) violations.
This anomaly helps to illustrate how awkward it would be to apply § 924(c)(1) to a host of circumstances if we accepted the government’s interpretation of the statute. As the dissent recognizes, see dissent at 1342, it would surely prove devilishly difficult analytically to determine on which occasions and in what circumstances during an ongoing conspiracy or a long-term possession with intent to distribute a defendant was guilty of another separate and distinct “use” or “carry.” Moreover, if we were to accept the [1332]*1332government’s argument — that in theory the number of distinct uses or carries that could be appended to an underlying predicate is infinite — it could and would be expected that the government would charge multiple violations of § 924(c)(1) with respect to almost any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. The dissent suggests that such violations could be limited to separate “impulses” or separate “transactions.” As we have noted, however, once it is accepted that Congress intended separate “uses” to be separate violations, the logic of Canterbury appears impeccable; so long as each gun possessed or carried can be said to have a separate purpose, each gun represents a different violation of § 924(c)(1). Thus a derringer hidden in one sleeve would presumably have a different purpose than a .357 Magnum carried in a shoulder holster.
Even assuming arguendo that the “separate transaction” limitation can be imposed as an interpretation of the Act,7 one can easily imagine that each separate display of a gun would be a separate § 924(c)(1) violation, and presumably each day a gun was carried would be one also. The government, ignoring the simultaneous possession of two guns in separate stashes in counts three and four, would focus our attention on the two separate events in counts one and two. It argues — and the dissent accepts, see dissent at 1341-42 — that we should not concern ourselves with the troubling implications of this proposed interpretation as it would apply in other cases; it is enough that in our ease two events are easily distinguishable. But we think it necessary to consider the analytical difficulties with the government’s approach for two reasons: first, because to do so casts light on Congress’ intent in employing the language before us; and second because it is the more principled approach. We are naturally reluctant to apply a rule of law that does not seem to extend very far beyond the facts of the case before us. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1175, 1177-79 (1989). Of course, if Congress intended us to apply § 924(c)(1) as the government suggests, we would have no alternative; but, as we observed swpra, we think that if Congress had contemplated convictions for multiple “uses” or “carries” during one ongoing drug crime or crime of violence, it would have composed language that would clearly indicate that intent and make its implementation easier.
The government (and the dissent) rely on early Supreme Court cases to support the argument that the word “uses” refers only to a discrete act, not to one of a continuing nature or (most relevantly) a conditional status. Compare In Re Snow, 120 U.S. 274, 281, 7 S.Ct. 556, 559, 30 L.Ed. 658 (1887) with In re Henry, 123 U.S. 372, 374, 8 S.Ct. 142, 143, 31 L.Ed. 174 (1887); see dissent at 1337. But the mail fraud statute interpreted in In re Henry makes it a crime to “place any letter or packet in any post office,” see 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988) (emphasis added), and therefore criminalizes each act of mailing a letter. See 123 U.S. at 374, 8 S.Ct. at 143. (“Each letter so ... put in constitutes a separate and distinctive violation of the act.”). If the statute had made it a crime to “use” the mails, it would be more analogous to this case — and would have surely been interpreted as forbidding a course of conduct. Similarly in Ebeling v. Morgan, 237 U.S. 625, 629, 35 S.Ct. 710, 711, 59 L.Ed. 1151 (1915), the defendant was held to have been properly convicted of six violations of a statute providing that “[w]hoever shall tear, cut, or otherwise injure any mail bag ... shall be fined,” even though he cut the six mailbags during the same criminal episode. The Court reasoned that “[although the transaction of cutting the mail bags was in a sense [1333]*1333continuous, the complete statutory offense was committed every time a mail bag was cut in the manner described, with the intent charged.” Id. Again, that statute referred to “any mailbag.”
Section 924(c)(1) differs significantly from those statutes in which the Supreme Court has distinguished a discrete act from a continuous one. In this statute, we have the added complexity of another act — the underlying drug crime or crime of violence to which a § 924(c)(1) violation is appended.8 (The statute in Ebeling would be analogous to this case if it read, “whoever cuts a mailbag during or in relation to a theft of mails commits a crime”; or, better yet, “whoever uses a knife during or in relation to cutting mailbags ... and if the weapon is a machete, he shall receive a 30 year sentence.”) Therefore, if Congress intended, as we think it did, the “at any time” meaning, it does not really matter whether “uses” or “carries” is susceptible of a discrete act interpretation. Even if one can imagine a distinct “use” or “carry,” if Congress intended us to ask only whether the defendant at any time used or carried a firearm in relation to the underlying predicate crime, § 924(c)(1) is properly interpreted without regard to this consideration.
We are led, then, to the ultimate conclusion that at a very minimum, § 924(c)(1) is ambiguous. The rule of lenity must, therefore, govern application of the statute. See United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 452-53 (D.C.Cir.1989); Lindsay, 985 F.2d at 678; United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1317 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, 102 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988) (citations omitted). As Justice Frankfurter once elegantly put it:
It is not to be denied that argumentative skill, as was shown at the Bar, could persuasively and not unreasonably reach either of the conflicting constructions. About only one aspect of the problem can one be dogmatic. When Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing it— when it has the will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity. And this not out of any sentimental consideration, or for want of sympathy with the purpose of Congress in proscribing evil or antisocial conduct. It may fairly be said to be a presupposition of our law to resolve doubts in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsher punishment____
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955).
The government and the dissent nevertheless argue that to interpret the statute as we do is to ascribe to Congress the illogical (“it borders on the absurd,” dissent at 1339) purpose of permitting “every use after the first use [to be] a free use.” This argument assumes its conclusion; it defines “uses” (significantly, it avoids the word “carries,”) as referring to a distinct act — the “every time” meaning — and then asks the circular question why would Congress not want to punish “a use” every time. We think that Congress’ explicit concern for disincentives — through punishment of second and subsequent violations with 20-year sentences each — rather suggests that if Congress had wished the statute to be interpreted as the dissent has done, it would have indicated so clearly.9
Unless the government wishes to retain the option to seek a de facto life imprisonment penalty in many routine drug cases by simply charging § 924(c)(1) violations based on the number of guns involved, the practical [1334]*1334significance of the “at any time” interpretation may not be great. Cf. United States v. Cappas, 29 F.3d at 1190 (government concession of ease of charging multiple § 924(c)(1) counts tied to separate crimes). In circumstances in which a defendant displays or fires a gun on separate and distinct occasions, the government will often be able to charge those acts as separate § 924(c)(1) violations linked to separate predicate offenses. Indeed, it is likely that the more distinctive is the particular “use or carry,” the easier that will be. As we noted earlier, in this very ease the government argued before the panel that “a finding that appellant Anderson has waived his multiplicity objection is particularly appropriate since a timely objection before trial would have allowed the government to obtain a superseding indictment which linked at least two of the § 924(c) charges to separate drug offenses.” (emphasis added). And government counsel at oral argument before the en banc court frankly admitted that “I don’t disagree that in many cases, if not most, we could charge a separate predicate per gun use.”
Further, at oral argument, counsel for the government agreed that appellant’s separate § 924(c)(1) charges could have been readily tied to (1) the conspiracy, (2) the Park Towers possession with intent to distribute count, and (3) Travel Act charges (or a similar inchoate, interstate crime of violence) for the robbery attempts (government counsel stated that he “didn’t know why we didn’t charge [Travel Act violations] in this case,” which would have provided additional predicates to which to tie the attempted robbery “uses”). See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988); cf. United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d at 379 (holding that offense of traveling or causing another to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit murder is a “crime of violence” for purposes of § 924(c)(1)).
Depending then on just how extensive and pervasive is the government’s concession in Camps concerning multiple guns, obliging the government to tie a § 924(c)(1) charge to a specific predicate crime may not prevent the government’s use of that section to seek quite extensive penalties.
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Whatever the practical implications, however, we agree with the Second Circuit that, at minimum, the statute is quite ambiguous with respect to the issue before us. Accordingly, we hold that only one § 924(c)(1) violation may be charged in relation to one predicate crime.