United States v. Manzo

279 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14795, 2003 WL 22015957
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Jersey
DecidedAugust 1, 2003
DocketCivil Action 97-289 (MLC)
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 279 F. Supp. 2d 558 (United States v. Manzo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Jersey primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Manzo, 279 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14795, 2003 WL 22015957 (D.N.J. 2003).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COOPER, District Judge.

The United States (“the Government”) brought this now-consolidated action under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. *561 § 9607(a) to recover response costs in connection with the alleged release or threatened release of hazardous substances at the Burnt Fly Bog Superfund Site (“the Site”). 1 (CompLIffl 1, 7.) In a Memorandum Opinion filed December 29, 2000 (“the Liability Opinion”) we held, inter alia, that (1)defendants Dominick and Carmella Manzo, who are husband and wife (collectively “the Manzos”), are liable parties as owners of a vessel or facility within the meaning of CERCLA; and (2) defendant Ace Manzo, Inc. (“Ace Manzo”) is a liable party as a transporter within the meaning of CERCLA. 2 United States v. Manzo, 182 F.Supp.2d 385, 397-99 (D.N.J.2000).

The Court further held that genuine issues of fact existed as to whether the harm was divisible among the Manzo defendants and other individuals causing harm at the Site. Id. at 404-05. We held a bench trial from June 11 through 14 and 24 through 25, 2002 to decide this issue. {See Trs. dated 6-11-02,10:34 a.m. (“1st Tr.”), 6-11-02, 3:30 p.m. (“2d Tr.”), 6-12-02 (“3d Tr.”), 6-13-02 (“4th Tr.”), 6-14-02 (“5th Tr”), 6-24-02 (“6th Tr”), & 6-25-02 (“7th Tr.”).) Thereafter, the parties submitted post-hearing briefs and we conducted oral argument. For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the Manzo defendants have not proven divisibility and, therefore, are jointly and severally liable for the response costs sought by the Government. 3

I. BACKGROUND: Legal Background; Factual Background; and Relevant Procedural History

A. Legal Background

The Court has jurisdiction over this action. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345; 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(b). CERCLA authorizes the Government to undertake removal or remedial actions and then seek reimbursement from certain hable parties. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9607. Liable parties under CERCLA include:

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance

*562 Id. § 9607(a). Once a defendant is shown to be a liable party under this statute, the defendant is jointly and severally liable for all the Government’s response costs, absent proof by the defendant of divisibility. See, e.g., New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir.1997).

A defendant asserting divisibility must meet the difficult burden of proving either that (1) there are distinct harms; or (2) in the event of a single harm, “the harm is divisible and that the damages are capable of some reasonable apportionment.” United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270 (3d Cir.1992); see Hatco Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 836 F.Supp. 1049, 1087 (D.N.J.1993). 4 In other words, the defendant must prove that “there is a way to determine what portion of the harm (i.e. the hazardous substances present at the facility and the response costs incurred in dealing with them) is fairly attributable to the defendant as opposed to other responsible parties.” United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1280 (3d Cir.1993). Equitable considerations, while potentially relevant in a contribution action by a defendant against other responsible parties, are not pertinent to the divisibility inquiry. Id. at 1280-81.

B. Factual Background

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“the EPA”) and the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (“the NJDEP”) conducted investigations of the Site, beginning in 1979. Manzo, 182 F.Supp.2d at 390. These investigations revealed hazardous substances including but not limited to polychlorinated bi-phenyls (“PCBs”), lead, methylene chloride, trichloroethylene, chloroform, and benzene. Id. The EPA and the State of New Jersey then entered into a cooperative agreement to coordinate response actions. Id. at 391. They divided the Site into different areas including the: (1) Uplands, (2) Northerly Wetlands, (3) Tar Patch, 5 (4) Westerly Wetlands, and (5) Downstream Area. Id.

Seven waste oil lagoons (“the Lagoons”), a filter-clay pile, 6 and over one hundred drums for waste storage were located on the Uplands. Id. at 389. (7th Tr., Video Dep. of Martin Smith (“Smith”) at 147.) EPA and NJDEP investigations revealed extensive PCB and lead contamination in the Uplands, including the Lagoons. Id. at 391. The Northerly Wetlands, Tar Patch, Westerly Wetlands, and Downstream Area are down gradient from the Uplands; contamination in these areas has resulted, at least in part, from uncontrolled runoff and discharges from the Uplands. Id.

The EPA and NJDEP have divided the Site remediation into three separate operable units, “OU1,” “OU2,” and “OU3,” each addressing a unique series of remedial actions. 7 Id. Separate records of decision, *563

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279 F. Supp. 2d 558, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14795, 2003 WL 22015957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-manzo-njd-2003.