United States v. Madison

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: 24-1477
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1477 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 15, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 24-1477 (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00240-PAB-2) ALVIN MADISON, (D. Colo.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before HARTZ, Circuit Judge, LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. _________________________________

A jury convicted Alvin Madison of possession of a firearm by a prohibited

person in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced

Mr. Madison to 92 months’ imprisonment. Initially, the government indicated via

superseding indictment that it intended to seek enhanced sentencing penalties under

the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), based on

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1477 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 2

Mr. Madison’s prior Colorado convictions for attempted second degree murder,

felony menacing, and aggravated robbery. But, in United States v. Venjohn,

104 F.4th 179, 185-86 (10th Cir. 2024), a panel of this court concluded “Colorado

felony menacing can no longer be considered categorically a . . . crime of violence”

eligible for enhanced sentencing penalties (internal quotation marks omitted). 1 So,

after Venjohn, the government agreed “the ACCA enhanced penalties no longer apply

to [Mr. Madison],” R. vol. 1 at 553 n.1, and the district court did not apply the

enhancement in calculating his sentence.

Mr. Madison appeals from his conviction and sentence. We have jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Mr. Madison’s counsel has filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California¸ 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) expressing her

belief that any appeal would be wholly frivolous and moving to withdraw.

Mr. Madison, pro se, filed a responsive pleading to lay out his objections to counsel’s

Anders brief, and counsel filed a supplemental Anders brief addressing those

objections.

Counsel’s initial and supplemental Anders briefs addressed, in thorough detail,

eleven potential issues with Mr. Madison’s conviction and sentence. In his response,

Mr. Madison primarily focuses on the effectiveness of his trial counsel in pretrial

plea negotiations. But whatever the merits of these arguments, Mr. Madison’s

1 Venjohn construed a sentencing guideline, § 4B1.2(a)(1), see Venjohn, 104 F.4th at 185-86, which defines “crime of violence” identically to § 924(e)(2)(B)’s definition of “violent felony.” See United States v. Moyer, 282 F.3d 1311, 1315 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002).

2 Appellate Case: 24-1477 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 01/15/2026 Page: 3

ineffective assistance claims “should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on

direct appeal.” United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995); see

also id. (“Such claims brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and

virtually all will be dismissed.”). We therefore do not address the merits of

Mr. Madison’s ineffective-assistance claims now on direct appeal.

We have carefully considered each of the other potential issues discussed in

counsel’s Anders brief and Mr. Madison’s pro se response and conducted “a full

examination of all the proceedings,” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Mr. Madison was tried

timely in compliance with the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, and he did not

move for dismissal on the basis of a violation of that statute so he has waived

appellate review on that basis in any event. See § 3162(a)(2); United States v.

Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515, 1519-20 (10th Cir. 1995) (declining to review unpreserved

claim of Speedy Trial Act violation even for plain error).

Mr. Madison moved for sanctions against the government for inadequate

disclosures under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, but the court ultimately ordered production of

some of the evidence and there is no indication in the record that the untimeliness of

any disclosure prejudiced Mr. Madison’s defense. So, there is no non-frivolous basis

to argue the district court abused its discretion in handling pretrial discovery issues.

See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1261-62 (10th Cir. 1999) (setting

abuse-of-discretion as standard of review for pretrial disclosure issues and noting that

“[f]requently it will be found that the party who requested disclosure has not been

prejudiced and that no sanction is needed.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Sufficient evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the government,

Charley, 189 F.3d at 1272, existed to support Mr. Madison’s conviction for a

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He stipulated to his prior felony conviction and

to the firearm being in or affecting interstate commerce, and police found the firearm

(a Glock pistol) in his jacket pocket, so a reasonable juror could conclude he knew he

possessed it.

And, we have upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g) against Second

Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges in United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d

1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Vincent v. Bondi, 127 F.4th 1263, 1264-65

(10th Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 12, 2025) (No. 24-1155)

(affirming continued validity of McCane after recent Supreme Court decision in

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)).

Finally, there is nothing in the record suggesting unreasonableness in the

district court’s sentence, which was within the applicable Sentencing Guidelines

range. See United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e

presume that a sentence within the properly calculated guidelines range is

reasonable.”).

So the record reveals no non-frivolous basis to appeal on the basis of the

timeliness of the charge, the prosecution’s pretrial disclosures, the sufficiency of the

evidence, the constitutionality of the statute of conviction, the reasonableness of the

resulting sentence, or any other grounds. We agree with counsel that it would be

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frivolous to pursue this appeal. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and we

dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge