F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS April 10, 2007 TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 06-3232 v. D. Kansas JOSE M ACIAS, (D.C. Nos. 04-CV-3051-JAR & 02-CR-40089-JAR) Defendant - Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY A N D DISM ISSING APPEAL
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Jose M acias, a federal prisoner proceeding in form a pauperis (ifp), filed a
pro se motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After appointing counsel
and holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. It also
denied M acias’ subsequent request for a certificate of appealability (COA). M acias, still represented by counsel, has renewed his request for a COA in this
Court. Because M acias failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right,” see 28 U .S.C. § 2253(c)(2), we deny his request for a COA
and dismiss the application.
I. Background
On July 17, 2002, M acias was indicted for (1) possession of approximately
503 grams of methamphetamine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Count I), (2) possession of three firearms in furtherance of
a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (Count II), (3)
possession of approximately five kilograms of marijuana with intent to distribute
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (Count III), (4) possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A), (C) (Count IV) and (5) possession of a firearm with a removed,
obliterated or altered serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (Count V).
M acias retained Henry Boaten to represent him. On November 4, 2002, he pled
guilty to Counts I-III and V . By accepting a plea agreement and pleading guilty,
M acias avoided the possibility of a mandatory consecutive 25 year sentence on
C ount IV . See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C).
According to the plea agreement, in exchange for M acias’ guilty plea to
Counts I-III and V, the government agreed to recommend a three-level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. This obligation was contingent on
-2- M acias’ “continuing manifestation of acceptance of responsibility.” 1 (R. Vol. 1,
Doc. 31, Plea Agreement at 3.) The government also agreed not to seek an
upward departure. For his part, M acias agreed not to file a motion for downward
departure. He also waived his appellate and post-conviction rights but reserved
the right to appeal, directly or collaterally, “(1) an upward departure by the
sentencing judge; (2) a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; or (3) a
sentence in violation of law apart from the Sentencing Guidelines.” (Id. at 5.)
A presentence investigation report (PSR ) was prepared. 2 Based upon
1,007.81 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, M acias’ base offense level w as 32.
See USSG §2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(4). The probation officer recommended a two-level
enhancement for possession of a firearm (USSG §2D1.1(b)(1)) and a three-level
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility (USSG §3E1.1), resulting
1 Specifically, the plea agreement provided:
The Government will recom mend that defendant receive a three-level adjustment for acceptance of responsibility; however, the government’s obligation to recommend acceptance of responsibility pursuant to this plea agreement is contingent upon the defendant’s continuing manifestation of acceptance of responsibility. Should the defendant deny his involvement, give conflicting statements as to his involvement or engage in additional criminal conduct, including, but not limited to, personal use of a controlled substance, the government shall not be bound to recommend acceptance of responsibility.
(R . Vol. 1, Doc. 31, Plea Agreement at 3.) 2 Because M acias was sentenced pursuant to the 2002 edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines M anual, all guideline citations refer to the 2002 edition, unless otherwise indicated.
-3- in a total offense level of 31. W ith a criminal history category of I, the guideline
range of imprisonment on Counts I, III and V was 108-135 months. However, the
guideline range for Counts III and V was limited to 60 months, the statutory
maximum. The guideline range for Count II was 60 months (the statutory
minimum), to run consecutive to the terms of imprisonment imposed on Counts I,
III and V. See USSG §2K2.4(b).
The government objected to the three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility, arguing inter alia M acias’ statement regarding
acceptance of responsibility minimized his conduct and failed to address the
elements of the crimes to which he pled guilty. W hile M acias’ statement
admitted he kept a bag of methamphetamine for someone else and officers found
drugs and guns in his house, it did not admit he possessed (1) any of the drugs
with intent to distribute, (2) any of the firearms in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking offense or (3) a firearm with an obliterated serial number. 3 M acias
3 Specifically, M acias’ attorney provided the following written statement to the probation officer:
I have lived at 1801 S.E. Hudson for about two months before the arrest. The house was rented to me by Antonio Beltran. Earlier on July 12, 2002, an individual by the name of “Cholo” or M artin, brought a black duffel or gym bag containing the controlled substance for me to keep. He was supposed to come back and pick it up.
On or about 19th and Hudson I was stopped by Topeka Police Officers who inquired about drugs in the vehicle I w as driving. I told them there were tw o joints in the ashtray. The officers seized the drugs and escorted me back to my house where police officers conducted a search
-4- responded, arguing he pled guilty to the elements of his offenses at the change of
plea hearing, his statement to the probation officer was clear and unequivocal in
that he admitted to possessing the drugs and weapons which formed the basis for
the charges against him and the fact he did not elaborate on the facts in his
statement did not mean he was not accepting responsibility for his actions. 4
M acias also moved, despite recognizing his plea agreement obligation not
and found additional drugs and w eapons.
(R . Vol. 6 at 9 (quotations omitted).) 4 In his COA application to this Court, M acias suggests, without raising it as an issue, that the government’s failure to recommend an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility constituted a breach of the plea agreement. M acias never raised this issue with the district court, even as a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and does not specifically raise it as an issue in his present request for a COA. Therefore, we need not consider it. Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999); Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 720 (10th Cir. 1993). W ere we to address the issue, we would find no breach. To determine whether the government breached a plea agreement, we “1) examine the nature of the promise; and 2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the promise at the time of the guilty plea.” U nited States v. Rodriguez-Delma, 456 F.3d 1246, 1250 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1338 (2007). “General principles of contract law define the government’s obligations under the agreement, looking to the express language and construing any ambiguities against the government as the drafter of the agreement.” Id. at 1250-51 (quotations omitted). The government’s obligation to recommend an acceptance of responsibility adjustment was contingent on M acias’ continuing manifestation of acceptance of responsibility. Charitably considered, M acias’ statement to the probation officer grossly minimizes his involvement; objectively considered, it amounts to an outright denial of responsibility. The government did not consider it a continuing manifestation of acceptance of responsibility; the probation officer agreed, as did the district court, as do we.
-5- to, for a downward departure under USSG §5K2.0 based on the fact he had agreed
and tried to assist the government but it refused to talk with him. The
government argued such motion violated the plea agreement. It also alleged
M acias had two opportunities (at the time of his arrest and after his first
appearance) to provide substantial assistance to the government but refused. Only
after M acias’ motion to suppress was denied did he attempt to come forward with
information. By that time, law enforcement officers had obtained the information
they sought from M acias from other sources.
In response to the parties’ objections, the probation officer amended the
presentence report to eliminate the three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility. The officer also recommended denying M acias’
motion for downward departure. Under the amended PSR, M acias’ base offense
level was 34, resulting in a guideline range of 151-188 months imprisonment for
Count I. The recommendations for Counts II, III and V remained the same. The
district court adopted the probation officer’s new recommendations and sentenced
M acias to a total of 211 months. M acias did not file a direct appeal.
On February 12, 2004, M acias filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside or
correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged his trial counsel was
ineffective at the motion to suppress and sentencing hearings. 5 On September 7,
5 Specifically, M acias alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) subpoena a witness for the motion to suppress hearing, (2) allow him to explain for acceptance of responsibility purposes that he considered the small baggies of
-6- 2004, M acias sought leave to amend/supplement his § 2255 motion to include an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure to timely
file a notice of appeal as promised and to consult with him after his sentencing
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal. In response, the
government argued to the extent M acias’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims
did not relate to the validity of the plea or the plea agreement’s waiver provision,
they were barred by the w aiver. To the extent the w aiver did not bar M acias’
claims, the government asserted they were without merit. The district court
concluded an evidentiary hearing was necessary on the limited issue of whether
M acias’ counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal and
appointed counsel for M acias. See Rule 8(c) of the Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings for the U nited States District Courts.
On M arch 6 and 27, 2006, the district court conducted an evidentiary
hearing at which M acias, his mother and Boaten testified. On April 12, 2006, the
court issued an order denying M acias’ § 2255 motion. It concluded M acias’
ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning counsel’s performance at the
motion to suppress and sentencing hearings fell within the plea agreement’s
waiver provision. As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
methamphetamine found in his house unmarketable and that he did not consider the duffel bag of marijuana to be his property, and (3) object to (a) the separation of the possession of marijuana and methamphetamine charges in the indictment, (b) the consideration of drugs which were not intended to be distributed into the calculation of his sentence and (c) the firearm enhancement under USSG §2D1.1.
-7- counsel’s failure to file a notice of appeal, the court determined Boaten was not
ineffective because M acias never asked Boaten to file an appeal and Boaten
neither ignored a request to file an appeal nor proposed to file an appeal on
M acias’ behalf. 6
Thereafter, M acias filed a notice of appeal and a request for a COA limited
to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal. 7 H e
alleged the court failed to consider w hether Boaten was ineffective for failing to
consult with him after his sentencing concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of an appeal. The court denied M acias’ request for a COA. In
doing so, it considered and rejected the failure to consult argument, finding
Boaten had consulted with M acias about an appeal. M acias renews his request for
a COA with this Court.
II. Discussion
A COA is a jurisdictional pre-requisite to our review. M iller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U .S. 322, 336 (2003). W e will issue a COA only if M acias makes a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
6 The district court construed M acias’ § 2255 motion to include a claim that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). It concluded the claim was w ithout merit because neither Blakely nor United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), apply retroactively to initial motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. M acias does not seek a COA on this issue. 7 In his COA request, M acias conceded his ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning counsel’s performance at the motion to suppress and sentencing hearings were barred by the plea agreement’s waiver provision.
-8- 2253(c)(2). To make this showing, he must establish that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved [by the district
court] in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(quotations omitted).
A plea agreement waiver of post-conviction rights is “generally enforceable
where the waiver is expressly stated in the [] agreement and where both the plea
and the waiver w ere knowingly and voluntarily made.” United States v.
Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001). Exceptions to the general rule
include “where the agreement was involuntary or unknowing, where the court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race, or where the agreement is
otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1182-83. M oreover, “a plea agreement waiver of
postconviction rights does not waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on
ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging the validity of the plea or the
waiver. Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
are characterized as falling outside that category are waivable.” Id. at 1187.
M acias’ COA application is limited to arguing the district court erred in
finding Boaten was not ineffective for failing to consult with him after sentencing
concerning the advantages and disadvantages of an appeal. The district court
found this claim survived the plea agreement waiver of post-conviction rights and
addressed its merits. However, because this claim falls within the scope of the
-9- plea agreement’s waiver provision and does not relate to the validity of the plea
or w aiver, it too is barred. Id. at 1187; see also United States v. Davis, No. 06-
3289, 2007 W L 588326, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 2007) (unpublished). 8 In any
event, it is without merit. 9
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that (1)
“counsel’s performance was deficient” and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
“[A] defendant who explicitly tells his attorney not to file an appeal plainly
cannot later complain that, by following his instructions, his counsel performed
deficiently.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000). On the other hand,
8 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent. W e mention Davis only because of its persuasive value. See 10 TH C IR . R. A PP . P. 32.1(A). 9 In United States v. Garrett, Garrett’s plea agreement contained a waiver of appeal. 402 F.3d 1262, 1263 (10th Cir. 2005). In his § 2255 motion, he argued his counsel was ineffective for failing to file an appeal despite being requested to do so. The district court dismissed the claim without an evidentiary hearing, concluding the attorney could not be faulted for failing to file an appeal when Garrett had expressly waived his appellate rights. W e concluded the court should have conducted a hearing to determine whether Garrett had requested counsel to file an appeal. Id. at 1266-67. In a footnote, we noted Garrett’s plea agreement also contained a waiver of his right to collaterally challenge his guilty plea or sentence. Id. at 1266 n.5. However, we did not enforce that waiver because (1) the government had not argued the waiver barred Garrett’s § 2255 motion based on counsel’s failure to file an appeal and (2) the plain language of the waiver did not address the claim. Id. Here, the government raised the waiver issue. W e are satisfied the plea agreement permissibly waived M acias’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s alleged failure to consult. The district court seems to have read Garrett differently and addressed the merits. Its merits analysis, while unnecessary, was correct.
-10- “a lawyer who disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file a notice
of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally unreasonable.” Id. In such
circumstances, the defendant is entitled to a new appeal, regardless of whether
such appeal would have merit. Garrett, 402 F.3d at 1265.
Even when a defendant neither instructs counsel to file an appeal nor
requests that an appeal not be taken, counsel may be still be ineffective for failing
to file an appeal if he did not consult w ith the defendant about an appeal, i.e., if
he failed to “advis[e] the defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of
taking an appeal” and “mak[e] a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s
wishes.” Roe, 528 U.S. at 478. “[C]ounsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to
consult with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1)
that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are
nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably
demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing.” Id. at 480. In
making this determination, relevant factors include “whether the conviction
follows a trial or guilty plea” (“because a guilty plea reduces the scope of
potentially appealable issues and . . . may indicate that the defendant seeks an end
to judicial proceedings”), “whether the defendant received the sentence bargained
for as part of the plea” and “whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some
or all appeal rights.” Id. In this case, the district court found (1) M acias did not
ask Boaten to file an appeal and (2) Boaten did not ignore a request to file an
-11- appeal or propose that an appeal be filed. These findings are not clearly
erroneous. United States v. M ora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2002) (“In
reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, we review for clear error the district
court’s factual findings, and we review legal conclusions de novo.”).
At the evidentiary hearing, M acias testified that immediately following his
sentencing hearing, he met with Boaten, who informed M acias he did not agree
with the sentence and stated they had one to two years to appeal it. M acias’
mother testified she spoke with Boaten after the sentencing hearing, using her
daughter as an interpreter. She asked Boaten what they could do and Boaten
responded they could appeal “within a year, three.” (R. Vol. 4 at 22.) Boaten
testified he visited with M acias concerning an appeal prior to his entering into the
plea agreement. He informed M acias that if he pled guilty and received a lawful
sentence, he could not appeal his conviction or sentence. After weighing the pros
and cons, M acias decided to plead guilty. Boaten also testified he did not recall
speaking with M acias about an appeal after sentencing, but he never informed
M acias he would be filing an appeal nor did M acias direct him to. He could not
recall any conversation with M acias’ mother or sister.
W hile the testimony was conflicting, the district court resolved the conflict
in favor of Boaten. This finding is entitled to deference. See Nat’l Refining Co.
v. Wagner, 169 F.2d 43, 45 (10th Cir. 1948) (credibility of witnesses and weight
to be given their testimony are questions for the trial court; a trial judge observes
-12- the witnesses w hile testifying and is in a better position to judge their credibility
than is this Court). It is also adequately supported. As the court noted, M acias
has never claimed he explicitly asked Boaten to file an appeal. His claim has
always been that Boaten was particularly upset with the court’s denial of a three-
level downward departure for acceptance of responsibility, and told M acias he
would file an appeal but failed to do so. However, Boaten testified he explained
to M acias that if he chose to plead guilty, he would not be able to appeal. That is
why Boaten never discussed an appeal with M acias after sentencing — he knew
M acias had waived his right to appeal except in limited circumstances, none of
which applied. Further, both M acias and his mother testified Boaten told them
they had several years to file an appeal, which is not the applicable deadline
thereby calling the veracity of their testimony into question. Because M acias
never requested an appeal and Boaten never proposed filing an appeal, Boaten
was not ineffective for failing to file an appeal.
W ith regard to the duty to consult, however, we conclude the district court
erred in finding Boaten consulted with M acias about an appeal after sentencing.
In support of this finding, the court stated: (1) under Roe, a finding that counsel
did not fail to follow the defendant’s express instructions with respect to an
appeal subsumes a finding that counsel consulted with the defendant, (2) Boaten
testified he spoke with M acias about how a guilty plea affected his right to appeal
his sentencing and (3) M acias’ testimony that he asked Boaten to file a notice of
-13- appeal necessarily suggests that Boaten consulted with him about an appeal. The
court’s finding is not supported by the record. W hile Boaten testified he
discussed with M acias the effect of a guilty plea on his appellate rights, there is
no evidence Boaten consulted with M acias after the sentencing hearing about the
advantages and disadvantages of an appeal. Indeed, Boaten testified he did not
recall talking to M acias about an appeal after the sentencing hearing. M oreover,
M acias never testified he asked Boaten to file an appeal; his claim has always
been that Boaten proposed filing an appeal on M acias’ behalf. Lastly, a finding
that Boaten did not fail to follow M acias’ express instructions with respect to an
appeal does not support an assumption that Boaten consulted with M acias’ about
an appeal, especially when the attorney concedes he did not consult with the
defendant. Even when a defendant does not instruct counsel to file an appeal,
counsel may be ineffective for failing to file an appeal if counsel had a duty to
consult w ith the defendant about an appeal and did not do so. Roe, 528 U.S. at
478.
Despite the court’s error, we conclude Boaten’s failure to consult was not
constitutionally ineffective because there was no duty to consult in this case.
M acias’ conviction followed a guilty plea and he received the bargained-for
sentence. Although he did not receive the three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility, this portion of the “bargain” was contingent on
M acias continuing to manifest an acceptance of responsibility, which he failed to
-14- do. W hile M acias may have “lost” on the acceptance of responsibility reduction,
he “gained” twenty-five years by entering into the plea agreement. He also
waived the right to appeal his sentence except in limited circumstances, none of
which occurred. These facts demonstrate Boaten had no reason to believe a
rational defendant would want to appeal and, more specifically, that M acias
would be interested in appealing the sentence he “bargained” for.
Although the district court unnecessarily addressed issues raised by M acias,
it did so correctly. Its denial of his § 2255 motion is not reasonably debatable.
Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. W e DENY M acias’ request for a COA and DISM ISS the
application.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge
-15-