United States v. Lubbock Independent School District

455 F. Supp. 1223, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19907
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedJanuary 27, 1978
DocketCiv. A. CA-5-806
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 455 F. Supp. 1223 (United States v. Lubbock Independent School District) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Lubbock Independent School District, 455 F. Supp. 1223, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19907 (N.D. Tex. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WOODWARD, Chief Judge.

This suit was initially commenced on August 19,1970 by the United States of America as plaintiff against the Lubbock Independent School District, its superintendent, members of its board of trustees, and others. Under mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit the matters in controversy were scheduled for trial in August of 1970 in order that a determination could be made by the court as to whether or not relief should be ordered, and if so, the extent thereof, prior to the opening of school some ten days to two weeks after the trial. After considering the evidence and argument of counsel at the August 1970 hearing the court entered its memorandum opinion on August 25, 1970, and the remedies ordered by the court were implemented by action of the Lubbock Independent School District (LISD) at the commencement of the 1970-71 school year. The court’s order in 1970 changed the boundary lines for Dunbar High School and Struggs Junior High School (both previously all Black) with the expectation that the boundary line changes would integrate these two all Black schools. The previous order of the court did not give all of the relief prayed for by plaintiff but there was no appeal and the school system has been operated in accordance with this order up until the present time.

In the spring of 1977 the LISD was authorized by a vote of the residents of the district to issue $11.9 million dollars in tax bonds for new construction. Phase I was to expend $6 million dollars for the construction of three new elementary schools in the south and southwest portions of the district, for the purchase of nine additional relocatable classrooms, for extracurricular facilities and equipment for women’s participation in athletics, and for substantial classroom additions to the Parkway, Jackson, and Arnett Elementary Schools. In Phase II the construction of another elementary school in the northwest part of the district and a junior high school in the southwest part of the district was authorized. These new schools were to be built on sites that had been previously purchased by the Board and held by it for such purposes.

LISD applied to this court for approval of such construction in view of the court’s retention of jurisdiction over this matter by its 1970 order. Notice was given to plaintiff and the United States of America *1225 thereupon filed its opposition to the proposed construction and further applied to the court for supplemental relief on the grounds that the order of the court in 1970 did not accomplish that which had been contemplated and that LISD had not been converted to a fully integrated school system.

By stipulation of the parties the trial of the case was continued until the November term of this court with the agreement that neither party would seek enforcement of any additional orders from this court until the commencement of the 1978-79 school year.

LISD replied to plaintiff’s motion for supplemental relief, opposed the requests for supplemental relief, and filed motions for judgment founded upon the defenses of estoppel and res judicata.

The defendants argue that the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel preclude the court from granting additional relief, or, in the alternative, that those doctrines prevent the court from finding a constitutional, violation prior to August 25,1970, the date of the original desegregation order in this case. Although the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applied to ensure the finality of judgments, both doctrines must be rejected where, as here, their application would result in manifest injustice.

Decisions of the United States Supreme Court subsequent to this court’s 1970 desegregation order have significantly clarified judicial remedial powers under school desegregation law. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971); Keyes v. Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973). Recognizing this supervening growth and clarification of desegregation law, the Fifth Circuit repeatedly has upheld the application of current judicial standards to pre-Swann desegregation orders and the grant of appropriate supplemental relief. Ellis v. Board of Public Instruction, 465 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1972); Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School System, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). Furthermore, through its 1970 desegregation order, this court has retained and exercised supervisory jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties of the original suit.

For the above reasons, the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel as raised by the defendants against the plaintiff’s Motion for Supplemental Relief are DENIED.

The court set the matter down for hearing on November 14, 1977, and advised the parties that it would hear the merits of the petition of the LISD to approve the construction under the bond issue and the merits of the plaintiff’s motion for supplemental relief. Accordingly all parties appeared on said date and the court has now heard and examined the evidence, the pleadings, the arguments and briefs of counsel, and this memorandum opinion shall constitute the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court agrees with the plaintiff that this court should re-examine all relevant evidence and issues and if the merits of the case so indicate, give either complete or partial relief as prayed for in the motion for supplemental relief and also to determine the issues with respect to the construction proposed under the bond issue.

HISTORY OF LISD WITH RESPECT TO ITS INTEGRATION POLICIES

Prior to the 1954 decision by the United States Supreme Court in Brown I, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), LISD had adopted and enforced a fixed policy that all Black school children would be required to attend school at what had been historically known as the Dunbar Schools, in the northeast part of Lubbock, which afforded classes in grades 1 through 12 for Black children only. Prior to 1949, Mexican-American school children in the elementary grades of LISD were assigned to what is known as the Guadalupe area. Guadalupe had at one time been called the “Mexican School” and in 1920 that school site had been moved to the present Guadalupe School location upon the petition of the Mexican-American par *1226 ents in the area. The evidence indicates that this move was made at the expense of the Mexican-American School patrons and not by LISD. The evidence is not certain, but in all probability only the elementary Mexican-American students were segregated in the Guadalupe area.

As a result of the Delgado decision in 1948,

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Related

Powell v. Powell
703 S.W.2d 434 (Court of Appeals of Texas, 1985)
United States v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago
554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Illinois, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
455 F. Supp. 1223, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19907, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-lubbock-independent-school-district-txnd-1978.