F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-6356 (D.C. No. 97-CV-1255-M) ROY LEON LINDSEY, JR., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, ** Senior District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Roy Leon Lindsey, Jr. pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to
125 months in prison. He voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. He now
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Lindsey contends that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the quantity of
methamphetamine and his alleged ownership of a gun listed in his presentence
report and for failing to request a downward departure. He also contends that the
district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and correspondingly
to appoint counsel to represent him. We previously granted Lindsey a certificate
of appealability and appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Because the
district court did not make any factual findings, our review of its denial of
Lindsey’s § 2255 motion is de novo. See United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 338
(10th Cir.1996).
Lindsey was arrested after a fire he had built on the floor of his stalled
vehicle got out of control, and firefighters and Oklahoma state police arrived to
extinguish the fire and investigate. In the partially burned vehicle, officers found
a loaded .357 Ruger pistol under the driver’s seat, several lumps of a white
-2- substance that appeared to be wrapped in plastic and packed in bundles, and
various glassware including beakers, flasks and tubing. The presentence report
noted that the gun was owned by and registered to Lindsey. The report also stated
that lab analysis determined that the bundles recovered from the vehicle had a
weight of 454 grams including packaging and that the substance in the bundles
was methamphetamine weighing 198.36 grams. Lindsey did not object to these
statements in the presentence report, and the district court relied on the stated
amount of methamphetamine (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7)) and possession of the gun
(U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)) in determining his offense level. 1
In his § 2255 motion, Lindsey contends that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the amount of methamphetamine and his alleged ownership of
the gun. 2 He contends that because the methamphetamine melted together with its
plastic wrapping in the vehicle fire, the lab analysis of the relative weights of
methamphetamine and wrapping may have been wrong. Therefore, he continues,
his counsel should have obtained an independent estimate of the amount of the
drug, and “[d]epending on the estimate and the district court’s assessment of its
reliability, Lindsey’s offense level may well have been lower.” Appellant’s
1 The district court used the 1995 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 2 The brief filed by appointed counsel did not address the gun, but Lindsey’s pro se brief filed prior to the appointment of counsel did.
-3- Suppl. Opening Br. at 11. He also contends that because he has never owned or
registered a .357 Ruger pistol and was not aware it was in the vehicle, his counsel
should have challenged his two-level adjustment for possession of the gun.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both
that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that this
deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Under the first prong of this test, a defendant must establish
“that counsel made errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Under this standard,
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and
the court must avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. Under the
second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must establish that “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
We conclude that Lindsey has failed to show that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. He has made no allegation, much less presented any
evidence, that the lab analysis of the amount of methamphetamine was wrong.
He is simply speculating that it may have been wrong, that through appointment
of counsel, further analysis and an evidentiary hearing, he may be able to show
that the amount of the drug he possessed was disputed, and that the district court
-4- may have found his theoretical evidence more credible. Such layers of
speculation are insufficient to show prejudice. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d
365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997); Garrett v. United States, 78 F.3d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir.
1996). Moreover, defendant personally was in the best position to inform his
counsel both that the amount of methamphetamine he admitted possessing was
overstated 3 and that he did not own the gun the presentence report stated was
registered in his name, yet he does not contend that he told his counsel about
these alleged errors. In this regard, defendant thus cannot fault his counsel for
failing to challenge the presentence report. Cf. United States v. King, 936 F.2d
477, 480 (10th Cir. 1991) (“An attorney’s failure to investigate cannot be charged
as a claim of ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ when the essential and
foundational information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld
from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.”) (quotation omitted).
Lindsey also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a downward departure on the basis that his criminal history category
overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal past because his criminal history
consisted largely of non-violent, substance-abuse related conduct. Lindsey’s past
does not present a strong case for departure.
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F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 1998 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-6356 (D.C. No. 97-CV-1255-M) ROY LEON LINDSEY, JR., (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, ** Senior District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. ** Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Roy Leon Lindsey, Jr. pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and was sentenced to
125 months in prison. He voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal. He now
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside or correct his
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Lindsey contends that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to challenge the quantity of
methamphetamine and his alleged ownership of a gun listed in his presentence
report and for failing to request a downward departure. He also contends that the
district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and correspondingly
to appoint counsel to represent him. We previously granted Lindsey a certificate
of appealability and appointed counsel to represent him on appeal. Because the
district court did not make any factual findings, our review of its denial of
Lindsey’s § 2255 motion is de novo. See United States v. Cox, 83 F.3d 336, 338
(10th Cir.1996).
Lindsey was arrested after a fire he had built on the floor of his stalled
vehicle got out of control, and firefighters and Oklahoma state police arrived to
extinguish the fire and investigate. In the partially burned vehicle, officers found
a loaded .357 Ruger pistol under the driver’s seat, several lumps of a white
-2- substance that appeared to be wrapped in plastic and packed in bundles, and
various glassware including beakers, flasks and tubing. The presentence report
noted that the gun was owned by and registered to Lindsey. The report also stated
that lab analysis determined that the bundles recovered from the vehicle had a
weight of 454 grams including packaging and that the substance in the bundles
was methamphetamine weighing 198.36 grams. Lindsey did not object to these
statements in the presentence report, and the district court relied on the stated
amount of methamphetamine (U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(7)) and possession of the gun
(U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)) in determining his offense level. 1
In his § 2255 motion, Lindsey contends that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the amount of methamphetamine and his alleged ownership of
the gun. 2 He contends that because the methamphetamine melted together with its
plastic wrapping in the vehicle fire, the lab analysis of the relative weights of
methamphetamine and wrapping may have been wrong. Therefore, he continues,
his counsel should have obtained an independent estimate of the amount of the
drug, and “[d]epending on the estimate and the district court’s assessment of its
reliability, Lindsey’s offense level may well have been lower.” Appellant’s
1 The district court used the 1995 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual. 2 The brief filed by appointed counsel did not address the gun, but Lindsey’s pro se brief filed prior to the appointment of counsel did.
-3- Suppl. Opening Br. at 11. He also contends that because he has never owned or
registered a .357 Ruger pistol and was not aware it was in the vehicle, his counsel
should have challenged his two-level adjustment for possession of the gun.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both
that his counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient, and that this
deficient performance prejudiced him. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). Under the first prong of this test, a defendant must establish
“that counsel made errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Under this standard,
“[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential,” and
the court must avoid the “distorting effects of hindsight.” Id. at 689. Under the
second prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must establish that “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.
We conclude that Lindsey has failed to show that his counsel was
constitutionally ineffective. He has made no allegation, much less presented any
evidence, that the lab analysis of the amount of methamphetamine was wrong.
He is simply speculating that it may have been wrong, that through appointment
of counsel, further analysis and an evidentiary hearing, he may be able to show
that the amount of the drug he possessed was disputed, and that the district court
-4- may have found his theoretical evidence more credible. Such layers of
speculation are insufficient to show prejudice. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d
365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997); Garrett v. United States, 78 F.3d 1296, 1302 (8th Cir.
1996). Moreover, defendant personally was in the best position to inform his
counsel both that the amount of methamphetamine he admitted possessing was
overstated 3 and that he did not own the gun the presentence report stated was
registered in his name, yet he does not contend that he told his counsel about
these alleged errors. In this regard, defendant thus cannot fault his counsel for
failing to challenge the presentence report. Cf. United States v. King, 936 F.2d
477, 480 (10th Cir. 1991) (“An attorney’s failure to investigate cannot be charged
as a claim of ‘ineffective assistance of counsel’ when the essential and
foundational information required to trigger such an investigation is withheld
from the defendant’s attorney by the defendant himself.”) (quotation omitted).
Lindsey also claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request
a downward departure on the basis that his criminal history category
overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal past because his criminal history
consisted largely of non-violent, substance-abuse related conduct. Lindsey’s past
does not present a strong case for departure. His criminal history category of VI
3 Nor has he ever stated in this § 2255 action that, based on his personal knowledge, the amount was overstated.
-5- (13 or more points) resulted from his accumulation of 17 points for convictions
for possession of marijuana, driving after declared habitual traffic violator,
possession of drug paraphernalia, aggravated false impersonation, driving under
the influence of alcohol (twice), theft by deception, and serving a sentence at the
time of offense. Other convictions for possession of methamphetamine and
paraphernalia were not counted because they were related offenses. See U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2 Application Note 3. He had eight other arrests that included six drunk
driving charges and several charges for possession of marijuana and
methamphetamine that were dismissed as parts of plea agreements. His criminal
conduct has continued from 1985 to the time of his current offense. Cf. U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.3 (citing as example of possibly overrepresentative criminal history level,
case of defendant with two minor misdemeanor convictions close to ten years
prior to the instant offense and no other evidence of criminal behavior in
intervening period). As we have said before, “driving under the influence of
alcohol is not inherently non-violent.” United States v. Jones, 80 F.3d 436, 439
n.2 (10th Cir. 1996). Finally, counsel did state at sentencing that most of
Lindsey’s crimes were substance-abuse related, so the court was aware of this as
a possible basis for departure. 4 Given this situation, counsel’s failure to request a
4 The court was also aware of this information when, from a range of 110 to 137 months, it chose to sentence Lindsey to 125 months.
-6- downward departure was not such a serious error, if error at all, that his counsel’s
performance was constitutionally deficient.
Because Lindsey’s ineffective counsel claims lack merit, the district court
did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing. See Lasiter v.
Thomas, 89 F.3d 699, 702 (10th Cir. 1996). The judgment of the district court
is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha Circuit Judge
-7-