United States v. Leyva-Martinez

Ninth Circuit

United States v. Leyva-Martinez

632 F.3d 568, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1703, 2011 WL 300188

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 27, 2011

Docket10-50269

StatusPublished

Cited by32 cases

This text of 632 F.3d 568 (United States v. Leyva-Martinez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Leyva-Martinez, 632 F.3d 568, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1703, 2011 WL 300188 (9th Cir. 2011).

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Opinion

ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Jose Antonio Leyva-Martinez appeals from the 70-month sentence imposed following his conviction for attempted re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Leyva-Martinez contends that the district court erred when it applied a 16-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because his prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or co-habitant, in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5, does not qualify as a crime of violence. As Leyva-Martinez concedes however, this contention is foreclosed. See United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir.) (holding that a conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 is categorically at “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines because the offense requires the intentional use of physical force against the person of another), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 216, 178 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).

Leyva-Martinez also contends the district court erred by applying 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) to enhance his sentence. Specifically, he argues that Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which permits enhancement based on the existence of a prior felony, has been overruled by Nijhawan v. Holder, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), so that his prior felony conviction must be either admitted or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly held, however, that Almendarez-Torres is binding unless it is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2009), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 583, 178 L.Ed.2d 425 (2010); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 643-44 (9th Cir.) (citing cases), cert, denied — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 767, 172 L.Ed.2d 763 (2008). Because Nijhawan does not even mention *570 Almendarez-Torres, we cannot conclude that Almendarez-Torres has been expressly overruled and, accordingly, we reject Leyva-Martinez’s contention to the contrary and grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance.

AFFIRMED.

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ORDER

PER CURIAM:

Jose Antonio Leyva-Martinez appeals from the 70-month sentence imposed following his conviction for attempted re-entry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Leyva-Martinez contends that the district court erred when it applied a 16-level enhancement, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), because his prior conviction for inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or co-habitant, in violation of California Penal Code § 273.5, does not qualify as a crime of violence. As Leyva-Martinez concedes however, this contention is foreclosed. See United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 823 (9th Cir.) (holding that a conviction under California Penal Code § 273.5 is categorically at “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines because the offense requires the intentional use of physical force against the person of another), cert, denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 216, 178 L.Ed.2d 130 (2010).

Leyva-Martinez also contends the district court erred by applying 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) to enhance his sentence. Specifically, he argues that Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which permits enhancement based on the existence of a prior felony, has been overruled by Nijhawan v. Holder, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 2294, 174 L.Ed.2d 22 (2009), so that his prior felony conviction must be either admitted or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly held, however, that Almendarez-Torres is binding unless it is expressly overruled by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir.2009), cert, denied, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 583, 178 L.Ed.2d 425 (2010); Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 643-44 (9th Cir.) (citing cases), cert, denied — U.S.-, 129 S.Ct. 767, 172 L.Ed.2d 763 (2008). Because Nijhawan does not even mention *570 Almendarez-Torres, we cannot conclude that Almendarez-Torres has been expressly overruled and, accordingly, we reject Leyva-Martinez’s contention to the contrary and grant appellee’s motion for summary affirmance.

AFFIRMED.

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632 F.3d 568, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1703, 2011 WL 300188, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-leyva-martinez-ca9-2011.

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