USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11494 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LEROY TAFFE, a.k.a. Lee, a.k.a. Tommy Lee Ellis,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11494
D.C. Docket No. 1:90-cr-00874-JLK-1 ____________________
Before LUCK, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Leroy Taffe asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on Amendment 782 of the United States Sentencing Guide- lines. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that the 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence reduction, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 1992, Taffe pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 846 (count 1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in viola- tion of 21 U.S.C. section 841 (count 2); and using and possessing a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence and drug traf- 1 ficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c) (count 5). United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir. 1994). At sentencing, the district court found Taffe responsible for 146 kilograms of co- caine and, after imposing the relevant sentence enhancements, set
1 While he was incarcerated for these three offenses, Taffe later pleaded guilty in a separate proceeding to attempted escape, attempted first degree murder, and hostage taking. United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1048 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994). The district court consolidated the two cases for sentencing. Id. USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 3 of 7
22-11494 Opinion of the Court 3
Taffe’s adjusted offense level at 43. The district court sentenced him to two concurrent 327-month terms of imprisonment on the cocaine conspiracy and possession counts and a consecutive 30- year sentence on the section 924(c) count. In Taffe’s direct appeal, we affirmed the district court’s sen- tences for counts one and five—one of the 327-month sentences and the 30-year consecutive sentence—but we vacated the sen- tence for count two. Id. at 1050. In imposing the sentence for count two, the district court counted the total amount of cocaine that was present in the warehouse when Taffe attempted his rob- bery. Id. But we determined that the government “did not estab- lish that Taffe possessed all of the cocaine placed in the ware- house,” so we vacated that particular sentence. Id. On remand, the district court resentenced Taffe to 292 months for count two, to run concurrently with his 327-month sentence on count one. This appeal is about Taffe’s fifth motion to reduce his sen- tence, this time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2) and based on Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines. Taffe moved the district court to lower his sentence for his conspiracy and posses- sion counts from 327 months to 262 months’ imprisonment. He argued that he had been a “model inmate” and his “history and characteristics . . . warrant[ed] leniency.” Taffe explained that he had earned his high school equivalency degree while incarcerated, and he argued that, even under a reduced sentence, he would not be released until he is in his “late 70’s,” which would put him at a low risk of recidivism. He attached letters showing that he did USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11494
“outstanding work” in the prison kitchen; knitted hats, scarves, and blankets for the local Salvation Army; and taught classes in prison, such as a religious studies class and a sport officiating class. He had “strong family and community support” to help him “become a productive member of society after his release,” and he noted that he would be removed to his home country of Jamaica once re- leased, which would be “better for the American taxpayer.” The district court denied Taffe’s motion. It found that “the factors under [section] 3553(a) do not warrant release” because Taffe had “held a federal employee hostage at gunpoint[,] tried to shoot another employee[,] and was sanctioned while in prison in 2015 for possession of a dangerous weapon[.]” Taffe appeals the denial of his sentence reduction motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “The district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incor- rect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its de- termination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). DISCUSSION Taffe argues that the district court abused its discretion be- cause it failed to consider his “rehabilitative steps and accomplish- ments.” The district court, Taffe contends, focused “solely” on Taffe’s behavior in the early stages of his incarceration and the USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 5 of 7
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“[m]inor infractions” he committed “throughout the course of his sentence.” We disagree. Section 3582(c)(2) allows a court to reduce a defendant’s sen- tence if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission later lowered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), and if the court considers a reduction appropri- ate after “considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) [and] . . . if such a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements” in the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider the following fac- tors when determining a sentence: (1) the nature and circum- stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de- fendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sen- tences available; (4) the applicable sentencing range under the guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statements by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispari- ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id.
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USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11494 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus LEROY TAFFE, a.k.a. Lee, a.k.a. Tommy Lee Ellis,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11494
D.C. Docket No. 1:90-cr-00874-JLK-1 ____________________
Before LUCK, BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Leroy Taffe asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2) motion to reduce his sentence based on Amendment 782 of the United States Sentencing Guide- lines. Because we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in determining that the 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a) factors did not support a sentence reduction, we affirm. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In April 1992, Taffe pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 846 (count 1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in viola- tion of 21 U.S.C. section 841 (count 2); and using and possessing a firearm during and in relation to crimes of violence and drug traf- 1 ficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 924(c) (count 5). United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1049 (11th Cir. 1994). At sentencing, the district court found Taffe responsible for 146 kilograms of co- caine and, after imposing the relevant sentence enhancements, set
1 While he was incarcerated for these three offenses, Taffe later pleaded guilty in a separate proceeding to attempted escape, attempted first degree murder, and hostage taking. United States v. Taffe, 36 F.3d 1047, 1048 n.1 (11th Cir. 1994). The district court consolidated the two cases for sentencing. Id. USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 3 of 7
22-11494 Opinion of the Court 3
Taffe’s adjusted offense level at 43. The district court sentenced him to two concurrent 327-month terms of imprisonment on the cocaine conspiracy and possession counts and a consecutive 30- year sentence on the section 924(c) count. In Taffe’s direct appeal, we affirmed the district court’s sen- tences for counts one and five—one of the 327-month sentences and the 30-year consecutive sentence—but we vacated the sen- tence for count two. Id. at 1050. In imposing the sentence for count two, the district court counted the total amount of cocaine that was present in the warehouse when Taffe attempted his rob- bery. Id. But we determined that the government “did not estab- lish that Taffe possessed all of the cocaine placed in the ware- house,” so we vacated that particular sentence. Id. On remand, the district court resentenced Taffe to 292 months for count two, to run concurrently with his 327-month sentence on count one. This appeal is about Taffe’s fifth motion to reduce his sen- tence, this time pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3582(c)(2) and based on Amendment 782 to the sentencing guidelines. Taffe moved the district court to lower his sentence for his conspiracy and posses- sion counts from 327 months to 262 months’ imprisonment. He argued that he had been a “model inmate” and his “history and characteristics . . . warrant[ed] leniency.” Taffe explained that he had earned his high school equivalency degree while incarcerated, and he argued that, even under a reduced sentence, he would not be released until he is in his “late 70’s,” which would put him at a low risk of recidivism. He attached letters showing that he did USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 4 of 7
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11494
“outstanding work” in the prison kitchen; knitted hats, scarves, and blankets for the local Salvation Army; and taught classes in prison, such as a religious studies class and a sport officiating class. He had “strong family and community support” to help him “become a productive member of society after his release,” and he noted that he would be removed to his home country of Jamaica once re- leased, which would be “better for the American taxpayer.” The district court denied Taffe’s motion. It found that “the factors under [section] 3553(a) do not warrant release” because Taffe had “held a federal employee hostage at gunpoint[,] tried to shoot another employee[,] and was sanctioned while in prison in 2015 for possession of a dangerous weapon[.]” Taffe appeals the denial of his sentence reduction motion. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a sentence reduction under section 3582(c)(2). See United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “The district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incor- rect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making its de- termination, or makes clearly erroneous factual findings.” United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). DISCUSSION Taffe argues that the district court abused its discretion be- cause it failed to consider his “rehabilitative steps and accomplish- ments.” The district court, Taffe contends, focused “solely” on Taffe’s behavior in the early stages of his incarceration and the USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 5 of 7
22-11494 Opinion of the Court 5
“[m]inor infractions” he committed “throughout the course of his sentence.” We disagree. Section 3582(c)(2) allows a court to reduce a defendant’s sen- tence if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that the Sentencing Commission later lowered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), and if the court considers a reduction appropri- ate after “considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) [and] . . . if such a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy statements” in the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Section 3553(a) directs courts to consider the following fac- tors when determining a sentence: (1) the nature and circum- stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de- fendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed; (3) the kinds of sen- tences available; (4) the applicable sentencing range under the guidelines; (5) any pertinent policy statements by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispari- ties among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Id. § 3553(a). Section 3582(c)(2) lays out a “two-step process”: “First, the district court must determine if the defendant is eligible for relief, i.e., whether a retroactive [g]uidelines amendment actually lowers his applicable [g]uidelines range.” Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1248 (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824–28 (2010)). If so, then second, “the district court must then consider any applica- ble [section] 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 6 of 7
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discretion, the reduction authorized . . . is warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances of the case.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Here, as to the first step, the district court found, and the government agreed, that Amendment 782 retroactively reduced Taffe’s sentencing range by two levels. On appeal, the government agrees that Amendment 782 lowered Taffe’s offense level from 36 to 34. As to the second question, the district court concluded, based on “the facts of [Taffe’s] original offense and subsequent con- duct,” and “the factors under [section] 3553(a),” that Taffe’s con- duct in prison had been “anything except ‘good conduct.’” Taffe’s decisions to hold a federal employee hostage at gunpoint, attempt to shoot another federal employee, and possess a dangerous weapon as recently as 2015, didn’t warrant granting Taffe a re- duced sentence. The district court acted well within its discretion in denying Taffe’s motion. It reviewed his arguments, stated that it had con- sidered the section 3553(a) factors, and concluded that the circum- stances of both Taffe’s “original offense and later conduct” did not warrant a reduced sentence. This analysis was sufficient, as a dis- trict court need not “address each of the [section] 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evidence.” United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1241 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations omitted). “Instead, an acknowledgement by the district court that it considered the [section] 3553(a) factors and the parties’ argument is sufficient.” Id. USCA11 Case: 22-11494 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2024 Page: 7 of 7
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Taffe argues that the district court abused its discretion be- cause it ignored the “rehabilitative steps” he has taken while in prison. But section 3553(a)(1) permits a district court to evaluate “the nature and circumstances of the [defendant’s] offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” when deciding whether to reduce a sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moreover, even if we “would have gone the other way had it been our call[,]” we “must affirm unless we find that the district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004). Because the district court did not commit a clear error of judgment, or apply 2 the wrong legal standard, we affirm. AFFIRMED.
2 After the time for filing a reply brief had passed, Taffe sent the court a letter “seeking permission to amend [his] appeal” and asking for counsel to be ap- pointed. The clerk’s office responded to Taffe that he could “file a motion if you would like to file an amended appellate brief or would like to be appointed counsel by the [c]ourt.” Taffe never filed a motion.