United States v. LeRonald Loper

Eighth Circuit

United States v. LeRonald Loper

507 F. App'x 621

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedMay 31, 2013

Docket12-3512

StatusUnpublished

This text of 507 F. App'x 621 (United States v. LeRonald Loper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. LeRonald Loper, 507 F. App'x 621 (8th Cir. 2013).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

LeRonald Loper pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and one count of attempting to interfere with commerce by threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). On the basis of Loper’s prior convictions, the district court 1 determined Loper was an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 210 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release on each count. Loper appeals, arguing the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, he argues the district court erred in applying § 924(e) because the government failed to charge his prior convictions in the present indictment and because the facts of his prior convictions were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the present case.

As Loper acknowledges, our precedent precludes his argument on appeal. We previously recognized that under Almen-darez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), prior convictions used for the purpose of sentencing enhancements need not be charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 707-08 (8th Cir.2001). Further, we have specifically held that neither Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), nor Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), changed this rule. See Campbell, 270 F.3d at 708 (“It is the law in this circuit, until the Supreme Court chooses to revisit the question of recidivism statutes, that Apprendi does not require the ‘fact’ of prior convictions to be pled and proved to a jury.”); United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir.2005) (“The Supreme Court has never overruled its decision in Almendarez-Torres, and Shepard did not alter the rule....”).

We are bound by the decisions of prior panels. See United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir.1997). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

LeRonald Loper pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and one count of attempting to interfere with commerce by threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). On the basis of Loper’s prior convictions, the district court 1 determined Loper was an Armed Career Criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and sentenced him to concurrent sentences of 210 months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release on each count. Loper appeals, arguing the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, he argues the district court erred in applying § 924(e) because the government failed to charge his prior convictions in the present indictment and because the facts of his prior convictions were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in the present case.

As Loper acknowledges, our precedent precludes his argument on appeal. We previously recognized that under Almen-darez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), prior convictions used for the purpose of sentencing enhancements need not be charged in the indictment nor proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702, 707-08 (8th Cir.2001). Further, we have specifically held that neither Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), nor Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), changed this rule. See Campbell, 270 F.3d at 708 (“It is the law in this circuit, until the Supreme Court chooses to revisit the question of recidivism statutes, that Apprendi does not require the ‘fact’ of prior convictions to be pled and proved to a jury.”); United States v. Johnson, 408 F.3d 535, 540 (8th Cir.2005) (“The Supreme Court has never overruled its decision in Almendarez-Torres, and Shepard did not alter the rule....”).

We are bound by the decisions of prior panels. See United States v. Prior, 107 F.3d 654, 660 (8th Cir.1997). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

1

. The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

507 F. App'x 621, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-leronald-loper-ca8-2013.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack