Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 30, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-7015 (D.C. No. 6:22-CR-00111-RAW-1) GEOVANTA TY’KEARON LEE, a/k/a (E.D. Okla.) Devion Richard Knight,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Geovanta Lee fired a gun at his ex-girlfriend’s car. After she reported the
shooting to the police, Lee called her repeatedly and threatened to post intimate
videos of their sexual relationship online. A subsequent investigation revealed that
Lee had a phone containing explicit videos of his ex-girlfriend, who was underage. A
jury convicted Lee of assault, use of a firearm during a crime of violence,
cyberstalking, and receipt and possession of material involving the sexual
exploitation of a minor. On appeal, Lee urges us to reverse for improper venue and
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines *
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 2
insufficient evidence. He also challenges his sentence. Discerning no error, we
affirm.
Background
A relationship between two Ardmore, Oklahoma teenagers led to the events at
issue in this appeal. In the summer of 2020, Lee, then 19, began dating J.D., who was
16 at the time. During their on-again, off-again relationship, they often recorded
videos of themselves performing sexual acts. After dating for about a year, they
broke up but maintained irregular contact. Eventually, J.D. asked Lee to leave her
alone and blocked him on social media. Lee nevertheless continued to contact her.
One day in February 2022, J.D. was driving around town with a friend when
she spotted Lee riding in the passenger seat of a red Nissan traveling in the opposite
direction. The Nissan turned around and followed J.D.’s car for several blocks. When
J.D. stopped the car, the Nissan pulled up beside her. Lee got out and began hitting
the back window of her car with a gun. When J.D. started to drive off, Lee fired at
her car. The bullet penetrated the trunk, hitting an amplifier. J.D. called the police,
who referred the case to the FBI. 1 J.D. later testified that Lee had not scared her when
he fired at her car.
While the FBI’s investigation was underway, Lee repeatedly tried contacting
J.D. on social media and by phone. Sometimes Lee would call in the middle of the
1 The Ardmore Police Department referred the case to the FBI because Ardmore lies within the boundaries of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, and Lee is an enrolled member of that tribe. 2 Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 3
night and block his caller ID. At one point, Lee messaged J.D. and said, “Ima finna to
post all our shit on Facebook,” 2 which J.D. took as a threat to post the sexually
explicit videos they had recorded. R. vol. 3, 106. Lee threatened to send the videos to
J.D.’s mother as well. J.D. did not want the videos shared, but Lee made these threats
at least five times. Yet the communication between Lee and J.D. was not always one
way; J.D. also reached out to Lee at times. For instance, she accused him of shooting
at her car and asked him to repay money that he owed her. The two also met up and
had sex on multiple occasions after the shooting.
Once J.D. and her mother told investigators about the videos, police obtained a
search warrant for the house in Ardmore that Lee shared with his mother. In one of
the bedrooms, they found mail addressed to Lee, medicine prescribed to him,
identifying documents, and three cellphones. On one of the phones, an FBI agent
found text messages between J.D. and Lee, including an exchange from October
2021, when J.D. was still a minor. 3 That exchange included a video of her having
oral sex with an unidentified man. In response, Lee wrote, “LMAO WYD,” 4 and then
2 “Finna” is “used for ‘fixing to’ in informal speech.” Finna, Merriam- Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/finna [https://perma.cc/PMS4-BTTJ] (last visited June 25, 2025). 3 It appears that J.D. was the primary user of the phone, which was used to send the video to a number associated with Lee. And Lee periodically used the phone to access email. 4 “LMAO” is an abbreviation for “laughing my ass off.” LMAO, Merriam- Webster.com, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/LMAO [https://perma.cc/D9KR-TBXY] (last visited June 25, 2025). And “WYD” is an abbreviation for “[w]hat are you doing?” Wyd, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/e/acronyms/wyd/ [https://perma.cc/FMH2-LZEV] (cleaned up) (last visited June 25, 2025). 3 Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 4
said, “I’m finna to post it.” Id. at 305–06.
A grand jury indicted Lee on five charges: assault with a dangerous weapon
with intent to do bodily harm in Indian Country; violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) by
using, carrying, brandishing, or discharging a firearm during a crime of violence;
cyberstalking; receiving material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor; and
possessing material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor in Indian Country.
At trial, after the government presented the evidence detailed above, Lee
declined to put on any evidence and moved for acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29. The court denied his motion, and the jury convicted Lee on
all counts.
A probation officer then prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR).
The PSR proposed a five-level enhancement for engaging in a pattern of activity
involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor, citing numerous recorded video
jail calls in which Lee asked his minor girlfriend, M.W., to display her nude body.
Based in part on that enhancement, the PSR calculated Lee’s sentencing range under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or the Guidelines) at 135 to 168
months. But because his § 924(c) conviction carried a mandatory minimum of 120
months that must be served consecutively, his sentencing range was 255 to 288
months.
At sentencing, the district court overruled Lee’s objection to the enhancement,
adopted the PSR, and rejected Lee’s requested sentence of 166 to 177 months. And
although the government requested an upward variance based on Lee’s continued
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criminal behavior behind bars—enticing M.W., smoking marijuana, and possessing a
weapon—the district court chose to impose a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range: 255 months in prison, plus five years of supervised release. 5
Lee appeals.
Analysis
Lee challenges several of his convictions on grounds of venue and the
sufficiency of evidence. He also challenges his sentence, arguing that the pattern
enhancement should not apply and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.
We address each issue in turn.
I. Venue
Lee first argues that we must reverse his conviction for receiving material
involving sexual exploitation of a minor because venue was not proper in the Eastern
District of Oklahoma. The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a
trial in the state and district in which he or she committed the alleged crime. U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“Trial shall be held in the [s]tate where the said [c]rimes
shall have been committed.”); id. amend. VI (establishing right to trial “by an
impartial jury of the [s]tate and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed”); cf. also Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (“Unless a statute or these rules permit
5 Aside from the consecutive 120 months on the § 924(c) count, the district court ran Lee’s other sentences concurrently: 135 months for receiving material involving sexual exploitation of a minor, 120 months for possessing material involving sexual exploitation of a minor, 120 months for assault, and 60 months for cyberstalking. 5 Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 6
otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense
was committed.”). When reviewing venue challenges, we “view[] the evidence in the
light most favorable to the [g]overnment” and ask whether “the [g]overnment proved
by [a] preponderance of direct or circumstantial evidence that the crimes charged
occurred within the district.” United States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 1229, 1232–33 (10th
Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Rinke, 778 F.2d 581, 584 (10th Cir. 1985)).
Here, the government charged Lee with knowingly receiving material
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor “using any means and facility of
interstate and foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252. Crimes under § 2252 are
considered continuing offenses that can occur in multiple districts. See United States
v. Cameron, 699 F.3d 621, 636 (1st Cir. 2012) (recognizing receipt and possession of
child pornography in violation of § 2252 as continuing offense); United States v.
Moncini, 882 F.2d 401, 403–04 (9th Cir. 1989) (same); cf. United States v. Thomas,
74 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[F]ederal obscenity laws, by virtue of their
inherent nexus to interstate and foreign commerce, generally involve acts in more
than one jurisdiction or state.”). And Congress allows continuing offenses to be
“prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such . . . imported object or
person moves.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). Thus, because receipt of explicit material
touches both the district from which it is sent and the district to which it is sent, the
government could prosecute a defendant in either district.
Lee contends venue was improper here because the government failed to
proffer any evidence that he was in the Eastern District of Oklahoma—where he had
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lived his entire life—when he received the explicit material. To be sure, Lee’s
primary phone was never recovered, and phone records did not reveal his phone’s
location at the time of receipt. However, J.D. testified that she recorded videos with
Lee in the Eastern District. And law enforcement found a phone in Lee’s room in
Ardmore that contained a video of J.D. performing oral sex. Therefore, at the very
least, the video moved “into” the venue, which is sufficient for a continuing offense
like this one. § 3237(a).
Although we have not fielded a venue challenge under § 2252 like the one at
issue here, our approach is consistent with that of the First Circuit, which addressed a
similar situation in Cameron. There, the defendant argued venue was improper in
Maine for his § 2252 charge because he was in New York when he received child
pornography. 699 F.3d at 636. However, the court explained that § 2252 is a
continuing offense that could be prosecuted in Maine because the defendant later
brought his laptop there. Id. We thus hold that the government established by a
preponderance of evidence that venue was proper in the Eastern District of
Oklahoma.
II. Sufficiency
Lee next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting three of his
convictions: possessing material involving sexual exploitation of a minor, assault
with intent to do bodily harm, and cyberstalking. In a sufficiency challenge, we
“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government” and ask whether
“any rational tier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a
7 Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 8
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Vallo, 238 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2000)
(quoting United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)).
A. Possessing Material Involving Sexual Exploitation of a Minor
Lee argues no reasonable jury could convict him of possessing material
involving sexual exploitation of a minor. For this offense, the government had to
prove that Lee knowingly possessed a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct. § 2252(a)(4)(A).
Lee challenges the “knowingly” element. For possession to be “knowing,” a
defendant “must know the charged images exist.” United States v. Haymond, 672
F.3d 948, 955 (10th Cir. 2012). And possession can be actual or constructive,
meaning a defendant “knowingly hold[s] the power and ability to exercise dominion
and control over” property. United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir.
1987). The government can prove constructive possession circumstantially, such as
through incriminating statements about the contraband. Id. at 882.
Recall that the government’s evidence of Lee’s possession of explicit material
came from a phone found in Lee’s bedroom at his mother’s house. Lee argues that
finding the phone there does not prove knowing possession because nothing indicates
that he turned it on or knew that it contained prohibited material. Yet a witness
testified that Lee used the phone to check his email, a function that would require the
phone to be turned on. The witness also testified that the phone contained a
conversation in which a number associated with Lee responded to an explicit video.
And in a recorded jail call, Lee acknowledged the phone was found in his room.
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Further, the government presented evidence that Lee messaged J.D. and threatened to
post their videos (something he could only do if he possessed them), made statements
to a detective about J.D. being a minor at the time of recording, and mentioned the
videos in jail phone calls. A rational trier of fact could have concluded from this
evidence that Lee knew he possessed material involving sexual exploitation of a
minor.
B. Assault with a Dangerous Weapon with Intent to do Bodily Harm
Next, Lee contends the government failed to prove the requisite specific intent
for his assault conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) (criminalizing “[a]ssault with a
dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm” (emphasis added)); United States
v. Harris, 10 F.4th 1005, 1015 (10th Cir. 2021) (stating that § 113(a)(3) “requires
specific intent”). The statute does not define “intent to do bodily harm,” and our
caselaw does not provide much guidance beyond the generalities that criminal intent
is a factual question “peculiarly within the province of the jury” and typically proven
by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Greene, 442 F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (10th
Cir. 1971) (quoting United States v. Ebey, 424 F.2d 376, 378 (10th Cir. 1970)); see
also United States v. Lovern, 590 F.3d 1095, 1105 (10th Cir. 2009). But both Lee and
the government suggest relying on the objective approach taken by the Fifth Circuit.
That court does not consider intent subjectively—by “the secret motive of the actor
or some undisclosed purpose merely to frighten”—but “objectively from the visible
conduct of the actor and what one in the position of the victim might reasonably
conclude.” Shaffer v. United States, 308 F.2d 654, 655 (5th Cir. 1962).
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Invoking this standard, Lee relies on J.D.’s testimony that he shot at the car,
not at her, and that she was not afraid of him. And Lee emphasizes that the bullet
went into the trunk, which he suggests shows that he did not aim at someone in the
car. Thus, according to Lee, the record establishes that he objectively lacked the
specific intent to do bodily harm. But our review of the record reveals otherwise.
Viewed objectively, the record shows that an armed Lee approached the car, hit it
with his gun, and then opened fire on the back of the car knowing the car was
occupied by two people. Under these circumstances, someone in J.D.’s position
would “reasonably conclude” that Lee intended to do bodily harm. Id.
Moreover, even if we were to go beyond Shaffer’s purely objective approach,
evidence of Lee’s subjective intent only confirms this conclusion. J.D.’s friend
testified that Lee seemed angry when he approached the car. Although J.D. testified
that she was not afraid of Lee, she also said that when he got out of the car, she
“already knew there was nothing good about that” and decided to drive off. R. vol. 3,
115. And witnesses who responded to the scene described her as “scared, crying,
shaking,” “very upset,” and “traumatized”—impressions that were confirmed by
body-camera footage introduced at trial. Id. at 141, 327, 366. In sum, intent is a
question uniquely suited for a jury, and a rational juror viewing this evidence in a
light most favorable to the government could find Lee had the requisite intent to do
bodily harm.
C. Cyberstalking
Lee also argues there was insufficient evidence supporting his cyberstalking
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conviction. The statute prohibits “engag[ing] in a course of conduct that . . . causes,
attempts, or would be reasonably expected to cause substantial emotional distress”
while having “the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate.” 18 U.S.C. § 2661A(2).
On appeal, Lee claims his many calls and vague threats to post explicit videos of J.D.
online did not form such a course of conduct. In support, he highlights that J.D.
willingly called him, saw him, and had sex with him multiple times after the
shooting, which supports the conclusion that no stalking occurred.
Not so. That J.D. at times reached out to and interacted with Lee (including, in
one instance, to accuse him of the shooting) does not negate his course of conduct,
which a rational jury could conclude amounted to cyberstalking. Lee repeatedly
called J.D., including in the middle of the night while blocking his caller ID, and sent
messages threatening to disseminate the videos. J.D. testified that he probably made
this threat more than five times. Such threats would be reasonably expected to cause
distress; indeed, J.D. testified that she did not want the intimate videos shared. Thus,
sufficient evidence supports Lee’s cyberstalking conviction.
III. Sentence
Lee challenges his sentence on two fronts. First, he argues that the district
court erred by assessing a five-level enhancement for a pattern of enticing and
persuading minors to create exploitative materials. Second, he argues that his
sentence is substantively unreasonable.
A. Enhancement
“When evaluating sentence enhancements under the . . . Guidelines, this court
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reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error and questions of law de
novo.” United States v. McDonald, 43 F.4th 1090, 1095 (10th Cir. 2022). Lee argues
the district court erred in applying a five-level enhancement for receiving material
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor based on a finding that Lee “engaged in
a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2G2.2(b)(5). The commentary to § 2G2.2 defines “sexual exploitation” by
incorporating conduct described in a series of other statutes, and it defines a pattern
of activity as “any combination of two or more separate instances of the sexual abuse
or sexual exploitation of a minor by the defendant, whether or not the abuse or
exploitation (A) occurred during the course of the offense; (B) involved the same
minor; or (C) resulted in a conviction.” § 2G2.2 cmt. 1. At the same time, the
commentary also clarifies that “[s]exual abuse or exploitation does not include
possession, accessing with intent to view, receipt, or trafficking in material relating
to the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, the district court found a pattern based on several recorded jail calls
during which Lee asked his minor girlfriend, M.W., to expose her nude body. Lee
takes issue with this finding, arguing the district court erred because he did not
actually engage in sexual abuse or exploitation of M.W.; instead, he only received or
possessed the material relating to the sexual abuse or exploitation of M.W.
But Lee overlooks that the commentary’s definition of sexual exploitation
expressly includes the conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), which prohibits
“entic[ing]” a minor “to engage in[] any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
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producing any visual depiction of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a
live visual depiction of such conduct.” And sexually explicit conduct includes
“lascivious exhibition of the . . . genitals.” 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v). Lee’s conduct
fits squarely within this definition. While incarcerated for receiving sexual videos of
a minor, Lee enticed his minor girlfriend to show her nude body on multiple
occasions on live video calls that were also recorded. Therefore, he “engaged in a
pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor,” and the
five-level enhancement was appropriate. § 2G2.2(b)(5).
B. Substantive Reasonableness
We review the substantive reasonableness of Lee’s sentence for abuse of
discretion, meaning that a sentence is substantively unreasonable if it “exceed[s] the
bounds of permissible choice, given the facts and the applicable law.” United States
v. Chavez, 723 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. McComb,
519 F.3d 1049, 1053 (10th Cir. 2007)). We examine “whether the length of the
sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the case in light of the factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. (quoting United States v. Reyes-Alfonso, 653
F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 2011)). And because Lee’s 255-month sentence is within
his Guidelines range, we presume it is reasonable; Lee bears the burden of rebutting
that presumption. Id.; see also United States v. Richards, 958 F.3d 961, 969 (10th
Cir. 2020).
Lee cannot do so. His only argument is that his 135-month sentence for
receiving material involving sexual exploitation of a minor is substantively
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unreasonable because his sexual relationship with J.D. did not violate the law—only
receipt of the recording did. Citing no authority, he contends this is not the kind of
scenario Congress intended to punish.
But Lee’s argument overlooks that the severity of his sentence on this count
stems, in part, from the enhancement outlined above: based on Lee’s calls with
M.W., the Guidelines suggested a range of 135 to 168 months. The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence on the low end of that range. 6
And because Lee offers no other reason to question the reasonableness of his 255-
month sentence overall (which resulted from the combination of his Guidelines range
and the consecutive 120 months for his § 924(c) offense), we reject his substantive-
unreasonableness argument.
Conclusion
In sum, we affirm Lee’s convictions, holding that venue was proper and the
evidence was sufficient. We also affirm his sentence, finding no error in the
§ 2G2.2(b)(5) enhancement and no abuse of discretion in the overall length of his
6 Lee also purports to take issue with the district court imposing the statutory maximum sentences for cyberstalking, assault, and possession. But those charges didn’t determine the length of his sentence. Instead, as Lee acknowledges, the receipt charge was the “primary engine that drove the sentence in this case.” Aplt. Br. 28. And because we find Lee’s 135-month sentence for receipt is substantively reasonable, we need not address his alternative arguments about the other charges. 14 Appellate Case: 24-7015 Document: 42-1 Date Filed: 06/30/2025 Page: 15
sentence.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge