United States v. Lawrence Manyfield, Sr.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: June 11, 2020
• Docket: 19-2096
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 19-2096 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

LAWRENCE MANYFIELD, SR., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:09-cr-00157-1 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge. ____________________

SUBMITTED APRIL 28, 2020 — DECIDED JUNE 11, 2020 ____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, RIPPLE, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. After Lawrence Manyfield admitted several violations of his supervised release, the district court revoked his term of supervision and sentenced him to twen- ty-four months in prison followed by a lifetime term of su- pervised release. The parties agree on appeal that the court neither gave adequate notice of the conditions of supervision (many of which we have deemed vague) nor sufficiently ex- plained its reasons for imposing them. They disagree, how- 2 No. 19-2096

ever, about the proper scope of the remand. We conclude that the court properly justified the prison sentence and term of supervised release and, therefore, remand only for further consideration of the release conditions. Mr. Manyfield pleaded guilty in 2011 to one count of possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B); he was sentenced to 120 months in prison and a fifteen-year term of supervision. Within a year of Mr. Manyfield’s release from prison, his probation officer twice found him in possession of a cell phone with internet connectivity, in violation of his conditions of release. A fo- rensic exam of one phone showed that Mr. Manyfield had created several email and social-media accounts and ac- cessed pornographic websites—actions that his release con- ditions also prohibited. Through those accounts, Mr. Manyfield also had sent messages to several people ask- ing for pictures of them with their children, and the officer found five hard-copy photos of what “appear[ed] to be mi- nor females in sexually provocative poses.” 1 Mr. Manyfield’s probation officer filed a petition to re- voke his supervised release based on these and other viola- tions. Supplemental reports further noted that Mr. Manyfield failed to attend a sex-offender-treatment pro- gram and followed Twitter accounts advertising images of underage girls. Given Mr. Manyfield’s repeated disregard for the conditions of his release and the apparent risk he posed to the community, the officer recommended eighteen months’ imprisonment (above the range recommended by the policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing

1 R. 110 at 6. No. 19-2096 3

Guidelines) to be followed by a lifetime term of supervised release with twenty-two mandatory, discretionary, and spe- cial conditions. Mr. Manyfield did not dispute the allega- tions but argued that the recommended sentence was exces- sive in view of the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and empha- sized a need for treatment instead of reincarceration. He fur- ther asked that supervised release, if any, be limited to an- other fifteen-year term, and he objected to a few of the pro- posed conditions. At the hearing that followed, Mr. Manyfield admitted a total of eight violations, and the district court heard sentenc- ing arguments. Citing concerns about the seriousness of the offense, Mr. Manyfield’s risk to the community, and the need for specific deterrence, the Government recommended a twenty-four-month sentence—the maximum allowed un- der 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). For his part, Mr. Manyfield noted that the range under the applicable policy statements was four to ten months’ imprisonment, explained that he needed a phone to schedule doctor appointments, and emphasized that he had not acted on the fantasies reflected in the porno- graphic materials. He acknowledged that he must follow the conditions and, in light of his age (sixty-seven) and medical conditions, requested a prison sentence within the range and a fifteen-year term of supervision. The court revoked Mr. Manyfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison, explain- ing that he was a danger to the community and that the maximum term was necessary to deter him. The court noted that it did not intend to further punish Mr. Manyfield for past conduct, but his criminal history—including abusing 4 No. 19-2096

his minor stepdaughter—was still a “relevant factor.” 2 It fur- ther explained that if Mr. Manyfield needed a cell phone, he should have asked his probation officer for help getting one without internet capabilities. The reports, moreover, showed that Mr. Manyfield used an encrypted internet connection to conceal his internet use. In light of Mr. Manyfield’s “ram- pant” violations, the court concluded that this was not a sit- uation in which he had “tried his best.” 3 “[T]he only reason I’m going to impose a 24-month sentence,” the court stated, “is because I can’t impose more. … If I could impose a 48-month sentence, I would … .” 4 Without further explanation, the court also imposed “lifetime supervised release with the same conditions that were imposed before.” 5 The court neither read the condi- tions aloud nor asked whether Mr. Manyfield (who had counsel present) waived reading. When the written judg- ment issued, it contained many conditions that had not been proposed in the revocation petition. Further, several of these conditions have been questioned or deemed vague since Mr. Manyfield’s original sentencing. 6 The written judgment also reflected the imposition of eight concurrent prison sen- tences and terms of supervision (one for each violation), but,

2 R.136 at 26:21. 3 Id. at 29:1, 28:13. 4 Id. at 29:4–7. 5 Id. at 29:11–13. 6 For example, the conditions included general prohibitions on “exces- sive” alcohol use and “frequenting” places where controlled substances are sold, see R.123 at 5, which we have held are unduly vague. See United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376–77, 379 (7th Cir. 2015). No. 19-2096 5

at the hearing, the district court referred only to one sentence for all eight violations. Mr. Manyfield has appealed, arguing that the district court did not explain adequately its reasons for imposing the conditions of supervised release. Although he did not object to these conditions at the sentencing hearing, we do not ap- ply the waiver doctrine. The challenged conditions were nei- ther included in the revocation petition, nor read aloud at the hearing. Indeed, the Government concedes that “the dis- trict court imposed numerous conditions of supervised re- lease without defendant having sufficient notice of those conditions and their precise formulation.” 7 Consequently, Mr. Manyfield had no “meaningful opportunity” to object. United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 450 (7th Cir. 2019) (ex- plaining that “[w]e will find waiver … when the defendant has notice of the proposed conditions, a meaningful oppor- tunity to object, and she asserts (through counsel or directly) that she does not object to the proposed conditions, waives reading of those conditions and their justifications, challeng- es certain conditions but not the one(s) challenged on appeal, or otherwise evidences an intentional or strategic decision not to object”), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 504 (2019). Turning to the merits, we agree with the parties that the district court did not justify properly its imposition of the conditions of supervised release. We have said that, in im- posing conditions of supervised release, sentencing judges should consider four factors: (1) the importance of advance notice of condi- tions being considered; (2) the need to justify

7 Gov’t’s Mot. to Vacate 13. 6 No. 19-2096

the conditions and the length of the term at sentencing by an adequate statement of rea- sons, reasonably related to the applicable § 3553(a) factors; (3) the goal of imposing only specific, appropriately-tailored conditions— which is to say, avoiding the imposition of vague or overbroad conditions; and (4) the re- quirement to orally pronounce all conditions, with the written judgment only clarifying the oral pronouncement in a manner that is not in- consistent with an unambiguous oral provi- sion. United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 838–39 (7th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, the court summarily imposed “the same conditions that were imposed before,” 8 so we cannot tell from the sentencing transcript whether it considered these factors in selecting which conditions to impose. Moreover, the court’s failure to explain its decision on the conditions of release was not harmless. Because several of the conditions had not been proposed in the probation of- ficer’s prehearing report, Mr. Manyfield had no notice of the conditions the court was considering. See Thompson, 777 F.3d at 377–79. The parties also have identified many conditions that have been deemed vague. These shortcomings require us to vacate the portion of the sentence imposing the condi- tions of supervised release. See United States v. Moose, 893 F.3d 951, 960, 962 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Miran- da-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2016).

8 R.136 at 29:12–13. No. 19-2096 7

The only issue, then, is the scope of the remand. Mr. Manyfield argues that our holding in United States v. Mobley, 833 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2016), mandates plenary re- sentencing for any Thompson error. By contrast, the Govern- ment contends that we should remand as to the conditions of supervised release because the court adequately justified the prison sentence. We agree with the Government and remand for recon- sideration of only the conditions of supervised release. In Mobley, we held that a district court instructed to resentence a defendant “in light of Thompson” must conduct a full re- sentencing “unless the opinion and mandate specify other- wise.” 833 F.3d at 801. We may order, however, a limited remand when there is no cause to disturb the prison sen- tence or term of supervision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106; Moose, 893 F.3d at 962 (affirming the defendant’s sentence and term of supervised release, but remanding “for the limited pur- pose of addressing th[e] conditions of supervised release”). Here, the district court amply justified the two-year pris- on sentence. It stated that the maximum term was necessary to deter Mr. Manyfield because his violations showed he was a danger to the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Moreover, the court’s comment that “the only reason I’m go- ing to impose a 24-month sentence is because I can’t impose more” 9 convinces us that it would impose the same term of imprisonment regardless of any changes to the conditions of supervised release. We acknowledge the “interplay” be- tween the custodial and supervised-release portions of the sentence, Kappes, 782 F.3d at 867, but here the district court’s

9 R.136 at 29:4–5. 8 No. 19-2096

remarks leave no room for doubt as to the appropriateness of the sentence. We also note that in his opening brief—filed before the Government conceded error—Mr. Manyfield did not challenge the term of imprisonment. Likewise, we see no need to remand for reconsideration of the term of supervised release in view of the court’s dis- cussion about the need for specific deterrence. Although the court did not tie explicitly this concern to the lifetime term of supervised release, there is no need to justify separately terms of imprisonment and supervised release when the same explanation reasonably supports both. See United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, Mr. Manyfield’s repeated violations of the conditions of re- lease, attempts to conceal his behavior, and failure to attend sex-offender treatment suggest that less severe measures had proven to be ineffective deterrents. The district court, there- fore, reasonably concluded that a lifetime term of supervi- sion was necessary. See Moose, 893 F.3d at 960 (extending prison-sentence rationale where it applied “equally well” to term of supervision). Last, the parties correctly note that, because Mr. Manyfield’s original sentence included a single term of supervised release, the district court may impose, upon rev- ocation, only one term of imprisonment and supervised re- lease. See United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006). The new judgment should reflect this principle. We VACATE and REMAND for a limited resentencing on the conditions of supervised release. VACATED in part and REMANDED in part