OPINION OF THE COURT
JAMES HUNTER, III, Circuit Judge.
The appellant, Priscilla Dominguez Laura, pled guilty in October 1976 to charges of importing and conspiring to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 963.1 Appellant was sentenced by the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in June 1977 to five years probation on each of two counts of the indictment, to run concurrently. Following an unrelated 1978 conviction in a federal district court in Florida for possession and distribution of cocaine, the Government moved the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate appellant’s probation. At that time, appellant moved to withdraw her 1976 guilty plea and to vacate the 1977 sentence.
This appeal raises the following issues:
a) Was appellant deprived of her sixth amendment right to the effective assistance [367]*367of counsel because of the joint representation of herself and her co-defendant husband by the same attorney?
b) Did the lower court err in finding that appellant waived her right to separate representation?
c) Did the lower court err in finding that the trial court’s acceptance of appellant’s guilty plea was not prejudicial error?
We have reached the following conclusions:
a) The actual conflict of interest which resulted from the joint representation of appellant and her co-defendant husband did not adversely affect the representation afforded her. Thus, she was not deprived of her right to effective assistance of counsel.
b) The lower court did not err in finding that appellant executed a valid waiver of her right to separate counsel. The record supports the lower court’s conclusion that the trial court conducted a proper inquiry into the joint representation of appellant and her husband.
c) Because appellant failed to allege or prove any prejudice, the lower court did not err in finding that the trial court’s alleged technical non-compliance with Fed.R. Crim.P. 11 in accepting appellant’s guilty plea did not justify relief.
Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects.
FACTS
Appellant Laura and her husband, Anthony Laura, were among twelve defendants charged in February 1976 with participating in a cocaine-importing scheme. Appellant was charged under two counts of the indictment with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 963; her husband was charged under all five counts of the indictment, which additionally charged violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.2
The Lauras retained the same attorney to represent them in the proceedings. On April 13, 1976, the district court, Judge Daniel H. Huyett, III (the “trial court”), ordered that all defendants retain separate counsel. The Lauras’ attorney, Robert I. Kalina, moved to vacate this order. In support of this motion, Kalina submitted an affidavit from himself and one from each of his clients, the appellant and her husband. The latter two affidavits were identical except that references to “my husband” in appellant’s affidavit were replaced with “my wife” in appellant’s husband’s affidavit. The affidavit from appellant, which was prepared by Kalina and sent to appellant for her signature, expressed appellant’s belief that she could best be represented by Kalina even though he also represented her husband. At one point the affidavit states that appellant “perceive[s] no conflict of interest.” Appendix at 104. Noting that the issue of conflict of interest had been raised not by the court, but by application of the Government, the affidavit continues:
I know of no substantive reason cited for the application other than that the prosecution might give discovery to one defendant that it might not give to another and that plea bargaining with one may someway effect [sic] the other. I do not wish to entertain plea bargaining and wish to go to trial in this matter if the Court decides the motions to dismiss the indictment herein adverse [sic] to me. Additionally, the Court must be aware that whatever discovery is given to the defense in this case will be shared between the defendants. To think otherwise, is an exercise in naivety. My defense is being burdened for some purpose I cannot perceive.
As I understand it, there is a privileged relationship between my husband and [368]*368myself that would preclude the last vestige of conflict of interest.
Appendix at 105-06.
On April 27, 1976, Judge Huyett conducted an inquiry on the issue of Kalina’s representation of both appellant and her husband. Judge Huyett requested that Kalina
step forward with your clients and .. . have each of them make a statement on the record that will roughly parallel the information in the affidavit so there is no question that they understand their rights, that they waive them, that they wish you as their attorney, [and] believe there is no conflict of interest.
Appendix at 8-9. The court did not address the appellant directly. Kalina undertook the examination of appellant:
Q. You have retained me to represent you in this matter?
A. Yes.
Q. Am I the attorney of your choice?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you aware that Anthony Laura retained me?
A. Yes.
Q. We have discussed this case and reviewed the facts of this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you perceive a conflict of interests in my representing you both, you and Anthony in this case?
A. No.
Q. Do you desire to have me represent you while representing Anthony in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. . Do you waive the claim to raise the issue at any point in this matter?
A. Yes.
Q. Have I informed you that the Court stated to me in a conference on April 15, 1976, in this Courthouse that either you or Anthony should obtain other counsel and I could not represent both of you?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe that would deprive you of counsel of your choice?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you believe I can represent your best interests in this case while representing Anthony?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you afford to retain other counsel?
A. No, I cannot afford it.
Appendix at 120-21. The attorney for the Government stated at the hearing that despite the waiver, he objected to the representation of the appellant and her husband by Kalina:
[W]e feel that the interest of Priscilla Dominguez Laura and the interest of [her husband] are completely different, that the culpability is somewhat different and that dual representation of each will either work to the detriment of both or perhaps to the benefit of both if everything goes swimmingly. The point is there is an inherent conflict there because they cannot be represented [by Kalina].
Appendix at 9. The trial judge accepted the waiver of the defendant and her husband, ruled that Kalina could continue to represent them in pretrial proceedings, and told the Government’s attorney to file a motion at any time during trial if he believed that there was a conflict of interest requiring separate trial counsel. Kalina in fact continued as counsel to appellant and her husband throughout the proceedings in Judge Huyett’s court.
The case did not go to trial. In October 1976 a plea agreement was reached whereby all defendants, including appellant, agreed to retract their former pleas of not guilty, and to plead guilty to the indictment. The guilty pleas of eight of the defendants, including the appellant’s, were entered, at the same time, on October 18, 1976.
Before accepting appellant’s guilty plea, Judge Huyett addressed the defendants en masse. He read Count 1 of the indictment, expressly omitting the overt acts set forth therein. He then asked: “Do any of you have any questions concerning the charges against you in Count 1?” As [369]*369Judge Huyett read the defendants’ names, each of them, including appellant, replied “No, sir.” The same procedure was followed for each count of the indictment. The prosecutor then recited the facts that would be proven at trial, essentially repeating the text of the indictment. Each defendant stated that the prosecution’s recital of facts was true. Judge Huyett accepted appellant’s guilty plea.
On June 20, 1977, Judge Huyett imposed concurrent five-year probationary terms upon appellant’s pleas of guilty to Counts 1 and 2. Appellant’s husband was sentenced to two years imprisonment and a special parole term on each count to which he pled guilty, to run concurrently.
In August 1978, appellant was convicted in a federal court in Florida of involvement in another cocaine scheme. Based on this conviction, Judge Huyett held a hearing on November 21, 1978, regarding appellant’s violation of her probation. On that day, appellant filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d)3 to withdraw her guilty plea under the 1976 indictment, and to vacate sentence.4 On December 27,1978, appellant filed a motion to transfer the case to another judge based on a conflict of interest between her newly retained local counsel, James S. Rothstein, and Judge Huyett. On December 28, 1978, Judge Huyett dismissed Rothstein from the case, denied all of appellant’s motions, revoked her probation, and sentenced her to a prison term.
An appeal was taken to this court. We reversed solely on the ground that the dismissal of attorney Rothstein was unsupported on the record. United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1979). On remand, 500 F.Supp. 1347, Judge Huyett ordered that the case be transferred to another judge, and vacated all of his orders of December 28, 1978. He ordered that appellant’s motions to withdraw her guilty plea and to vacate sentence, and the petition to revoke probation, be reconsidered ab initio by the transferee court.
On June 6, 1980, Judge Broderick (the “district court”) conducted a hearing on the pending motions and petition. The only witness at the hearing was appellant. The government offered no evidence. On the conflict of interest issue, appellant testified that Kalina had been hired and paid by her husband, and that the extent of her private consultation with Kalina outside the presence of her husband was ten minutes, although long conferences were held with both clients present. She testified that Kalina never explained the contents of her “conflict of interest” affidavit, never explained what a conflict of interest was, and never told her how a conflict could affect a plea bargaining situation. She further testified that Kalina had presented the plea agreement to her as an “all-or-nothing” deal: the agreement would be accepted by the government only if all defendants pled guilty. She stated that Kalina told her that the plea agreement was extremely beneficial to her husband because he would receive a two year sentence pursuant to the plea agreement, whereas if he went to trial he would be convicted because of the overwhelming evidence against him and could be sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years. She also testified that until the plea agreement was offered, Kalina had assured her that she had no reason to fear going to trial, but that after the plea agreement was offered, Kalina told her that her decision not to plead guilty would mean that her husband would receive a fifteen year sentence. Appendix at 10.
Judge Broderick found that appellant had identified an actual conflict of interest. Appendix at 12. However, he also found that appellant had executed a [370]*370waiver of her right to separate counsel. Judge Broderick based the latter finding on several factors: the inquiry in which Kalina examined appellant regarding the conflict of interest; the affidavit submitted by appellant; that although appellant testified that no one explained to her the meaning of her affidavit or of conflict of interest, she never testified that she did not understand them; that appellant’s motion to withdraw her guilty plea and vacate sentence was not made until after a petition to revoke her probation had been filed with the court; that appellant appeared to be an intelligent woman, she had attended college, and was 22 years old when she executed the waiver. To the extent that her testimony conveyed that her waiver was not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent, Judge Broderick found appellant’s testimony not credible. Appendix at 13-14.
With respect to appellant’s claim that the trial court had not complied with Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 in accepting her guilty plea, Judge Broderick found that the hearing conducted by Judge Huyett was satisfactory. He also found that appellant failed to allege or prove that she was prejudiced by the trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 11, insofar as appellant failed to assert that stricter compliance with Rule 11 would have brought about a change in her plea decision.
DISCUSSION
The Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant claims that the actual conflict of interest which existed in the joint representation of herself and her husband deprived her of her sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. The standard for determining the validity of appellant’s claim has recently been clarified by the United States Supreme Court.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Supreme Court reversed a decision of this court which had held that a sixth amendment violation could be established by showing a “possibility of prejudice or conflict of interest, however remote.” United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 522 (3d Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original). The Court noted that, under the standard enunciated by the court of appeals, virtually every instance of multiple representation would constitute a sixth amendment violation. 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718. Thus, the Court held, “[i]n order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Id. (footnote omitted). Although the Court held that the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice resulting from the inadequate representation, the Court emphasized that the defendant must show “that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation.” 446 U.S. at 349-50,100 S.Ct. at 1718-19.
The recent decision in United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), illustrates the need for a showing of adverse effect in a case in which ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged. In Morrison, federal agents, aware that the defendant had retained counsel, met and conversed with her without the knowledge or permission of her counsel. In the course of this conversation, the government agents disparaged defendant’s counsel, and suggested that she could be better represented by the public defender. 449 U.S. at 362,101 S.Ct. at 666. Based on these facts, we concluded that defendant’s sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated, and that she was entitled to relief, as the Supreme Court paraphrased us, “whether or not any tangible effect upon [her] representation had been demonstrated or alleged. ... ” 449 U.S. at 363, 101 S.Ct. at 667.5
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court assumed that the actions of the government agents violated defendant’s [371]*371sixth amendment right to counsel. It stated that “[o]ur cases have ... been responsive to proven claims that governmental conduct has rendered counsel’s assistance to the defendant ineffective.” Id. The Court further noted:
[T]he premise of our prior cases is that the constitutional infringement identified has had or threatens some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel’s representation or has produced some other prejudice to the defense. Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to counsel and to a fair trial.
449 U.S. at 365, 101 S.Ct. at 668. - Although the government agents had acted improperly, the defendant in Morrison failed to allege or prove that this improper action had had any effect on her representation. Thus, she failed to demonstrate a deprivation of her right to the effective assistance of counsel.
In the instant case, appellant testified that her attorney informed her that she would probably be acquitted if she went to trial, but that the plea bargaining agreement offered to her and her co-defendants was presented as an “all-or-nothing” deal. The attorney also provided appellant with information regarding the value of the agreement to her husband. This information was relevant to appellant’s plea decision. Appellant does not allege or show that the information was relayed to her in a coercive manner or that her attorney suggested a course of action to be taken by her. Indeed, if her attorney had been adversely influenced by his representation of appellant’s husband, and wished to coerce appellant into accepting the plea agreement, he would not have told appellant that she was likely to be acquitted if she proceeded to trial.6
Appellant’s attorney did nothing more than inform appellant of the probable consequences of the actions available to her. Thus, even if an actual conflict of interest existed in the joint representation of appellant and her husband, it did not affect the adequacy of her representation and did not deprive her of her sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Waiver of the Right to Separate Counsel
In United States ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 1973), this court held that the right to separate counsel may be waived so long as the dangers inherent in joint representation are explained to a defendant at the earliest possible time in the proceeding. Accord, United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1180-81 (3d Cir. 1978). See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 351, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1720, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring). Appellant asserts that the trial court failed to meet the requirements of Davenport in accepting her waiver. We do not agree.
The record reveals that the trial court was alert to the danger of conflict from the start of these proceedings. It was the trial court which originally ordered that appellant and her husband obtain separate counsel. The trial court did not permit joint representation to continue until after it conducted an inquiry which satisfied it that appellant understood the importance of her decision to waive her right to separate counsel. At this inquiry, the court had an opportunity to observe the appellant as she testified regarding the conflict issue. In the appellant’s presence, the Government noted the possible dangers involved in the joint representation. The trial court was in the best position to evaluate whether appellant’s waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Moreover, a second hearing on the waiver issue was conducted, this time before Judge Broderick. Judge Broderick reviewed the inquiry conducted by the trial [372]*372court. He also received testimony from appellant; the Government offered no evidence. Again, Judge Broderick had ample opportunity to observe appellant as she testified on this question. He noted in his opinion that, although appellant testified that no one explained the conflict of interest situation to her, she did not testify that she did not understand the hazards of joint representation. Judge Broderick found appellant to be an intelligent woman who understood the meaning of her decision. His evaluation of appellant paralleled that of the trial court.
Judge Broderick also noted the setting in which appellant first challenged the validity of her waiver of separate representation. Appellant entered her initial guilty plea in October 1976 and was sentenced in June 1977. Over a year later, in August 1978, appellant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a federal court in Florida for her involvement in a cocaine scheme that was unrelated to the scheme for which she had previously been sentenced. The second cocaine scheme was carried out during appellant’s probation on the first offense. The government, based on these facts, petitioned the federal court in Pennsylvania to vacate appellant’s original sentence of probation. In November 1978, Judge Huyett conducted a hearing regarding appellant’s violation of her probation. Then and only then did appellant challenge the validity of the waiver she executed during the first proceeding.
Under these circumstances, there is ample support in the record for both the trial court’s and the district court’s conclusion that appellant made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of her right to separate counsel.
Acceptance of Appellant’s Guilty Plea
Appellant’s final claim is that the trial court failed to comply with Fed.R. Crim.P. 11 in accepting her guilty plea. Rule 11 provides in part that
[bjefore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. . . .
Appellant asserts that the trial court failed technically to comply with this requirement because it omitted a discussion of the overt acts allegedly committed by appellant, and because it did not engage in an extensive colloquy with appellant regarding her plea decision.
The district court rejected appellant’s Rule 11 claim on the ground that appellant failed to allege or prove any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s technical non-compliance with the rule. In so doing, the district court relied on this court’s decision in United States v. Horsley, 599 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865, 100 S.Ct. 135, 62 L.Ed.2d 88 (1979).
The Horsley opinion relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 99 S.Ct. 2085, 60 L.Ed.2d 634. (1979). In Timmreck, as in the instant case, the petitioner moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that the district judge failed to comply with Rule 11. The petitioner did not, however, allege any specific prejudice arising out of the asserted violation of the rule. The Supreme Court denied the claim, holding that “collateral relief is not available when all that is shown is a failure to comply with the formal requirements of the Rule.” 441 U.S. at 785, 99 S.Ct. at 2088, quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429, 82 S.Ct. 468, 471, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962).
The appellant in this case, like those in Timmreck and Horsley, failed to allege or prove any specific prejudice resulting from the technical non-compliance with Rule 11. Appellant did not argue that, had there been compliance, her plea decision would have been different. Therefore, the district court did not err in rejecting appellant’s Rule 11 claim.
Based on the foregoing discussion, appellant has failed to show the “manifest injustice” required under Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(d) to warrant the setting aside of a [373]*373conviction and the withdrawal of a guilty plea. The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.