ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
John D. Parisién was convicted in the County Court for Rolette County of Driving under Suspension and Fleeing a Police officer after entering pleas of guilty to both charges. We affirm.
Parisién challenges the convictions, asserting that the county court failed to comply with Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., by failing to “personally” advise Parisién of his rights and by accepting a plea of guilty when Parisién had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Pari-sién also complains that he is currently being held at the state penitentiary in violation of section 12-51-09 of the North Dakota Century Code because the county court sentenced him to commitment at the state farm and he has not received written explanation as to why he is being held at the penitentiary.
The central focus of this appeal is Rule 11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., which reads:
“(b)
Advice to Defendant.
The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally [except as provided in Rule 43(c) ] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered;
(3) That the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty;
(4) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury or otherwise and the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses; and
(5) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against the defendant and, if necessary,
one will be appointed to represent the defendant, as provided in Rule 44, North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
The procedures which are outlined in Rule 11 are mandatory and binding upon the court.
State v. Schumacher,
452 N.W.2d 345 (N.D.1990);
State v. Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d 861, 865 (N.D.1982);
State v. Mortrud,
312 N.W.2d 354, 356 (N.D.1981);
State v. McKay,
234 N.W.2d 853, 859 (N.D.1975). However, compliance with Rule 11 does not require the court to examine the defendant in a predetermined, ritualistic manner.
State v. Boushee,
459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D.1990) (citing
State v. Storbakken,
246 N.W.2d 78 (N.D.1976)).
See also, State v. Hoffarth,
456 N.W.2d 111, 113 (N.D.1990);
Schumacher,
452 N.W.2d at 347;
Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d at 866.
On September 17, 1990, Parisién appeared before the County Court for Rolette County. Parisién and an unknown number of other defendants were provided with a “group” explanation of rights.
The group explanation covered the defendants’ right to counsel, their right to plead guilty or not guilty, and their rights concerning a trial by jury; the group explanation covered subsections 3, 4, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Subsequent to the “group” explanation of rights, Parisién was individually informed of his right to counsel, the maximum and minimum penalties of the charges, the nature of the charges, and questioned about his understanding of the group explanation.
Parisién asserts that the county court failed to comply with Rule 11 because the “group” explanation of rights does not constitute “personally addressing” the defendant as required in Rule 11. We disagree.
The pertinent part of Rule 11 reads:
“(b)
Advice to Defendant.
The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first,
by addressing the defendant personally
[except as provided in Rule 43(c) ] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the following: [Emphasis added.]”
The requirement of “addressing the defendant personally” is satisfied when the court provides one recitation of those rights which are common to all of the defendants, and then subsequently requires each defendant to respond individually.
United States v. Hobson,
686 F.2d 628, 629-30 (8th Cir.1982) (citing
United States v. Fels,
599 F.2d 142, 145-46 (7th Cir.1979);
United States v. Laura,
500 F.Supp. 1347, 1353-54 (E.D.Pa.1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1981));
State v. Martens,
222 Neb. 870, 872, 387 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1986). We believe the county court complied with the requirement of Rule 11 relating to addressing the defendant personally when it collectively informed the defendants of their common rights and then required Parisién to respond individually.
In summary, the group explanation of rights properly informed Parisién of those rights outlined in subsections 3, 4, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Following the group explanation of rights, Parisién was individually informed of the nature of the charges against him, the maximum and minimum penalties for those offenses, and that he had a right to counsel on either or both charges; subsections 1, 2, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Therefore, we are convinced the county court complied with Rule 11 prior to accepting Parisien’s pleas.
Parisién also contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Compliance with Rule 11 insures that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily made the decision to plead guilty.
E.g. Boushee,
459 N.W.2d at 554;
Hoffarth,
456 N.W.2d at 114. The procedural aspects of Rule 11 are satisfied “if knowledge on the part of the defendant of the rights waived by pleading guilty ‘is clearly reflected from the whole record, not just the interrogation of the defendant by the trial court’ ”.
Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting
Storbakken,
246 N.W.2d at 84).
The burden of establishing a basis for post-conviction relief rests upon the defendant.
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ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
John D. Parisién was convicted in the County Court for Rolette County of Driving under Suspension and Fleeing a Police officer after entering pleas of guilty to both charges. We affirm.
Parisién challenges the convictions, asserting that the county court failed to comply with Rule 11, N.D.R.Crim.P., by failing to “personally” advise Parisién of his rights and by accepting a plea of guilty when Parisién had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Pari-sién also complains that he is currently being held at the state penitentiary in violation of section 12-51-09 of the North Dakota Century Code because the county court sentenced him to commitment at the state farm and he has not received written explanation as to why he is being held at the penitentiary.
The central focus of this appeal is Rule 11(b), N.D.R.Crim.P., which reads:
“(b)
Advice to Defendant.
The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally [except as provided in Rule 43(c) ] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;
(2) The mandatory minimum punishment, if any, and the maximum possible punishment provided by the statute defining the offense to which the plea is offered;
(3) That the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty;
(4) That if the defendant pleads guilty there will not be a further trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury or otherwise and the right to be confronted with adverse witnesses; and
(5) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that the defendant has the right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against the defendant and, if necessary,
one will be appointed to represent the defendant, as provided in Rule 44, North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.”
The procedures which are outlined in Rule 11 are mandatory and binding upon the court.
State v. Schumacher,
452 N.W.2d 345 (N.D.1990);
State v. Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d 861, 865 (N.D.1982);
State v. Mortrud,
312 N.W.2d 354, 356 (N.D.1981);
State v. McKay,
234 N.W.2d 853, 859 (N.D.1975). However, compliance with Rule 11 does not require the court to examine the defendant in a predetermined, ritualistic manner.
State v. Boushee,
459 N.W.2d 552, 555 (N.D.1990) (citing
State v. Storbakken,
246 N.W.2d 78 (N.D.1976)).
See also, State v. Hoffarth,
456 N.W.2d 111, 113 (N.D.1990);
Schumacher,
452 N.W.2d at 347;
Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d at 866.
On September 17, 1990, Parisién appeared before the County Court for Rolette County. Parisién and an unknown number of other defendants were provided with a “group” explanation of rights.
The group explanation covered the defendants’ right to counsel, their right to plead guilty or not guilty, and their rights concerning a trial by jury; the group explanation covered subsections 3, 4, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Subsequent to the “group” explanation of rights, Parisién was individually informed of his right to counsel, the maximum and minimum penalties of the charges, the nature of the charges, and questioned about his understanding of the group explanation.
Parisién asserts that the county court failed to comply with Rule 11 because the “group” explanation of rights does not constitute “personally addressing” the defendant as required in Rule 11. We disagree.
The pertinent part of Rule 11 reads:
“(b)
Advice to Defendant.
The court may not accept a plea of guilty without first,
by addressing the defendant personally
[except as provided in Rule 43(c) ] in open court, informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant understands the following: [Emphasis added.]”
The requirement of “addressing the defendant personally” is satisfied when the court provides one recitation of those rights which are common to all of the defendants, and then subsequently requires each defendant to respond individually.
United States v. Hobson,
686 F.2d 628, 629-30 (8th Cir.1982) (citing
United States v. Fels,
599 F.2d 142, 145-46 (7th Cir.1979);
United States v. Laura,
500 F.Supp. 1347, 1353-54 (E.D.Pa.1980), aff’d, 667 F.2d 365 (3rd Cir. 1981));
State v. Martens,
222 Neb. 870, 872, 387 N.W.2d 701, 703 (1986). We believe the county court complied with the requirement of Rule 11 relating to addressing the defendant personally when it collectively informed the defendants of their common rights and then required Parisién to respond individually.
In summary, the group explanation of rights properly informed Parisién of those rights outlined in subsections 3, 4, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Following the group explanation of rights, Parisién was individually informed of the nature of the charges against him, the maximum and minimum penalties for those offenses, and that he had a right to counsel on either or both charges; subsections 1, 2, and 5 of Rule 11(b). Therefore, we are convinced the county court complied with Rule 11 prior to accepting Parisien’s pleas.
Parisién also contends that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. Compliance with Rule 11 insures that the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily made the decision to plead guilty.
E.g. Boushee,
459 N.W.2d at 554;
Hoffarth,
456 N.W.2d at 114. The procedural aspects of Rule 11 are satisfied “if knowledge on the part of the defendant of the rights waived by pleading guilty ‘is clearly reflected from the whole record, not just the interrogation of the defendant by the trial court’ ”.
Hagemann,
326 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting
Storbakken,
246 N.W.2d at 84).
The burden of establishing a basis for post-conviction relief rests upon the defendant.
E.g. State v. Skjonsby,
417 N.W.2d 818, 820 (N.D.1987);
State v. Gilley,
289 N.W.2d 238, 241 (N.D.1980). In
Gilley
we said: “Whenever there is contradiction between the record and the unsupported assertion of an accused, the court is compelled to accept the record.” 289 N.W.2d at 241.
During the “group” explanation of rights Parisién was informed that he had a
right to counsel and if he could not afford counsel, counsel would be appointed for him at public expense. When individually questioned as to whether or not he understood the rights which had been explained to the group, he responded that he did understand. Immediately before the county court asked for his pleas, he was again asked, this time individually, whether or not he desired to have an attorney present, and whether or not he desired to have time to talk to an attorney about the current charges. He responded in the negative. Immediately following his pleas, Parisién was asked if he had been promised anything, threatened, or in any way pressured into entering pleas of guilty. He responded in the negative. The record also shows that Parisién has had a number of previous encounters with the criminal justice system, including two prior convictions for fleeing a police officer. Significantly, he was arrested only a matter of fourteen hours after being released from the state farm after serving a sentence for a similar charge. Parisién has neither cited authority nor discussed this issue in his brief.
Parisién seemingly argues that it is per se invalid to accept a guilty plea from a defendant who is not represented by counsel.
We disagree. We have previously noted that criminal defendants have a sixth amendment right to self-representation where there is a knowing and intelligent election to do so.
In Interest of R.Z.,
415 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D.1987) (citing
Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)).
In light of the fact that the county court twice informed Parisién of his right to counsel, that the record discloses that Parisién has had considerable experience with the criminal justice system, that he was specifically questioned as to whether or not he was acting voluntarily, and that Parisién has failed to cite any authority for his assertion, we conclude that Parisien’s argument is without merit.
Parisien’s final argument involves a complaint that he has not received any written notice as to why he is being held in the state penitentiary and not the state farm. Parisién relies upon § 12-51-09, N.D.C.C., for his argument.
We find nothing in § 12-51-09, N.D.C.C., that re
quires written notice be provided to Pari-sién. We believe that this argument is also without merit.
For the reasons stated in the opinion, we affirm.
GIERKE, LEVINE and MESCHKE, JJ., concur.
VANDE WALLE, J., concurs in the result.