United States v. Lalonnie Egans

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2024
• Docket: 22-50191
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 13 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50191

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:15-cr-00474-PSG-6 v.

LALONNIE EGANS, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Philip S. Gutierrez, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 8, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, FRIEDLAND, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Lalonnie Egans appeals the sentence imposed by the district court following

her jury conviction of three counts for health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1347 for her role in Atlantic Recovery Services’ (“ARS”) scheme to bill

California’s Drug Medi-Cal program for fraudulent substance-abuse treatment.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court did not err by finding that Egans played a supervisory

role in the scheme and then applying a two-level role enhancement to her offense-

level under USSG § 3B1.1(c), as had been recommended by the presentence report

(“PSR”). Egans contends that she was not in fact a “supervisor” even though she

was “called a supervisor” at ARS because she did not exercise control over her

supervisees, was subject to the direct control of her supervisors, and claimed no

share in the profits.

A court may impose a two-level role enhancement if there is evidence that

“the defendant exercised some control over others involved in the commission of

the offense [or was] responsible for organizing others for the purpose of carrying

out the crime.” United States v. Salcido-Corrales, 249 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.

2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “Regardless of the district court’s

specific statements at sentencing, the enhancement is proper nonetheless if there is

evidence in the record that would support the conclusion that [the defendant] did,

in fact, exercise the requisite control over others.” United States v. Whitney, 673

F.3d 965, 976 (9th Cir. 2012). Here, the enhancement is amply supported by the

record. Egans admits, and the evidence at trial establishes, that she “supervised”

and “directed” at least three co-defendants: Tina St. Julian, Denise Lugo, and

Shameca Womac. See United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir.

2 2020) (affirming a three-level role enhancement for a defendant who

“acknowledged ‘he could be said to have directed or supervised [his co-

defendant]’”). Further, Egans audited her supervisees’ paperwork to ensure that

counselors followed ARS’s fraudulent billing practices; directed counselors to

collect students’ signatures on sign-in sheets for counseling sessions, regardless of

actual attendance; and trained counselors to fabricate student progress notes and

update logs for billing purposes. At least St. Julian and Lugo followed her

instructions. See United States v. Maldonado, 215 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“A single incident of persons acting under a defendant’s direction is sufficient

evidence to support a two-level role enhancement.”).

2. Nor was the below-Guidelines sentence substantively unreasonable.

Egans participated in a years-long fraudulent scheme in which she supervised,

directed, and covered up “reimbursements” of over $1.2 million from a public

health program and burdened high-school and middle-school students with a sham

history of substance-abuse. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir.

2008) (en banc). Egans argues that the district court abused its discretion by

disregarding several 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) sentencing factors and imposed a

disproportionate sentence relative to others convicted in the scheme. However, the

district court expressly considered the § 3553(a) factors. And as Egans

acknowledges, each of her co-defendants who received a lower sentence entered a

3 guilty plea and cooperated with the government. A “sentencing disparity based on

cooperation is not unreasonable.” United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1121

(9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, “in the overwhelming majority of cases, a Guidelines

sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that would be

reasonable in the particular circumstances.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 994 (citations

omitted).

AFFIRMED.