United States v. Kurashev
Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-2874 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:21-cr-00040-KJM-1 v. MEMORANDUM* MURAT KURASHEV,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Kimberly J. Mueller, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 13, 2026 San Francisco, California
Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and S.R. THOMAS and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Following a guilty plea, Murat Kurashev was convicted on one count of
attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). He was sentenced to 144 months of
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. Kurashev now
appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
At sentencing, the district court imposed a 12-level “terrorism” enhancement
under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4(a), which applies when an offense involved a “federal
crime of terrorism” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). Under section
2332b(g)(5), a federal crime of terrorism is an offense that (A) was “calculated to
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion,” and
(B) was a violation of one of a list of specified provisions, including 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, which Kurashev pleaded guilty to violating.
We review a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo and its application of the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d 693, 698–99 (9th Cir. 2020).
1. Kurashev argues that the district court abused its discretion in applying
the terrorism enhancement because there was insufficient evidence of his specific
intent. We have described section 2332b(g)(5)(A) as imposing a “specific intent
requirement.” Alhaggagi, 978 F.3d at 700. Because “[i]t is possible . . . to provide
material support to a terrorist group in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)
without intending that the support . . . would influence [or] affect . . . government
conduct,” we have explained that the enhancement “does not automatically apply
to all material support offenses.” Id. at 699. In material-support cases, a court
2 24-2874 generally will be required to identify “evidence beyond the facts underlying the
offense conduct” to show that the defendant intended for his material support to be
used to “influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or
coercion.” Id. at 701–02. That intent may be inferred from evidence regarding the
defendant’s knowledge of how the support will be used. Id. at 702–03.
The record supports the district court’s determination that Kurashev had the
requisite intent. Specifically, the evidence shows that Kurashev sent money to
Farrukh Fayzimatov, a Syria-based fundraiser, with the intent that at least some of
the funds would be used to purchase military equipment for Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
(HTS) to use in its armed conflict against the Syrian government.
Unlike in Alhaggagi, see 978 F.3d at 702–03, the evidence shows that
Kurashev knew how his support would be used. Kursahev knew that HTS was
engaged in armed conflict against the Syrian government during the Syrian civil
war. And he knew not only that Fayzimatov was a fundraiser for HTS generally,
but also that Fayzimatov personally solicited and spent money to support HTS’s
military efforts. For example, Kurashev forwarded an undercover agent a
fundraising post from Fayzimatov that listed the prices of military equipment—
including weapons and ammunition vests—and encouraged donors to “[e]quip the
warrior.” Kurashev also forwarded a video in which Fayzimatov stated that he had
“equip[ped] over a hundred mujahids” using funds raised during the past year.
3 24-2874 Kurashev’s contemporaneous statements confirm that he intended for some
of his funds to be used to support HTS’s armed conflict against the Syrian
government. When Fayzimatov told Kurashev that donating would mean “using
your assets to carry out jihad,” Kurashev responded, “Yes, brother, I am trying to
act with only this intent.” And after Fayzimatov remarked on the expense of “one
operation,” Kurashev replied that “[w]ar is an expensive pleasure.”
Despite this evidence, Kurashev contends that the record does not establish
that he acted with specific intent because he put no limits on Fayzimatov’s use of
the money, and he intended to support some of Fayzimatov’s journalistic work.
But Alhaggagi makes clear that the requisite intent can be found without evidence
that the defendant instructed the recipient on how to use the funds, see 978 F.3d at
702–03 (focusing on knowledge of how the support would be used), and section
2332b(g)(5)(A) does not require that the offense be calculated exclusively to affect
government conduct by intimidation or coercion. On this record, it was well within
the district court’s discretion to determine that Kurashev’s donations were not
“only intend[ed] to support journalistic efforts.”
2. Kurashev also argues that the district court erred in applying the
enhancement because the Assad regime in Syria was not a “government” under
section 2332b(g)(5). As Kurashev concedes, he did not raise this argument below,
4 24-2874 so we review it for plain error. See United States v. Gomez, 165 F.4th 1199, 1206–
07 (9th Cir. 2026) (en banc). We see none.
“When a statute does not define a term, we typically ‘give the phrase its
ordinary meaning.’” FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)). Kurashev does not dispute
that the Assad regime was a government in the ordinary sense—that is, “the body
of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit or
organization.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 982 (2002). Instead,
he argues that “government” should not be given its ordinary meaning in section
2332b(g)(5)(A). We are not persuaded by his arguments to depart from ordinary
meaning. At a minimum, he cannot show that the district court’s application of
ordinary meaning was a clear or obvious error. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 734 (1993).
3. Finally, Kurashev argues that the application of the enhancement was
“procedurally unreasonable” because the district court did not “sufficiently explain
the decision to impose the enhancement.” This challenge was not raised below, so
we review it for plain error.
The district court did not err, let alone plainly. The court articulated the
requirements of the enhancement and pointed to evidence in the record supporting
its finding that those requirements were met. Its explanation was sufficient “to
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