United States v. Kochersperger

26 F. Cas. 803, 9 Am. Law Reg. 145
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania
DecidedJuly 1, 1860
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 26 F. Cas. 803 (United States v. Kochersperger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Kochersperger, 26 F. Cas. 803, 9 Am. Law Reg. 145 (circtedpa 1860).

Opinion

CADWALADER, District Judge.

Judge GRIER authorizes me to state that he has perused the following opinion carefully, and that he fully concurs in it.

A post, etymologically defined, is a mode of conveying written or unwritten intelligence, to and from appointed stations, at regular intervals, or whenever the performance of such service may properly be required. The modes by which intelligence is transmitted through q. post, otherwise than at regular intervals, are usually called expresses. Regular posts no longer transmit unwritten intelligence. A post-road is a public highway, whose use by the post is prescribed or authorized by law. A mail is a portable receptacle in which letters, or packets of written or printed sheets, are conveyed by post to an appointed station. A post-office, according to the primary meaning of the word, is an apartment, or building, at an appointed station, for the local transaction of the business of the mail. No postal station is now maintained without such an office.

No government has ever organized a system of posts without securing to itself, to some extent, a monopoly of the carriage of letters and mailable packets. The policy of such an exclusive system is a -subject of legislative, "not of judicial, inquiry. But the monopoly of the government is an optional, not an essential, part of its postal system. The mere existence of a postal department of the government is not an establishment of the monopoly. When it is legislatively established, it may include one. or more, without embracing all of the subjects of the government’s postal arrangements. The business of private carriers of letters and mailable packets, even on principal mail-routes, is lawful, unless legislatively prohibited. A private monopolist, secured by prohibitory legislation, cannot require the suppression of a rival business of competitors who do not infringe the prohibition, merely because the continuance of their business would lessen or destroy the profits of his monopoly. A like rule applies in determining the effect of a government’s legislative prohibitions to secure its own postal monopoly. The monopoly cannot be extended beyond the legislative prohibitions merely because the continuance of a specific business which has not been prohibited would reduce the postal earnings of the government, or even frustrate the purposes of its exclusive policy. The remedy, if required, is, in such a case, legislative. These remarks are applicable to the laws which congress has thought necessary and proper for carrying the constitutional power to establish post-offices and post-roads into execution.

How far, if either post-offices alone, or post-[804]*804roads alone, had been mentioned in the constitution, the carriage of mailable matter by private persons could have been prohibited by congress, might perhaps, under certain heads, have been a question attended with difficulties which do not exist under the constitution as framed. If the necessity or expediency of a postal monopoly is assumed, the wisdom of expressly mentioning both post-offices and post-roads in the constitution must be conceded. Neither subject of the two-fold constitutional power is altogether distinct or independent of the other. But, as the words of the constitution should be interpreted, each subject of the power is to be regarded as additional to the other. In the present case, the question is, not how far the constitutional power under either head extends, but how far it has been legislatively carried into execution.

The policy of the postal statutes has been to establish, as post-roads, those highways in every prescribed or authorized mail route, which are within the general public domain of the respective states. This has been done by declaring the respective mail routes, post-roads, authorizing the postmaster general to enter into temporary contracts to extend the line of posts, and making prospectively the roads designated in such contracts post-roads. The statutes also make all navigable waters on which steamboats regularly pass, from port to port, post-roads, and all completed railroads post-routes; and authorize the postmaster general to contract for carrying the mall on plank roads and navigable canals, declaring them respectively, for such times and such distances as the mails may be carried on them, post-roads. To obstruct or to retard the passage of the mail, or to refuse to it the privilege of a public ferry, is made penal. On such general public highways, natural or artificial, the citizens of each state are, under the constitution, entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states. The states, in surrendering the jwwers which they have united in delegating to the general government, had no prudential reasons inducing them to restrict its postal authority over such highways.

But the constitutional power to establish state roads as post-roads, can be executed only by the designation of actual public highways, present or future, for use by carriers of the mail. The existence and continuance of such highways are independent of congressional control. Congress cannot regulate their use, or secure their permanence. When they cease to be common public highways of the respective states, they are no longer post-roads. While they are post-roads, carriers of the mail use them under the same conditions as the respective states have imposed on their own citizens in a case in the Western district of this circuit, the court was of opinion that the act of congress making all railroads post-routes, applied only to railroads laid out and constructed conformably to the legislation of the respective states. A subsequent act of congress had enacted that certain roads, including a designated railroad, should “be established as post-roads,” and declared this railroad a post-route. The road was in a route unauthorized by the legislative charter of the company which constructed it. The court was of opinion that these acts of congress had not made it a lawful highway Cleveland, P. & A. R. Co. v. Franklin Canal Co. [Case No. 2,890]. See 10 Stat. 250; 9 Harris [21 Pa. St] 123. An act of congress declaring the Wheeling bridge, as it had been constructed at a particular elevation, an established post-road, required steamers navigating the river to adapt the height of their chimneys to this elevation of the bridge. This provision as to steamers, though considered by the supreme court a constitutional exercise of the power to regulate commerce between the states, was not sustained as an execution of the power to establish post-roads. [Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co.] 18 How. [59 U. S.] 431. The post office law authorizes the postmaster general to “direct the route or road, where there are more than one, between places designated by law for a post-road,” and enacts that the road thus designated “shall be considered the post-road.” But though there is only one road in a prescribed mail-route, he cannot, when the road is, from physical obstructions or want of repair, impassable, adopt measures to render it serviceable. The same law requires him in any such case “to report” the fact “to congress, with such information as can be obtained to enable congress to establish some other road instead of it,in the same main direction.”

But, the highways of a state, so long as open to the common public use of her own citizens, may be used unobstructedly by carriers of the mail, and cannot be used by private carriers of mailable matter in any mode which has been prohibited by congress.

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16 F. 609 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York, 1883)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
26 F. Cas. 803, 9 Am. Law Reg. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kochersperger-circtedpa-1860.