United States v. Kim

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
• Decided: May 5, 2023
• Docket: 22-0234/AR
• Status: Published

Opinion

This opinion is subject to revision before publication.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ARMED FORCES _______________

UNITED STATES Appellee

v.

Byunggu KIM, Sergeant First Class United States Army, Appellant

No. 22-0234 Crim. App. No. 20200689

Argued February 7, 2023—Decided May 5, 2023

Military Judges: Mary Catherine Vergona and Troy A. Smith

For Appellant: Captain Carol K. Rim (argued); Colo- nel Michael C. Friess, Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. McFeatters, and Major Bryan A. Osterhage (on brief); Major Julia M. Farinas, Major Rachel P. Gor- dienko, and Jonathan F. Potter, Esq.

For Appellee: Captain Joshua A. Hartsell (argued); Colonel Christopher B. Burgess, Lieutenant Colonel Jacqueline J. DeGaine, and Major Pamela L. Jones (on brief).

Judge SPARKS delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Judge OHLSON, Judge MAGGS, Judge HARDY, and Judge JOHNSON joined. _______________ United States v. Kim, No. 22-0234/AR Opinion of the Court

Judge SPARKS delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises out of the conviction of Sergeant First Class Byunggu Kim (Appellant), in accordance with his pleas, of four specifications of sexual abuse of a child and one specification each of making an indecent recording, as- sault consummated by a battery, and indecent conduct in violation of Articles 120b, 120c, 128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 920b, 920c, 928, 934 (2018). The military judge sentenced Appellant to a dishonorable discharge, 130 months of confinement, and reduction to grade E-1. In keeping with the plea agree- ment, the convening authority reduced the confinement to six years and otherwise approved the sentence. The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals af- firmed the findings and sentence in a summary disposition. Appellant then petitioned this Court and his petition was granted on November 7, 2022. This Court granted oral argument to resolve three ques- tions, 1 including whether the military judge abused his dis- cretion by failing to abide by the heightened plea inquiry requirements under United States v. Hartman, 69 M.J. 467 (C.A.A.F. 2011). For the reasons set forth below, we con- clude that the military judge did abuse his discretion.

1 The actual granted issues were: I. Whether a guilty plea to an offense waives a challenge that the conduct is not a cognizable offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. II. Whether, in this case, internet search que- ries for “drugged sleep” and “rape sleep” are indecent conduct; in the alternative, whether the military judge abused his discretion by failing to abide by the heightened plea inquiry requirements under United States v. Hart- man, 69 M.J. 467 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

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Because of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the remaining issues. I. Background The relevant charge in this case stemmed from Appel- lant’s sexual abuse of his twelve-year-old stepdaughter, AK, which unfolded over an approximately two-year period starting in 2018. The abuse usually took place late at night in the living room or AK’s bedroom. At first, Appellant would wait until AK started falling asleep and then mas- sage her on the leg, the upper thigh, and the buttocks area. Eventually the massages migrated to her genital area, both over and under her clothing. AK was taking medication that could cause hallucinations and Appellant would flash lights and pound on the walls late at night to exacerbate this side effect. Appellant also began setting up his cell phone to film AK in the shower. He then edited these clips into sexually explicit videos he stored on his phone. In ad- dition, in early 2019, Appellant conducted multiple searches on a pornographic website using the terms “rape sleep” and “drugged sleep” because watching such videos reminded him of abusing AK. In April 2019, AK reported Appellant’s actions to law enforcement. Appellant pled guilty to four specifications of sexual abuse of a child and several other offenses including one specification of indecent conduct by searching for the por- nographic videos. The specification stated that Appellant “did . . . commit indecent conduct, to wit: conducting an in- ternet search for ‘rape sleep’ and ‘drugged sleep,’ and that said conduct was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.” During the plea colloquy, Appellant told the military judge that he sought out videos “depicting simu- lated vulgar sex scenes involving sleep or sex with an indi- vidual that was pretending to be asleep” and that watching the videos reminded him of sexually abusing AK. The col- loquy of the military judge on this offense is at issue. II. Discussion We review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion and questions of law arising

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from the guilty plea de novo. United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008). “During a guilty plea inquiry the military judge is charged with determining whether there is an adequate basis in law and fact to support the plea before accepting it.” Id. at 321-22 (citing United States v. Prater, 32 M.J. 433, 436 (C.M.A. 1991)). A military judge abuses his or her discretion by “fail[ing] to obtain from the accused an adequate factual basis to support the plea—an area in which we afford significant deference” or if his or her ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law. Id. at 322. We give the military judge broad discretion in the deci- sion to accept a guilty plea because the facts are undevel- oped in such cases. Id. In reviewing the military judge’s de- cision, this Court applies a substantial basis test: “Does the record as a whole show a substantial basis in law and fact for questioning the guilty plea.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Prater, 32 M.J. at 436). “[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the de- fendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.” United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 539, 40 C.M.R. 247, 251 (1969) (quoting McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969)). The First Amendment to the United States Constitu- tion states that, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I. Though ser- vicemembers are not excluded from First Amendment pro- tection, it is important to remember that: the different character of the military community and of the military mission requires a different ap- plication of those protections. The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent neces- sity for imposition of discipline, may render per- missible within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). “When a charge against a servicemember may implicate both criminal and constitutionally protected conduct, the

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distinction between what is permitted and what is prohib- ited constitutes a matter of critical significance.” Hartman, 69 M.J. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. O’Connor, 58 M.J. 450, 453 (C.A.A.F. 2003)). In a guilty plea situation, “the colloquy between the military judge and an accused must contain an appropriate discussion and acknowledgment on the part of the accused of the critical distinction between permissible and prohib- ited behavior.” Id. “The fundamental requirement of plea inquiry . . . involves a dialogue in which the military judge poses questions about the nature of the offense and the ac- cused provides answers that describe his personal under- standing of the criminality of his or her conduct.” Id. at 469. In Hartman, this Court was troubled by the fact that the military judge failed to ask the appellant whether he understood the relationship between certain sections of the colloquy and the distinction between constitutionally pro- tected behavior and criminal conduct. Id. We determined that “[i]n the absence of a dialogue employing lay terminol- ogy to establish an understanding by the accused as to the relationship between the supplemental questions and the issue of criminality, we cannot view [an appellant’s] plea as provident.” Id. Hartman involved a conviction for sodomy under Article 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (2006). 69 M.J. at 467. As such, it implicated the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), protecting consensual sodomy in the privacy of one’s own home. The First Amendment right implicated in the present case was established by the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In that case, investigators acting upon a search warrant for evidence of illegal bookkeeping seized three reels of eight- millimeter film they deemed obscene. Id. at 558. The ap- pellant challenged his conviction for possession of obscene matter, asserting his First Amendment rights had been vi- olated. Id. at 559. The Supreme Court agreed, stating that “the mere private possession of obscene matter cannot con- stitutionally be made a crime.” Id. The Court upheld a con- stitutional right “to be free, except in very limited

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circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusion into one’s privacy.” Id. at 564. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitu- tional heritage rebels at the thought of giving gov- ernment the power to control men’s minds. Id. at 565. This constitutional right protected in Stanley does not automatically apply to servicemembers. Conduct that is constitutionally protected for civilians could still qualify as prejudicing good order and discipline or bringing discredit upon the military. United States v. Moon, 73 M.J. 382, 388 (C.A.A.F. 2014) (quoting United States v. Barberi, 71 M.J. 127, 131 (C.A.A.F. 2012)). However, images viewed for sex- ual gratification do not necessarily lose their First Amend- ment protection. Id. at 389. Appellant’s behavior here oc- cupies a constitutional gray area similar to that at issue in Hartman. As a result, the plea colloquy should have estab- lished why possibly constitutionally protected material could still be service discrediting in the military context. See id. (stating that “[w]ithout a proper explanation and understanding of the constitutional implications of the charge, [a]ppellant’s admissions in his stipulation and dur- ing the colloquy regarding why he personally believed his conduct was service discrediting and prejudicial to good or- der and discipline do not satisfy Hartman.”). 2 Appellant argues that the military judge’s examination of Appellant did not rise to the level of the detailed inquiry required under Hartman whenever there is the potential to criminalize constitutionally protected conduct. The Gov- ernment counters that the military judge engaged in a de- tailed colloquy that included a thorough explanation of the charges and demonstrated Appellant’s understanding of

2 Moon involved an appellant charged with possession of im- ages of nude minors. 73 M.J. at 383.

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the criminality of his actions, and that this was sufficient to meet the heightened standard required by Hartman. The record shows that the military judge conducted a thorough plea colloquy with regard to the elements of the offense. He stated the elements and definitions relevant to the charged offense and questioned Appellant in detail about his behavior. Appellant was clear about the nature of the videos he searched for and watched and about why he watched them, as well as the service discrediting nature of his actions. The military judge explored Appellant’s mo- tivation in searching for and viewing pornographic videos related to the terms “rape sleep” and “drugged sleep.” Ap- pellant confirmed with the military judge the connection between the videos and abusing his stepdaughter. Appel- lant appeared to understand why his conduct was criminal. See Care, 18 C.M.A. at 541, 40 C.M.R. at 253. However, the military judge did not discuss Appellant’s First Amendment rights or any of the constitutional implications of his situation. In Hartman, this Court set aside a guilty plea because the military judge failed to discuss with the appellant the relevant distinction between constitutionally protected behavior and criminal conduct. 69 M.J. at 469. If we adhere to the heightened standard outlined in Hartman, the military judge should have discussed with Appellant the existence of constitutional rights relevant to his situation and made sure Appellant understood why his behavior under the circumstances did not merit such protection. Given our decision in Hartman, we cannot view this plea colloquy as sufficient. We have been clear that the col- loquy between the military judge and an accused “must contain an appropriate discussion and acknowledgment on the part of the accused of the critical distinction between permissible and prohibited behavior.” Id. at 468 (emphasis added). In Moon, we further clarified that such discussion is required in situations where an Article 134, UCMJ, charge implicates constitutionally protected conduct. 73 M.J. at 388. Because such a discussion did not occur here, there is a substantial basis in law for questioning the plea.

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We therefore conclude that the military judge abused his discretion and that Appellant’s guilty plea to the charge of indecent conduct was improvident. III. Decision The decision of the United States Army Court of Crimi- nal Appeals is reversed as to Charge VI and its specifica- tion and the sentence, but affirmed in all other respects. The findings of guilty with respect to this charge and spec- ification are set aside, and Charge VI and its specification are dismissed without prejudice. The decision is affirmed as to the remaining findings. The case is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for remand to that court for reassessment of the sentence.