USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 1 of 34
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 24-4512
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KEVIN DAMON WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, District Judge. (3:22-cr-00247-KDB-DCK-1)
Argued: March 18, 2026 Decided: July 7, 2026
Before THACKER, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Reversed, vacated, and remanded by published opinion. Judge Benjamin wrote the opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Judge Rushing wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Ashley Ali Askari, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julia Kay Wood, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Ann L. Hester, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Russ Ferguson, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee. USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 2 of 34
DEANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge:
This case arises from an encounter between police officers and a man seated in a
parked car. It raises two questions under the Fourth Amendment: whether that encounter
was a seizure and, if so, whether the seizure was justified by reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. For the following reasons, we hold that a seizure occurred and that it was
not supported by reasonable suspicion.
I.
A.
The encounter took place on a roadway and in an adjacent parking area within an
apartment complex. The roadway allows cars to travel in both directions. The parking
area lines one side of the roadway with the parking spaces set at right angles to the road.
Each parking space extends directly from the pavement edge so that parked vehicles sit
perpendicular to the flow of traffic.
Kevin Williams and two of his friends were seated in a white Mercedes E-class
sedan in one of these parking spaces near the pool area of the apartment complex. The car
was backed into a parking space between two other cars.
While the group was in the vehicle, a 911 operator received a call reporting a White
Mercedes parked in the pool area of the apartment complex parking lot with multiple
subjects inside, including a light-brown-skinned male with either dreads or twists, possibly
selling or possessing narcotics. The caller, who stated he lived in the neighborhood, wished
to remain anonymous and therefore did not provide his number or name.
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The 911 operator notified police in the area through a written report on patrolling
officers’ computer aided dispatch (“CAD”) systems. 1 The CAD report showed the caller’s
phone number and instructed the officers in department shorthand to “CHECK FOR”
“BRO SKINNED, LT SKINNED, MALE WITH BRAIDS” “SITTING IN WHI MERZ
SEDAN” “SAME APPEARS TO BE MAKING DRUG TRANSACTIONS”
“CURRENTLY NEAR THE POOL AREA.” J.A. 59. 2 The CAD report further showed
the priority status of the call as “Priority Normal” and noted that “NO WPNS SEEN.” J.A.
59.
Officers Pistone and Wilson received the CAD report and proceeded to the
apartment complex in response. They arrived in two separate marked police vehicles and
drove down the apartment complex roadway at normal speeds, without lights or sirens.
As the officers approached the pool area, they suddenly and simultaneously stopped
at the sight of Williams and the white Mercedes sedan. Pistone stopped in the middle of
the roadway, perpendicular to and partially in front of Williams’ car. Pistone’s car was
approximately 15 feet in front of Williams’ car. Wilson stopped a few yards behind
Pistone.
1 CAD systems are used by police departments to process calls and identify who to dispatch. The systems allow 911 operators to send information from emergency calls directly to the screen of police officers’ cars. 2 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains the record on appeal from the district court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize the “JA#” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.
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Middle: Williams’ white Mercedes. Right foreground: Wilson’s police vehicle. Right background: Pistone’s police vehicle.
Left: Williams’ white Mercedes. Foreground: Wilson’s police vehicle. Background: Pistone’s police vehicle.
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Left: White vehicle parked next to Williams’ Mercedes. Background: Pistone’s police vehicle. Foreground: Williams’ white Mercedes.
Left: Pistone’s police vehicle. Right: Wilson’s police vehicle.
After stopping, the officers exited their vehicles and immediately smelled the odor
of marijuana. They then approached the vehicle and made contact with Williams and the
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other occupants. When asked about the odor, Williams admitted that he and the others had
smoked the marijuana. Based on the odor and Williams’ admission, Pistone directed all
occupants to exit the vehicle so that the officers could conduct a search. Pistone detained
Williams and placed him in the back of his police vehicles while Wilson attended to the
remaining occupants.
While Williams was being detained and placed in the back of a police vehicle, a
black Ford Fiesta, which had no relation to Williams, exited the apartment complex. The
black Ford Fiesta was parked a few spaces away from Williams’ Mercedes and was not
parked immediately between two other cars. To exit, it pulled out of its parking space and
drove by Wilson’s patrol vehicle.
Background: Black Ford Fiesta exiting a nearby parking space.
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After Williams and the other occupants were secured, the officers searched
Williams’ Merecedes and discovered a handgun between the driver’s seat and the center
console. When Pistone questioned Williams about the gun, Williams admitted it was his
and that he had purchased it from a friend.
B.
Based on a prior felony conviction for domestic violence, Williams was charged
with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pled not
guilty.
Williams moved to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his car, arguing
that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they stopped their vehicles in
front of him. To Williams, the officers, at that moment, seized him without reasonable
suspicion.
The district court held a hearing on Williams’ motion to suppress and heard
testimony from Pistone. Pistone described the area as a “very high violent-crime and drug
sale/possession area” and testified that he had previously responded to calls for service in
the area. J.A. 120. Pistone admitted that he had not listened to the 911 call when he
responded to the call for service and had only viewed the written information in the CAD
system. Id. Pistone further testified that he intended to “look for the vehicle” and “make
voluntary contact” to speak with the occupants about why they were in the parking lot.
J.A. 120–21. Voluntary contact meant that Pistone would approach the vehicle like he
“would approach anyone else on the street, voluntary, no seizure or detention committed.”
J.A. 121.
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Pistone further commented that he would have let Williams leave before he opened
his door and smelled the odor of marijuana:
Q [from counsel]: Before you opened the door, as you parked your vehicle, if Mr. Wilson – if Mr. Williams had started his vehicle and tried to pull out, would you have let him leave?
A [from Pistone]: Yes sir, he would have been free to leave.
Q: You would have just let him drive away?
A: Yes, sir.
J.A. 143.
After hearing this testimony, watching the officers’ body-worn camera videos, and
considering the parties’ arguments, the district court denied Williams’ motion to suppress,
finding that Williams was not seized when the officers first stopped their cars. On that
point, the court found that there was room for Williams to drive out, both to the left and to
the right. The court also found that a reasonable person in Williams’ position would have
felt free to leave, even considering the position of the police vehicles.
The district court then found that the encounter became “something else when [the
officers] smelled burnt marijuana.” J.A. 171. The court concluded that the smell of
marijuana, the 911 call, and the corroboration of the details in the phone call provided
reasonable suspicion to seize Williams by walking up to the car. The district court also
concluded that those same facts provided probable cause to support the search of the
vehicle.
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Williams then proceeded to a bench trial, where the Government introduced
evidence of the gun found during the search. The district court found Williams guilty of
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon.
Williams now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Williams
argues that he was seized when the officers stopped their cars in the roadway because a
reasonable person in Williams’ position would not have felt free to leave. Williams further
argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify such a seizure.
We have jurisdiction to review the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress, we review a district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error, construing the facts in the
government’s favor. United States v. Brinkley, 980 F.3d 377, 383 (4th Cir. 2020). The
reasonable person standard “ ‘is an objective one,’ thus ‘its proper application is a question
of law’ ” that we review de novo. United States v Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2012)
(quoting United States v. Weaver, 282 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).
III.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” U.S. CONST. AMEND IV. “[A] seizure does
not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.” See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991). “So long as a reasonable
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person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his business, the encounter is
consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
For such a seizure to be constitutional, it must be supported by an officer’s
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
Accordingly, two questions emerge in this case. First, did a seizure occur when the
officers stopped their police vehicles in the roadway? Second, if a seizure occurred, did
the officers have reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure?
We start with the first question: whether the officers seized Williams the moment
they stopped their police vehicles in the apartment complex roadway.
As stated above, a seizure occurs only when an officer, by either physical force or
show of authority, has restrained a person’s liberty. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16. In assessing
whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, “a court must consider all the
circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would
have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439. In other
words, a seizure occurs when the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter
would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave. United States v.
Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Courts consider several factors in determining whether the circumstances
surrounding the encounter would lead a reasonable person to believe that he was not free
to leave. These include, but are not limited to, the number of police officers present during
the encounter, whether they were in uniform or displayed their weapons, whether they
touched the defendant, whether they sought to block his departure or restrain his
movement, whether the officers’ questioning was nonthreatening, and whether they treated
the defendant as though they suspected him of “illegal activity rather than treating the
encounter as ‘routine’ in nature.” United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322–23 (4th Cir.
1989) (emphasis added & citation omitted).
Whether a suspect’s vehicle has been “blocked in” by a police vehicle is important
for our seizure analysis. See Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299–302 (4th Cir. 2012) (“When an
officer blocks a defendant’s car from leaving the scene . . . the officer demonstrates a
greater show of authority than does an officer who just happens to be on the scene and
engages a citizen in conversation.”). A vehicle may be considered blocked in even if it is
not completely constrained. See, e.g., id. at 301 n.4. This is the case where a reasonable
person would not feel free to attempt the available means to exit. See id. By contrast, if it
is “readily apparent” that there is “more than enough room” to drive away without any
“special maneuvering,” then a person has not been blocked in. United States v. Watkins,
816 F. App’x 821, 827–28 (4th Cir. 2020).
In Jones, this court found that the defendant was blocked in even though he could
have physically maneuvered his car to exit. Jones, 678 F.3d at 305. There, a police officer
followed the defendant into a private apartment complex and stopped his police vehicle in
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the one-way lane of traffic behind the row of diagonal parking spaces that the defendant
had just pulled into. Id. at 296–97. The police officer stopped in the roadway (i.e., the lane
of traffic) instead of pulling into one of the diagonal parking spaces to ensure that he would
have the opportunity to contact the occupants of the vehicle. Id. at 297. Even with the
police officer in that position, the defendant could have backed his car out of the parking
lot and exited the apartment complex going the wrong way on the one-lane driveway. Id.
at 301 n.4. Despite his physical ability to leave, the court still concluded that the defendant
was “blocked in” by reasoning that “no reasonable law-abiding person would take such
evasive action in the presence of police officers.” Id.
In Watkins, this court held that the totality of circumstances did not indicate that the
defendants were seized, largely based on the defendants’ ability to maneuver their vehicle.
Watkins, 816 F. App’x at 828. 3 There, a police officer observed a truck parked in the rear
of a hotel parking lot and suspected the individuals in the truck might be using drugs. Id.
at 823. Deciding to investigate further, the officer drove into the hotel parking lot and
parked his vehicle in the driving lane on the opposite side of the truck, three parking spaces
away from where the defendants were parked. Id. To exit their parking space, the
defendants would have had to back up and turn the rear of the truck away from the police
vehicle. Id. “In other words, the [police vehicle] was not even in the direction that would
3 The Government primarily relies on Watkins to support its argument that Williams was not seized. Watkins is an unpublished opinion. In our circuit, unpublished opinions “ha[ve] ‘no precedential value’ and [are] ‘entitled only to the weight’ generated ‘by the persuasiveness of [their] reasoning.’ ” Koontz v. SN Servicing Corp., 133 F.4th 320, 327 (4th Cir. 2025) (quoting Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006)). 12 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 13 of 34
stop the truck from being able to get out of the parking spot.” Id. at 827. To exit the
parking lot, the defendants would have had to drive the truck past the parked police vehicle
where there was “more than enough room.” Id. at 827–28. The court determined that the
defendants were not seized because it was “readily apparent” that the officer did not
actually block the defendants’ exit from the parking lot, and because the rest of the officer’s
actions, like parking his vehicle in a parking space and approaching the truck on foot,
reflected a routine encounter. Id.
Here, the district court found that Williams could have exited either to his left or to
his right 4 but, despite the emphasis on maneuvering in Jones and Watkins, did not make
any findings regarding what kind of maneuvering Williams would have had to make in
order to leave.
Even construing the facts in the Government’s favor, the evidence shows that it was
not “readily apparent” that there was “more than enough room” for Williams to drive away
without any “special maneuvering.” Watkins, 816 F. App’x at 828–29. Pistone testified
that he parked relatively close to—approximately fifteen feet away—and partially in front
of Williams’ car. J.A. 140; J.A. 145. Williams’ car, a Mercedes E350, is 16.25 feet long
and 6.75 feet wide. 5 The photos above show that to exit to his left Williams would have
4 Williams disputes that he could have physically left and argues that the district court erred when it found that there was room for Williams to leave the parking space on either side. We need not resolve that issue because, even assuming he could have physically left, we ultimately conclude that Williams was seized. 5 Used 2021 Mercedes-Benz E350 – Specs & Features, EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/mercedes-benz/e-class/2021/st-401844177/features- specs/?msockid=14d09f39868e6d6019e0882a871a6cfa [https://perma.cc/3RLY-DMSP]. 13 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 14 of 34
had to drive towards Pistone’s police vehicle. And considering the length and width of his
car and the position of the other vehicles in the parking area, Williams would have had to
maneuver in close proximity to both Pistone’s vehicle and the white car parked to his left,
potentially risking a collision. The spacing between the vehicles was so limited that
Williams may have needed to perform a multipoint turn to clear the space. Exiting to his
right presented similar obstacles. Williams again would have had to drive towards
Pistone’s police vehicle and maneuver in close proximity to both Pistone’s police vehicle
and the brown car parked to his right, again risking a collision or requiring a multipoint
turn. Additionally, exiting to the right would require Williams to drive by Wilson’s police
vehicle, which was parked in the middle of the roadway. Both of Williams’ exit options
contrast with the defendants’ ability to maneuver in Watkins, where the truck could pull
out if its parking space away from the police vehicle and proceed past it on the opposite
side of the driving lane. Accordingly, we hold that Williams, like the defendant in Jones,
was “blocked in” because a reasonable person would not have felt free to attempt his
available means to exit. See Jones, 678 F.3d at n.4.
In addition to being blocked in, the officers’ conduct would suggest to a reasonable
person in Williams’ position that he was the subject of an investigation and not free to
leave. The police arrived in two separate marked police cars. Although the officers were
not speeding as they approached, a person in Williams’ position would have seen them
arriving from the right and would have also seen how quickly they stopped their vehicles.
They stopped their cars in the middle of the roadway instead of against the curb or in one
of the nearby available parking spaces. Pistone parked in the roadway at least partially in
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front of Williams’ car, and Wilson parked in the roadway just behind Pistone. The act of
parking in the roadway in front of a vehicle parked in a delineated parking space necessarily
suggests an obstructive motive because it is inconsistent with how parking lots are
“routinely used.” Cf. O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 669 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting
that “parking behind a vehicle in a driveway does not inherently send a message of seizure
because it is how driveways are routinely used”). Parking perpendicular to Williams’ car
in the middle roadway inherently sent a message of seizure to Williams. This is especially
true because there were several open parking spaces that the officers could have used. Each
of these factors would indicate to a reasonable person that he was the subject of police
investigation and therefore not free to leave.
The Government relies on the black Ford Fiesta’s departure from its parking space
to argue both that Williams was not blocked in and that a reasonable person in Williams’
position would have felt free to leave, but that comparison is inapposite for two reasons.
First, the black Ford Fiesta was not similarly situated to Williams’ vehicle. The
black Ford Fiesta was smaller than Williams’ Mercedes E-class sedan and therefore more
capable of maneuvering out of its parking space and by Wilson’s police vehicle. 6 And
unlike Williams’ vehicle, which was parked between two cars, the black Ford Fiesta had
6 A Ford Fiesta is 13.33 feet long and 5.66 feet wide. Used 2019 Ford Fiesta – Specs & Features, EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/ford/fiesta/2019/features- specs/?msockid=14d09f39868e6d6019e0882a871a6cfa [https://perma.cc/5ACF-9GZT]. A Mercedes E350 is 16.25 feet long and 6.75 feet wide. Used 2021 Mercedes-Benz E350 – Specs & Features, EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/mercedes-benz/e- class/2021/st-401844177/features-specs/?msockid=14d09f39868e6d6019e0882a871a6cfa [https://perma.cc/3RLY-DMSP]. 15 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 16 of 34
space on both sides. As a result, it could exit its parking space without undertaking special
maneuvers. Therefore, the black Ford Fiesta’s ability to leave does not establish that
Williams’ vehicle was not effectively blocked in.
Second, the black Ford Fiesta’s departure does not inform whether a reasonable
person in Williams’ position would have felt free to leave. The black Ford Fiesta did not
drive away until after Williams was placed in the back seat of a police vehicle. By that
point, the officers were focused on apprehending Williams, signaling to others in the
parking lot that they were not the subject of police attention. Indeed, the officers
approached and questioned only the occupants of Williams’ vehicle. This selective
conduct would have indicated to a reasonable person in any other parking space that they
were not under investigation and were therefore free to leave. By contrast, a reasonable
person in Williams’ position would not have felt free to leave before the officers exited
their vehicles as he would have had no reason to believe the police presence was directed
at anyone other than himself.
Accordingly, we conclude that Williams was seized when the officers stopped their
cars in the roadway.
Because Williams was subject to a Fourth Amendment seizure, we continue to the
second question: whether the information available to the officers provided reasonable
suspicion to justify the seizure.
The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigatory seizures when a law
enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at
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434. The “reasonable suspicion” necessary to justify a seizure “is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.” Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
Courts consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether the officer
had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. United States v.
Foster, 824 F.3d 84, 88–89 (4th Cir. 2016). The “officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [an] intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. “Seemingly innocent factors,
when viewed together, can amount to reasonable suspicion.” Foster, 824 F.3d at 89. But
courts should be “skeptical of [g]overnment attempts to spin . . . largely mundane acts into
a web of deception.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Anything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
The court’s inquiry “must account for the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ rather than
employ a ‘divide-and-conquer analysis.’ ” United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 238, 247
(4th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). But in
considering whether the factors articulated by a police officer amount to reasonable
suspicion, the court may “separately address each of the[] factors before evaluating them
together with the other circumstances of the [seizure].” United States v. Powell, 666 F.3d
180, 187–88 (4th Cir. 2011); see, e.g., United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 214–18
(4th Cir. 2018) (considering each factor alone before considering the factors together with
the totality of the circumstances).
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The Government argues that the officers had reasonable suspicion to seize Williams
based on the anonymous 911 call and the presence in a high crime area. We address both
factors separately in sections III.B.1–2 before evaluating them together in Section III.B.3.
1.
Anonymous tips “are generally less reliable than tips from known informants and
can form the basis of reasonable suspicion only if accompanied by specific indicia of
reliability.” Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000). Such indicia may include firsthand
observation of criminal activity, a report that is roughly contemporaneous with the
observed criminal activity, reports of an ongoing emergency, and use of the 911 emergency
system. See Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399–401 (2014). Reliability may also
be strengthened when police corroborate certain details of the anonymous tip. See White,
496 U.S. at 331.
That said, an anonymous tip supports reasonable suspicion only if police
corroborate details connected to the alleged criminal activity. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 272
(2000). For example, in Alabama v. White, the tipster’s accurate prediction of future
behavior suggested “a special familiarity with [the suspect’s] affairs,” which in turn
implied that the tipster had “access to reliable information about that individual’s illegal
activities.” 496 U.S. at 332. Conversely, a tip that merely identifies a specific person
without providing the police with means to corroborate the accusation of wrongdoing does
not bear sufficient indicia of reliability. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
In Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip was insufficient
to justify an investigatory stop. Id. at 271–74. In that case, the police received a call from
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an unidentified person, calling from an unidentified location, and reporting that “a young
black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun.”
Id. at 268. Police officers responded to the bus stop and found three Black males, one of
whom was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. Based on the anonymous tip, one of the officers
approached J.L., told him to put his hands up, frisked him, and seized a gun from his pocket.
Id. The Court held that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion because the tip “provided
no predictive information” that would have allowed the officers “to test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility” about crime that may be afoot. Id. at 271. While the anonymous
tip of course provided an accurate description of J.L.’s location and appearance, such
“readily observable” details showed nothing about the tipster’s “knowledge of concealed
criminal activity.” Id. at 272. Reasonable suspicion, the Court emphasized, “requires that
a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate
person.” Id. Accordingly, the tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the
officers with reasonable suspicion for their investigatory stop. Id. at 274.
Like the tip in J.L., the anonymous tip here contained no information allowing the
officers to test or corroborate the alleged criminal activity and instead consisted only of
readily observable identifying details. The officers here only received information through
their CAD systems, which showed the 911 caller’s phone number and instructed the
officers to “check for” “bro skinned, lt skinned, male with braids” “sitting in whi merz
sedan” “same appears to be making drug transactions” “currently near the pool area.” J.A.
59. Like the tip in J.L., the CAD report “provided no predictive information” whatsoever.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271. The CAD report did not suggest when any alleged transaction would
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occur, with whom, or under what circumstances. It did not mention future movements,
planned behavior, or any basis for concluding that the tipster had actually seen a drug
transaction. In no way did the CAD report allow the officers “to test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility” about the alleged crime. Id. Nor did it show that the tipster had
a “special familiarity” with Williams’ affairs to suggest that the tipster had “access to
reliable information about . . . [Williams’] illegal activities.” White, 496 U.S. at 332.
Instead, the content of the CAD report consisted primarily of “readily observable” facts,
like the appearance and location of Williams and his car, that any passerby could have
reported. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272. As the Supreme Court made clear in J.L., such a tip “does
not show that the tipster ha[d] knowledge of concealed criminal activity,” and therefore
cannot establish reliability in the assertion of illegality. Id. at 272.
The Government’s primary response is to invoke Navarette v. California, arguing
that the use of the 911 system renders the anonymous tip reliable, but Navarette involved
far more than a call to 911.
In Navarette, the Supreme Court held—in a “close case”—that an anonymous tip
provided officers with reasonable suspicion that a driver was intoxicated. 572 U.S. at 399–
401. There, a 911 dispatcher received a tip from an anonymous caller who reported that a
pickup truck had just run her vehicle off the road. Id. at 395. The 911 dispatcher relayed
the tip to the officers as follows: “ ‘Showing southbound Highway 1 at mile marker 88,
Silver Ford 150 pickup. Plate of 8-David-294925. Ran the reporting party off the roadway
and was last seen approximately five [minutes] ago.’ ” Id. Two officers found the truck
and followed it for five minutes. See id. The officers stopped the truck even though they
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did not see the driver make any driving errors. Id. When they approached the truck, the
officers smelled marijuana and discovered marijuana in the bed of the truck. Id.
The driver and passenger of the truck moved to suppress the evidence from the
traffic stop, arguing that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because it was based
solely on an anonymous tip and the officers lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Id. at 396. Because the anonymous caller provided details about the vehicle’s
make, model, color, and license plate; made the call to 911 (which allows for identifying
and tracing callers and could subject the caller to prosecution if she made a false report);
and was “under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event” (making the call less
likely to be preplanned), the Supreme Court found the tip reliable. Id. The Court then
emphasized the dangers of drunk driving and how certain behaviors are “sound indicia”
that a driver might be intoxicated. See id. at 400, 403–04. Considering those dangers as
part of the “totality of the circumstances,” the Court held that “the indicia of reliability in
this case [was] sufficient to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion that the driver of
the reported vehicle had run another vehicle off the road.” Id. at 404.
When holding the anonymous tip provided the officers with reasonable suspicion,
the Court stressed the dangerousness of the situation. See id. at 398–404. The Court noted
that the 911 caller “reported more than a minor traffic infraction” and instead “alleged a
specific and dangerous result of the driver’s conduct: running another car off the highway.”
Id. at 403. To the Court, “[t]hat conduct b[ore] too great a resemblance to paradigmatic
manifestations of drunk driving to be dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.”
Id. The Court also distinguished other uncorroborated traffic tips from tips suggesting
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drunk or reckless driving, stating “[u]nconfirmed reports of driving without a seatbelt or
slightly over the speed limit, for example, are so tenuously connected to drunk driving that
a stop on those grounds alone would be constitutionally suspect.” Id. at 402. On the other
hand, the Court stated, “a reliable tip alleging the dangerous behaviors discussed above
generally would justify a traffic stop on suspicion of drunk driving.” Id. In closing, the
Court found “[e]xtended observation” inappropriate in this context and warned of the
“disastrous consequences” that could result if officers “allow[ed] a drunk driver a second
chance.” See id. at 403–04. 7
Contrary to the Government’s contention, the circumstances here are unlike
Navarette because they did not involve a dangerous, urgent, or fleeting situation that would
justify immediate police intervention. The CAD report did not indicate a dangerous
situation; rather it reported that occupants in a vehicle “appeared” to be making drug
transactions and noted that no weapons were seen. J.A. 59. The call was classified as
“Priority Normal,” a non-emergency designation. Id. Indeed, the officers responded in a
nonemergent fashion, reporting to the apartment complex at normal speeds and without
7 The dissent in Navarette also implied that the dangers of drunk driving moved the Court. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Drunk[] driving is a serious matter, but so is the loss of our freedom to come and go as we please without police interference. To prevent and detect murder we do not allow searches without probable cause or targeted Terry stops without reasonable suspicion. We should not do so for drunken driving either.”). Other courts have also acknowledged that an important factor in Navarette was the ongoing emergency situation. See United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding reliable an anonymous 911 tip from an eyewitness reporting an ongoing and dangerous situation); see also United States v. White, 681 F. App’x. 603, 604 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding an anonymous 911 tip unreliable because it did not describe “ ‘conduct that bears great resemblance to paradigmatic manifestations of’ an ongoing and dangerous criminal activity.” (quoting Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403)). 22 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 23 of 34
sirens or lights. Pistone even testified that he would have let Williams drive away before
opening his car door, underscoring the absence of urgency. J.A. 143. Additionally, the
anonymous tip did not present the kind of fleeting scenario at issue in Navarette, where
officers had limited opportunity to corroborate illegality before acting. Here, by contrast,
the officers could have tried to corroborate the suspected drug activity through a consensual
encounter or by surveilling Williams and the other occupants of the Mercedes. Unlike in
Navarette, “extended observation” would have been appropriate under these
circumstances.
And aside from the fact that the call reporting Williams was made through the 911
system, this case lacks the other indicia of reliability that supported the tip in Navarette.
The caller in Navarette provided a contemporaneous report of a specific, startling event,
suggesting firsthand observation. See 572 U.S. at 399; see also id. at 400 (holding that
“contemporaneous report[ing] has long been treated as especially reliable”). The tip here,
by contrast, offered no such detail. It did not describe any specific, observable conduct
indicative of drug transactions, such as individuals approaching the vehicle and exchanging
items. Instead, the CAD report offered only a vague assertion of suspected wrongdoing,
unsupported by predictive information or any meaningful basis of knowledge of what the
occupants of the car were actually doing. That kind of accusation, untethered to details of
illegal activity or predictive information, provides no objective basis for reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was actually occurring. The Government’s reliance on
Navarette is therefore misplaced.
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The Supreme Court’s decisions in White, J.L., and Navarette establish a clear
framework for evaluating anonymous tips. An anonymous tip cannot support reasonable
suspicion unless it provides some reliable basis to believe the allegation of criminal
activity, such as predictive information, White 496 U.S. at 33, or details that suggest
firsthand observation of criminal activity, Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399. The use of the 911
system, standing alone, does not establish reliability, as Navarette recognized several other
indicia, such as contemporaneous firsthand observations of criminal activity and
observations made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event. Id. Where
those additional features are absent, a 911 tip is not much more reliable than other
anonymous tips based on readily observable facts.
Under this framework, the tip here was unreliable because it lacked predictive
information, details to suggest firsthand observation of criminal activity, or any indication
of urgency. The tip therefore deserves little weight in the totality of the circumstances.
Holding otherwise would allow officers to seize individuals based on nothing more than a
vague accusation relayed through 911.
2.
Presence in a “high-crime area” is a relevant contextual consideration but cannot
alone create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States v. Curry, 965 F.3d
313, 330–31 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc). The court has reasoned that “presence in a high
crime neighborhood is a fact too generic and susceptible to innocent explanation to satisfy
the reasonable suspicion inquiry.” United States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 488 (4th
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119,
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139 (2000)); accord United States v. Hawkins, 161 F.4th 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2025) (stating
that presence in a high-crime area is a “weak and generic factor” when considered to
support reasonable suspicion).
Based on this court’s prior pronouncements regarding presence in a high-crime area,
the fact that the events here took place in an area known to the officers for crime deserves
little weight in the totality of the circumstances.
3.
Even though neither of the factors above independently provide a basis for a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Williams was engaged in criminal activity, we still
must consider all the factors together. Bowman, 884 F.3d at 218; United States v.
Drakeford, 992 F.2d 255, 263 (4th Cir. 2021). The “court ‘must look at the cumulative
information available to the officer,’ rather than hold a ‘[seizure] unjustified based merely
on a piecemeal refutation of each individual fact and inference.’ ” Id. at 218 (quoting
United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008)). To find reasonable suspicion
based on a combination of innocent factors, the Government must identify specific reasons
to suspect criminal activity. Bowman, 884 F.3d at 218–19.
Even combining all the factors identified by the Government, we find that there was
not reasonable suspicion that Williams was engaged in criminal activity. The officers
lacked specific indicators linking Williams or the other occupants of the Mercedes to drug
dealing. Before arriving at the apartment complex, the officers only possessed the
information on the CAD report, which indicated the occupants of the Mercedes “appear[]
to be making drug transactions.” J.A. 59. Even if the report was reliable, such a vague
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allegation is insufficient to provide a particularized and objective basis for a seizure. The
CAD report did not describe any specific suspicious behavior, like a hand-to-hand
transaction. See United States v. Hawkins, 161 F.4th 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2025) (concluding
that officers did not have reasonable suspicion that a drug transaction had taken place when
there were no “specific identifiers” like a handshake or items changing hands). Moreover,
the alleged drug activity here occurred during the day and in a public setting, which is not
indicative of criminal activity. See id. at 249 (discounting an interaction for purposes of
reasonable suspicion partly because the interaction “took place in the middle of the
afternoon, in broad daylight, and in a public place”). Although the area was known for
criminal activity, that fact adds little weight towards a finding of reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, the Government presents a weaker case for reasonable suspicion here
than the government in Drakeford, Bowman, and Hawkins, three cases where the court
found the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. In Drakeford, the government argued there
was reasonable suspicion based on “(1) a confidential informant [that] provided
information that [the defendant] trafficked cocaine and heroin; (2) officers witness[ing]
what they believed to be a drug transaction in a gas station parking lot” where a person
exited their car and sat in the defendant’s car for 30 to 45 seconds before returning to their
car; (3) officers finding syringes in the car of the person who entered the defendant’s car;
(4) “officers witness[ing] [the defendant] arrive at a second gas station and wait in his car;
[(5)] officers witness[ing] [the defendant] enter a home empty handed, leave carrying bags,
and subsequently inform the confidential informant that he had drugs to sell; and [(6)] [an
officer] believe[ing] he witnessed a ‘hand-to-hand’ [drug] transaction when [the defendant]
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engaged in a second handshake in [a] . . . parking lot.” Drakeford, 992 F.3d at 263. In
Bowman, the government argued there was reasonable suspicion based on (1) “[the
defendant’s] apparent nervousness”; (2) “the presence of a suitcase, clothes, food, and an
energy drink inside of the [car]”; (3) “[the defendant’s] inability to supply [the officer] with
the [requested] name and address”; and (4) “statements that [the defendant] had been laid
off recently and that he had recently purchased the” car he was driving. Bowman, 994 F.3d
at 215. In Hawkins, the government argued there was reasonable suspicion based on (1)
presence in a high crime area; (2) the driver’s prior drug conviction; (3) an interaction
between a third party and the occupants of the vehicle, where the third party, who was
known from prior drug investigations, leaned into the car to speak with the occupants; and
(4) inconsistent statements from the occupants of the vehicle when questioned separately
roadside. Hawkins, 161 F.4th at 248. All three of those cases presented more suspicious
circumstances than the facts here, yet the court still found the officers lacked reasonable
Accordingly, the facts taken together failed to create reasonable suspicion sufficient
to lawfully seize Williams. 8
8 Pistone testified that when he received the call for service he intended to “arrive look for the vehicle or subjects described in the call for service and make voluntary contact with them.” J.A. 120–21. Pistone further testified that he would have let Williams leave the parking lot before he opened his vehicle door and smelled the odor of marijuana. J.A. 143. This testimony suggests that even Pistone himself did not believe he had a reasonable basis to suspect that Williams was engaged in criminal activity to effectuate the seizure. 27 USCA4 Appeal: 24-4512 Doc: 58 Filed: 07/07/2026 Pg: 28 of 34
IV.
For the above reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of Williams’ motion to
suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED
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RUSHING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that Officers Pistone and
Wilson did not seize Williams during the two seconds between when the Officers parked
their vehicles near Williams’s car and when they opened their doors and smelled the
marijuana Williams had been smoking. I would affirm that well-supported conclusion.
Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, a “seizure” occurs when an officer, by “physical
force or show of authority,” in some way “restrain[s] the liberty” of a person. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); see Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989, 995 (2021). Law
enforcement officers do not effectuate a seizure “merely by approaching individuals on the
street or in other public places and putting questions to them.” United States v. Drayton,
536 U.S. 194, 200 (2002). “So long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the
police and go about his business,” the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. Florida v.
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, a person is
“seized” if, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 537 (4th Cir.
2013). Factors this Court considers as part of the totality of the circumstances include, but
are not limited to:
[T]he number of police officers present during the encounter, whether they were in uniform or displayed their weapons, whether they touched the defendant, whether they attempted to block his departure or restrain his movement, whether the officers’ questioning was non-threatening, and whether they treated the defendant as though they suspected him of illegal activity rather than treating the encounter as routine in nature.
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United States v. Jones, 678 F.3d 293, 299–300 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the Officers had probable cause to search Williams’s car as soon as Officer
Pistone opened the door of his patrol vehicle and smelled marijuana; therefore, whether an
unreasonable seizure occurred turns solely on how the Officers approached the parking lot
and parked their police cruisers. Viewing the totality of the circumstances and construing
the facts in the light most favorable to the Government, as we must, see United States v.
Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 197 (4th Cir. 2010), no seizure occurred. It is undisputed that the
Officers arrived in two marked vehicles without engaging their blue lights or sirens. They
were not driving at high speeds and proceeded through the residential area as any other
vehicle might, with their vehicles slowing substantially in the final stretch of roadway
before coming to a stop. The Officers had not followed Williams into the parking lot but
rather arrived at the apartment complex and stopped in the parking lot roadway “seemingly
at random.” Jones, 678 F.3d at 300. By all appearances, this was “a routine encounter”
with officers on patrol. Id. at 301. Nothing in the Officers’ approach indicated that they
were “target[ing]” Williams, or for that matter, anyone else in the parking lot or apartment
complex. Id.
Williams focuses almost exclusively on the positioning of the patrol vehicles in
relation to his parked car, insisting that they blocked his exit. The district court, however,
found that Williams had “room to drive out, both to the left and to the right.” J.A. 171.
The court’s finding that “there was room to drive out” indicates that Williams could have
taken the simple action of putting the car into drive and exiting the parking space in normal
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fashion for a parking lot, which typically occurs in close proximity to other vehicles and at
low speed.
The district court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Norman, 935 F.3d 232, 236 (4th Cir. 2019) (standard of review). That finding is confirmed
by body-worn camera footage and the testimony of Officer Pistone, who the district court
found “credible” and who was present in the parking lot and observed the vehicles
firsthand. J.A. 171. The body-worn camera footage shows room through which Williams’s
white Mercedes could have turned out of the spot it was backed into in the same manner
as the nearby black Ford Fiesta later did. Officer Pistone’s cruiser was pulled beyond the
Mercedes, only partially blocking its path if it had pulled straight out. Although turning
out to the left would have been a tighter fit, the gap between the police vehicles created
plenty of turning room for the front-left corner of the Mercedes in an exit to the right, and
there were several feet of room on both sides of the Mercedes, as shown below. Any
maneuvering that Williams would have had to perform to exit the parking space was no
greater than the normal maneuvers that people commonly must perform in everyday
parking scenarios. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Williams had “room
to drive out.” J.A. 171.
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Digital Ex. 2, at 0:34.
Digital Ex. 1, at 3:31.
This situation is unlike that in Jones. There, an officer followed the defendant into
a parking lot and parked his patrol car in a one-lane driveway, which had diagonal parking
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spots to one side. To leave his parking spot, the defendant would have had to back his
vehicle out of the parking spot and back down the one-way driveway going in the wrong
direction. 678 F.3d at 297. By contrast, here the Officers parked in a two-lane driveway
with room for Williams’s vehicle to leave to the left or to the right. The Officers did not
block Williams’s exit or create a situation where he would have to attempt unreasonable
and extraordinary efforts to exit—he just had to “drive out.” J.A. 171. Nor did the Officers
follow Williams to that location. Cf. Jones, 678 F.3d at 296. Instead, Williams had been
sitting in the parking lot for at least fifteen minutes between the concerned citizen calling
911 and the Officers arriving.
Moreover, the location of the patrol vehicles did not constitute a liberty-restraining
show of authority against anyone, much less Williams in particular. The Officers parked
in the two-lane roadway adjacent to an apartment building, leaving the subject of their visit
unclear. They did not single out Williams by parking directly in front of, or flanking both
sides of, his vehicle specifically. The Officers could have been responding to a call from
one of the apartment buildings or to a call about any of the five cars parked in the row near
the police cruisers—perhaps a reported vehicle break-in, for example. While Williams and
the majority place dispositive emphasis on the Officers’ parking job, the location of the
police cruisers did not communicate to any reasonable person in the parking lot or the
apartment complex that they were not free to go about their business. See Bostick, 501
U.S. at 434.
In reaching a different conclusion, the majority appears to adopt a new legal
standard. The majority reasons that officers have seized a car and its occupants unless it is
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“‘readily apparent’ that there [is] ‘more than enough room’ . . . to drive away without any
‘special maneuvering.’” Maj. Op. 13 (quoting United States v. Watkins, 816 Fed. App.
821, 827–828 (4th Cir. 2020)). It is not sufficient, apparently, that a reasonable person
would feel free to drive away, or that he could drive away without any special maneuvering.
Nor is it sufficient even that a reasonable person had enough room to drive away without
special maneuvering—he must have “more than enough room.” But even that does not
suffice. Rather, officers must make it “readily apparent” that all of this is the case.
Watkins, the unpublished case on which the majority relies, does not stand for that
proposition. In Watkins, the Court found no seizure because it was readily apparent there
was more than enough room for the vehicle to exit, contrary to the defendants’ arguments
about maneuvering. See 816 Fed. App. at 825–828. But it does not follow that the facts
sufficient to show the absence of a seizure in Watkins are necessary to prove the absence
of a seizure here, or in any other case. By turning Watkins’s facts into a legal standard, the
majority commits the logical fallacy of confusing sufficient conditions with necessary
ones.
Construed in the light most favorable to the Government, the facts confirm the
district court’s conclusion that, at the time of the Officers’ arrival, a reasonable person in
Williams’s situation would consider himself free to leave the parking lot unconstrained by
any individualized show of police authority. Accordingly, the district court correctly
denied Williams’s motion to suppress. Because the majority concludes otherwise, I
respectfully dissent.