USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-14436 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cr-00038-RH-GRJ-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN LAMAR RATLIFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(July 20, 2021) USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Lamar Ratliff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
In 2008, a jury found Ratliff guilty of conspiring to distribute or possess
with intent to distribute powder cocaine or crack cocaine and possessing with
intent to distribute powder cocaine or crack cocaine. The jury found that each
offense involved five grams or more of crack cocaine. Based on this drug-quantity
determination, Ratliff, who had prior felony drug convictions, faced a statutory
penalty range of 10 years to life on each count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
(2008). At sentencing, the district court found that Ratliff qualified as a career
offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Consistent with the career-offender guideline, the
court looked to the statutory maximum penalty for each offense to set Ratliff’s
offense level and calculated Ratliff’s guidelines range as 360 months’ to life
imprisonment. See id. Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of 360 months’
imprisonment for each offense with the sentences to run concurrently.
After Ratliff was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 to address disparities in sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine
2 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 3 of 7
and those involving powder cocaine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–100 (2007)
(providing background on disparity). The Fair Sentencing Act increased the
quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the highest statutory penalties from
50 grams to 280 grams and the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger
intermediate statutory penalties from 5 grams to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing
Act § 2; 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). Until recently, the Fair Sentencing
Act’s reduced penalties applied only to defendants who were sentenced on or after
the Fair Sentencing Act’s effective date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260,
264 (2012).
Later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194 (2018), to give district courts the discretion “to apply retroactively the
reduced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 to movants sentenced before those penalties became effective.” United
States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 404 of the First
Step Act authorizes a district court “that imposed a sentence for a covered offense”
to reduce a defendant’s sentence. First Step Act § 404(b). A “covered offense”
refers to a “violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id. § 404(a).
The First Step Act permits a district court to “impose a reduced sentence as if” the
3 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 4 of 7
Fair Sentencing Act had been “in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.” Id. § 404(b).
After the First Step Act went into effect, the district court determined that
Ratliff was eligible for a reduction under § 404. The court concluded that Ratliff
had covered offenses because each offense involved five grams or more of crack
cocaine. If Ratliff had been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, he would
have faced a lower penalty range because the maximum statutory penalty for each
offense would have been 30 years’ imprisonment, not life. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C).
The court then considered whether to exercise its discretion to reduce
Ratliff’s sentences. The court looked at what Ratliff’s guidelines range would
have been if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time of his
sentencing. Given Ratliff’s career-offender status, the district court determined
that his guidelines range would have been 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The
court then exercised its discretion and reduced Ratliff’s sentences to 262 months’
imprisonment for each count with the sentences to run concurrently.
In 2020, Ratliff filed motions seeking a further reduction in his sentences
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In relevant part, he argued that
extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranted a reduction because the
4 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 5 of 7
district court had erroneously continued to treat him as a career offender when it
awarded him a reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act.
The district court denied Ratliff’s motions. The court explained that whether
Ratliff was eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) turned on whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted his release. Because
extraordinary and compelling circumstances were not present, the court found that
Ratliff was not eligible for relief. But even if Ratliff were eligible for a sentence
reduction, the court said, it would not grant him one. This is Ratliff’s appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s determination about whether a
defendant is eligible for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We liberally construe pro se filings. Jones
v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
III.
A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence
and “may do so only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v.
Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
3582(c) permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence in certain
circumstances. In this case, Ratliff sought a sentence reduction based on
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).
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USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-14436 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:08-cr-00038-RH-GRJ-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN LAMAR RATLIFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida ________________________
(July 20, 2021) USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 2 of 7
Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Lamar Ratliff, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his motion for compassionate release pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
In 2008, a jury found Ratliff guilty of conspiring to distribute or possess
with intent to distribute powder cocaine or crack cocaine and possessing with
intent to distribute powder cocaine or crack cocaine. The jury found that each
offense involved five grams or more of crack cocaine. Based on this drug-quantity
determination, Ratliff, who had prior felony drug convictions, faced a statutory
penalty range of 10 years to life on each count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)
(2008). At sentencing, the district court found that Ratliff qualified as a career
offender. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Consistent with the career-offender guideline, the
court looked to the statutory maximum penalty for each offense to set Ratliff’s
offense level and calculated Ratliff’s guidelines range as 360 months’ to life
imprisonment. See id. Ultimately, the court imposed a sentence of 360 months’
imprisonment for each offense with the sentences to run concurrently.
After Ratliff was sentenced, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 to address disparities in sentences between offenses involving crack cocaine
2 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 3 of 7
and those involving powder cocaine. See Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–100 (2007)
(providing background on disparity). The Fair Sentencing Act increased the
quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger the highest statutory penalties from
50 grams to 280 grams and the quantity of crack cocaine necessary to trigger
intermediate statutory penalties from 5 grams to 28 grams. See Fair Sentencing
Act § 2; 21 U.S.C § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (B)(iii). Until recently, the Fair Sentencing
Act’s reduced penalties applied only to defendants who were sentenced on or after
the Fair Sentencing Act’s effective date. Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260,
264 (2012).
Later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132
Stat. 5194 (2018), to give district courts the discretion “to apply retroactively the
reduced statutory penalties for crack-cocaine offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010 to movants sentenced before those penalties became effective.” United
States v. Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020). Section 404 of the First
Step Act authorizes a district court “that imposed a sentence for a covered offense”
to reduce a defendant’s sentence. First Step Act § 404(b). A “covered offense”
refers to a “violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which
were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.” Id. § 404(a).
The First Step Act permits a district court to “impose a reduced sentence as if” the
3 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 4 of 7
Fair Sentencing Act had been “in effect at the time the covered offense was
committed.” Id. § 404(b).
After the First Step Act went into effect, the district court determined that
Ratliff was eligible for a reduction under § 404. The court concluded that Ratliff
had covered offenses because each offense involved five grams or more of crack
cocaine. If Ratliff had been sentenced under the Fair Sentencing Act, he would
have faced a lower penalty range because the maximum statutory penalty for each
offense would have been 30 years’ imprisonment, not life. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C).
The court then considered whether to exercise its discretion to reduce
Ratliff’s sentences. The court looked at what Ratliff’s guidelines range would
have been if the Fair Sentencing Act had been in effect at the time of his
sentencing. Given Ratliff’s career-offender status, the district court determined
that his guidelines range would have been 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. The
court then exercised its discretion and reduced Ratliff’s sentences to 262 months’
imprisonment for each count with the sentences to run concurrently.
In 2020, Ratliff filed motions seeking a further reduction in his sentences
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In relevant part, he argued that
extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranted a reduction because the
4 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 5 of 7
district court had erroneously continued to treat him as a career offender when it
awarded him a reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act.
The district court denied Ratliff’s motions. The court explained that whether
Ratliff was eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) turned on whether
extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted his release. Because
extraordinary and compelling circumstances were not present, the court found that
Ratliff was not eligible for relief. But even if Ratliff were eligible for a sentence
reduction, the court said, it would not grant him one. This is Ratliff’s appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s determination about whether a
defendant is eligible for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
996 F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We liberally construe pro se filings. Jones
v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
III.
A district court has no inherent authority to modify a defendant’s sentence
and “may do so only when authorized by a statute or rule.” United States v.
Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 605–06 (11th Cir. 2015); see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
3582(c) permits a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence in certain
circumstances. In this case, Ratliff sought a sentence reduction based on
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For a defendant to be eligible for a sentence reduction under
5 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 6 of 7
this provision, a district court must find, among other things, that “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” warrant the reduction. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1254.
In Bryant, we held that “extraordinary and compelling reasons” are limited
to those reasons listed in the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement found in
United States Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13. Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262. Section
1B1.13 lists four extraordinary and compelling reasons: the medical condition of
the defendant, the age of the defendant, family circumstances, and other reasons.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. We held that “other reasons” are limited to those
determined by the Bureau of Prisons, not by courts. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1263.
Ratliff argues that extraordinary and compelling reasons are present in his
case. But he does not argue that one of the extraordinary and compelling reasons
listed in section 1B1.13 or that one of the “other reasons” determined by the
Bureau of Prisons applies in this case.1 Id. We therefore cannot say the district
1 In the district court, Ratliff argued that extraordinary and compelling circumstances existed because of the risks created by the COVID-19 pandemic and his hypertension. But on appeal Ratliff raises no argument based on his health condition and thus has abandoned this argument. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”). Even if Ratliff has preserved an argument about his health, we cannot say that it constituted an extraordinary and compelling circumstance. Under § 1B1.13, a defendant’s medical condition constitutes an extraordinary and compelling circumstance only when the defendant (1) has a terminal illness or (2) is suffering from a physical or mental condition that diminishes his ability to provide self-care in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A).
6 USCA11 Case: 20-14436 Date Filed: 07/20/2021 Page: 7 of 7
court erred in concluding that Ratliff was ineligible for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).
AFFIRMED.