United States v. Keiswetter

703 F. Supp. 1464, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1094, 1989 WL 8528
CourtUnited States District Court for the District of Arkansas
DecidedJanuary 17, 1989
DocketCrim. A. No. 86-10125-01
StatusPublished

This text of 703 F. Supp. 1464 (United States v. Keiswetter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States District Court for the District of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Keiswetter, 703 F. Supp. 1464, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1094, 1989 WL 8528 (ard 1989).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

THEIS, District Judge.

This matter comes before the court following remand from the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for clarification of this court’s reasons for finding that a factual basis existed for the charge of conversion of property to which the defendant pleaded guilty. The Tenth Circuit instructed the court to enter written findings and certify those findings as a supplement to the record on appeal.

The defendant had entered into an agreement with the government in which he agreed to plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge of conversion in exchange for the dismissal of the original felony charge of conversion. The property that the defendant allegedly converted was cattle which had been mortgaged to the Production Credit Association of Stockton, Kansas (PCA). Shortly after the defendant entered his guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), he moved to withdraw his plea. At the sentencing hearing, the court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. It is from this denial that the defendant appeals.

The Tenth Circuit’s remand order essentially ordered this court to specify what [1465]*1465matters the court considered in determining that a factual basis existed for the plea. This court did not hold any further proceedings, but instead has considered solely those matters which were before it at the time of the defendant’s plea and sentencing. Those items are: the Presentence Report (attached to this opinion as Exhibit A); the Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty; and the actual transcripts of the plea and sentencing hearings.

The Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, which the panel quoted in its opinion, contains the defendant’s sworn statement: “THAT ON OR ABOUT MARCH 22, 1984, IN THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS, I DID, WITH THE INTENT TO DEFRAUD, KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY CONCEAL, DISPOSE OF OR CONVERT TO MY OWN USE, PROPERTY OF A VALUE LESS THAN $100.00, WHEN SAID PROPERTY WAS MORTGAGED OR PLEDGED AS COLLATERAL, IN VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. SECTION 658.” This sworn statement contains the defendant’s admission that he converted the cattle, which had been pledged as collateral, with the requisite intent to defraud.

The court also considered the material contained in the Presentence Report, specifically the government’s and the defendant’s versions of the offense. The government’s version, at pp. 1-2 [see appendix, pp. 1467-1469], begins with a recitation of the defendant’s dealings with the PCA, including the July 1983 loan and security agreement at issue here. The defendant applied for and received a loan in the amount of $22,764. As collateral, the defendant pledged, among other items, some cattle. The PCA learned in March 1984, that the defendant had sold this cattle. Pursuant to the security agreement which the defendant had signed, any proceeds from the sale were to be paid to the PCA. The defendant received a check for $13,-133.96 as the proceeds from the sale of the pledged cattle. The defendant’s endorsement was present on the check. The money was deposited in the defendant’s personal bank account.

The defendant’s version of the offense, at pp. 3-6 of the Presentence Report [see appendix, pp. 1469-1471], reflects the defendant’s views as to the illegality of the PCA. The defendant also summarized his dealings with the PCA, including his belief that the PCA breached its fiduciary duties and caused impossibility of performance by its failure to extend further credit to him. The defendant alleges other misconduct on the part of the PCA, including alleged breaches of contract and violations of the Truth in Lending Act. The defendant also refers to a civil case filed in state court by the PCA and defendant’s inability to reach a settlement in that case. The court notes that the defendant never addressed the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. The defendant never denied the key background facts: signing the loan documents and the security agreement, knowledge of the provisions of those instruments, pledging the cattle as collateral, receiving and using the proceeds of the loan from the PCA, selling the cattle, or keeping the proceeds in violation of the security agreement. Further, the defendant never asserted that he had authority to sell the collateral. The defendant asserted that because the PCA filed suit against him, he had the right to keep the collateral.

The matters presented at the plea hearing also provide factual support for the court’s acceptance of the plea. Throughout the plea hearing, the defendant raised issues which were not relevant to the criminal charge. The transcript of the plea hearing includes a lengthy discussion of the defendant’s contentions regarding the legality of the PCA. The defendant’s attorney, Mr. Harris, advised the defendant that the PCA’s status as a corporation was not invalidated by repeal of the relevant statute, because of a savings clause. Counsel stated further that he and the defendant disagreed on this point. Plea Tr. p. 11, 1.7 through p. 17, 1.25. Mr. Harris was the defendant’s choice for court-appointed counsel, having been involved in the ongoing civil litigation between the defendant and the PCA.

The defendant expressed his concern that he was being selectively prosecuted, [1466]*1466that the PCA used the criminal charge to dispose of the ongoing civil case, and that the PCA was itself guilty of conversion. Plea Tr. p. 19, 1.4 through p. 20, 1.17. The defendant further expressed his opinion that the criminal charge was retaliatory. Plea Tr. p. 23, 11.13-16. Defense counsel discussed negotiations with the PCA on the civil matter as well as his legal opinion that the civil proceedings and criminal charge were completely separate. Plea Tr. p. 25, 1.6 through p. 27, 1.14.

The defendant stated that the criminal proceedings had become costly, even though he had appointed counsel, and that he was “sick and tired of the whole mess.” Plea Tr. p. 24, 11.1-5. The defendant expressed his intention to proceed with the plea. Plea Tr. p. 28, 11.12-14.

The transcript of the sentencing hearing provides further factual support for the guilty plea. The defendant stated that he entered the guilty plea to gain an advantage in the civil litigation with the PCA. His inability to resolve the civil matter with the PCA led to the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. Sentencing Tr. p. 6, I.14 through p. 8, 1.6; p. 8, 1.9 through p. 9, 1.9. The court pointed out several times that the civil and criminal cases were separate (Sentencing Tr. p. 9, 11.14-18; p. 12 II.19-22; p. 16, 11.13-17), but the defendant insisted that the criminal charge was conditioned on the outcome of the civil case. Sentencing Tr. p. 12,11.14-18; p. 12, 1.23 through p. 13, 1.2; p. 16, 11.7-12.

During the plea and sentencing hearings, the defendant never denied the background facts. He signed the security agreement. That instrument provided that if he sold the collateral he could not keep the proceeds. He sold the collateral but did not remit the proceeds to the PCA. Instead, the money was traced to his personal bank account. These facts are sufficient to establish that the crime of conversion occurred. The defendant never challenged the existence of these facts. The sole basis for his motion to withdraw his plea and his continuing protestations of innocence was the defendant’s erroneous view of the law.

The defendant requested that Mr.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

North Carolina v. Alford
400 U.S. 25 (Supreme Court, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
703 F. Supp. 1464, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1094, 1989 WL 8528, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-keiswetter-ard-1989.