United States v. Kaczynski

446 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58141, 2006 WL 2319889
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedAugust 10, 2006
Docket2:96-cr-00259
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 446 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (United States v. Kaczynski) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Kaczynski, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58141, 2006 WL 2319889 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

Opinion

ORDER

BURRELL, District Judge.

After convicted Unabomber Theodore John Kaezynski pled guilty “to a series of coldly calculated bombings that resulted in the loss of innocent life and numerous life-altering injuries,” Kaezynski moved for return of his property that was “seized pursuant to a search of his Montana cabin in 1996.... ” United States v. Kaczynski, 416 F.3d 971, 972 (9th Cir.2005). His motion was denied partly because of a ruling that a $15,026,000 restitution order, which had been entered in favor of certain victims and their families (“Named Victims”) but had not yet been satisfied, constituted a lien on the property that defeated his motion. United States v. Kaczynski, 306 F.Supp.2d 952, 955-56 (E.D.Cal.2004). 1

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that the restitution order in favor of the Named Victims “gives the government a cognizable claim of ownership” that “defeat[s][the] motion for return of property [only] ‘if that property is needed to satisfy the terms of the restitution order.’ ” Kaczynski, 416 F.3d at 974 (quoting United States v. Mills, 991 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir.1993)). Since the government asserted the property had only “negligible value,” the Ninth Circuit concluded the government had not shown that the property was needed to satisfy the restitution order. Id. at 975. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]n the probable event” the property has more than negligible value, “the government has a cognizable claim of ownership sufficient to defeat [the] motion for its return” and “has some degree of discretion as to how to enforce the restitution lien.” Id. at 976. But the Ninth Circuit found “neither [the government’s] actions ... nor its ... proposed restitution plan ... [were designed to obtain restitution for the Named Victims in a] reasonable [manner].” Id. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded the return of property motion “to the district court ... to give a timely and adequate opportunity for the government to present ... a commercially reasonable plan to dispose of the property at issue, the principal purpose of which shall be to maximize monetary return to the [Named Victims].” Id. at 977. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]f the government fails or refuses to *1149 provide such a plan within a reasonable period of time, or if its plan includes a finding of negligible value or results in a nominal, taxpayer-funded contribution to victim restitution, then the district court is directed to return Kaczynski’s property to him.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit also stated that Kac-zynski, and the Named Victims through appointed pro bono amicus counsel, were to be provided an opportunity to “comment upon” the plan proposed by the government. Id. The Ninth Circuit observed that the “viewpoints and desires” of the Named Victims were “missing throughout this litigation” and should be obtained since the “very purpose” of the restitution order “is to provide financial compensation for their great losses.” Id.

Upon remand, the government proposed a plan in a Status Report filed September 12, 2005, (“September 12 Plan”). 2 However, the parties subsequently stipulated to multiple continuances of a Status Conference regarding the plan, mainly to allow time for settlement discussions. As a result, a Status Conference was not held until June 16, 2006. 3

At the Status Conference, I questioned whether the September 12 Plan comported with the Ninth Circuit remand decision. 4 The government responded that “the reason [it] ha[d] not proposed a detailed plan ... [was] because [it] d[id] know exactly what ... [it was] to sell.” (Reporter’s Tr. of June 16 Status Conf. (“RT”) at 14.) The government asserted it “need[ed] direction from the victims” since “the purpose of the restitution order ... is to bring benefit to the victims.” (Id. at 14.) Counsel for the Named Victims then “suggested] ... a fairly short deadline [be set] to come up with [the] kind of detailed proposal that would satisfy the [Ninth Circuit remand decision].” (Id. at 17.) The government agreed, Kaczynski’s counsel acquiesced, and the government was given a deadline to file a document that proposed a plan consistent with the remand decision and explained why such a plan should be found timely submitted. (Id. at 22.) Kac-zynski and the Named Victims were given an opportunity to respond to the proposal. (Id. at 23-24.)

On July 7, 2006, the government submitted another Status Report, in which it proposed a markedly different plan (“July 7 Plan”). In the Status Report, the government asserted the July 7 Plan was timely because the government could not submit a more concrete plan “until [it] knew precisely what the Named Victims wanted to do and how the costs of the sale would be handled.” (Gov’t Status Report, filed July 7, 2006, at 5.) In addition, the government explained that some delay was attributable to settlement negotiations, which “the parties [explored] for several months.” 5 (Id. at 6.)

The July 7 Plan proposed to sell Kac-zynski’s property in a modified “federal judicial execution sale,” which would involve the United States Marshal “con *1150 tract[ing] with an entity ... [to] sell the property through an internet auction.” (Id. at 2.) The government explained “the Marshal [would] request three bid proposals from companies which conduct internet auctions.” (Id.) The company selected by the Marshal would “publicize the items to be sold and the terms of the auction,” and would be “paid a percentage of the sales proceeds, not to exceed 10%, to cover ... costs.” (Id.) The government represented that the Marshal “can request bid proposals and negotiate a final contract [for the auction] within sixty days” of receiving court approval. 6 (Id.)

In the July 7 Plan, the government divided the property at issue into four categories — personal items, firearms, bomb-making materials, and writings — and specifically identified the items of property in each category. 7 (Id. at 3-4.) The government proposed auctioning all of the personal items, and stated the Named Victims “intend to credit bid for any personal items ... which do not sell,” i.e. the Named Victims would bid on and purchase property by applying Kaczynski’s restitu-tory debt toward the purchase price. 8 (Id. at 3.) The government asserted the firearms and bomb-making materials should not be included in the auction nor returned to Kaczynski. (Id.

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Related

United States v. Theodore Kaczynski
443 F. App'x 299 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Kaczynski
551 F.3d 1120 (Ninth Circuit, 2009)

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Bluebook (online)
446 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58141, 2006 WL 2319889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-kaczynski-caed-2006.