United States v. Joshua Brent Gray, United States of America v. Terrence A. Askew

491 F.3d 138, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15760, 2007 WL 1881194

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 2, 2007
• Docket: 05-4397, 05-4398
• Status: Published

Opinions

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILKINSON wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge WILLIAMS joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the arrest of defendants Terrence Askew and Joshua Gray at the Huntington, West Virginia apartment leased by Gray. Defendants were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) and 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).

Defendants contend that, because police conducted an unlawful search of Gray’s apartment, the district court should have granted their motions to suppress evidence obtained from that search. More specifically, Askew argues that he has standing to contest the physical evidence obtained from Gray’s residence. We hold, however, that because the Askew-Gray relationship was at core a business one, Askew had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Gray’s apartment and cannot claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment. For his part, Gray argues that the testimony of Terrence Askew, David Cole, and Dora Wallace is the product of an illegal search. Because the testimony of the three witnesses was given voluntarily, however, its causal connection to the violation of Gray’s Fourth Amendment rights is too attenuated to be considered the fruit of an unlawful search. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

On July 3, 2003, three members of the Huntington Federal Drug Task Force went to Joshua Gray’s apartment, located at 4511 Rear Altizer Avenue, to conduct a “knock and talk.” The officers’ visit was prompted by drug trafficking complaints filed by at least one neighbor. The officers knocked on, and Gray opened, the side kitchen door. A few moments later, the officers entered Gray’s home.

Upon entering the apartment, the officers saw a tan substance, which they believed to be cocaine base, or crack, on the kitchen table. Detective Hunter looked into the living room and observed two men. One man, later identified as Askew, was standing beside a table. The table contained a set of digital scales, a white substance that looked like cocaine, and a second substance that looked like crack cocaine.

Detective Hunter asked for Askew’s name. Askew identified himself as “Rico Green,” and started to reach into his pocket. Worried that Askew was reaching for a weapon, Detective Hunter told Askew to place his hands over his head and initiated a pat down search. Askew had $8,000 in cash — rolled up in a plastic baggy — in his front pants pocket. An additional plastic baggie of tan chunks, later identified as cocaine base, was hidden in his shoe. During the search, Askew told Officer Hunter that he had swallowed an eight-ball (about 3.5 ounces) of cocaine base, and the officers called the paramedics.

The officers asked Gray for permission to search the rest of the home. Gray refused. Sergeant Copley then applied for and obtained a search warrant. The warrant was executed that day and the officers recovered an additional .36 grams of cocaine base, drug paraphernalia, a .45 caliber Glock handgun, a magazine, and fifteen rounds of ammunition.

While the officers were waiting outside Gray’s home for Sergeant Copley to return with the search warrant, David Cole and Dora Wallace came to the residence to purchase drugs. Cole gave a statement to the officers on July 3, 2003, and also testified before the grand jury on August 12, 2003, in which he described his previous drug purchases at the Gray residence. Cole told officers that he had been to the Altizer Avenue apartment on various occasions and had seen Gray, Askew, and a third man packaging amounts of cocaine base. Wallace declined to speak with officers at the scene. On February 9, 2004, however, she gave a statement to police concerning her knowledge of defendants’ drug activities.

On August 12, 2003, a federal grand jury-returned a two-count indictment against defendants. Count One charged that defendants knowingly conspired to distribute cocaine base, or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. Count Two charged defendants with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Defendants filed separate motions to suppress the evidence obtained from Gray’s residence. The district court held a suppression hearing, and found that Gray had not voluntarily consented to the initial warrantless search of his residence. Accordingly, the court granted Gray’s motion to suppress the physical evidence obtained from the illegal entry.¹ The court, however, denied Askew’s suppression motion for lack of standing, finding that Askew did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in Gray’s residence. The court also denied Gray’s motion to exclude the testimony of Terrence Askew, David Cole, and Dora Wallace, explaining that the connection between the testimony of the three witnesses and the illegal search was too attenuated to be fruit of the illegal search.

The defendants then entered into conditional plea agreements with the government. On February 12, 2004, Askew pled guilty to aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and agreed to provide testimony in exchange for dismissal of the conspiracy to distribute cocaine base charge. On April 9, 2004, Gray pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. In return, the government moved to dismiss the aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine base charge. Both defendants reserved the right to seek review of the district court’s suppression rulings. Following a joint sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced both defendants to 97-month prison terms. Defendants now appeal.²

II.

Askew contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence on the ground that he lacked Fourth Amendment standing to challenge the search of Gray’s residence. We review factual findings underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and legal determinations de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). The burden of showing a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched rests with the defendant. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980).

A.

The Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of the people’s right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,” protects individuals living in a large number of legal arrangements. U.S. Const, amend. IV. Until a valid search warrant has issued, the Amendment safeguards the privacy interests of owners, Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925), boarders, McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454-56, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948), and tenants, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), of a home, apartment, or other dwelling place. Co-tenants, co-owners, and co-occupants can also avail themselves of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S.Ct. 1515, 1526, 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006). And, travelers are entitled to be free from unreasonable government scrutiny in their hotel and motel rooms. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).

Moreover, while “[t]he text of the Amendment suggests that its protections extend only to people in ‘their’ houses” a person “may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house of someone else.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89, 119 S.Ct. 469, 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998). The Supreme Court has long held that the relatives of home owners who regularly reside at the residence are protected by the Fourth Amendment. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546-48, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). And, more recently, the Supreme Court extended the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections to overnight guests. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990).

The Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home does not turn on whether illegal activity takes place therein. A search cannot “be justified by what it turns up.” Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548 n. 10, 88 S.Ct. 1788. To the contrary, the people’s right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion “has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001). Indeed, notions of privacy would mean little if they crumpled on the finding of inculpatory evidence.

Although the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable government scrutiny are broad, they are not unlimited. It is axiomatic that “suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) (emphasis added). The right to be free from an unreasonable search is personal in nature and cannot be vicariously asserted. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Thus, the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends ... upon whether the person who claims the protection ... has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S.Ct. 469 (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. 421). A search can therefore be unconstitutional with respect to one person, yet the evidence obtained therefrom admissible against a second person.

Of course, every perpetrator of an unlawful act hopes for privacy in the sense of not getting discovered or caught. But it is not enough that an individual have a subjective expectation of privacy. Rather, the expectation must be one “which the law recognizes as ‘legitimate.’ ” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421. To be legitimate, an expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable: it must flow from “a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 119 S.Ct. 469 (quotation omitted); see also Bonner v. Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir.1996).

B.

The Fourth Amendment’s protections do not attach to every visitor. For not every visitor “merely present with the consent of the householder” has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469. It is rather a foundational principle that “not all persons in the company of the property owner have the owner’s right to assert the spatial protection.” Id. at 99, 119 S.Ct. 469 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Fourth Amendment is not so broad as to encompass “anyone legitimately on the premises where a search occurs.” Id. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469; see also Rakas, 439 U.S. at 147-48, 99 S.Ct. 421. Thus, a temporary visitor to a residence — perhaps the mailman or pizza deliverer — cannot generally claim the Fourth Amendment’s protections. See, e.g., Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469; Terry v. Martin, 120 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.1997).

In Minnesota v. Carter, the Supreme Court held that visitors who were “essentially present for a business transaction” had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the apartment of a third party. 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469; see also United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1286 (10th Cir.2003) (interpreting Carter to create “a clear distinction between the status of individuals present at a residence for social purposes and those present for business or commercial matters”); United States v. Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir.2000) (interpreting Carter to hold that “[a]n individual whose presence on another’s premises is purely commercial in nature ... has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that location”).

The distinction between social guests and business visitors arises from several considerations. To begin with, the text of the Fourth Amendment speaks to the people’s interest in “their” homes. It traces its origins to the ancient maxim: “A man’s home is his castle.” And, while early English cases protect a defendant in his own dwelling, they do not extend to protect “any person who flies to his house.” Semayne’s Case, (1605) 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 198 (K.B.); see also Johnson v. Leigh, (1815) 128 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1030 (C.P.). Rather, at common law “the house of any one [wa]s not a castle or privilege but for himself.” Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 198.

To say that every business visit, however fleeting, gives the visitor a legitimate expectation of privacy in someone else’s home strays far from the text and its commonlaw heritage. For “[a]t the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31, 121 S.Ct. 2038 (internal quotations omitted). And while expectations of privacy are at their apex in one’s home, they diminish considerably in nonresidential property. An industrial complex does not, of course, “share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home.” Id. at 37, 121 S.Ct. 2038. Rather, the “expectation of privacy in commercial premises ... is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home.” Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700, 107 S.Ct. 2636, 96 L.Ed.2d 601 (1987)).

Moreover, the purpose for which one goes abroad can determine whether an expectation of privacy is legitimate. See, e.g., United States v. Higgins, 282 F.3d 1261, 1271 (10th Cir.2002); Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d at 458. Indeed, those who venture forth to conduct illegal business often do not hold a legitimate expectation of privacy in locations that are not their own. Someone who hides illegal activity in a vacant field or abandoned warehouse, for example, takes his or her chances that law enforcement officials will happen upon incriminating evidence.

The distinction between business and social guests also draws upon the fact that a social host often shares not only his home but also his privacy with his guest. See Olson, 495 U.S. at 99, 110 S.Ct. 1684. Many social guests entrust their hosts with the safety and security of both their persons and their belongings. An overnight guest, for example, seeks shelter in another’s home “precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place where he and his possessions will not be disturbed.” Id. The same generally cannot be said of business visitors. Often strangers with little or no connection to a residence, business associates may or may not have reasons for mutual trust. To expand the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to cover any such caller, does not map onto “the everyday expectations of privacy that we all share.” Id. at 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684.

III.

The facts of this case suggest that Askew was a business, not a social, guest.³ There can be no doubt that at the time of his arrest Askew was using Gray’s apartment to traffic in drugs.

At the outset, the evidence adduced at the suppression hearing itself suffices to establish that Askew was selling drugs out of Gray’s home. In its order denying Askew’s motion to suppress, the district court found the following facts. The task force’s investigation began when neighbors complained that certain individuals were running a drug ring out of Gray’s residence. When the officers arrived, Askew was standing beside a table and identified himself as Rico Green. The table contained a set of digital scales and what appeared to be both cocaine base and cocaine. And Askew had $8,000 in cash hidden in his front pants pocket.

The suppression hearing revealed further undisputed facts which also support the conclusion that the Gray-Askew relationship was a commercial, rather than social, one. For example, Askew had a plastic baggie containing cocaine base hidden in his shoe. On the day of the search, Askew did not have a key to the apartment; had been there for only a short time; and was only one of several visitors. He was not, the district court found, “planning on spending the night.”

At the close of the suppression hearing, the district court concluded based on these facts and circumstances “that Mr. Askew did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Mr. Gray’s home.” The court noted that Askew was not an overnight guest, and had not “demonstrated any equivalent reason for his having a legitimate expectation of privacy in [Gray’s] home.” As a result, the district court denied Askew’s Fourth Amendment claim, explaining that he “lack[ed] standing to challenge the officers’ entry into Mr. Gray’s home on July 3, 2003 and the search and seizure subsequently conducted pursuant to a warrant authorizing a search of Mr. Gray’s home.”

In short, the district court had more than enough evidence to support its finding “that Mr. Askew did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Mr. Gray’s home.” Indeed, the dissent acknowledges that Askew used Gray’s apartment for “his own business purpose”: drug dealing. See infra at 167. In seeking to overturn the district court’s ruling, however, the dissent dismisses Askew’s use of Gray’s apartment “for his own business purpose” as a “factor,” see infra at 167, and closes its eyes to the drugs, cash, weapons, and customers that are the wherewithal of a flourishing drug business. These facts, however, reveal that the Gray-Askew relationship was a commercial one. We hold that the district court correctly concluded that Askew had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the Altizer Avenue apartment.

While the evidence found by the district court in its suppression order itself suffices to uphold the district court’s suppression ruling, nothing prohibits our review of confirmatory facts adduced later in Askew’s presentence report and sentencing hearing, so long as information obtained from Gray’s parallel proceeding is not used against Askew.

The dissent objects, however, to use of later, confirmatory facts found by the district court at sentencing after full due process protections were accorded to the defendant — facts which only serve to confirm what was, in any event, the district court’s evidently sound and correct suppression ruling. The idea that district or appellate courts should somehow close their eyes to facts that only bear out the correctness of a district court’s initial view is at odds with both common sense and the aims of the criminal justice system. While the dissent may be fearful that these subsequent facts serve to underscore the correctness of the suppression ruling, it is utterly unremarkable that a court should take note of facts developed after a defendant had every opportunity to object to them.⁴

This court has recognized that when later proceedings confirm the correctness of the district court’s findings, we can affirm a pre-trial suppression ruling based on such evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 539 (4th Cir.1996) (citing cases); see also United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C.Cir.1992); United States v. Corral, 970 F.2d 719, 723 (10th Cir.1992). This ruling makes sense because all the facts pertinent to a suppression motion are not inevitably developed at a pre-trial hearing and both the trial court and the appellate court should not be precluded from taking note of a more comprehensive record supporting, as it does here, the district court’s initial denial of the motion to suppress. See Hicks, 978 F.2d at 725. In adopting a contrary approach, the dissent would create an artificial barrier against ascertainment of truth, lowering the curtain well before the end of the play.

The whole idea of cordoning off suppression hearings and keeping them free from the supposed “taint” of subsequent sentencing proceedings is an artificial one. In either setting, a defendant has every opportunity to object to unreliable or untruthful evidence. See United States v. Terry, 916 .2d 157, 162 (4th Cir.1990) (holding that a defendant may rebut or explain away evidence compiled in the pre-sentence report). Indeed, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 is replete with procedural safeguards that afford the defendant and his attorney ample opportunity to present, orally and in writing, objections to anything in the presentence report. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e)(2), (f)(1), (i)(l)(A), (i)(l)(C), (i)(l)(D); see also U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (2006). The Sentencing Guidelines reinforce these protections requiring the district court to “resolve with care” any disputed issues of fact which may bear on sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (2006) (commentary). And a wrongly maligned defendant has every incentive to explain away any inaccuracy — often on pain of additional prison time. Notwithstanding all this, the dissent makes the astonishing suggestion that sentencing proceedings are not adversarial. See infra at 158-59. If this is true, then one wonders why counsel must be present, why defendant is given every opportunity to object, and why innumerable rules exist both to ensure accuracy and to safeguard a defendant’s interests at sentencing.

There is no dispute that Askew received the benefit of all of these safeguards: His sentencing procedure complied with the Sentencing Guidelines and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Askew was provided with a copy of the presentence report, and, through his legal counsel, made three written objections. In support of these objections he submitted a thirteen page memorandum to the district court on February 24, 2005, and a second supplemental sentencing memorandum on March 7, 2005. At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined that Askew had been given an opportunity to read the report, had discussed it with his lawyer, and understood its contents. The court then held an evidentiary hearing, made findings of fact, and examined and heard oral argument on each of defendant’s objections. The district court ruled on each of defendant’s objections; adopted, with modification, the presentence report; and gave Askew a final opportunity to speak on any topic, asking “Mr. Askew, [is there] anything you’d like to say?” These extensive procedures afforded Askew every facet of due process. Further, the district court and this court have not moved beyond facts as adopted by the district court. Askew had every opportunity to, and did, challenge those facts below. Due process requires nothing more.

Under the dissent’s inflexible view, however, never under any circumstance may evidence in a sentencing proceeding be used to confirm (or to rebut) a prior suppression ruling — no matter how reliable or relevant the evidence. In this, the dissent denies to the district court in the first instance and later to appellate courts the discretion to ascribe to evidence the weight it is entitled. To so rigidly bind the hands of a court in the face of probative evidence is per-seism at its worst.

It takes no clairvoyance to understand that the dissent envisions formalized suppression hearings themselves imbued with trial-like trappings. But, of course, suppression hearings, while properly observant of due process, are not meant to replicate trials. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974) (holding that there is “no automatic rule against the reception of hearsay evidence in [suppression] proceedings”). Under the dissent’s view, not only would evidence be suppressed at trial, but there would now be suppressions from suppression rulings on the grounds that trial-like procedures are not in place. To adopt the dissent’s approach would thus pile suppression upon suppression — at no small cost to the ascertainment of truth.

The dissent’s protestations aside, nothing in our ruling will “discourage the use of conditional guilty pleas and force more trials.” See infra at 164. A defendant will plead guilty when he gets a good deal and he will enter a conditional plea when he believes there is fair prospect that his Fourth Amendment claim will be sustained. None of this self-interested calculation is affected by our ruling in the least, because facts damaging to the defendant’s suppression motion may also be uncovered if a defendant goes to trial.

The dissent argues, however, that to look to Askew’s presentence admissions to confirm the correctness of a suppression ruling would vitiate the requirement that a guilty plea be deemed knowing and voluntary. See infra at 163-64. This is hardly the case. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 sets out the “information a court is to convey to assure that a defendant who pleads guilty understands the consequences of the plea.” Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65, 115 S.Ct. 2021, 132 L.Ed.2d 46 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). With respect to the “consequences of the plea,” Congress amended Rule 11 to “identify] more specifically what must be explained to defendant”: A court must “inform the defendant of and determine that he understands ‘the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law for the offense to which the plea is offered.’” Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 (advisory comm. 1974 n.).

No one contends that the district court failed to comply with Rule ll’s requirements here. Under Rule 11, there is no requirement that a judge inform a defendant about a number of collateral consequences of a guilty plea, such as parole eligibility, the fact that a jury might find him guilty of a lesser included offence, or that he might be subject to additional punishment by reason of his or her prior conviction, Fed.R.Crim.P. 11 (advisory comm. 1974 n.), much less a requirement that defendant be informed of the “full consequences” of his telling of the truth, see infra at 164. “As we have stated previously, the district courts are wholly capable of guaranteeing that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary without flyspecking on the appellate level.” United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1308 (4th Cir.1996).

Quite beyond the dissent’s novel gloss on Rule 11, neither the government nor a defendant has any right to expect that the disposition of a suppression motion should be made on something other than the facts of a case. The criminal justice system retains an interest in reliable suppression rulings. That interest would be undercut if the suppression of reliable evidence from suppression rulings were henceforth to be the standard.

The dissent makes much of the fact that the purpose of a sentencing hearing is sentencing, not suppression. Something is either true or it is not. A fact does not become true for sentencing purposes and false for some other purpose. If this logic were followed to its endpoint, evidence adduced at trial would also be out-of-bounds — for the purpose of a trial is ascertainment of guilt, not suppression. This view is foreclosed by our precedent which plainly allows for the consideration of post-suppression trial evidence. See Han, 74 F.3d at 539.

The dissent perceives a great injustice here because “[b]oth sides ... understood that [sentencing] evidence ... would be used only to determine an appropriate sentence.” See infra at 165. This is not the case. While the plea agreement expressly prohibits the government from using such testimony “in any further criminal prosecutions or in determining the applicable guideline range,” it contains no reference to, and thus no limitation on, the applicability of sentencing proceedings to the suppression ruling.

Defendant Askew obviously understood as much because he raised an objection to the presentence report on this very point. There, Askew objected to “any inference or any other statements in the presentence investigation report that states or tends to show that the search conducted of Mr. Gray’s apartment was a legal search and seizure.” The objection was deferred to the sentencing hearing, where it was repeated and subsequently overruled by the district court.

Put simply, nothing in the proceedings below requires the court to disregard evidence that might provide some insight to the correctness and appropriateness of the suppression ruling. To find otherwise would remove from courts the ability to ensure that their own suppression orders, whether granted or denied, are based upon a full and accurate set of facts. Courts do retain an interest in having their own orders not be shams. Moreover, had the evidence developed at sentencing been beneficial to the defendant, he would have no doubt urged this court to consider it when reviewing the suppression ruling. In fact, defendant Gray argues before this court that evidence from the sentencing hearing supports his claim that the district court erred when it refused to suppress the testimony of Cole and Wallace, on the grounds that the testimony was too closely linked to a nonconsensual search. Gray, like any defendant, has the right to do this: the principle is not a one-way street, but one designed to ensure the accuracy and integrity of judicial rulings.

In sum, where, as here, the defendant has had adequate opportunity to object to the report; and the district court has adopted the presentence findings as reliable after consideration of defendant’s objections, it is perfectly appropriate for an appellate court to take cognizance of confirmatory facts contained within the report.

C.

In the case at hand, facts developed in Askew’s Presentence Investigation Report and adopted by the district court as well as Askew’s sentencing testimony leave no doubt that the district court correctly concluded that Askew’s actions, viewed in their totality, left him with no legitimate expectation of privacy in the Altizer Avenue apartment. Indeed, to ignore relevant subsequent evidence on the considerable scale of Askew’s drug operation would do a disservice both to the district court and to the notion that the criminal justice system should not lightly construct arbitrary barriers to the ascertainment of truth.

For example, Askew’s Presentence Investigation Report as adopted by the district court revealed that the search of Gray’s apartment recovered “cocaine base along with a .45 caliber semiautomatic Glock, a magazine and fifteen rounds, one box of 12-gauge shotgun slugs and drug paraphernalia.” Askew’s own presentence statements further confirm that the Gray-Askew association was a business one; Askew admitted to making an “agreement to pay Gray for selling drugs out of his house.” The court concluded that the testimony indicated that Askew “was clearly involved in the trafficking of substantial amounts of cocaine base.”

While the terms of the Gray-Askew agreement were never formalized, the district court’s sentencing hearing findings also confirm that the Gray-Askew association was a business one. “[EJvery factual element,” including the cash, scales, and presence and proximity of a gun, indicated that 5411 Rear Altizer Avenue was operating as a “crack house,” the court noted. The court found no “other rational explanation for [$8,680] cash being carried on a person under these circumstances.” In light of these facts, the district court was “convince[d]” that Gray and Askew “were doing drug business.” In the district court’s view, Askew’s “explanation of saving [the cash] for college ... just earr[ying] it around in the pocket of his pants, just doesn’t measure up.” “I find that beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court stated. The district court’s factual finding — that it was not college tuition rolled up in Askew’s pants pocket — along with other facts brought to light during Askew’s sentencing proceedings, confirms the correctness of the district court’s conclusion that Askew had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Gray’s home.

D.

Askew argues, however, that other facts point to the existence of a social relationship. According to Askew, he would visit Gray four or five times a week, spending several hours. They would watch tv, play video games, and “do other things” around the house. Askew kept a change of clothes, a toothbrush, and his Playstation console at Gray’s home. Askew also testified that Gray had, on occasion, lent him a key and allowed him to spend the night. For his part, however, Gray could not remember any night during which Askew had stayed at the Altizer apartment.

Askew’s recitation is less than a half-told tale and ignores extensive evidence before the district court. We are hard pressed to find that the presence of scattered personal possessions are sufficient to transform what was essentially a business relationship into a social one. If a change of clothes was sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court’s insistence that an expectation of privacy in commercial premises is “less than” the corresponding expectation of privacy in a home would be rendered meaningless. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. 469. We also decline to create a toothbrush or Nintendo rule that would inflexibly mark a relationship as social in the face of testimony of extensive drug operations, replete with scales, large amounts of cash, neighborhood complaints, and multiple customers. Social interaction is, of course, incidental to many business dealings. But were we to accept Askew’s argument, the ancient maxim that a man’s home is his castle would be turned on its head: a defendant’s “castles” would dot the countryside. For not only would every person planning illegal activity have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own home, but also in the home of every acquaintance where he could stash some personal belongings.

To be sure, not everyone who uses an illegal substance in someone else’s home is thereby transformed into a business guest. Here, however, Askew did not go to Gray’s apartment simply to use drugs; rather, the evidence shows that Askew used Gray’s home to turn a profit. He ran his drug ring from the Altizer Avenue apartment: regularly selling cocaine base to multiple customers in the manner of a commercial enterprise.

Askew nonetheless claims that the time he spent in the apartment is alone sufficient to bring him within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. We disagree. The fact that Askew engaged in a series of drug transactions, rather than a single drug sale, does not transform his asserted expectation of privacy into one “the law recognizes as legitimate.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n. 12, 99 S.Ct. 421. A business transaction does not change character simply because it is repeated. We reject a rule that accords members of ongoing drug operations heightened constitutional protection.

The dissent contends that “Askew was accepted into Gray’s household” and that, given his “long-established and meaningful connections to both Gray and Gray’s apartment, Askew could reasonably expect that his privacy would not be disturbed.” See infra at 167 (alterations omitted). But, in its order denying suppression, the district court found that Askew was a mere “visitor” who had no “reasonable expectation of privacy in Mr. Gray’s home.”

Askew’s attempt to fit his case within the holding of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), also fails. The defendant in that case, Jones, was essentially house-sitting. The apartment belonged to Jones’s friend, Evans, who had gone out of town for “about five days.” Id. at 259, 80 S.Ct. 725. Evans had given Jones the use of the apartment, and a key, with which Jones admitted himself on the day of the search. Id. Except with respect to the owner, “Jones had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. 421 (interpreting Jones, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725).

Askew cannot claim similar “dominion and control” over the Altizer Avenue apartment. On the day of the search, he did not have a key and was not planning on spending the night. There was no evidence that Askew exercised control or dominion over the residence, or that he had any private space in the home, as one would often expect with a social guest. And nothing suggests that he could have excluded the police or anyone else from the apartment. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that the holding in Jones must not be extended beyond its specific facts. See, e.g., Carter, 525 U.S. at 89-90, 119 S.Ct. 469; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. 421; compare infra at 168 (“Askew need not show that his case is identical to Jones.”).

This court’s precedent also supports the fact that Askew does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in Gray’s residence. While we have recognized that persons other than overnight guests can have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the home of another, we have done so in the context of social visitors with near-familial relationships. Bonner, 81 F.3d at 475. In Bonner, the court allowed plaintiff in that case, Joyce Bonner, to assert a Fourth Amendment right in her section 1983 action. We emphasized the depth of the social relationship in that case: Bonner was a frequent visitor at Ms. Mealey’s, a woman whom she and other community members called “Grandma”; her half-sister had been raised in Ms. Mealey’s home; and she had previously lived in a neighboring building on the Mealey property. Id. at 475. In view of these social connections, we concluded that “Bonner’s activities — visiting a neighbor and assisting the elderly — established] an expectation of privacy that is ‘recognized and permitted by society.’ ” Id. at 475 (quoting Olson, 495 U.S. at 100, 110 S.Ct. 1684) (emphasis added). Askew’s drug trafficking activities are not rooted in similar understandings. Indeed, Bonner distinguished the situation presented here, noting that Bonner’s case “differs from that of defendants ... who are unable to suppress evidence because they have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched.” Id.

In short, Askew “treated the apartment as a base for his business operations, not as a sanctuary from outsiders.” United States v. Hicks, 978 F.2d 722, 724 (D.C.Cir.1992). The Tenth Circuit made this precise point when it held that a “business invitee who had permission from the owner to be on the premises for a specific purpose — to clean and repair the property” did not have “an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises that society [wa]s prepared to accept.” Higgins, 282 F.3d at 1270. Similarly, in United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 338 (3d Cir.2002), the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence because the court found “no evidence that [defendants] were at [a third party’s] apartment for any purpose other than to engage in drug-related activities.” Therefore, defendants had demonstrated no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment “that would permit them to claim the protection guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 336.

Finally, we note that although an individual can have an expectation of privacy in his workplace, see O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987), Askew does not claim such an expectation here. Even viewing Askew’s Fourth Amendment challenge through the lens of commercial privacy, however, that challenge must fail. While the Supreme Court has held that a worker may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the desk and file cabinets located in his own private office, see id. at 718-19, 107 S.Ct. 1492, Askew was not in his own private office, but was conducting an extensive drug operation from someone else’s home. A defendant cannot simply co-opt another’s dwelling for illegal business enterprises. Thus, in Minnesota v. Carter, the Supreme Court distinguished similarly situated defendants who were “essentially present for a business transaction” from the “worker in O’Connor [who] had ... his own private office.” 525 U.S. at 90-91, 119 S.Ct. 469.

To sum up, the district court made the following findings: that 4511 Rear Altizer Avenue was operating as a “crack house”; that Gray and Askew “were doing drug business”; that Askew “was clearly involved in the trafficking of substantial amounts of cocaine base”; that Askew “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in Mr. Gray’s home”; and that Askew had in fact demonstrated no reason “for his having a legitimate expectation of privacy in [Gray’s] home.” These conclusions rested in part upon the district court’s ability to observe the demeanor of those witnesses involved, not least among them Askew himself. We thus conclude, in accord with substantial authority, that because Askew’s purpose at 4511 Altizer Avenue was patently commercial, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in Gray’s residence, and we affirm the district court’s denial of Askew’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered therein. See, e.g., Perez, 280 F.3d at 337 (holding no legitimate expectation of privacy where defendants were “in another’s apartment for a short time for the business purpose of packaging cocaine”); Higgins, 282 F.3d at 1270-71 (holding no “objectively reasonable expectation of privacy” where defendant was a business invitee engaging in methamphetamine production); United States v. Sturgis, 238 F.3d 956, 958-59 (8th Cir.2001) (holding defendant “plainly lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in [a hotel] room” where defendant’s purpose in visiting “was purely commercial”); Gamez-Orduño, 235 F.3d at 458 (“An individual whose presence on another’s premises is purely commercial in nature ... has no legitimate expectation of privacy in that location.”).

IV.

We now turn to Gray’s contention that the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of David Cole, Dora Wallace, and Terrence Askew as the tainted products of an illegal search. We note at the outset that since Gray had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his own dwelling he was plainly entitled to claim the Fourth Amendment’s protections of the home. See, e.g., Agnello, 269 U.S. at 33, 46 S.Ct. 4. Based on its finding that Gray did not voluntarily consent to the warrantless search, the district court correctly excluded all of the physical evidence discovered by the search from the case against Gray. The question presented here is whether Gray can also exclude the witness testimony of Cole, Wallace, and Askew.

Whether evidence is tainted fruit requires a two-step analysis. The threshold question is whether testimonial evidence is the product of an illegal search. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13 (1990). Even if the evidence is the product of an unconstitutional search, it is nonetheless admissible if the causal connection between the evidence and the illegal conduct is attenuated. Hudson v. Michigan, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006). The question is thus “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (quotation omitted).

The “standards for suppression of witness testimony are stricter than for physical evidence.” United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 479 (4th Cir.2002). “[S]ince the cost of excluding live-witness testimony often will be greater, a closer, more direct link between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required.” United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978); Najjar, 300 F.3d at 479 (same). Accordingly, “[t]he exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance where the claim is based on a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object.” Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054.

The primary focus of attenuation analysis is whether or not the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is served by suppression. Id. at 275-76, 98 S.Ct. 1054; United States v. McKinnon, 92 F.3d 244, 247 (4th Cir.1996). In making this determination, Ceccolini directs us to consider first the “enormous cost” of “exclusion [that] would perpetually disable a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts.” Id. at 277, 98 S.Ct. 1054. The willingness of a witness to testify is a second factor that “represents a significant attenuation of the link between the police misconduct and its evidentiary fruits.” United States v. Leonardi, 623 F.2d 746, 752 (2d Cir.1980). As the Fifth Circuit put it, “One source of attenuation ... is to be found in the exercise of the codefendants’ own wills.” United States v. Houltin, 566 F.2d 1027, 1032 (5th Cir.1978). The court may also consider the role played by the illegally seized evidence in gaming the witness’s cooperation; the proximity between the illegal search, the decision to cooperate, and the actual testimony; and the police motivation in conducting the search. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279-80, 98 S.Ct. 1054; McKinnon, 92 F.3d at 247-48.

The testimony of David Cole and Dora Wallace is admissible under this framework. To begin with, Gray’s challenge to Cole and Wallace’s testimony does not meet Ceccolini’s threshold inquiry: the search was not a but-for cause of their testimonies. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 274, 98 S.Ct. 1054; Harris, 495 U.S. at 19, 110 S.Ct. 1640. The discovery of Cole and Wallace was unrelated to the illegal entry. It was pure happenstance that Cole and Wallace walked up to Gray’s apartment to purchase drugs after the search was underway, rather than during the officers’ lawful surveillance. Indeed, the officers were investigating the Gray residence precisely because neighbors had complained of drug-related foot traffic. This too suggests that the illegal entry was not a but-for cause of Cole and Wallace’s testimony.

Even if the testimonies of Cole and Wallace were the product of an illegal search, but-for causality is a necessary, but not sufficient, ground for suppression. Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2164. Since any link between the testimonies and the unlawful search is attenuated, they are admissible under Ceccolini Cole and Wallace voluntarily chose to speak with the officers. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 276-77, 98 S.Ct. 1054; Najjar, 300 F.3d at 479. As the district court found, Cole and Wallace’s “decision to provide information to the officers was an exercise of free will sufficient to attenuate the taint of the illegal search.”

Defendants argue, however, because both Cole and Wallace were under subpoena to appear at trial, and because Cole’s testimony to the grand jury was pursuant to a subpoena (Wallace did not show up), their testimonies cannot be considered voluntary. But the initial statements given by Cole and Wallace to drug enforcement officers were not given under subpoena. Moreover, the fact that Cole and Wallace were required to show up does not mean that they were compelled to waive their own privileges and testify against Gray. We decline to hold that a meticulous prosecutor who obtains a subpoena to ensure that witnesses will be in the right place at the right time invariably renders any subsequent testimony “involuntary.” As the Fifth Circuit found in similar circumstances, the fact that a refusal to testify “risk[s] being cited for contempt” does not alone “render it involuntary.” Houltin, 566 F.2d at 1032.

Other factors support the district court’s conclusion that the link between the unlawful entry and the testimony of Cole and Wallace is an attenuated one. To begin with, the statements made by Cole and Wallace merely provided background information relating to the alleged drug conspiracy, its modus operandi, and the roles of the various players, not the evidence discovered during the illegal search. See McKinnon, 92 F.3d at 247-48. Wallace’s testimony is also distant in time from the illegal search — she waited more than six months to give a statement to the police. And while Cole gave a statement to police on the day of the search, he did not testify before the grand jury for several months. Finally, there is no indication that officers conducted the search in the hope of obtaining testimony from Cole or Wallace. To suppress live witness testimony in such circumstances would place an inordinate strain on the truth-seeking function of courts while having a minimal deterrent effect on police behavior.

Gray next contends that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress Askew’s testimony. He argues that Askew’s testimony was not voluntary because it was secured by a plea agreement that Askew would not have made but for the illegally seized evidence obtained from Gray’s home.

We disagree. To begin with, Askew had no Fourth Amendment right to object to evidence obtained from Gray’s home. See supra Part II. Moreover, the existence of inculpatory evidence does not make a defendant’s self-interested decision to bargain with the government involuntary. To the contrary, Askew’s decision to offer his testimony in exchange for the dismissal of one charge was not coercion, but a deliberate and calculated choice motivated by his desire to receive a lesser sentence. Askew could have chosen to go to trial or to plead guilty without a plea agreement. Hard choices are choices nonetheless, and Askew’s decision, however difficult, was voluntary. Other courts have held as much. United States v. Abridge, 346 F.3d 618, 630 (6th Cir.2003) (testimony of code-fendant testifying pursuant to a plea bargain admissible as a product of free will); Leonardi, 623 F.2d at 752-54 (same); Houltin, 566 F.2d at 1032 (testimony of codefendants testifying pursuant to use immunity admissible as a product of free will).

In search of a distinction, the dissent argues that each of these cases involve circumstances where the identity of the testifying co-defendant is already known to law enforcement officers pursuant to an independent source. See infra at 170- 71. But there is every reason to assume that where neighborhood complaints identified Rico Green as the mastermind behind the Altizer Avenue drug trafficking ring, lawful surveillance would have ultimately unearthed Rico Green’s true identity. In any event, the point of those cases is that a defendant’s choice to testify is a product of free will which may itself break the causal connection between the testimonial evidence and the illegal search.

Even if this general proposition could somehow be brought into question, the specifics of Askew’s agreement do not lend themselves to a finding of involuntariness. His plea agreement, for example, was distant in time from the constitutional violation. It was entered into several months after the illegal search and thus a “product of detached reflection.” Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 277, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Finally, we may not ignore the “enormous cost” of Gray’s invitation to “permanently si-lenc[e]” Askew in light of the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 277, 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Where, as here, there is no indication that law enforcement officers “searched with the intent of finding a willing and knowledgeable witness” the deterrent effect of exclusion is minimal. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280, 98 S.Ct. 1054.⁵ In so ruling, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s admonition that the exclusionary rule must be “our last resort, not our first impulse.” Hudson, 126 S.Ct. at 2163.

V.

Intractability often suggests inevitability. So it is with illegal drugs. We seem resigned to the matter as to some low-grade national fever which we may never wholly shake.

Viewed in macro terms, that may be true. Viewed in broad societal terms, we may not be able to make much of a dent in the “drug problem.” And yet viewed through the lens of a wrecked and shattered life, drugs are not an abstract “problem,” but an all too concrete tragedy. Our court system, while hardly the whole answer, still brings to justice those who strip the lives of others of hope and potential and leave them to the toils of addiction.

Neither these nor any other observations would or should permit a disregard of Fourth Amendment values. And the district court accorded those values full respect. It ruled — properly—that the search here was not consensual. It ruled — properly—that the physical products of that search must be excluded as to Gray. But it also ruled — properly—that Askew did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in someone else’s apartment from which he dealt substantial quantities of illegal drugs. The court’s rulings in their totality respected our Constitution and declined to allow a marginal and speculative gain in deterrent effect to negate the role of courts in holding accountable those who break our laws and profoundly wrong their fellow citizens. The judgment of the trial court is in all respects

AFFIRMED.

1 . At the January 2004 hearing on the motions to suppress, the government argued that Gray had in fact consented to the initial search. Detective Hunter testified that the officers identified themselves to Gray, told him that they were there to investigate drug trafficking complaints, and asked if they could come in. Gray "stepped to the side ... walked in front of [the officers] ... and [they] walked in right behind him.” Detective Hunter did not remember seeing any officer touch Gray prior to entering the home.

The defendants remembered events differently. They testified that, when the officers asked to speak with him, Gray stepped out of his home, pulling the door behind him. Gray stated that one of the officers, Corporal Jivi-den, placed his hand on Gray’s chest, and said something like, "Let’s speak to you inside.” Gray took a step back and the officers followed him into his home. According to Gray, he asked the officers if they had a warrant and Officer Jividen replied, "You’re going to try and make this tough on us. If you do, I'll make it tough on you.” The officers saw what looked like crack cocaine on the kitchen table, handcuffed Gray, and stated that the crack cocaine was their search warrant.

2 . At oral argument, Gray’s counsel conceded on behalf of both defendants that defendants’ Ex Post Facto Clause sentencing argument, based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), had been rejected by this court in United States v. Davenport. See Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir.2006) (holding that, because defendant was on notice of the maximum statutory penalty when he committed the crime, retroactive application of Booker did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause).

3 . Askew, of course, maintained a legitimate expectation of privacy in his person within Gray’s residence. Accordingly, Askew has “standing” to challenge the pat down search of his person. But searches incident to lawful arrest are a longstanding exception to the warrant requirement. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979). The district court properly concluded that given the circumstances (Askew was standing next to a set of digital scales and substances appearing to be crack and cocaine) "the officers had probable cause to believe that Mr. Askew was committing a felony.” As a result, the search of Askew's person was incident to lawful arrest, and the evidence obtained from the search is clearly admissible. Likewise, the district court correctly concluded that "all statements made [by Askew] during th[e] pat down search were voluntary,” and thus admissible. Indeed, Askew does not challenge the district court’s suppression order on these grounds.

4 . The dissent tries to argue that this ruling is "far- reaching” and "unprecedented.” See infra at 157-58. That is incorrect. In fact, the dissent does not contend that any of the facts from the sentencing hearing were anything other than accurate, anything other than confirmatory of the district court's suppression decision, or anything other than relevant to the nature of Askew's presence in Gray’s residence. How this can somehow be of much significance is beyond us unless the judicial process is prepared to renounce its character and close its eyes to evidence. The only unprecedented development would be an artificial ruling precluding the use of con-cededly accurate facts in all suppression rulings. In fact, the dissent must resort to hypo-theticals to voice its concerns, see infra at 162, and it goes without saying that the dissent's hypothetical is just that. As for reaching out to make a ruling on the point, the dissent is in no position to take issue, believing as it does that the facts developed in the suppression hearing were insufficient to affirm the district court. While that is not our own view, the dissent should hardly complain about facts that serve only to reinforce the correctness of judicial rulings.

5 . Defendant Gray argues that, because Askew was questioned about the evidence found in Gray's apartment, illegally seized evidence was used to gain Askew’s cooperation. See Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054. But this again ignores the fact that the evidence obtained from the unlawful search was admissible as to Askew. See supra Part II. Moreover, much of the questionary evidence complained of by the defense — e.g., the money found in Askew's pocket and the cocaine base swallowed by Askew — was independently admissible against Askew because the evidence was obtained by search pursuant to lawful arrest. See supra note 3. As noted above, see id., the district court found that "all statements [made by Askew] during th[e] pat down search were voluntary,” not that they were the result of interrogation. Id.