United States v. Jose Fermin Matos-Peralta

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: September 29, 2025
• Docket: 23-13645
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13644 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2025 Page: 1 of 5

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 23-13644 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

FRANKLIN BONILLA-FROMETA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20184-RKA-2 ____________________ ____________________ No. 23-13645 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, USCA11 Case: 23-13644 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2025 Page: 2 of 5

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13644

versus

JOSE FERMIN MATOS-PERALTA, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20184-RKA-1 ____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, ABUDU, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Franklin Bonilla-Frometa and Jose Matos-Peralta appeal their convictions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq., for possessing and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Both appellants ar- gue that the MDLEA is unconstitutional as applied to them because their offense took place within Colombia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), and, therefore, did not occur on the “high Seas” as used in the Felonies Clause of the United States Constitution. In addition, Matos-Peralta argues that the application of the MDLEA to his conduct exceeds Congress’s power to define offenses under the Felonies Clause and violates his right to due process because his offense lacked a sufficient nexus to the United States. 1 The

1 Bonilla-Frometa also claims, in his “Summary of the Arguments,” that his

conviction must be vacated because the government lacked jurisdiction over USCA11 Case: 23-13644 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2025 Page: 3 of 5

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government, in turn, moves for summary affirmance. After careful review, we grant the government’s motion. Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of the essence, or where one of the parties is clearly correct as a matter of law such that there is no substantial question with respect to the outcome of the case. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 2 When a motion to dismiss an indictment is based on subject matter jurisdiction, we review the district court’s denial of the motion de novo. United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, No. 24-6177 (U.S. May 19, 2025). We also review a district court’s interpretation of the constitution- ality of a statute de novo. Id. We are bound to adhere to our prior panel precedent unless that precedent has been abrogated by this Court sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court. United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2016). In Alfonso, we rejected the argument that the MDLEA was unconstitutional as applied to the defendants because the definition of “high Seas” under the Felonies Clause was limited by interna- tional law and foreign nations’ EEZs were not part of the high Seas

him and his prosecution violated his right to due process. But because he does not cite any legal authority in support of these arguments and does not raise them in the argument section of his brief, he has abandoned them. See United States v. Corbett, 921 F.3d 1032, 1043 (11th Cir. 2019). 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we

adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October 1, 1981. USCA11 Case: 23-13644 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2025 Page: 4 of 5

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under international law. 104 F.4th at 821–27. We explained that, based on the Founding-era concept of the “high Seas,” foreign na- tions’ EEZs are part of the “high Seas” under the Felonies Clause, and that customary international law does not limit the Felonies Clause. Id. Thus, we concluded, the MDLEA could be constitu- tionally enforced in EEZs. See id. In United States v. Cabezas-Montano, we held that the MDLEA is a valid exercise of congressional power under the Felonies Clause even as applied to trafficking offenses that lack a nexus to the United States. 949 F.3d 567, 586–87 (11th Cir. 2020). We also held that the prosecution of non-citizens for trafficking on the high Seas under the MDLEA does not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. Here, the government’s position is clearly correct as a mat- ter of law because the appellants’ arguments are foreclosed by bind- ing precedent. Groendyke, 406 F.2d at 1162. As we’ve noted, Alfonso held that the MDLEA could properly be enforced in EEZs and squarely rejected the argument, which both appellants raise, that the definition of the “high Seas” under the Felonies Clause is lim- ited by international law. See Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 821–27. Moreo- ver, Cabezas-Montano rejected the arguments, raised by Matos-Per- alta, that the MDLEA exceeds Congress’s power under the Felo- nies Clause as applied to trafficking offenses that lack a nexus to the United States and that the prosecution of non-citizens for traffick- ing on the high Seas violates their right to due process. Cabezas- Montano, 949 F.3d at 586–87. We are bound to adhere to those de- cisions unless and until they are abrogated by the Supreme Court USCA11 Case: 23-13644 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 09/29/2025 Page: 5 of 5

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or this Court siting en banc, which has not happened. White, 837 F.3d at 1228. Accordingly, because the government’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law, we GRANT the government’s motion for summary affirmance. Groendyke, 406 F.2d at 1162. AFFIRMED.