BLD-123 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-3536 ___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JORGE FIGUEROA, Appellant ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-91-cr-00518-001) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 18, 2021
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2021) _________
OPINION * _________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Jorge Figueroa appeals from the District Court’s order denying
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In 1991, Figueroa
pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to a four-count indictment charging
him with conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, importation of cocaine, aiding and
abetting the importation of cocaine, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises.
The factual basis of his guilty plea included his statements to undercover agents
regarding his efforts “to establish Philadelphia as a major port of entry for cocaine of the
Cali cartel of [Colombia].” United States v. Figueroa, No. 91-518-01, 1992 WL 301285,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1992). The District Court imposed a life sentence, and this Court
affirmed the District Court’s judgment. United States v. Figueroa, 8 F.3d 813 (3d Cir.
1993) (TABLE). In 1996, Figueroa filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
reduce his sentence based on Amendment 505 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The District
Court denied the motion, because the amendment had no impact on his base offense level
or resulting sentence. United States v. Figueroa, No. 91-518-1, 1996 WL 426690, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 1996). In 2019, Figueroa filed another § 3582(c)(2) motion, this time
based on Guidelines Amendment 782. The District Court determined that Amendment
782 reduces Figueroa’s Guideline range to 360 months to life in prison but concluded that
no sentence reduction was warranted after consideration of the relevant factors of
§ 3553(a). Thus, on January 30, 2019, the District Court denied Figueroa’s motion, and
Figueroa did not appeal.
2 In June 2020, after unsuccessfully pursuing relief with the Bureau of Prisons,
Figueroa filed a pro se motion seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” He presented information
concerning his various medical conditions and other factors, including the time already
served (nearly 30 years), his age (60 years old), his family support, and the non-violent
nature of his offenses. On June 30, 2020, citing its Administrative Standing Order—In re
Section 603(b) Relief under First Step Act (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2019), the District Court
referred Figueroa’s pro se motion to the Federal Community Defender Office to
determine whether it would represent Figueroa. The Federal Defenders accepted the
appointment and filed another § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion and supporting memorandum on
Figueroa’s behalf. Through appointed counsel, Figueroa argued that his health
conditions, considered with the COVID-19 pandemic, presented an extraordinary
circumstance justifying a sentence reduction. In particular, Figueroa stated that he is a
thyroid cancer survivor, is obese, has hypertension and glaucoma, and had a surgically-
treated hernia. Figueroa also argued that he had demonstrated rehabilitation while in
prison, noting, among other things, that he has completed an associate degree and is close
to completing a bachelor’s degree. The Government opposed Figueroa’s motion.
The District Court denied Figueroa’s motion for compassionate release. While
acknowledging that Figueroa’s obesity and high blood pressure may place him at
increased risk of an adverse outcome from COVID-19, the District Court found that
Figueroa’s body mass index indicates that he is only slightly obese, and that he takes
medication to regulate his high blood pressure. Considering his other conditions, his age,
3 and his lack of other risk factors, the District Court concluded that Figueroa’s medical
conditions fell short of presenting an extraordinary and compelling reason to justify
compassionate release.
Further, even assuming the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons, and
even considering Figueroa’s positive accomplishments in prison, the District Court
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and still concluded that
compassionate release was not warranted. Specifically, the District Court noted
Figueroa’s offense conduct, along with the fact between 2000 and 2005—while in federal
prison—he engaged in another conspiracy to bring cocaine from Colombia into the
United States, resulting in another criminal conviction in the Eastern District of New
York. The District Court also noted that if Figueroa’s motion were granted, Figueroa
would have served 29 years of a life sentence imposed at age 32, and slightly more than
half of the 262-month sentence imposed for the Eastern District of New York case, which
“would undermine the need for the sentence to deter others from engaging in large-scale
narcotics trafficking (to say nothing of how release would undermine the need to deter
future crimes Figueroa himself might well commit).” (Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 2020 Mem. at 6.)
Moreover, the District Court rejected Figueroa’s argument that the likelihood that he
would face deportation upon his release was a factor in favor of granting release, because
release from prison would likely result in transfer to immigration detention, which posed
its own risks to Figueroa’s health. Figueroa filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
District Court denied.
4 Figueroa filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as his opening brief. The
Government filed a motion for summary affirmance, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6, and for permission to be relieved of its obligation to file a brief, see 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 31.2. Figueroa filed a response in opposition to summary action.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order for abuse of discretion; “thus we will not disturb the District Court’s decision
unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment
in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United States v.
Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration, internal quotation, and citation
omitted). We will take summary action if “no substantial question is presented.” 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
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BLD-123 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 20-3536 ___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JORGE FIGUEROA, Appellant ____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-91-cr-00518-001) District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 March 18, 2021
Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 30, 2021) _________
OPINION * _________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Jorge Figueroa appeals from the District Court’s order denying
his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In 1991, Figueroa
pleaded guilty in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to a four-count indictment charging
him with conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine, importation of cocaine, aiding and
abetting the importation of cocaine, and interstate travel in aid of racketeering enterprises.
The factual basis of his guilty plea included his statements to undercover agents
regarding his efforts “to establish Philadelphia as a major port of entry for cocaine of the
Cali cartel of [Colombia].” United States v. Figueroa, No. 91-518-01, 1992 WL 301285,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 1992). The District Court imposed a life sentence, and this Court
affirmed the District Court’s judgment. United States v. Figueroa, 8 F.3d 813 (3d Cir.
1993) (TABLE). In 1996, Figueroa filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
reduce his sentence based on Amendment 505 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The District
Court denied the motion, because the amendment had no impact on his base offense level
or resulting sentence. United States v. Figueroa, No. 91-518-1, 1996 WL 426690, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 29, 1996). In 2019, Figueroa filed another § 3582(c)(2) motion, this time
based on Guidelines Amendment 782. The District Court determined that Amendment
782 reduces Figueroa’s Guideline range to 360 months to life in prison but concluded that
no sentence reduction was warranted after consideration of the relevant factors of
§ 3553(a). Thus, on January 30, 2019, the District Court denied Figueroa’s motion, and
Figueroa did not appeal.
2 In June 2020, after unsuccessfully pursuing relief with the Bureau of Prisons,
Figueroa filed a pro se motion seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” He presented information
concerning his various medical conditions and other factors, including the time already
served (nearly 30 years), his age (60 years old), his family support, and the non-violent
nature of his offenses. On June 30, 2020, citing its Administrative Standing Order—In re
Section 603(b) Relief under First Step Act (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2019), the District Court
referred Figueroa’s pro se motion to the Federal Community Defender Office to
determine whether it would represent Figueroa. The Federal Defenders accepted the
appointment and filed another § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motion and supporting memorandum on
Figueroa’s behalf. Through appointed counsel, Figueroa argued that his health
conditions, considered with the COVID-19 pandemic, presented an extraordinary
circumstance justifying a sentence reduction. In particular, Figueroa stated that he is a
thyroid cancer survivor, is obese, has hypertension and glaucoma, and had a surgically-
treated hernia. Figueroa also argued that he had demonstrated rehabilitation while in
prison, noting, among other things, that he has completed an associate degree and is close
to completing a bachelor’s degree. The Government opposed Figueroa’s motion.
The District Court denied Figueroa’s motion for compassionate release. While
acknowledging that Figueroa’s obesity and high blood pressure may place him at
increased risk of an adverse outcome from COVID-19, the District Court found that
Figueroa’s body mass index indicates that he is only slightly obese, and that he takes
medication to regulate his high blood pressure. Considering his other conditions, his age,
3 and his lack of other risk factors, the District Court concluded that Figueroa’s medical
conditions fell short of presenting an extraordinary and compelling reason to justify
compassionate release.
Further, even assuming the existence of extraordinary and compelling reasons, and
even considering Figueroa’s positive accomplishments in prison, the District Court
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and still concluded that
compassionate release was not warranted. Specifically, the District Court noted
Figueroa’s offense conduct, along with the fact between 2000 and 2005—while in federal
prison—he engaged in another conspiracy to bring cocaine from Colombia into the
United States, resulting in another criminal conviction in the Eastern District of New
York. The District Court also noted that if Figueroa’s motion were granted, Figueroa
would have served 29 years of a life sentence imposed at age 32, and slightly more than
half of the 262-month sentence imposed for the Eastern District of New York case, which
“would undermine the need for the sentence to deter others from engaging in large-scale
narcotics trafficking (to say nothing of how release would undermine the need to deter
future crimes Figueroa himself might well commit).” (Dist. Ct. Nov. 4, 2020 Mem. at 6.)
Moreover, the District Court rejected Figueroa’s argument that the likelihood that he
would face deportation upon his release was a factor in favor of granting release, because
release from prison would likely result in transfer to immigration detention, which posed
its own risks to Figueroa’s health. Figueroa filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
District Court denied.
4 Figueroa filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as his opening brief. The
Government filed a motion for summary affirmance, see 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir.
I.O.P. 10.6, and for permission to be relieved of its obligation to file a brief, see 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 31.2. Figueroa filed a response in opposition to summary action.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order for abuse of discretion; “thus we will not disturb the District Court’s decision
unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it committed a clear error of judgment
in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.” United States v.
Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020) (alteration, internal quotation, and citation
omitted). We will take summary action if “no substantial question is presented.” 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Despite the District Court’s explanation of the Federal Defender’s appointment by
operation of the administrative standing order, Figueroa alleges that the District Court sua
sponte appointed the Federal Defender in order to avoid consideration of his pro se
motion for compassionate release. He also argues that his pro se motion was based on
multiple reasons for compassionate release, not just medical conditions, and that the
District Court unfairly adjudicated his motion. To the extent that Figueroa argues that the
District Court should have placed less weight on the negative elements of his criminal
history and more weight on his positive characteristics, we discern no clear error of
judgment in the District Court’s analysis of the relevant § 3553(a) factors as part of its
analysis under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include “the history and characteristics of
the defendant,” “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to promote respect for the law,”
5 and “deterrence to criminal conduct.” See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 330 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and (2)(A)-(B)). We have reviewed Figueroa’s pro se and
counseled filings and conclude that the District Court acted within its discretion to deny
relief based, in part, on the proportion of the sentence served, the seriousness of his
offense of conviction, his additional criminal history, and the need to deter criminal
conduct. See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331.
For these reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm
the District Court’s order. The Government’s motion to be relieved of filing a brief is
granted.