United States v. Jordan

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 25-6125
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 24, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. No. 25-6125 (D.C. No. 5:24-CR-00519-SLP-1) MARK RYAN JORDAN, (W.D. Okla.)

Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before PHILLIPS, EID, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Mark Ryan Jordan pled guilty to a charge of being a felon in possession of a

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He received a 120-month prison

sentence. Mr. Jordan appeals, challenging the sentence as substantively

unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 2

I. Background

On October 16, 2024, a witness identified as W.P. 1 reported to sheriff’s

deputies that Mr. Jordan had pulled his truck into W.P.’s yard to drop off W.P.’s

ex-wife. W.P. told Mr. Jordan repeatedly to get out of his yard, and when Mr. Jordan

finally started backing up, W.P. followed on foot. Mr. Jordan then pointed a firearm

at W.P. and threatened to shoot him. W.P. told the deputies his ex-wife and three-

year-old daughter had been in Mr. Jordan’s truck during the entire exchange.

Nearly two weeks later, a witness identified as A.C. reported to sheriff’s

deputies that she and her minor daughter had been the victims of a road-rage

incident. They had been tailgated by a man, later identified as Mr. Jordan, who was

yelling and gesturing at them. At one point he exited his vehicle and struck A.C.’s

vehicle with his hand, then returned to his vehicle to continue following them. When

A.C. and her daughter pulled into a gas station to call the police, Mr. Jordan followed

into the parking lot and pointed a firearm at them before driving away. During their

investigation of the incident, deputies learned Mr. Jordan had stolen a shotgun from

his sister earlier that day, and when the sister demanded its return, he responded that

he intended to block off Interstate 35 and have a shootout with the police.

Later that evening, deputies were dispatched to the home of Mr. Jordan’s

estranged wife, E.J. She reported that Mr. Jordan had said he was going to kill her

and then get into a shootout with the police. At the deputies’ urging, E.J. relocated to

1 The district court record identified the witnesses to Mr. Jordan’s conduct only by their initials. 2 Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 3

her parents’ home. The deputies later returned to E.J.’s home and discovered a front

window had been shattered by a shotgun blast. Security footage later showed

Mr. Jordan’s vehicle stop in front of the residence, followed by a gunshot and muzzle

flash coming from the vehicle.

After arriving at her parents’ home, E.J. and the deputies were coordinating an

emergency protective order when they observed Mr. Jordan drive past the house,

make a U-turn, and drive past again. The deputies then took Mr. Jordan into custody

and observed he was wearing an ammunition pouch containing seven rounds of

ammunition. They also found a loaded shotgun in Mr. Jordan’s vehicle, along with

six spent shotgun shells.

In December 2024, a federal grand jury charged Mr. Jordan with being a felon

in possession of a firearm, for which the maximum sentence is 15 years. See

18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8). He pled guilty without a plea agreement.

In June 2025, the United States Probation Office released its final presentence

investigation report (PSR). The PSR calculated Mr. Jordan’s total offense level at 17

after various adjustments based on the circumstances of the charged offense and his

acceptance of responsibility.

The PSR also detailed Mr. Jordan’s criminal history. This included drug

offenses at the age of 19, for which he was fined, and driving under the influence at

the age of 32, for which he received a one-year suspended sentence. In between

those offenses, he was convicted three separate times for domestic abuse of E.J. His

first conviction was for punching her in the face while she was holding their three-

3 Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 4

month-old baby. He was convicted a second time for strangling her in the presence

of four minor children. And he was convicted a third time for punching E.J.

repeatedly in the back of the head and threatening to beat her after she said she was

calling the police. Again, this happened in the presence of minor children, including

their three-year-old daughter, whom E.J. was holding at the time of the assault.

Mr. Jordan received either a suspended or deferred sentence for each conviction, so

he served no prison time.

Mr. Jordan’s criminal history resulted in a criminal history category of II.

Based on that category and his total offense level of 17, the PSR applied U.S.S.G.

§ 2K2.1 (the applicable guideline for violations of § 922(g)(1)) and calculated an

advisory sentencing range of 27 to 33 months in prison.

After the submission of the PSR, the parties each filed a sentencing

memorandum. Mr. Jordan emphasized the significant trauma he suffered in

childhood, his struggles with substance abuse, and his mental health problems. The

government’s memorandum focused on the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and,

based on those factors, requested an upward variance to 120 months in prison.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court heard argument from Mr. Jordan’s

counsel, who requested a within-guidelines sentence, and then allowed Mr. Jordan an

opportunity to address the court. The district court then stated that the advisory

guidelines range of 27 to 33 months did not adequately satisfy the factors to be

considered under § 3553(a). After examining those factors, the court concluded they

supported a 120-month sentence. This appeal followed.

4 Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 5

II. Discussion

In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, “[w]e must determine

whether the length of the sentence is reasonable given all the circumstances of the

case in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” See United States v. Kaspereit, 994 F.3d 1202,

1214 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We reverse only if the

district court abused its discretion in weighing permissible § 3553(a) factors in light

of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court has “an unquestionable institutional advantage over an

appellate court to consider whether the facts of an individual case justify a variance,”

United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008), so we “give due

deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify

the extent of the variance,” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The fact

that [we] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate

is insufficient to justify the reversal of the district court.” Id. Thus, “we will affirm

so long as the district court’s decision falls within the realm of the rationally

available choices.” Kaspereit, 994 F.3d at 1214 (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted). “A cogent and reasonable explanation for a sentence makes that

sentence more likely within the bounds of reasonable choice, while a limited, brief,

or inconsistent explanation can hinder our review of a sentence’s substantive

reasonableness.” United States v. Guevara-Lopez, 147 F.4th 1174, 1183 (10th Cir.

2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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In Mr. Jordan’s case, the district court’s explanation for the sentence was

cogent and reasonable. It began its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors by

acknowledging Mr. Jordan’s childhood trauma, poor mental health, and substance

abuse. It nevertheless concluded that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, the

advisory guideline range did not satisfy the § 3553(a) factors.

Concerning the seriousness of the offense and its nature and circumstances,

see §§ 3553(a)(1) & (a)(2)(A), the district court observed that Mr. Jordan had

threatened to get into a shootout with police and kill his estranged wife; fired a stolen

shotgun through her bedroom window; and on two occasions pointed the same

shotgun at other people, including a mother and daughter who were complete

strangers to Mr. Jordan. The court further noted that the discharge of the firearm was

an “aggravating factor” that required the need to promote respect for the law. R. vol.

3 at 17; see § 3553(a)(2)(A).

Regarding Mr. Jordan’s history and characteristics, see § 3553(a)(1), the

district court discussed Mr. Jordan’s pattern of domestic violence, which included

three separate convictions for physically assaulting his wife, each time in the

presence of children. The court also noted that Mr. Jordan’s domestic abuse had

escalated to firearms and gunfire and that Mr. Jordan’s estranged wife was still

frightened and uncertain of her safety, thus highlighting the need to protect the public

from further crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(C). Finally, the court acknowledged that

Mr. Jordan had not served prison time for his domestic abuse convictions but that a

6 Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 7

significant sentence was still warranted to afford adequate deterrence, see

§ 3553(a)(2)(B).

After its examination of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court concluded that

an upward variance was warranted. It observed that the applicable statutory

maximum was 180 months, which would be reserved “for the most aggravated felon

in possession case imaginable,” while sentences “[s]omewhere far lower than that

[would be for] cases that are far more mitigated and less serious.” R. vol. 3 at 16.

The district court concluded that in the circumstances of Mr. Jordan’s case, a 120-

month sentence—still 60 months shy of the statutory maximum—was not

unreasonable. The district court’s conclusion was not an abuse of discretion, and its

decision fell “within the realm of the rationally available choices.” Kaspereit,

994 F.3d at 1214 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Jordan contends otherwise, relying on United States v. Guevara-Lopez,

147 F.4th 1174. In that case, the defendant’s sentencing guideline range was 24 to 30

months, and the district court varied upward to the statutory maximum of 60 months.

Id. at 1178. This court found the sentence substantively unreasonable, in part

because “the district court inadequately explained the significant upward variance.” 2

Id. at 1193. In so holding, the court pointed to statistics from the U.S. Sentencing

2 The court also found the sentence substantively unreasonable because the district court relied on incorrect information about pending state charges. Id. at 1189–90. The court noted that “where we have a significant upward variance, supported by only a few facts, the inaccuracy of even one fact may tip the scale, rendering the justification for that variance unreasonable.” Id. at 1190. Mr. Jordan points to no such error in his case. 7 Appellate Case: 25-6125 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 8

Commission’s Judiciary Sentencing Information (JSIN) platform, which had been

included in the PSR. See id. at 1185. The court emphasized that “we do not require

district courts to consult Sentencing Commission data before imposing a sentence,

nor do we require district courts to follow national statistics when imposing a

sentence.” Id. at 1188. Rather, “[w]ithout an otherwise sufficient explanation to

justify the extent of the upward variance, [such] statistics highlight the potential

sentence disparities that the district court failed to guard against.” Id. (emphasis

added); see also id. at 1193 (“The statistical disparities that we highlight merely

demonstrate our concern with the significant upward variance given the inadequate

explanation.”).

Neither party presented any statistics at Mr. Jordan’s sentencing, but he asks

this court to take judicial notice of JSIN statistics showing that for defendants

sentenced in similar circumstances (i.e., sentenced pursuant to § 2K2.1 with a final

offense level of 17 and a criminal history category of II) the average prison sentence

was 25 months, and the median was 27 months. As Guevara-Lopez confirms,

however, a district court is under no obligation to consult such statistics where it

provides a sufficient explanation for the upward variance, as the district court did

here. Mr. Jordan’s resort to statistics is therefore of no effect. And even if the

district court had the benefit of the statistics on which Mr. Jordan now relies, the

district court’s reasoning “would have provided a sensible basis to reject the national

average as a benchmark for [Mr. Jordan’s] sentence.” United States v. Doty,

150 F.4th 1351, 1358 (10th Cir. 2025).

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Finally, while Mr. Jordan acknowledges that the nature and circumstances of

the offense are “undoubtedly serious,” Opening Br. at 15, he argues the advisory

guidelines already took that factor into account by increasing the offense level under

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b). This argument appears to be an attack on the procedural

reasonableness of the sentence. See United States v. Alapizco-Valenzuela, 546 F.3d

1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2008) (observing that defendant’s argument that district court

erred in using same facts that supported an enhancement to justify an upward

variance was a procedural challenge). Mr. Jordan did not raise this procedural

challenge below, so we may only review it for plain error. See id. And because he

has not argued for plain error, he has waived this argument. In any case, “district

courts have broad discretion to consider particular facts in fashioning a sentence

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even when those facts are already accounted for in the

advisory guidelines range.” United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910, 921 (10th Cir.

2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Conclusion

We affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.

Entered for the Court

Allison H. Eid Circuit Judge