Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-1291 (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00301-NYW-1) EDWARD MARTIN JONES, a/k/a (D. Colo.) Edward Brown,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
The parties settled this case in district court with a plea agreement. One of the
agreement’s terms required Edward Jones to waive his right to appeal except under
limited circumstances not present here. Despite the waiver, Mr. Jones has appealed.
He urges us not to enforce the waiver, claiming he did not fully understand the plea
agreement. Although he expressed confusion at times during his plea hearing, the
record makes clear that he ultimately understood the agreement. And so we grant the
government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 2
I
We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s
scope, (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, and
(3) enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States
v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Mr. Jones concedes that the scope of his waiver covers this appeal, so we will
address only the other two requirements.
II
Mr. Jones has the burden to prove his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
See United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2012). To
determine whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary, we typically focus on two
factors—whether the plea agreement says the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
entered into it, and whether the district judge conducted an adequate plea colloquy.
See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
A
The plea agreement says that Mr. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to appeal. The parties’ dispute centers on what happened at the plea hearing.
At the plea hearing, the parties presented an agreement containing two relevant
stipulations. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). First, the parties agreed that 10 years’
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. Second, the parties agreed to
recommend that Mr. Jones receive credit for time he served on a state conviction that
had been vacated after his successful appeal. Although the parties stipulated that the
2 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 3
credit recommendation was “part of the binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement,” they
recognized that the Bureau of Prisons would “ultimately calculate the sentence.”
Mot. to Enforce, Attach. 1 (Plea Agreement) at 2 n.2.
At the beginning of the plea hearing, some of Mr. Jones’s responses suggested
he still had questions:
THE COURT: Is there anything about how you feel right now, either physically or emotionally, that prevents you from understanding what is happening in this hearing?
THE DEFENDANT: I wouldn’t say emotionally.
THE COURT: Is there anything about how you are today that makes you unable to understand what is going on?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I need to clarify some things, and I think that maybe you can—only you are the one to clarify.
THE COURT: Okay. So do you understand what is happening in this hearing right now?
THE DEFENDANT: So far, yes.
THE COURT: So if you don’t understand something, I need [you to] ask me the question so I can clarify it for you, okay.
THE DEFENDANT: I will.
Mot. to Enforce, Attach. 2 (Plea Tr.) at 6–7. When the court asked if his attorney had
answered all of his questions, Mr. Jones said, “Well, almost. Almost.” Id. at 7.
But as the hearing progressed, Mr. Jones denied having any outstanding
questions. The court asked if he had any questions about the information discussed
3 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 4
at the hearing. Although he initially claimed to have questions, when the court asked
what they were, Mr. Jones replied, “You’ve answered them. You’ve answered
them.” Id. at 21.
After pleading guilty, however, Mr. Jones disclosed “a big problem” he had
with the plea agreement. Id. at 26. He wondered whether the Bureau of Prisons had
to honor the court’s recommendation to give him credit for time spent in state
custody. The court informed him that if it accepted the plea agreement, it would be
bound to make the recommendation for credit, but it could not guarantee what the
Bureau of Prisons would do with the recommendation. Mr. Jones insisted that the
court’s description was not what he had been “told from the beginning.” Id. at 31.
The court then gave Mr. Jones an opportunity to back out of the plea
agreement, but he chose to stand by it.
B
Claiming his plea was invalid, 1 Mr. Jones underscores his statements in the
beginning of the hearing asserting that he needed clarification and suggesting that he
had outstanding questions. But the record provides no reason to think that either
confusion or questions remained by the time the hearing ended.
1 Although the issue before us is whether Mr. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, his focus on the validity of his plea more broadly is appropriate. After all, if he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement, then “the appellate waiver subsumed in the agreement also cannot stand.” United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014). 4 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 5
Mr. Jones disagrees. He contends that we should discount his statements near
the end of the plea hearing—the statements, for example, that his questions had been
answered and that he still wished to enter the plea agreement after the court had
clarified the nature and limitations of its credit recommendation. Those statements
have no significance, he says, because the court never followed up on his earlier
expressions of confusion, leaving him with “a feeling of helplessness” and causing
him just to “say what was expected.” Resp. at 9.
The record refutes this contention. Mr. Jones had no problem raising his
concern about the credit recommendation. More than that, though, he then engaged
in a back-and-forth (filling several transcript pages) about the recommendation
directly with the court. That is not the behavior of someone resigned just to go
along.
In his remaining challenges to his plea, Mr. Jones suggests that his plea
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Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT January 5, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 25-1291 (D.C. No. 1:23-CR-00301-NYW-1) EDWARD MARTIN JONES, a/k/a (D. Colo.) Edward Brown,
Defendant - Appellant. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HOLMES, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
The parties settled this case in district court with a plea agreement. One of the
agreement’s terms required Edward Jones to waive his right to appeal except under
limited circumstances not present here. Despite the waiver, Mr. Jones has appealed.
He urges us not to enforce the waiver, claiming he did not fully understand the plea
agreement. Although he expressed confusion at times during his plea hearing, the
record makes clear that he ultimately understood the agreement. And so we grant the
government’s motion to enforce the appeal waiver.
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 2
I
We will enforce an appeal waiver if (1) the appeal falls within the waiver’s
scope, (2) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal, and
(3) enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States
v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Mr. Jones concedes that the scope of his waiver covers this appeal, so we will
address only the other two requirements.
II
Mr. Jones has the burden to prove his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
See United States v. Salas-Garcia, 698 F.3d 1242, 1254 (10th Cir. 2012). To
determine whether a waiver was knowing and voluntary, we typically focus on two
factors—whether the plea agreement says the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
entered into it, and whether the district judge conducted an adequate plea colloquy.
See Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325.
A
The plea agreement says that Mr. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to appeal. The parties’ dispute centers on what happened at the plea hearing.
At the plea hearing, the parties presented an agreement containing two relevant
stipulations. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). First, the parties agreed that 10 years’
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. Second, the parties agreed to
recommend that Mr. Jones receive credit for time he served on a state conviction that
had been vacated after his successful appeal. Although the parties stipulated that the
2 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 3
credit recommendation was “part of the binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement,” they
recognized that the Bureau of Prisons would “ultimately calculate the sentence.”
Mot. to Enforce, Attach. 1 (Plea Agreement) at 2 n.2.
At the beginning of the plea hearing, some of Mr. Jones’s responses suggested
he still had questions:
THE COURT: Is there anything about how you feel right now, either physically or emotionally, that prevents you from understanding what is happening in this hearing?
THE DEFENDANT: I wouldn’t say emotionally.
THE COURT: Is there anything about how you are today that makes you unable to understand what is going on?
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, I need to clarify some things, and I think that maybe you can—only you are the one to clarify.
THE COURT: Okay. So do you understand what is happening in this hearing right now?
THE DEFENDANT: So far, yes.
THE COURT: So if you don’t understand something, I need [you to] ask me the question so I can clarify it for you, okay.
THE DEFENDANT: I will.
Mot. to Enforce, Attach. 2 (Plea Tr.) at 6–7. When the court asked if his attorney had
answered all of his questions, Mr. Jones said, “Well, almost. Almost.” Id. at 7.
But as the hearing progressed, Mr. Jones denied having any outstanding
questions. The court asked if he had any questions about the information discussed
3 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 4
at the hearing. Although he initially claimed to have questions, when the court asked
what they were, Mr. Jones replied, “You’ve answered them. You’ve answered
them.” Id. at 21.
After pleading guilty, however, Mr. Jones disclosed “a big problem” he had
with the plea agreement. Id. at 26. He wondered whether the Bureau of Prisons had
to honor the court’s recommendation to give him credit for time spent in state
custody. The court informed him that if it accepted the plea agreement, it would be
bound to make the recommendation for credit, but it could not guarantee what the
Bureau of Prisons would do with the recommendation. Mr. Jones insisted that the
court’s description was not what he had been “told from the beginning.” Id. at 31.
The court then gave Mr. Jones an opportunity to back out of the plea
agreement, but he chose to stand by it.
B
Claiming his plea was invalid, 1 Mr. Jones underscores his statements in the
beginning of the hearing asserting that he needed clarification and suggesting that he
had outstanding questions. But the record provides no reason to think that either
confusion or questions remained by the time the hearing ended.
1 Although the issue before us is whether Mr. Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, his focus on the validity of his plea more broadly is appropriate. After all, if he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea agreement, then “the appellate waiver subsumed in the agreement also cannot stand.” United States v. Rollings, 751 F.3d 1183, 1189 (10th Cir. 2014). 4 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 5
Mr. Jones disagrees. He contends that we should discount his statements near
the end of the plea hearing—the statements, for example, that his questions had been
answered and that he still wished to enter the plea agreement after the court had
clarified the nature and limitations of its credit recommendation. Those statements
have no significance, he says, because the court never followed up on his earlier
expressions of confusion, leaving him with “a feeling of helplessness” and causing
him just to “say what was expected.” Resp. at 9.
The record refutes this contention. Mr. Jones had no problem raising his
concern about the credit recommendation. More than that, though, he then engaged
in a back-and-forth (filling several transcript pages) about the recommendation
directly with the court. That is not the behavior of someone resigned just to go
along.
In his remaining challenges to his plea, Mr. Jones suggests that his plea
counsel provided ineffective assistance. But defendants generally must raise
ineffective-assistance claims in collateral proceedings rather than on direct appeal.
United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2005). That remains true
even when the ineffective-assistance claim seeks to invalidate an appeal waiver. Id.
Mr. Jones neither acknowledges this general rule nor offers a reason for us to depart
from it. We therefore decline to consider his arguments impugning plea counsel’s
advice.
5 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 6
To sum up: Despite the statements suggesting Mr. Jones went into the plea
hearing with lingering questions, the record shows that he ultimately accepted the
plea agreement with a full understanding of its terms.
III
Enforcing an appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice only if
(1) the district court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor; (2) ineffective
assistance of counsel in negotiating the waiver makes it invalid; (3) the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum; or (4) the waiver is otherwise unlawful in a way that
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327.
Arguing that enforcing the appeal waiver will result in a miscarriage of justice,
Mr. Jones reiterates the points he made challenging the validity of his plea. “His
waiver,” he says, “stemmed from incomplete and insufficient advice about the terms
and consequences, as well as a feeling that his questions and doubts were not going
to be addressed if he did try to express them.” Resp. at 11.
Mr. Jones has not shown that enforcing his waiver will result in a miscarriage
of justice. Again, he must raise any ineffective-assistance claims in a collateral
proceeding. See Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144. And his claim that he felt reluctant to
raise questions at the plea hearing amounts to an argument against the validity of his
plea, one we have already rejected.
6 Appellate Case: 25-1291 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 01/05/2026 Page: 7
* * *
We grant the government’s motion to enforce Mr. Jones’s appeal waiver. We
dismiss this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam