United States v. Jonas Michel

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: July 10, 2025
• Docket: 24-11699
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 1 of 10

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11699 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JONAS MICHEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 9:23-cr-80015-AMC-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 2 of 10

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11699

Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Jonas Michel, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on Part A of Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a retroactive amendment eliminating or reducing criminal history status points for certain offenders. He argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying him a sentence reduction because it: (1) failed to justify the increased upward variance resulting from his reduced Guidelines range; (2) failed to cite the United States Sentencing Commission’s policy reasons for Amendment 821; (3) relied on criminal history already reflected in his Guidelines range; and (4) did not mention his history of mental health issues and substance abuse or his efforts at rehabilitation in declining to reduce his sentence. After thor- ough review, we affirm. We review de novo the district court’s legal determination of whether a defendant is eligible for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Lawson, 686 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012). However, we review the decision to grant or deny an eligi- ble defendant’s request for a sentence reduction for abuse of discre- tion. United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1238 (11th Cir. 2017). “A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 3 of 10

24-11699 Opinion of the Court 3

factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotations omitted). An appellant abandons a claim when he “does not plainly and prominently raise it, for in- stance by devoting a discrete section of his argument to those claims,” makes it only in a passing reference, or addresses it in a perfunctory manner without reasoning or citations to authorities in support. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins., Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). A district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprison- ment if the defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commis- sion. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Any reduction, however, must be con- sistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements. Id. To obtain a reduction in a term of imprisonment based on an amendment to the Guidelines, the relevant amendment must be listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1). Because it is listed in § 1B1.10(d), Part A of Amendment 821 to the Guidelines may serve as the basis for a sentence reduction. Id. § 1B1.10(c). Courts must follow a two-step inquiry to evaluate a motion for a sentence reduction. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010). First, the court must recalculate the Guidelines range under the amended Guidelines to determine whether a ret- roactive amendment lowered the defendant’s Guidelines range, then decide whether relief would be consistent with the applicable policy statement. Id. Second, if a defendant is eligible for relief, the USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 4 of 10

4 Opinion of the Court 24-11699

court must consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the defendant’s term of imprison- ment.” Id.; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B(ii))). The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the of- fense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish- ment”; (3) the need for adequate deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public from further crimes; (5) the Guidelines range; and (6) any pertinent policy statement from the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4)(A), (a)(5). The district court has wide discretion to conclude that the § 3553(a) factors justify an upward variance from the Guidelines range, including factors already incorporated when calculating the Guidelines range. United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021). In the context of an original sentencing proceeding, a substantial variance should be supported by a more significant justification than a lesser one. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). But “[t]he district court is not required to artic- ulate the applicability of each factor, as long as the record as a whole demonstrates that the pertinent factors were taken into ac- count by the district court.” United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotations omitted). Thus, a sentencing court’s failure to specifically mention certain mitigating factors does not compel the conclusion that a sentence crafted in accord- ance with the § 3553(a) factors was substantively unreasonable. USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 5 of 10

24-11699 Opinion of the Court 5

United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 873 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally, “[t]he discretion federal judges hold at initial sentencings also char- acterizes sentencing modification hearings.” Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 492 (2022). So, when applying the § 3553(a) factors, the district court need only articulate a brief statement of reasons for its decision, considering all nonfrivolous arguments, but may “dismiss arguments that it does not find compelling with- out a detailed explanation.” Id. at 495, 501. However, a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding is not plenary or de novo sentencing. United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1198 (11th Cir. 2010). Congress authorized only limited adjustments to a final sen- tence under § 3582(c)(2). Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 115 (2018). The denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion does not produce a different sentence in light of the reduced Guidelines range or even reimpose the original sentence but merely provides that the origi- nal sentence continues unreduced. United States v. Caraballo-Mar- tinez, 866 F.3d 1233, 1245–46 (11th Cir. 2017). Given the limited scope of § 3582(c)(2) proceedings, the district court does not im- pose a new sentence by denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion but only by granting one. Id. at 1246. The district court is commanded by Congress to consider the Guidelines, which represent “an accumulation of knowledge and experience” and were promulgated over time by an expert agency with a statutory charge. United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006). Consideration of the Guidelines range is im- portant because the Guidelines are an important tool in USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 6 of 10

6 Opinion of the Court 24-11699

accomplishing a Congressional mandate in federal sentencing -- promoting uniformity -- and a district court must give the Guide- lines range “real weight” in imposing a sentence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1217 (quotations omitted). The “advisory guidelines range is but one of many considerations” a sentencing court must take into ac- count when sentencing a defendant, and we have “not attempted to specify any particular weight that should be given to the guide- lines range, and . . . rejected any across-the-board prescription re- garding the appropriate deference to give the Guidelines.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015) (quota- tions and citation omitted). Still, the Guidelines are “the starting point and the initial benchmark” in determining an appropriate sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49; see also United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (vacating a sentence of probation where the district court failed to give “real weight” to the Guidelines im- prisonment range of 97 to 120 months). And “§ 3582(c)(2) allows district courts to reconsider a prisoner’s sentence based on a new starting point -- that is, a lower Guidelines range -- and determine whether a reduction in the prisoner’s sentence is appropriate.” Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675, 686 (2018). Section 4A1.1(d) formerly provided that a person received two criminal history points if he committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2021). As amended on November 1, 2023, § 4A1.1(e) now pro- vides that a defendant receives only one criminal history point if he committed the instant offense while under a criminal justice sen- tence -- including supervised release -- and otherwise received USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 7 of 10

24-11699 Opinion of the Court 7

seven or more points under § 4A1.1 (a) through (d). Id. § 4A1.1(e) (2023); id., App. C, Amend. 821, pt. A. In implementing this change, the Sentencing Commission noted that “updated research suggest[ed] that status points’ ability to predict future recidivism -- a core justification for their use -- may be less than the original Commission may have expected.” U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines (Aug. 31, 2023), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-proc ess/reader-friendly-amendments/202308_RF-retro.pdf. A criminal history score between four and six establishes a criminal history category of III, whereas a criminal history score between seven and nine establishes a criminal history category of IV. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table. A criminal history category of III and an offense level of 12 yields a Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment. See id. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deter- mining that Michel was not entitled to a sentence reduction. First, the district court correctly determined that Michel was “eligible for relief” because Amendment 821 reduced his Guidelines range. That is to say, Part A of Amendment 821 retroactively reduced Michel’s criminal history points from 8 to 6 because he would no longer receive any status points, thereby decreasing his criminal history category from IV to III and reducing his Guidelines impris- onment range from 21 to 27 months to 15 to 21 months. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d); id., App. C, Amend. 821, pt. A; id. § 4A1.1(e) (2023); id., Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table. The district USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 8 of 10

8 Opinion of the Court 24-11699

court then proceeded directly to the § 3553(a) analysis at the second step, finding that the sentencing factors weighed against a sentence reduction. In recognizing that Amendment 821 lowered Michel’s range and made him eligible for a sentence reduction and in noting that it had reviewed the full record, expressly including Michel’s motion that cited his new Guidelines range of 15 to 21 months’ im- prisonment, the district court implicitly considered the lowered Guidelines range -- an approach that Michel does not take issue with on appeal. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. As for Michel’s broad claim that the district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors in denying him relief, we disagree. As the record reflects, the district court’s decision concerning the § 3553(a) factors offered several specific reasons for denying a sen- tence reduction -- including Michel’s extensive criminal history, the need to afford specific deterrence and prevent future crimes by Michel, and the need to promote respect for the law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(B(ii))). This discussion was more than sufficient since the district court was not required to cite every § 3553(a) factor in its decision as long as the record shows that it considered the pertinent factors, as it does here. See Hughes, 584 U.S. at 686; Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 492; Williams, 557 F.3d at 1256. As for Michel’s argument that the district court was required to offer a greater justification in denying his § 3582(c)(2) motion because the size of the resulting upward variance increased with the reduction of his Guidelines range, it is without merit. The USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 9 of 10

24-11699 Opinion of the Court 9

district court’s denial of Michel’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, even in light of his reduced Guidelines range, did not impose a new sentence requiring full justification. See Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1245– 46. Indeed, the principle that a large variance must be supported by more reasoning than a small one is drawn from the context of sentencing proceedings, not § 3582(c)(2) proceedings -- which at most authorize a limited adjustment to a final sentence and do not constitute a de novo sentencing. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50; Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1198; Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 115. In other words, the dis- trict court’s denial of Michel’s § 3582(c)(2) motion was merely a refusal to make a limited adjustment to his existing sentence and did not amount to an abuse of discretion. See Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1238. As for Michel’s argument that his criminal history points al- ready took into account his adult criminal conduct so the district court erred in relying on his criminal history as a reason to deny relief, we are also unpersuaded. Under our case law, the district court is not barred from considering factors already incorporated into the Guidelines range, and Michel’s criminal history was one of the § 3553(a) factors it was directed to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1264. Michel also claims that the district court failed to acknowledge the Sentencing Commission’s finding that criminal status points have little predictive value in an- alyzing an offender’s risk of rearrest or to apply this finding to his case, but the district court was not required to take into account the Sentencing Commission’s published explanation for an amend- ment. Nor, moreover, did the Sentencing Commission’s general USCA11 Case: 24-11699 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 07/10/2025 Page: 10 of 10

10 Opinion of the Court 24-11699

conclusions about the risk of rearrest among a population of of- fenders displace the district court’s responsibility to conduct an in- dividualized assessment of Michel’s history and characteristics. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3582(c)(2); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1), (d). Finally, Michel says the district court erred by ignoring his mental health issues, the emotional and psychological abuse he en- dured as a child, and his efforts at rehabilitation, which were due consideration under § 3553(a). But, again, in determining that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against a sentence reduction, the district court said that it reviewed the full record, which included that in- formation because it was discussed in Michel’s presentence inves- tigation report. The court’s failure to specifically reference Michel’s mitigating arguments does not suggest that it abused its discretion. See Snipes, 611 F.3d at 873. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Michel’s motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Further, because the district court’s order is due to be affirmed, we need not address whether reassignment to a different judge on remand would be appropriate. AFFIRMED.