Opinions of the United 1997 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
2-24-1997
United States v. Johnstone Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-5833
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Recommended Citation "United States v. Johnstone" (1997). 1997 Decisions. Paper 44. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/44
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _________________
NO. 95-5833 _________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee
v.
RONALD JOHNSTONE, Appellant _________________________________________
On Appeal From the United States Court of Appeals For the District of New Jersey (D.C. No. 95-cr-00063-1) __________________________________________
Argued: June 5, 1996
Before: BECKER, MANSMANN, Circuit Judges, and SCHWARZER, District Judge.*
(Filed February 24, 1997)
GERALD KROVATIN, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) DAVID W. FASSETT, ESQUIRE Arseneault & Krovatin 560 Main Street Chatham, New Jersey 07928
Attorneys for Appellant
DEVAL L. PATRICK, ESQUIRE Assistant Attorney General
DAVID L. FLYNN, ESQUIRE LINDA F. THOME, ESQUIRE MICHELLE ARONOWITZ, ESQUIRE (ARGUED) United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division P.O. Box 66078 Washington, DC 20035-6078
* Honorable William W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation.
1 FAITH S. HOCHBERG, ESQUIRE United States Attorney KEVIN McNULTY, ESQUIRE Assistant United States Attorney AMY S. WINKELMAN, ESQUIRE Assistant United States Attorney Office of the United States Attorney 970 Broad Street, Room 502 Newark, NJ 07102
Attorneys for Appellee
_________________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT ___________________________________
BECKER, Circuit Judge.
This appeal by Ronald Johnstone, a former municipal
police officer, in a federal criminal civil rights case, 18
U.S.C. § 242, requires us to consider the correctness of jury
instructions concerning the excessive force and intent elements
of that offense. We must also determine the propriety of a
sentencing guideline enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon.1
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1 Johnstone’s appeal raises a number of other issues, but we find patently without merit his contentions: (1) that the jury instructions incorrectly stated that any bodily injury, no matter how temporary, would sustain criminal liability; (2) that the court impermissibly allowed the prosecution unilaterally to dismiss a count it had emphasized in its opening; (3) that the court improperly allowed into evidence the testimony of a lay witness who described the state law standard for excessive force; (4) that the court erred by admitting potentially prejudicial testimony from a colleague of Johnstone who claimed that any assaults carried out by Johnstone were covered up by his superiors; (5) that, when it sentenced Johnstone, the court incorrectly viewed evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the government; and (6) that the court inaccurately applied the Sentencing Guidelines for aggravated assault, rather than minor assault.
2 Johnstone and Richard Poplaski, former officers in the
Kearny, New Jersey Police Department, were charged in a nine-
count indictment with the use of excessive force in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 242. Three of the counts involved allegations
against both Johnstone and Poplaski; six involved allegations
against only Johnstone. Prior to and during trial, two counts
against Johnstone and two counts against Poplaski were dismissed,
leaving for the jury seven counts against Johnstone and one count
against Poplaski. The jury convicted Johnstone of six of the
remaining seven counts against him and acquitted Poplaski of the
only remaining count against him. The district court sentenced
Johnstone to 87 months in prison and imposed a fine.
Central to a number of Johnstone's arguments are the
facts underlying the conviction. Of particular importance are
the timing of the force and the type of force used. Therefore,
we will briefly describe each of the instances for which
Johnstone was convicted, viewing the evidence presented at trial
in the light most favorable to the government.2
A. Austin Burke (Count VII)
On February 14, 1990, Johnstone and a fellow officer
stopped two men on the street whom they suspected of car theft.
Johnstone seized one of the men, Austin Burke, handcuffed him,
and threw him against the hood of the patrol car. Johnstone, who
2 As we will describe below, however, the order of events underlying these convictions -- in particular, whether the assaults occurred before or after Johnstone handcuffed the victims -- is not crucial to resolving the legal questions at issue. See infra part II.
3 is six-foot three inches and three hundred pounds, then pushed
him against the car several more times, and punched him on the
body. While putting Burke in the patrol car, Johnstone thrust
his head against its roof.
B. John Blevins (Count IV)
The jury convicted Johnstone for his role in the arrest
of John Blevins. On May 14, 1990, Blevins was waiting on a
street corner after attending a house party. Johnstone and
several other Kearny police officers, responding to a complaint
about noise, arrived at the scene. Blevins became disorderly,
and one of the other officers started to struggle with him while
attempting to place him under arrest. Johnstone observed the
struggle and moved in to assist the other officer. After other
officers had handcuffed Blevins and forced him to lie on the
ground, Johnstone kicked him in the mouth and chest.
C. Peter Sudziarski (Count III)
The jury also convicted Johnstone of employing
excessive force against Peter Sudziarski. On September 19, 1990,
Johnstone and Poplaski stopped Sudziarski and a friend, who were
driving in a stolen car. Sudziarski fled on foot, but was
promptly apprehended and handcuffed. His friend evaded
apprehension. Immediately after handcuffing Sudziarski, one of
the officers (it was not clear whether it was Johnstone or
Poplaski) kicked him in the back of the head. Later, upon
walking Sudziarski to the patrol car, Johnstone struck him in the
head and chest with his flashlight when Sudziarski refused to
reveal his accomplice’s name. Johnstone placed Sudziarski in the
4 patrol car and again asked for his accomplice’s name. When
Sudziarski refused to answer, Johnstone hit him across the face
with his flashlight.
D. Michael Perez (Counts V & VI)
Johnstone was convicted of twice using excessive force
against Michael Perez on July 5, 1991. Perez and five friends
were returning to Kearny from a Fourth of July celebration in
Jersey City when two of his friends got into a fight. When the
police arrived at the scene, Johnstone told Perez that he was
under arrest, and he and several officers walked Perez to his
squad car. Then, while attempting to handcuff Perez, Johnstone
struck him on the back of his head with a flashlight.
Perez and Johnstone exchanged words in the patrol car
during the trip to the Kearny police station. Upon arriving at
the station house garage, Johnstone pulled Perez out of the car,
and beat him, punching and kicking him in the head and on the
body. It was disputed at trial whether Perez remained handcuffed
at that time.
E. Robert Burden (Count IX)
The last incident occurred on September 1, 1991.
Robert Burden came out of a bar and discovered that the police
had arrested his son. He tried to glean some information about
the arrest from police officers at the scene, but was told by
Johnstone to leave. He returned to the bar. Shortly thereafter,
Johnstone followed him into the bar. Upon finding him, Johnstone
pulled Burden off his bar stool, threw him against a video
machine and against the wall, pushed him to the floor, and kicked
5 him. Johnstone then handcuffed Burden and took him away.
The district court exercised jurisdiction over the
criminal case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we exercise appellate
jurisdiction over the judgment of conviction and sentence
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II. JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING EXCESSIVE FORCE
We address first Johnstone’s challenge to the jury
instructions regarding excessive force. In reviewing whether a
district court in its charge to the jury correctly stated the
appropriate legal standard, our review is plenary. See, e.g.,
United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1995).3 A
jury charge must clearly articulate the relevant legal standards.
See, e.g., United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 881 (3d Cir.
1994). It must, therefore, be structured in such a way as to
avoid confusing or misleading the jury. See, e.g., United States
v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987). To ensure that
the district court met this requirement, we must examine the
charge in its entirety and not limit ourselves to particular
sentences or paragraphs in isolation. See, e.g., Coyle, 63 F.3d
at 1245.4 3 Johnstone is not challenging the precise language of the charge; instead, he is arguing that the district court articulated the improper legal standard in the charge. Were we to review the particular language employed by the district court in its charge, our review would be for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 789 (3d Cir. 1987).
4 Johnstone did not object to the jury charge in the district court, and so we can reverse in his favor only if any error made by the district court was “plain.” United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1260 n.6 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995) (“Where a party has not made a clear, specific objection to the charge that he alleges is erroneous at trial, he waives the issue on appeal ‘unless the error was so fundamental and highly
6 The district court charged the jury as follows: “If you
find, as to the particular count under consideration that a
defendant used force, you should consider whether the force used
by him was reasonable or whether it was greater than the force
which would have been reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to an ordinary and reasonable officer on the
scene.” Johnstone contends that the district court erred in
charging the jury under a Fourth Amendment “objective
reasonableness” standard rather than a due process standard
because the force that he used against Sudziarski, Perez, and
Blevins -- the conduct underlying four counts of his conviction -
- occurred after their “lawful restraint and arrest.”
In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme
Court established the constitutional standard that governs claims
that excessive force was employed during the course of an arrest.
According to the Court, “all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force -- deadly or not -- in the
course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a
free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and
its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive
due process’ approach.” Id. at 395. The Court held that this
Fourth Amendment “‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force
case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and
prejudicial as to constitute plain error.’” (quoting Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987)). Because we conclude that the district court did not err in its instructions, we need not reach the plain error question.
7 circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397.
While the Graham Court explained that the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness standard governs claims of excessive
force during arrest, the Court acknowledged: “Our cases have not
resolved the question whether the Fourth Amendment continues to
provide individuals with protection against the deliberate use of
excessive physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends
and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to answer
that question today.” Id. at 395 n.10. Nor did the Court in
Graham precisely determine the particular point at which the
“seizure” ends and the pre-trial detention begins, identifying
neither a point in time, nor a place, e.g., the station house,
that might suffice. The Court instead relied on its prior cases
in which it had defined a “seizure” to occur when law enforcement
officials have “by means of physical force or show of authority .
. . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968); see also Brower v. County of
Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (seizure occurs “when there is a
governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied”).
Johnstone contends that the district court erred in
instructing the jury to consider the excessive force claims under
the Graham objective reasonableness standard. According to
Johnstone, Graham only governs claims that excessive force was
carried out during the course of an arrest. Because Sudziarski,
Perez, and Blevins were already handcuffed when they were
8 assaulted, the argument continues, those assaults took place
after, not during, the arrests, hence, Graham does not govern
those counts. Johnstone then argues that his conduct, which
falls into the “gray” area about which the Graham Court
explicitly reserved decision, should be weighed under a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard. Thus,
Johnstone submits, the jury should have been instructed as to
whether the force used against those three victims was excessive
under a substantive due process “shocks the conscience” analysis,
or, at a minimum, should have been instructed about both
constitutional standards, and the specific facts that would
trigger the application of each standard.
We disagree. Without deciding where an arrest ends and
pretrial detention begins, we conclude, for the reasons that
follow, that the excessive force committed by Johnstone took
place during the arrests of Sudziarski, Perez, and Blevins, even
if those victims were in handcuffs. Therefore, the district
court correctly instructed the jury with a Fourth Amendment
objective reasonableness standard. Moreover, we believe that
this case is squarely controlled by Graham, as the force at issue in that case took place in a similar factual context.
In Graham, police officers stopped Graham’s car,
suspecting him of criminal activity. Suffering from an insulin
reaction, Graham emerged from his car, ran around it twice, sat
down on the curb, and then passed out briefly. An officer
handcuffed him, and several officers then carried him to the car,
placing him face down on the hood. When he regained
9 consciousness, one of the officers shoved him (face down) against
the hood, and then four of the officers threw him head first into
the car. Graham, 490 U.S. at 389. In holding that the Fourth
Amendment governed that case, the Graham Court implicitly held
that an arrest is a continuing event that does not end as soon as
a suspect is first restrained. Moreover, because Graham was
handcuffed at the time of his assault, Graham shows that
handcuffing is not necessarily the point at which a seizure ends
for purposes of the application of the Fourth Amendment.
We believe that the facts of Graham are nearly
identical to those that we face in the case at bar. Leaving
aside for a moment the assault on Perez in the station house
garage, each of the attacks against Perez and Blevins, and most
of the attacks against Sudziarski took place outside the patrol
car after the suspects had been handcuffed, just as the force in
Graham had been employed. Johnstone also struck Sudziarski with
the flashlight in the patrol car, but the placement of a suspect
in a squad car does not necessarily signal the end of an arrest.
Johnstone persisted in the same conduct both before and after
putting Sudziarski in the car: Johnstone questioned him, and when
Sudziarski refused to reveal his accomplice’s name, Johnstone
struck him.
We acknowledge that Johnstone’s assault on Perez in the
police station garage, after he had been transported from the
scene of the initial beating, is the most troubling in this
regard. That assault was the closest -- both temporally and
spatially -- to pre-trial detention at the station house. We
10 conclude, however, that the assault in the station house garage
also occurred during the course of Perez’s arrest. In so doing,
we are constrained by our holding in Groman v. Township of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 1995), a civil case, 42 U.S.C. §
1983, in which we held that a beating that took place when a
suspect was removed from the police car at the station house was
governed by the Fourth Amendment. We perceive no difference
between a civil and criminal case in terms of the applicable
standard.
In Groman, we reversed the grant of summary judgment
because we found that there were material facts in dispute as to
whether the defendants had violated Groman’s Fourth Amendment
right to be free from excessive force. Police officers were
called to Groman’s home because he had apparently suffered a
minor stroke. According to Groman, one of the officers struck
him in the mouth. After a brief struggle, the officers placed
Groman in handcuffs, and then took him to the police car. During
the transfer to the squad car, he sustained an injury to his face
and lost his dentures. When they arrived at the station, Groman
testified, the police officers dragged him from the car feet
first, so that his head hit the ground. After picking him up,
one of the officers stomped on his toe, allowed him to fall, and
an officer jumped on him. Groman, 47 F.3d at 632-33. We believe
that the facts of Groman are nearly identical to those
surrounding the beating of Perez in the station house garage, and
we are thus bound by Groman to find that Perez’s assault took place during the course of the arrest, even though he had already
11 been transported to the station house.
United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778 (3d Cir.
1987), on which Johnstone relies to support his contention that
the jury should have been instructed with a Fourteenth Amendment
standard, does not undermine this conclusion. In Messerlian,
which involved post-handcuffing force employed in the squad car
against a drunk-driving suspect, we upheld a conviction where the
jury was instructed under a Fourteenth Amendment due process
analysis. Id. at 782 & 790 n.20. We find Johnstone’s reliance
on Messerlian to be unpersuasive, for two reasons. First, it was
decided before Graham. Since Graham applies to force employed
after a suspect is first restrained or handcuffed, Messerlian
clearly falls into an area that is controlled by Graham. Thus,
the due process jury charge upheld in Messerlian has not survived
Graham. Second, although the instructions in Messerlian were
clearly grounded on the Fourteenth Amendment, the instructions
there did not include the “shocks the conscience” standard, which
Johnstone urges us to employ. Rather, the instructions closely
resembled the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness
instructions presented to the jury in this case. Id. at 789 (force violates a constitutional right if it is “excessive,
unreasonable, and unnecessary”).5 5 Though decided after Graham, Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc), is also inapposite. Fagan involved a high speed police chase, and the question whether there had been a seizure accordingly was not raised. See In re City of Philadelphia Litig., 49 F.3d 945, 964 (3d Cir.) (Greenberg, J., opinion announcing the judgment of the court) (“[N]ot a single member of our . . . court in Fagan suggested that the proper analysis in that case should have centered on the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures.”), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 176 (1995). The "shocks the conscience" standard has been employed in other high speed police car
12 In holding that Johnstone carried out each of the
assaults during the course of arrest, we observe that a “seizure”
can be a process, a kind of continuum, and is not necessarily a
discrete moment of initial restraint. Graham shows us that a
citizen can remain “free” for Fourth Amendment purposes for some
time after he or she is stopped by police and even handcuffed.
Hence, pre-trial detention does not necessarily begin the moment
that a suspect is not free to leave; rather, the seizure can
continue and the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
seizures can apply beyond that point.
Where the seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins
is a difficult question. While it does seem problematic for a
constitutional standard to change at some particular moment
during an encounter between a citizen and a law enforcement
official, as such encounters can be highly volatile, we need not
draw this line here, because Johnstone’s conduct would fall
squarely onto the seizure side of any line we would draw. Nor
need we decide whether the Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable seizures extends beyond that line. We therefore
conclude that the district court did not err in its jury
instructions concerning excessive force.6
chase cases since. Cf. Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1207 (3d Cir. 1996) (“We believe that the Fagan II shocks the conscience standard is limited to police pursuit cases . . . .”).
6 Johnstone makes two related contentions. First, he claims that the district court erroneously failed to charge the jury that the use of force must violate New Jersey state law for such force to constitute a constitutional violation. To support this argument, he relies on Messerlian and United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1985). We disagree. To be sure, in those cases this Court upheld jury instructions that referred to state law. But those cases were decided before Graham. As we have explained,
13 III. JURY INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING THE INTENT
ELEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 242
Johnstone contends that the jury charge incorrectly
defined the intent element of the crime for which the jury
ultimately convicted him. In evaluating this contention, we must
first set forth the appropriate legal standard. The statute
reads, in relevant part, as follows: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned, . . . or both . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 242. As is clear from the statute, the requisite
the jury in the case at bar was properly instructed under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard, and whether a defendant violated state law is not relevant to that determination. Second, Johnstone argues that the district court constructively amended the indictment by charging the jury that the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard governed each count, when the indictment charged him with depriving his victims of their right to due process. He contends that he was denied his Fifth Amendment grand jury right because the district Court “broaden[ed] the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment,” United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985), thus effectively trying him on charges for which he was not indicted. Again, we disagree. The indictment alleged as to each count that Johnstone deprived the victim of the “right secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, which includes the right to be secure in his person and free from the use of unreasonable force by one acting under color of law.” We find this language sufficient to charge a violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and therefore the notice and double jeopardy functions of the indictment were satisfied. An indictment is constructively amended only when the defendant is deprived of his “substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.” Miller, 471 U.S. at 140 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)); see also United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1122- 23 (3d Cir. 1985). That has not occurred here. See also United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was no constructive amendment of indictment in similar case).
14 intent required therein is "willful[]." The statute, however,
goes no further in explaining the meaning of that intent.
A. The Screws Standard
In the celebrated case of Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1945), the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the
meaning of willful in the predecessor statute to § 242.7 It is
not enough, the Court noted, for the defendant to exhibit "a bad
purpose or evil intent." Id. at 103; see also id. at 107.8
Instead, the Court declared that willfulness requires "a specific
intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by
decision or other rule of law . . . ." Id. at 103; see also id.
at 104. Screws also requires the violation of a particular
right. Clearly, the government has alleged such a violation in
this case. As we discussed more fully supra, that right is the
right to be free from the use of excessive force. 7 As quoted in Screws, the text of the predecessor statute reads in relevant part as follows:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both.
Screws, 325 U.S. at 93. Neither party suggests, nor do we believe, that the slight differences between the predecessor statute and that before us now warrant an interpretation of "willfully" different from that provided it by Screws.
8 The opinion in Screws could muster only a plurality. However, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have treated the reasoning with respect to the intent element of the statute as binding. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 223 (1974); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951). Cases in this Circuit have treated Screws similarly. See United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 790 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1985).
15 It is not necessary, however, for the government to
prove that the defendant was "thinking in constitutional terms
[provided that the defendant's] aim was not to enforce local law
but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected
by the Constitution." Id. at 106. The Court reconciles these
facially inconsistent standards -- that an individual can intend
to violate a right even if the individual is not thinking in
terms of any right -- by recognizing that willfulness includes
reckless disregard. See id. at 105 ("When they act willfully in
the sense in which we use the word, they act in open defiance or
in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has
been made specific and definite."); see also United States v.
Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 592 (3d Cir. 1985).9 Finally, Screws held
that willfulness can be shown by circumstantial evidence. See
Screws, 325 U.S. at 107; see also Dise, 763 F.2d at 592. 9 Although Johnstone does not raise this argument in terms, the tenor of his challenge suggests that he would claim that § 242 requires that Johnstone knowingly violate federal law. Screws clearly forecloses such an argument, however, when it states that a defendant need not be "thinking in constitutional terms" in order to be convicted of violating § 242. Screws, 325 U.S. at 106. Screws is therefore in line with the characterization of reckless disregard in other contexts in which reckless disregard is contrasted with and set apart from actual knowledge. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125-130 (1985) (interpreting a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and differentiating between knowledge and reckless disregard). Moreover, reckless disregard often entails some form of indifference. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed. 1990) ("For conduct to be 'reckless' it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, consequences . . . ."). In common parlance, for an individual to be indifferent, he must not be concerned "one way or the other" about the consequences of his action. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1151 (1966). A requirement that an individual know the consequences of his action is not antithetical to this definition of indifference, but it would introduce an additional element beyond lack of concern.
16 As is evident from the text, and has oft been noted,
Screws is not a model of clarity.10 Some of the sentences
therein, examined in isolation, resist easy explanation and can
be reconciled only by way of tortuous logic. Our task, however,
is to read these sentences in light of the text of Screws in its
entirety. The plurality in Screws believed its pronouncements to
be consistent; we must do the same.
In simpler terms, "willful[]" in § 242 means either
particular purpose or reckless disregard. Therefore, it is
enough to trigger § 242 liability if it can be proved -- by
circumstantial evidence or otherwise -- that a defendant
exhibited reckless disregard for a constitutional or federal
right. Reckless disregard has different meanings in different
contexts.11 In the context of § 242, we have only Screws to 10 For a more detailed discussion of Screws's somewhat opaque interpretation of "willfulness," see Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2113, 2180-86 (1993).
11 In Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Supreme Court, in the course of defining "deliberate indifference," discussed the different meanings of reckless disregard. The Court noted that in the civil context reckless disregard generally entails an objective analysis; an individual exhibits reckless disregard if he is indifferent to a risk "that is either known or so obvious that it should be known." Id. at 1978. By contrast, in the criminal context, reckless disregard generally requires a subjective analysis; a criminal defendant exhibits reckless disregard if he is indifferent to a risk "of which he is aware." Id. at 1978-79. Later in its discussion, the Court implied, at least in dicta, that reference to background criminal law is proper in understanding § 242. See id. at 1980 n.7 ("Appropriate allusions to the criminal law would, of course, be proper during criminal prosecutions under, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which sets criminal penalties for deprivations of rights under color of law."). Such a reference suggests that the reckless disregard standard of § 242 is subjective. In Dise, supra, we seemed to agree, stating that a defendant is potentially criminally liable under § 242 "if he acted in reckless disregard of the law as he understood it." Dise, 763 F.2d at 592
17 guide us.12
In sum, as is evident from the passages quoted above,
Screws is less than satisfying in its attempt to reconcile its
internally inconsistent mandates. Unfortunately, any further
attempt to explain the appropriate meaning of reckless disregard
to a jury would probably either do violence to Screws or inject
additional confusion into the standard that it announces; hence
we eschew such explanation. Fortunately, such explanation is
unnecessary for, given the Screws standard as it now stands, we
easily conclude that the jury charge as to intent was
permissible.
B. Validity of the Jury Charge
The relevant language of the charge follows: The fourth element which the United States must prove
(emphasis added). Screws gives no indication as to which definition, objective or subjective, is correct. We do not reach the question here because it is obvious that Johnstone, a trained police officer, was aware that federal and state law (recall that Johnstone was employed by a municipal police department that operated under state law) set boundaries within which the use of force is permissible and was surely aware that any use of force presented some risk of falling outside those boundaries.
12 Courts have looked to three Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to Screws for assistance in defining the intent requirement of § 242. None, however, are very helpful in furthering our present undertaking. In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), for example, the Court assumed -- with little discussion -- that police who beat a confession out of a suspect "acted willfully and purposely; their aim was precisely to deny the protection that the Constitution affords." See id. at 102. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) and Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974), the underlying offense was a conspiracy, prohibited under § 241. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47; Anderson, 417 U.S. at 213. The gravamen of any conspiracy charge -- including a charge under § 241 -- was stated to be the specific intent to achieve an illegal objective. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 753-54; Anderson at 223; id. at 234 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Neither Guest nor Anderson provide guidance with respect to the definition of reckless disregard.
18 beyond a reasonable doubt is that as to the count under consideration the defendant acted willfully. I instruct you that an act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is, as relevant here, with an intent to violate a protected right. Knowledge and intent exist in the mind. Since it is not possible to look into a person's mind to see what went on, you must take into consideration all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and determine from all such facts and circumstances whether the requisite knowledge and intent were present at the time in question. Knowledge and intent may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances. You may infer, for example, that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done. In other words, you may infer that a defendant intended all the consequences that a person standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should have expected to result from his acts knowingly done. You are not, of course, required to so infer. It is not necessary for you to find that a defendant was thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the conduct in question. You may find that a defendant acted with the required specific intent even if you find that he had no real familiarity with the Constitution or with the particular constitutional right involved, here the right to be free from the use of unreasonable or excessive force, provided that you find that the defendant intended to accomplish that which the constitution forbids. Nor does it matter that a defendant may have also been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion, provided that the specific intent which I have described to you is present.
We find nothing in the language of the charge that is
contrary to the appropriate legal standard of § 242 as
interpreted by Screws. Though the charge may not be crystal
clear, any confusion is a result of Screws itself and not of the
charge. The district court explained the appropriate legal
standard, such as it is, as well as that standard could be
explained.
Johnstone, however, submits that the district court was
19 required to charge the jury that it could find him guilty only if
it found that he knowingly violated state law prohibitions
against excessive force. We disagree. As we have explained, the
underlying right Johnstone was alleged to have violated was a
Fourth Amendment right. Therefore, it is the Constitution itself
that defines the standard for excessive force. See supra note 6.
State law is simply of no consequence.
Neither is Dise nor Messerlian on point in this regard,
notwithstanding the pronouncement in Dise that a knowing
violation of state law demonstrates reckless disregard for
constitutional rights, see Dise, 763 F.2d at 592, and the fact
that Messerlian approved jury instructions requiring that the
defendant knowingly violate state law, see Messerlian, 832 F.2d
at 789, 791. Even assuming that state law were relevant, nothing
in Dise nor Messerlian requires a knowing violation of state law;
they merely "hold that when a person acting under color of state
law invades the personal liberty of another, knowing that such
invasion is in violation of state law, he has demonstrated bad
faith and reckless disregard for constitutional rights." Dise,
763 F.2d at 592. That holding in no way forecloses the
possibility that a defendant has acted in reckless disregard for
constitutional rights without knowingly violating state law.
C. Summary
In sum, to convict a defendant under § 242, the
government must show that the defendant had the particular
purpose of violating a protected right made definite by rule of
law or recklessly disregarded the risk that he would violate such
20 a right. The government does not need to show that the defendant
knowingly violated any right. We conclude that, in this case,
the district court properly explained this standard to the jury. IV. GUIDELINE ENHANCEMENT FOR USE OF A
DANGEROUS WEAPON
We turn finally to Johnstone’s challenge to the four-
point enhancement to his base offense level under §
2A2.2(b)(2)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Our review of the
district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is
plenary. United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 451-52 (3d Cir.
1992). The court applied this enhancement in connection with the
aggravated assaults on Sudziarski and Perez. Johnstone contends
that, in so doing, the district court engaged in impermissible
double counting. This is so, Johnstone claims, because the
district court enhanced his offense level to reflect that “a
dangerous weapon was otherwise used,” after it had classified the
conduct underlying the convictions as “aggravated assault” within
the meaning of § 2A2.2 because the offenses “involved” a
dangerous weapon.
Section 2A2.2 provides the framework for calculating
the offense levels for aggravated assault. It sets a base
offense level of fifteen for aggravated assault, which the
comment defines as “a felonious assault that involved . . . a
dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm.” 1994 U.S.S.G. §
2A2.2, commentary, application note 1.13 Once a court has 13 The commentary also defines aggravated assault to include those assaults “that involved . . . serious bodily injury, or . . . an intent to commit another felony.” 1994 U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, commentary, application note 1.
21 determined that the aggravated assault, rather than the minor
assault, guideline applies, § 2A2.2 requires graduated increases
in the base offense level if the offense involves certain
specific offense characteristics. Section 2A2.2(b)(2), for
example, provides for incremental enhancements that reflect the
relative level of involvement of a dangerous weapon in the
commission of the offense. If a firearm was discharged, the
district court is directed to increase the base offense level by
5. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(A). If a dangerous weapon was
“otherwise used” in the commission of the offense, the base
offense level must be increased by 4 levels. See id. §
2A2.2(b)(2)(B). And if the dangerous weapon was “brandished or
its use was threatened,” the court must increase the offender’s
base offense level by 3. See id. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(C).
Turning to the district court’s calculation of
Johnstone’s sentence, the guideline for the substantive offense
that most closely resembled the conduct underlying Johnstone’s
civil rights conviction, assault, was used to calculate
Johnstone’s base offense level. For the convictions for the
assaults on Sudziarski and Perez, the court found that the
aggravated assault guideline applied, because a dangerous weapon
-- a flashlight -- was “involved” in the offenses. Accordingly,
it set the base offense level for those counts at 15. The court
then found that the dangerous weapon -- the flashlight -- had
been “otherwise used” in the assaults, and increased the offense
level by four levels under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B).
Johnstone contends that the district court engaged in
22 impermissible double counting when it enhanced his offense level
four points under § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). He complains that the
flashlight, a “dangerous weapon,” was the basis of the
application of the aggravated assault guideline because it was
“involved” in the offense, and then was used again to enhance the
offense level because this same “dangerous weapon” was “otherwise
used” to commit the assault. Johnstone concedes that the four-
level enhancement would not be double counting in all cases: for
example, if a knife, an inherently dangerous weapon, was involved
in the offense, it would not be double counting to enhance a
defendant’s offense level if that knife was actually used in the
course of the assault. But he contends that the enhancement is
impermissible in a case such as this in which the weapon is not
inherently dangerous, but rather is a “dangerous weapon” that is
“involved” in the offense, triggering the aggravated assault
guideline, solely because of how it is used in the assault.
In other words, Johnstone’s use of the flashlight was
counted twice in calculating his sentence because it was the
basis of both the application of the aggravated assault provision
and the four-point enhancement. In so arguing, Johnstone relies
on United States v. Hudson, 972 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1992), and
United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2288 (1995), in which the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that “while the Sentencing Guidelines
provide a logical framework for assaults involving inherently
dangerous weapons, the Guidelines proscribe impermissible double
counting where it is the use of an ordinary object as dangerous
23 weapon that transforms a ‘minor’ assault into an ‘aggravated’
one.” Hudson, 972 F.2d at 506.
We disagree, for several reasons. In so doing, we note
that we follow the majority of circuits that have considered this
issue. See United States v. Dunnaway, 88 F.3d 617, 619 (8th Cir.
1996) (boots and bottle used as weapons); United States v.
Sorensen, 58 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (7th Cir. 1995) (concrete block
used as weapon); United States v. Garcia, 34 F.3d 6, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 1994) (car used as weapon); United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d
870, 894-96 & n.32 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Williams,
954 F.2d 204, 205-08 (4th Cir. 1992) (use of a metal chair); see
also United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 672-75 (1st Cir.
1992) (similar enhancement under §2A2.2(b)(3) for serious bodily
injury held not to be impermissible double counting). The Second
Circuit is the only circuit to have held that applying
§2A2.2(b)(3)(B) can constitute double counting.
We begin with the observation that the four-point
enhancement where a dangerous weapon is “otherwise used” is not
double counting. The aggravated assault provision and the
specific enhancements for the relative level of involvement of a
dangerous weapon account for different aspects of an assault.
The aggravated assault guideline is triggered if the conduct
“involved a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm”: the
court must apply it if a dangerous weapon was involved in an
assault in any capacity so long as the offender had the intent to
do serious bodily harm with that weapon. By contrast, the
specific offense characteristic enhancements, including the
24 enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon that is at issue here,
deal with the relative level of involvement of that dangerous
weapon in the offense. Because the first provision accounts for
any type of involvement of a dangerous weapon in an assault if
the defendant had the requisite intent, and the second accounts
for the specific type of involvement of that weapon, the
provisions deal with different conduct and hence there is no
double counting.
We are not persuaded that this conclusion is any less
true when the weapon is an ordinary object, such as the large
flashlight used by Johnstone in the assaults against Sudziarski
and Perez. There is no basis in the Guidelines or in the
commentary for distinguishing between ordinary objects and
inherently dangerous weapons. Moreover, the Guidelines consider
a “dangerous weapon” to be “an instrument capable of inflicting
death or serious bodily injury.” 1994 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1,
commentary, application note 1(d). Ordinary objects, such as
large flashlights, are clearly “capable” of inflicting death or
serious bodily injury without being employed, and hence they
clearly fall within the definition of aggravated assault even if
they are not actually used in the offense. Thus, such an object
could be “involved” in an offense, triggering the aggravated
assault guideline, even if it is not “otherwise used” in the
offense.
But even if the four-level enhancement for the use of a
deadly weapon might in some cases, including this one, constitute
“double counting,” this double counting is permissible because it
25 is explicitly mandated by the clear and unambiguous language of §
2A2.2. See supra pp.22-23. A court must make all applicable,
mandatory adjustments unless the Guidelines specifically exempt
the particular conduct at issue. See id. § 1B1.1(b) (“Determine
the base offense level and apply any appropriate specific offense
characteristics contained in the particular guideline in Chapter
Two . . . .”).
We have held that a court must follow this rule even if
it would lead to counting a particular factor twice in
calculating a defendant’s sentence. We addressed the
permissibility of double counting under the Guidelines in United
States v. Wong, 3 F.3d 667 (3d Cir. 1993). See also United
States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1315-16 (3d Cir. 1996). In
those cases, we noted that the Sentencing Commission was aware of
the potential for double counting inherent in some of the
provisions, and that, accordingly, the Guidelines specifically
forbid double counting in certain, enumerated circumstances. For
example, the commentary to §§ 3A1.1, 3A1.2, and 3A1.3 states
explicitly that victim-related enhancements based on certain
conduct are not permitted if the applicable offense guideline
already accounts for the same conduct. See Wong, 3 F.3d at 670. Based on this understanding, we held that: the principle of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies. Following these principles, we conclude that the exclusion of a double counting provision in the [certain] sections . . . was by design. Accordingly, an adjustment that clearly applies to the conduct of an offense must be imposed unless the Guidelines exclude its applicability.
26 Id. at 670-71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).14
Thus, because the Sentencing Commission has not expressly
forbidden double counting in applying the aggravated assault
guideline, we hold that the district court correctly granted the
four-point enhancement even if doing so might in some sense
constitute double counting.15
To hold otherwise would frustrate the structure of the
Guidelines and their goal of ensuring the proportionality of
federal sentences, as the other circuits that we follow have
observed. Implicit in the aggravated assault guideline is the
understanding that certain aggravated assaults are more serious
than others. In crafting the aggravated assault provision, the
Sentencing Commission sought to take different levels of
culpability into account: this guideline assumes that defendants
are more culpable if they “use” a dangerous weapon in the
commission of an offense than if they merely possess that weapon
with the intent to do bodily harm. We follow the Fourth Circuit
in noting that “[w]e cannot . . . deprive the Sentencing
Commission of its authority to assign incrementally higher
14 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius means: the “expression of one thing is the exclusion of another.” Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (6th ed. 1990).
15 We note that the Second Circuit, the sole circuit to have held that the enhancement for the use of a dangerous weapon constitutes double counting unless the weapon is inherently dangerous, has explicitly refrained from holding that the Guidelines bar double counting only in a few, specifically enumerated, circumstances. See Hudson, 972 F.2d at 507; United States v. Olvera, 954 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1992). Hence, that circuit can find that an enhancement constitutes impermissible double counting even if the Guidelines have not expressly forbidden double counting in the provision at issue.
27 sentences based on important factors such as the degree of the
weapon’s involvement and the degree of the victim’s injury.”
Williams, 954 F.2d at 207; Reese, 2 F.3d at 896 n.32 (“The
relevant way to describe what is going on here is that the use of
a weapon transformed [the defendant’s] offense from a minor
assault to an aggravated-assault-in-which-a dangerous-weapon-was-
otherwise-used. That we use a single sentencing factor ‘twice’
to trace the effects of this transformation (first to distinguish
minor from aggravated assaults, then to distinguish more and less
culpable aggravated assaults) is merely an accidental by-product
of the mechanics of applying the Guidelines.”).
In sum, we conclude that the district court properly
interpreted Sentencing Guidelines § 2A2.2.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.