United States v. Johnny Steven Vann

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0232n.06

Case No. 24-3315 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 08, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE NORTHERN ) DISTRICT OF OHIO JOHNNY STEVEN VANN, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: STRANCH, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Jeffery Huffman

pulled over Johnny Vann after Vann failed to use his turn signal while changing lanes. Huffman

immediately noticed a strong smell of marijuana coming from the car and saw a dispensary bag in

the car door. So he moved Vann and his passenger to a patrol car while he searched the vehicle.

Huffman found large quantities of meth, fentanyl, and other drugs. Vann was arrested and

charged with drug trafficking offenses. He moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that Huffman

lacked probable cause to pull him over, but the district court disagreed and overruled Vann’s

motion. So Vann pleaded guilty but reserved the right to challenge the motion-to-suppress ruling.

He now appeals that ruling, and we AFFIRM.

I.

On April 15, 2023, Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) Trooper Huffman was parked in a

median surveilling traffic along the interstate. One car—a black sedan—stood out to him. The No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

car slowed down, as most do when they pass an officer, but it slowed to a speed that was

both “under the speed limit” and slow “[r]elative to other cars.” R.47, Hr’g Tr., pp.12–13, PageID

331–32. And as it passed, the driver made eye contact with Huffman and “almost looked like he

had s[een] a ghost.” Id. at p.14, PageID 333. Huffman thought this was abnormal behavior, and

it piqued his curiosity, so he followed the car.

The interstate had three lanes. Huffman was in the middle lane behind an SUV that was,

in turn, behind the black sedan, which he later learned Vann was driving. From his vantage point

behind the SUV, Huffman saw Vann change to the left lane. According to Huffman, Vann did not

use his turn signal while changing lanes. So Huffman moved to the right lane to pass the SUV

while Vann kept driving under the speed limit in the left lane. Huffman then moved to the left

lane to get behind Vann. As soon as he did, Vann changed lanes again, shifting into the middle

lane—this time, using his signal. So Huffman got behind him again and turned on his lights to

pull him over.

On the shoulder, Huffman approached Vann from the passenger side and immediately

noticed “the strong odor of marijuana” coming from the car. Id. at p.26, PageID 345. Huffman

told Vann that “when [he] went in the left lane, [he] never used [his] turn signal.” Gov’t Ex. 2,

Huffman Body Worn Camera (Huffman BWC), 16:43:24–29. By this time, Trooper Matthew

Born, who was on patrol nearby, also pulled over in case Huffman needed anything and stood near

the driver’s side door. Vann replied that the car was a rental, and Huffman again said he did not

use his turn signal and asked to see his license. Vann didn’t have it, so Huffman took the license

of his passenger, Bridgit Ganskow, and asked Vann to step out of the car with Born while they

worked to identify him.

2 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

As Vann exited the car, Huffman saw a bag from the “House of Dank,” a Michigan

marijuana dispensary, in the door. Huffman asked Ganskow what brought them to Ohio, and she

said they were going to a dispensary. To her surprise, Huffman informed her marijuana was illegal

in the state and they could not have it out in their car “like that,” gesturing toward the bag. Id. at

16:45:20–35. He asked if she had a medical marijuana card, and she did not.1 So he also had her

step out of the car and join Born.

Huffman then searched the vehicle. He began by going through Ganskow’s purse where

he found marijuana, other cannabis products, needles, and Narcan. Moving to the items in the

backseat, he found various pills, fentanyl, and a plastic bag with a large amount of crystal meth.

Shocked by the quantity of drugs, Huffman called Born over to look. This left Vann and Ganskow

alone in the backseat of the patrol car, where seemingly unaware the car had a camera, they

discussed who should take the fall for the drugs. Vann told Ganskow that she should because their

attorneys would “get it thrown out” anyway. R.47, Hr’g Tr., p.35, PageID 354; Gov’t Ex 3,

Backseat Camera, 17:10:24. When the officers returned, they arrested Vann and Ganskow.

Vann was indicted on three counts of possession with intent to distribute a controlled

substance—one count in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and two in violation of § 841(a)(1).2 He

moved to suppress all the evidence the government obtained in the traffic stop, arguing Huffman

lacked probable cause to initiate the stop. The court held a hearing on the motion, and Huffman

testified. He provided two bases for the stop: Vann did not signal while changing lanes, and he

impeded traffic by driving in the left lane under the speed limit, without passing other cars. The

1 At the time, only medical marijuana was legal in Ohio. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3796.03 (2023); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(C)(3) (criminalizing recreational marijuana) (amended Oct. 3, 2023). 2 The government also charged Ganskow for violating §§ 846 and 841(a), but she is not a party to this appeal. 3 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

government also introduced Huffman’s dash camera recording of Vann’s driving, the body camera

footage of his interaction with Vann and Ganskow, and the patrol car footage of Vann and

Ganskow’s conversation in the backseat.

But the dash camera footage is not a complete picture of the incident. It shows Vann

entering the left lane, but because the camera is positioned on the passenger side of the car, the

SUV behind Vann blocked the view of Vann’s rear lights. So the government also introduced a

photo showing the driver’s view from the car, and Huffman testified that he had a “clear line of

sight of the left side of the car” from the driver’s side. R.47, Hr’g Tr., p.17, PageID 336. And he

saw that Vann did not use his signal.

Vann’s attorney questioned Huffman on why he pulled Vann over, and no other motorists

who appeared to be violating traffic laws, and why he only mentioned the turn-signal violation

when he confronted Vann, and not the impeding-traffic violation. The attorney also cited a

provision in the OSHP policy manual that “recommends that [an officer] verbally document traffic

violations when [he] see[s] them in addition to [the] dash camera recording.” Id. at p.44, PageID

363. She questioned why Huffman did not do this, as it would have provided real-time evidence

of the traffic violations. Huffman questioned the practicality of the policy recommendation. It

would require officers to manually turn on their body cameras in the car (rather than allowing it to

automatically turn on as they exit the car). But then they’d have to wait for the ninety-second lag

between the camera turning on and when it begins recording to narrate what they are seeing, even

though this information is also communicated to dispatch. On redirect, the government pointed

out that this policy is entirely discretionary.

After watching the videos and hearing Huffman’s testimony, the district court concluded

Huffman was credible and had probable cause to initiate the stop. The judge based that probable

4 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

cause on Vann’s turn signal violation. But he expressed “no opinion” on whether probable cause

could also be based on Vann impeding traffic by his slow driving in the left lane. Id. at p.82,

PageID 401. While he believed the video showed that violation, he acknowledged that the officer

never mentioned it to Vann and had raised it for the first time in his after-incident report. So it

wasn’t clear to the judge if “another violation that nobody talked about until the report” could also

serve as probable cause for the initial stop. Id. at p.83, PageID 402. Still, he concluded “it’s

irrelevant” because testimony explained why the dash camera could not capture the turn-signal

violation and Huffman “unequivocally testified that he could see where that turn signal was and

[it] remained inactive” during the lane change—and that gave Huffman probable cause for the

stop. Id. So the court declined to suppress the evidence.

Vann entered a plea agreement on two counts that allowed him to appeal the adverse

motion-to-suppress ruling. He was sentenced to 120 months’ imprisonment and five years of

supervised release. He appealed.

II.

When reviewing a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s “findings of fact for

clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Taylor, 121 F.4th 590, 594 (6th Cir.

2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). And when a district court denies a motion, “we consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

For a factual finding to be clearly erroneous, the record must leave us “with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Rogers, 97 F.4th 1038, 1041 (6th

Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will affirm a district court’s conclusion if it

“can be justified for any reason.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

5 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

III.

Vann’s sole argument on appeal is really a factual dispute: he argues that Huffman could

not see his turn signal violation and so lacked probable cause to initiate the stop. He claims the

district court “ignored or discounted other evidence” showing that Huffman was not credible.

Appellant Br. at 13. But because the record supports the district court’s conclusion that Vann did

not use his turn signal while changing lanes, Huffman had probable cause to pull him over.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A person’s car is an “effect” under the

amendment. United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645, 657–58 (6th Cir. 2013). So to justify a

seizure, like a traffic stop, an officer must have “probable cause to believe that a traffic violation

has occurred.” Id. at 658 (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)). Once an

officer has probable cause, his “subjective intent is irrelevant.” United States v. Lott, 954 F.3d

919, 922 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). And an officer has probable cause

when he “observes a motorist violate a traffic law.” Id. at 923.

Everyone agrees that Ohio requires a motorist use a turn signal when changing lanes. So

the only question is whether Huffman observed Vann change lanes without using his turn signal.

The record supports the district court’s finding that he did. Although the dash camera video does

not show Vann changing lanes without signaling, there is a clear explanation why. The dash

camera is on the passenger side, so its sight line is different from the driver’s. Though the SUV in

front of Hoffman blocked the camera’s view of the turn-signal violation, Hoffman could still

observe the violation from the driver’s side. The government introduced photos to show that, and

Huffman testified to it. And the court acknowledged that the video did not capture the turn-signal

violation but nonetheless credited Huffman’s unequivocal testimony that he did not see Vann use

6 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

his signal when changing lanes. Aside from his testimony, Huffman also repeatedly raised the

turn-signal violation to Vann when he pulled him over. So the record provides consistent and

contemporaneous evidence that Huffman saw Vann fail to use his turn signal. Based on this record,

the district court’s factual finding was not clearly erroneous.

Vann fights this conclusion with a more nuanced pretext argument. He concedes that an

officer’s subjective intent is typically irrelevant to a probable-cause finding. But he contends that

it is relevant to the district court’s credibility determination. He claims that Huffman’s other

actions suggested that his suspicions of Vann prevented him from being a credible witness to the

alleged violation. For support, he points to three things: (1) Huffman’s “inconsistent[]” testimony

about whether it is abnormal for a driver to slow down as they pass police, (2) the fact that Huffman

did not follow the OSHP policy that recommends officers orally narrate suspected traffic

violations, and (3) the fact that Huffman did not raise the second alleged traffic violation until his

written report. Appellant Br. at 13–14. None of these arguments make the district court’s

credibility determination erroneous.

First, Huffman’s testimony was far from inconsistent. He acknowledged that most drivers

slow down when they see police. But Vann did more. Huffman testified that Vann “slowed down

to a slow speed under the speed limit” that was also slow “[r]elative to other cars.” R.47, Hr’g Tr.,

pp.12–13, PageID 331–32 (emphasis added). And when Vann made eye contact with Huffman,

he “almost looked like he had s[een] a ghost.” Id. at p.14, PageID 333. That is the conduct that

stood out to Huffman as abnormal. But even if Huffman’s testimony about normal driving

behavior was inconsistent, it would not lead us to conclude the district court erred in crediting his

testimony about a completely different topic—whether he saw Vann use his turn signal.

7 No. 24-3315, United States v. Vann

Vann’s second argument fares no better. His attorney thoroughly raised the OSHP policy

during the hearing. But as Huffman pointed out, it is unrealistic for officers to narrate each traffic

violation aloud while driving alone. This is especially true since it would require officers to

manually turn on the in-car video system and there is about a ninety-second delay before it begins

recording. More importantly, as the government pointed out, this policy is entirely discretionary.

So it isn’t clear that Huffman’s failure to follow this policy was evidence of malintent toward

Vann.

Finally, Vann argues that Hoffman’s failure to note the second violation until his report

was a credibility defect the district court erroneously ignored. But the district court considered

this. It noted that the video captured the violation, so it was not wrong for Huffman to include it

in his report. The judge only disregarded the violation for establishing probable cause because he

was unsure whether a violation mentioned only in the report can serve that purpose—not because

he believed Huffman was dishonest about it occurring. So Hoffman’s failure to note the second

violation until his report was not a credibility defect. Plus, this fact was irrelevant. Huffman had

already “unequivocally testified that he could see where that turn signal was and [it] remained

inactive” during the lane change—and that provided Huffman probable cause to stop Vann. Id. at

p.83, PageID 402.

Vann’s new spin on pretext is unavailing. The record before the district judge supports his

finding that Huffman had probable cause to stop Vann. And since that is Vann’s only argument

in favor of suppression, we affirm.