BAZELON, Chief Judge:
These motions to vacate a plea of guilty (28 U.S.C. § 2255) and to withdraw the plea (Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) are based on appellant’s claim of incompetence at the time the plea was entered. Since we find that the record does not “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,”1 it follows that the district court erred in denying these motions without a hearing.
I.
Appellant and a co-defendant were charged in a three-count indictment with [723] armed robbery,2 robbery,3 and assault with a dangerous weapon.4 The charges stemmed from a robbery of a gas station and one Leon Henderson; $104 in cash and a $60 watch were taken.
There were indications from the very outset that appellant was mentally deficient. At pretrial appointed counsel moved for a Miranda hearing, asserting that appellant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. At the pretrial appearance, the prosecutor admitted that “there may be some difficulty with the confession” and that he “may not use it.”5 Papers filed in connection with the proceedings below reveal that appellant could not sign his name; when his signature was required, appellant printed his name in scrawling block letters.6
Upon entry of the guilty plea on November 26,1973, when the trial court addressed appellant personally,7 he simply responded, “Yes, Ma’am” or “No, Ma’am” to all but one8 of the court’s queries.9 The complaining witness, Mr. Henderson, thereupon expressed to the court his belief that appellant was a “good” but “illiterate” man who must have been “put up to” the crime, and urged that he not be incarcerated.'10 Appellant’s counsel specifically suggested, and the court apparently agreed, that “in the presentence aspect of this case some attention [be] paid to the psychological aspect,” and that a suitable program of rehabilitation be devised.11
Sentencing was delayed pending preparation of a presentence report and an evaluation of appellant’s suitability for rehabilita[724] tion under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act.12 Appellant’s “extremely low level of intelligence” and his lack of any “concept of time” were stressed throughout the presentence report.13 The NARA staff found appellant’s narcotic addiction to be questionable, and recommended “special educational or vocational training”14 rather than NARA treatment, since “his mental capabilities would hinder him extremely in [NARA’s] type of intensive, therapeutic program.”15 Again, appellant’s low level of intelligence was noted, supported by the results of the Revised Beta Intelligence Test, on which appellant scored 57,16 and the Stanford Achievement Test, on which he scored 2.2, indicating that he operates “at slightly above the second grade level of academic achievement.”17
At sentencing on March 28, 1974, counsel reminded the court of appellant’s “extraordinarily low intelligence,”18 and suggested probationary supervision. When asked about a pending marriage to an old girlfriend, appellant told the court that “we haven’t been together for about three years and we were getting married this month or last month, like she is expecting a kid.”19 The trial judge replied, “Not yours, I take it,” to which appellant responded, “I don’t [725] know.”20 The court imposed a sentence of two to six years.
After a motion for reconsideration and reduction of sentence was denied, appellant filed the present motions to vacate the plea of guilty under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and to withdraw the plea under Rule 32(d), P.R.Cr. Pro.
II.
It is “fundamental to an adversary system of justice”21 that an individual whose “mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense”22 may not be subjected to a trial.23 The conviction of an accused who is mentally incompetent violates due process.24 Where the “circumstances generat[e] a substantial doubt as to the accused’s competence ... a suitable hearing must be held.”25
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BAZELON, Chief Judge:
These motions to vacate a plea of guilty (28 U.S.C. § 2255) and to withdraw the plea (Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure) are based on appellant’s claim of incompetence at the time the plea was entered. Since we find that the record does not “conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,”1 it follows that the district court erred in denying these motions without a hearing.
I.
Appellant and a co-defendant were charged in a three-count indictment with [723] armed robbery,2 robbery,3 and assault with a dangerous weapon.4 The charges stemmed from a robbery of a gas station and one Leon Henderson; $104 in cash and a $60 watch were taken.
There were indications from the very outset that appellant was mentally deficient. At pretrial appointed counsel moved for a Miranda hearing, asserting that appellant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. At the pretrial appearance, the prosecutor admitted that “there may be some difficulty with the confession” and that he “may not use it.”5 Papers filed in connection with the proceedings below reveal that appellant could not sign his name; when his signature was required, appellant printed his name in scrawling block letters.6
Upon entry of the guilty plea on November 26,1973, when the trial court addressed appellant personally,7 he simply responded, “Yes, Ma’am” or “No, Ma’am” to all but one8 of the court’s queries.9 The complaining witness, Mr. Henderson, thereupon expressed to the court his belief that appellant was a “good” but “illiterate” man who must have been “put up to” the crime, and urged that he not be incarcerated.'10 Appellant’s counsel specifically suggested, and the court apparently agreed, that “in the presentence aspect of this case some attention [be] paid to the psychological aspect,” and that a suitable program of rehabilitation be devised.11
Sentencing was delayed pending preparation of a presentence report and an evaluation of appellant’s suitability for rehabilita[724] tion under the Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act.12 Appellant’s “extremely low level of intelligence” and his lack of any “concept of time” were stressed throughout the presentence report.13 The NARA staff found appellant’s narcotic addiction to be questionable, and recommended “special educational or vocational training”14 rather than NARA treatment, since “his mental capabilities would hinder him extremely in [NARA’s] type of intensive, therapeutic program.”15 Again, appellant’s low level of intelligence was noted, supported by the results of the Revised Beta Intelligence Test, on which appellant scored 57,16 and the Stanford Achievement Test, on which he scored 2.2, indicating that he operates “at slightly above the second grade level of academic achievement.”17
At sentencing on March 28, 1974, counsel reminded the court of appellant’s “extraordinarily low intelligence,”18 and suggested probationary supervision. When asked about a pending marriage to an old girlfriend, appellant told the court that “we haven’t been together for about three years and we were getting married this month or last month, like she is expecting a kid.”19 The trial judge replied, “Not yours, I take it,” to which appellant responded, “I don’t [725] know.”20 The court imposed a sentence of two to six years.
After a motion for reconsideration and reduction of sentence was denied, appellant filed the present motions to vacate the plea of guilty under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and to withdraw the plea under Rule 32(d), P.R.Cr. Pro.
II.
It is “fundamental to an adversary system of justice”21 that an individual whose “mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense”22 may not be subjected to a trial.23 The conviction of an accused who is mentally incompetent violates due process.24 Where the “circumstances generat[e] a substantial doubt as to the accused’s competence ... a suitable hearing must be held.”25
It is axiomatic that an accused must be competent to enter a valid guilty plea: “A plea of guilty ... is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.”26 A defendant who enters such a plea waives “his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers.”27 The test of validity of the waiver is whether it is “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”28 If a plea is not “equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant [726] possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.”29
A defendant’s competency must be assessed “with specific reference to the gravity of the decisions with which [he] is faced.”30 Whether an accused is capable of making the “reasoned choice”31 essential to the validity of a guilty plea and the waiver of constitutional rights such as the plea entails “depend[s] . . . upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”32
A petitioner who lacked the capacity to have entered an intelligent plea may withdraw his plea pursuant to Rule 32(d), F.R.Cr.Pro.33 and/or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.34 One who seeks such relief must be offered an opportunity to present evidence at a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief . . . .”35
The trial court did not, and indeed could not, rely upon such a showing in the instant ease.36 Instead, it denied relief [727] based on: (1) appellant’s failure to raise the competence issue prior to sentencing; (2) its personal observation of appellant and the apparent understanding appellant displayed, as evidenced by his affirmative responses, during the guilty plea colloquy; and (3) appellant’s admissions of his role in the robbery. These grounds, of course, do not support the denial of relief without a hearing.
(1) The district court repeatedly emphasized that “[a]ll the factors raised as bases for withdrawal were known prior to sentencing.”37 The court observed that “[i]f the defendant’s lack of capacity was a truly serious claim, it certainly was apparent prior to sentencing, and would have been raised at that time.”38 This proposition reflects both a misapplication of the law, and a “basic failure of our criminal justice system to recognize that special provisions must sometimes be made for the mentally retarded.”39
Rule 32(d) specifically provides for withdrawal of a plea after both conviction and sentencing.40 There is no time limitation for the filing of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.41 The Supreme Court has recognized that the failure to raise the competency issue prior to conviction is no bar to relief since “it is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.”42
Although there were early signs suggesting retardation,43 appellant was first tested after entry of his plea. Counsel informed the court that only upon learning appellant’s IQ did he appreciate the import of those earlier signs and realize that appellant might have been incompetent.44 Counsel argued that
he was misled by defendant’s attitude and manner into believing that defendant understood the proceedings and the consequences of his plea of guilty. Defendant appeared to be agreeable to all suggestions, nodding to counsel as though he understood counsel’s explanation.45 (Emphasis added.)
Counsel’s initial failure to recognize appellant’s retardation and appellant’s apparent acquiescence must be examined in the light of available research. For example, studies could be introduced at a proper hearing, subject to examination and cross-examination, indicating that the mentally retarded often demonstrate an exaggerated [728] suggestibility and need to cooperate,46 and that retardation frequently goes undetected.47
(2) Nor can the court’s reliance on its personal observations of appellant be determinative.48 Decisions of the Supreme Court49 and the various courts of appeals50 clearly indicate that the trial court’s observation of a defendant’s apparent rationality and comprehension is an insufficient basis for denying a hearing on a § 2255 motion raising the issue of competency. The impropriety of reliance on personal observation is highlighted in the case of a retarded defendant.
And although the district court addressed appellant before accepting his plea, it is apparent that the standard Rule 1151 colloquy may prove an inadequate measure of the validity of a plea proffered by a [729] defendant of questionable mental competence. As the Supreme Court observed, “[t]he nature of the inquiry required by Rule 11 must necessarily vary from case to case . . . . In all such inquiries, ‘[m]atters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling.’ ”52
(3) Finally, appellant’s guilt or innocence is not a proper basis for dispensing with an evidentiary hearing.53 While under Rule 32(d) “a failure to demonstrate innocence, or an admission of guilt, has ordinarily been considered fatal,54 relief may be accorded under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regardless of petitioner’s guilt or innocence.55
It may be argued that we should order withdrawal of appellant’s plea on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in failing to do so. But we believe that the interests of the appellant and the administration of criminal justice would best be served by a hearing to properly examine and assess the nature and extent of appellant’s disabilities. Such information is essential whether the issue is competency to stand trial, withdrawal of a plea, criminal responsibility or sentencing.56 Only with the light of such information can we hope to find the path to accommodating society’s need for order with its deeply-held [730] concern for the dignity and worth of every human being.
Reversed and Remanded.
MR. HENDERSON: * * *
Your Honor, I believe in my heart, I believe that he didn’t do this on his own, that he was put up to do this, and 1 wish you would take that into your judgment that he didn’t because as long as I been knowing him, he hasn’t did nothing but work on the trash truck on his route, and how it was — how he got — that fellow — what his name — Snow [appellant’s co-defendant] or whatever it is— to put him up to it, I don’t believe it is in him, and I would appreciate, Your Honor, if you would please give him a break because if he go to jail he is not going to be no good when he get out.
MR. LOWY: Your Honor, if Mr. Henderson would like to tell Your Honor about what he considers, based on what he knows about Mr. Masthers, about his mental state, and the kind of mind that he has, and whether he— would you like to tell the judge about that?
MR. HENDERSON: Well, in my opinion, Your Honor, in my opinion, the man is — he is a good man because he is a hard-working man. I have seen him work.
But to my opinion — I don’t know whether he like it or not — but he is illiterate.
Do you understand what I mean? He has been deprived of his education and he is from where I am from, from the South, and he hasn’t had the education that he needs, and he is, you know, he is readily led by somebody that is smart, you know, like one of these gangsters or something like that, and that is the only reason I can see that he did it because it is not him, it is not in him. I have known him that long. It is not in him.
Because he has asked me for things. He has never took nothing. He has asked me for things. And that is what surprised me.
Transcript of November 26, 1973 Hearing, pp. 5-6.
Appellant’s IQ would place him in the “mildly retarded” category under the schemes most widely used today. The following table, adapted from Simmons, Tymchuk and Valente, “Treatment and Care of Mentally Retarded,” 4 Psychiatric Armais 38, 42 (1974), summarizes the two major systems for classifying the degrees of severity of mental retardation in terms of IQ:
TABLE 1
“ American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders II (1968).
““American Association on Mental Deficiency, Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation (Grossman, Ed. 1973).
IQ alone, however, is not a definitive measure of retardation. “[A] diagnosis of mental retardation is based on multiple criteria, including measured intelligence (usually quantified as Intelligence Quotient), adaptive behavior level (sometimes quantified as a Social Quotient), and medical classification.” Roos, “Basic Facts About Mental Retardation,” in Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped, p. 19 (Ennis and Friedman, Eds. 1973). The American Association on Mental Deficiency defines mental retardation as “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifest during the developmental period.” American Association on Mental Deficiency, Manual on Terminology and Classification, supra, at 5. See also Hughes, “Definition, Diagnosis, Classification and Associated Problems in Mental Retardation,” Law & Psychology Review 17 (Spring 1975).
In Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), the Supreme Court enunciated the test for competency: whether the accused “has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” This standard is codified by 24 D.C.Code § 301(a) (1973).
We have similarly recognized that the “level of awareness and comprehension” necessary for a valid waiver of constitutional rights differs from the level necessary to stand trial. United States v. David, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 117, 511 F.2d 355, 362 n. 19 (1975). See In re Williams, 165 F.Supp. 879 (D.D.C.), order modified on other grounds, Williams v. Overholser, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 259 F.2d 175 (1958), cert. denied, Williams v. United States, 379 U.S. 982, 85 S.Ct. 689, 13 L.Ed.2d 572 (1965). Cf. Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966).
Since [it] has somewhat more latitude to permit withdrawal under Rule 32(d), it will view the Motion in the light most favorable to the defendant and consider the post-conviction motions, motions under Rule 32(d). 8A Moore’s fl 32.07(4).
Memorandum Order, May 9, 1974, p. 1.
Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Rule 32(d) has no express “hearing” provision, but “the same standard for ordering a hearing appears to be appropriate.” 8A Moore’s Federal Practice § 32.07[4] (1975).
For a particularly revealing illustration of the way retardation goes undetected in the criminal process see, Haggerty, Kane and Udall, “An Essay on the Legal Rights of the Mentally Retarded,” 6 Family L.Q. 59 (1972). The authors conclude:
Where the defendant in a criminal case is retarded, this fact is rarely learned. One of the most pressing problems of the mentally retarded is that by default, as it were, their legal rights are often ignored, disregarded, or simply violated. . . . Generally speaking, most lawyers are unfamiliar with the legal rights of the mentally retarded. As a result, the mentally retarded do not have the protection of those rights.
Id. at 60.
There are great differences in the degree of intellectual functioning and adaptive ability among the mentally regarded. See Cytryn and Lourie, “Mental Retardation,” in Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry II (Freedman, Kaplan and Sadock, Eds. 1975). This extreme heterogeneity within the class of those considered retarded may contribute to the difficulty the average citizen has in recognizing another’s mental retardation. Most mildly retarded persons appear to others to be “normal,” though “slower” in thinking, speaking and moving. See, Giagiari, “The Mentally Retarded Offender,” 3 Crime & Delinq.Lit. 339, 561-2 (1971).
Congress has provided various resources to assist the court in gathering such information — e. g., a presentence report, examination under 24 D.C.Code § 301 and appointment of a psychiatrist and psychologist under 24 D.C. Code § 106. See Leach v. United States, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 320 F.2d 670, after remand, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 197, 334 F.2d 945 (1964).
An awareness of the availability and efficacy of various sentencing alternatives for the retarded offender is also essential. There is evidence, for example, indicating that while prisons provide few, if any, meaningful programs or services for the retarded, see Brown and Courtless, “The Mentally Retarded in Penal and Correctional Institutions,” 124 Amer. J. Psychiatry 1164, 1166 (1968), nearly 10% of our prison population is retarded, contrasted with a 3% incidence of retardation in the general population. Id. In some geographic areas, the retarded reportedly comprise more than 24% of the prison population. Dennis, “Tennessee’s Research and Demonstration Project on the Retarded Juvenile Offender,” The Naive Offender Format and Essays (New England Seminar on Retarded Youth and the Law Enforcement Process 1971), cited in Talent and Kelgord, supra, n. 47 at 39. This may be due to the fact that the retarded individual “is more easily apprehended, more prone to confess, more likely to be convicted, and ... incarcerated longer than the nonretarded offender.” Allen, 32 Fed.Prob., supra, n. 46 at 25. Research also indicates that the retarded are particularly vulnerable to victimization by brighter peers. See, Blackhurst, “Mental Retardation and Delinquency,” 2 J. Special Education 379 (1968).