United States v. Johnathan Anton Williams

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 1 of 11

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-13858 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOHNATHAN ANTON WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cr-00308-JSM-AAS-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 2 of 11

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Before JORDAN, LUCK, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This case returns to us on remand from the Supreme Court. Johnathan Williams appeals his conviction for possession of a fire- arm and ammunition as a convicted felon, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment and the Commerce Clause, both facially and as applied to him. In our previous panel opinion, we affirmed Williams’s conviction and sentence. Wil- liams petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in light of its decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). See Williams v. United States, 2025 WL 1603600 (U.S. June 6, 2025) (Mem.). We now reconsider Willaims’ appeal with the benefit of the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rahimi. After careful review, we affirm Williams’s conviction. How- ever, as both Williams and the government agree that the judg- ment contains a clerical error incorrectly citing the offense of con- viction as “18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (a)(2),” rather than 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), we thus vacate Williams’s written judg- ment, in part, and remand for the limited purpose of allowing the district court to amend the judgment to reflect the proper statute. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Williams was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (“Count One”); possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug- trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 3 of 11

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Two”); and possession of a firearm and ammunition as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (“Count Three”). Williams moved to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the indictment, arguing that (1) both counts violated the Second Amendment following New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), and (2) Count Three violated the Com- merce Clause. The government responded, asserting that this Court’s precedent foreclosed both of Williams’s arguments. The district court denied Williams’s motion to dismiss. Williams waived his right to trial by jury and the case pro- ceeded to a stipulated bench trial. Williams signed a factual proffer, agreed that the facts were true, and the court accepted the stipula- tions as evidence. The stipulated factual proffer included the fol- lowing offense conduct. While conducting surveillance, law en- forcement observed Williams give a man a tied-off plastic baggie in exchange for U.S. currency from his car. After law enforcement asked him to walk to the front of the car, a deputy observed, in plain view, multiple empty sandwich bags and a digital scale through the passenger window. When the officers asked Williams to place his hands behind his back, he attempted to flee but was apprehended. A search of the vehicle produced (1) a Taurus 9 mm pistol with a magazine and one round in the chamber, found be- tween the center console and the driver’s seat, (2) a Sig Saur pistol magazine with 9 mm ammunition in the center console, (3) a .45 caliber round in the driver-side door compartment, (4) 27.73 grams of methamphetamine, (5) two digital scales, and (6) $1,001.00 in USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 4 of 11

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U.S. currency. The gun was found near the narcotics and drug par- aphernalia. Williams had the gun to “further and protect his drug distribution.” An ATF agent determined that the gun was manu- factured in Brazil, four rounds of Prvi Partisan ammunition were manufactured in Serbia, and seven rounds of Armscor ammunition were manufactured in the Philippines or Montana. Williams had felony convictions for robbery, possession of cocaine, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and, on the day of the offense, Williams knew that he was a felon. Williams had intended to distribute the methamphetamine. The district court found Williams guilty on all three counts and sentenced Williams to a total of 104 months imprisonment, followed by 36 months of supervised release. This appeal ensued. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo as a ques- tion of law. United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010). Section 922(g) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits anyone who has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment from possessing a firearm or am- munition. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We turn first to Williams’s argu- ment that § 922(g) is unconstitutional under the Second Amend- ment as applied to him and the Commerce Clause.1

1 The distinction between as applied and facial constitutional challenges “goes

to the breadth of the remedy employed by the Court, not what must be USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 5 of 11

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Second Amendment Challenge In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), the Su- preme Court first recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess and carry weapons for lawful self- defense, unconnected with militia service. The Court then con- cluded that “on the basis of both text and history,” D.C.’s law pro- hibiting the possession of handguns in homes violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 595. But the Heller Court also acknowledged that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms was “not unlimited,” emphasizing that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” Id. at 626. The Supreme Court labeled these restrictions as “presumptively lawful.” Id. at 627 n.26. It specifi- cally ruled that Heller only had a right to register his handgun and carry it in his home if he was “not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.” Id. at 635. After Heller, we considered and rejected, in United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam), a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on felons possessing firearms. We explained in Rozier that “the first question to be asked” under Heller “is whether one is qualified to possess a firearm.” Id. at 770. When making this determination, a convicted felon’s Second

pleaded in a complaint.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010). USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 6 of 11

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Amendment right to bear arms “is not weighed in the same man- ner as that of a law-abiding citizen.” Id. at 771. Instead, Heller rec- ognized that prohibiting felons from possessing firearms was a “presumptively lawful longstanding prohibition.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And this language from Heller “suggest[ed] that statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” Id. We concluded that § 922(g)(1) was a “constitutional avenue to re- strict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including those with felony convictions. Id. We rejected Rozier’s argument that the statement from Hel- ler about “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” was “merely dicta” for two reasons. Id. at 771 n.6. First, to the extent that the statement “limit[ed] the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by law-abiding and qualified individuals,” it was necessary to the decision reached. Id. Second, even if the state- ment were superfluous to Heller’s holding, we would still afford it “considerable weight,” as dicta from the Supreme Court is not to be lightly ignored. Id. Because Rozier, as a convicted felon, fell within a class of people who could be excluded from firearm pos- session, Rozier’s purpose for possessing a handgun and the fact that he only used the gun in his home for purposes of self-defense were “irrelevant.” Id. at 770. Several years later, the Supreme Court in Bruen introduced a new framework to correctly apply “Heller’s text-and-history standard.” 597 U.S. at 39. At the first step, the court must decide USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 7 of 11

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whether the challenged law burdens conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. Id. at 17, 32. If the law bur- dens protected conduct, the government must demonstrate the re- striction burdens the Second Amendment right in a way that is “consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regula- tion.” Id. at 17. Applying its historical test, the Court invalidated New York’s licensing law, which required applicants to demonstrate a “special need for self-defense” before obtaining a permit to carry firearms in public. Id. at 38. Bruen relied on two main principles. First, a total or near-total ban on carrying weapons outside the home would infringe the Second Amendment right. Id. Second, the state failed to identify a “historical tradition limiting public carry only to those law-abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38–39. Applying Bruen, we rejected a defendant’s Second Amend- ment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1296 (11th Cir. 2024), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Dubois v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 1041 (2025) (Mem.), reinstated by 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (Dubois II). In Dubois II, we found the challenge was foreclosed by Rozier, which “interpreted Heller as limiting the [Second Amendment] right to ‘law-abiding and quali- fied individuals’ and as clearly excluding felons from those catego- ries by referring to felon-in-possession bans as presumptively law- ful.” Id. at 1293 (quoting Rozier, 598 F.3d at 771 & n.6). We also rejected the defendant’s argument that Bruen abrogated Rozier, USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 8 of 11

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observing that “Bruen, like Heller, repeatedly described the right as extending only to ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens.’” Id. (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 26). Because Rozier stood as binding, it foreclosed the defendant’s Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Id. Then, in Rahimi, the Supreme Court rejected a Second Amendment challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits in- dividuals subject to a domestic violence restraining order from pos- sessing a firearm. 602 U.S. at 684–85, 693. The Court again de- clared that prohibitions on “the possession of firearms by ‘felons and the mentally ill,’ are ‘presumptively lawful.’” Id. at 699 (quot- ing Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26). The Court observed that in Heller and Bruen, it “used the term ‘responsible’ to describe the class of ordinary citizens who un- doubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right.” Id. at 701–02. Even in holding that the statute was not unconstitutional as ap- plied, the Court rejected the government’s argument that a person could be disarmed “simply because he is not ‘responsible.’” Id. at 701. It reasoned that the term was too vague to impose a mean- ingful limitation. Id. But unlike individuals merely deemed irre- sponsible, “[a]n individual found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another may be temporarily disarmed con- sistent with the Second Amendment.” Id. at 702 (emphasis added). In January 2025, the Supreme Court vacated our decision in Dubois and remanded the case for further consideration after Rahimi. See Dubois, 145 S. Ct. at 1041. We reinstated our previous opinion in June 2025, concluding that “Rahimi—like [Bruen]—did USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 9 of 11

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not abrogate our holding in Rozier that section 922(g)(1) is consti- tutional under the Second Amendment.” Dubois II, 139 F.4th at 889. We reasoned that “[t]he only time that the Rahimi majority mentioned felons was to reiterate Heller’s conclusion that prohibi- tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill are presumptively lawful.” Id. at 893 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted). We stated in explicit terms that “Rahimi reinforced—not undermined—Rozier.” Id. So, under both Bruen and Rahimi, § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to Williams, and the Second Amendment permits a permanent ban on his fire- arm possession. We thus conclude that § 922(g) is constitutional as applied to Williams. B. Commerce Clause Challenge We now turn to Williams’s challenge under the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause reads: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. We have held that § 922(g) is constitutional under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Stancil, 4 F.4th 1193, 1200 (11th Cir. 2021). We have also rejected as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), holding that the government proves a “minimal nexus” to interstate commerce where it proves that the firearms were manufactured outside the state where the offense took place and thus necessarily traveled in interstate commerce. Wright, 607 F.3d at 715–16. In United States v. McAllister, we explicitly rejected the argument that United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ren- dered § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to the appellant, USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 10 of 11

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holding that § 922(g)(1)’s statutory requirement of a connection to interstate commerce could satisfy the “minimal nexus” require- ment that remained in binding precedent. 77 F.3d 387, 390 (11th Cir. 1996). Similarly, in United States v. Scott, we held that United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) did not abrogate McAllister because § 922(g)(1) contained an explicit statutory jurisdictional re- quirement that “immunizes § 922(g)(1) from Scott’s facial constitu- tional attack,” and Morrison did not compel a different conclusion than reached in McAllister. 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001). We thus conclude that Williams’s Commerce Clause challenge to § 922(g)(1) fails. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated, we conclude that the district court did not err in convicting Williams under § 922(g)(1) because his challenges are foreclosed by Bruen, Rahimi, and our binding prece- dent. See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71; Dubois II, 139 F.4th at 893. Fur- ther, as Williams conceded, his Commerce Clause arguments are similarly foreclosed by our precedent. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390; Scott, 263 F.3d at 1273. Accordingly, we affirm Williams’s convic- tion under § 922(g)(1). However, because the district court’s written judgment in- correctly lists Williams’s offense as “18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and (a)(2),” rather than 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), we vacate Williams’s written judgment, in part, and remand for the limited USCA11 Case: 23-13858 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2025 Page: 11 of 11

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purpose of allowing the district court to amend the judgment to reflect the proper statute. 2 AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

2 We may recognize errors in the judgment and remand with instructions for

the district court to correct the errors. See United States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 1998) (sua sponte remanding with directions to correct the judgment, where it cited the wrong statute). Rule 36 allows a court “at any time [to] correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the rec- ord, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36; United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2004). Rule 36 encompasses “minor, uncontroversial errors” and may not be used to correct substantive legal errors. Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164–65. Because we con- clude that the district court’s error below was purely clerical, Rule 36 author- izes correction.