United States v. John Edward Knight

905 F.2d 189, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8838, 1990 WL 71195
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedJune 1, 1990
Docket89-1799
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 905 F.2d 189 (United States v. John Edward Knight) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. John Edward Knight, 905 F.2d 189, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8838, 1990 WL 71195 (8th Cir. 1990).

Opinions

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

John Edward Knight pled guilty to bank robbery. Knight and the government entered into a stipulation which stated that Knight had accepted responsibility for the offense that he had committed and that Knight was entitled to a two-level reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court found that Knight had not accepted responsibility because it concluded that a plea of guilty, without other affirmative acts, is insufficient to justify the reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. We reverse and remand.

BACKGROUND

Knight’s plea of guilty was subject to a written agreement between Knight and the government that stipulated, in part, that “the Defendant is entitled to a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.” The plea agreement further provided that the “Defendant understands that the Court is not bound to accept the guidelines computation of either party.”

At the guilty plea hearing, Knight and the district court engaged in a colloquy and the plea was accepted. The district court advised Knight that “the Court is not bound to accept the guidelines computation of either party.” Sentencing was scheduled, and the court ordered the probation office to prepare a presentence investigation report (PSI).

Both the government and Knight made objections to certain factual statements found in the PSI. Neither the government nor Knight, however, objected to the finding in the PSI that Knight was entitled to a two-point reduction for “acceptance of responsibility” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The PSI states:

Although Mr. Knight’s admission was not timely, his guilty plea plus his admissions during the pre-sentence investigation warrant a two-level reduction of the adjusted offense level for acceptance of responsibility.

The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing, presumably to resolve the parties’ objections to the PSI.

At this hearing, the court inquired into and resolved the parties’ objections. The court then inquired into the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The district court allocated the burden of proof to Knight and asked for evidence or argument.

Counsel for Knight, while not prepared to discuss this issue, offered evidence that Knight had pled guilty, was debriefed by the probation office, offered his cooperation to the FBI, and was involved in a rehabilitation program. The government agreed with Knight, arguing that the reduction was in order because Knight had admitted his guilt and cooperated with the probation office.

The district court rejected both Knight's and the government’s position:

I may be the odd man out, but I’m not sure that there is enough here to convince me that he's entitled to it, and I would like to have counsel address this and demonstrate to me what the basis is for concluding that there is an adequate acceptance of responsibility to justify a downward adjustment of two points.
As I understand it, he didn’t do much more than plead guilty, and then after he pleaded guilty he apparently was candid [191]*191and cooperative with the probation officers. Anything else here to justify a conclusion that he accepted responsibility?
Well, with all due respect to counsel of both sides and the probation officer’s conclusion, I must disagree. I do not find acceptance of responsibility under the circumstances here. I think if we were to find acceptance of responsibility in this case I would almost be duty bound to find it in every single case where a defendant pleaded guilty and continued to concede his guilt in post-guilty plea discussions with the probation office. He will not be given a two point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

United States v. Knight, No. 88-117, Transcript of Sentencing at 26-30 (S.D.Iowa Apr. 28, 1989).

Knight was assigned an offense level of 23 and sentenced to 50 months of imprisonment, which was within the sentencing range.1

DISCUSSION

Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines provides:

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his [or her] criminal conduct, reduce the offense level by 2 levels.
(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this section without regard to whether his [or her] conviction is based on a guilty plea or a finding of guilty by the court or jury or the practical certainty of conviction at trial.
(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to a sentencing reduction under this section as a matter of right.

The Application Notes to § 3E1.1 provide, in relevant parts, the following:

1. In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this provision, appropriate considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(c) voluntary and truthful admissions to authorities of involvement in the offense and related conduct;
(e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instru-mentalities of the offense;
3. A guilty plea may provide some evidence of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. However, it does not, by itself, entitle a defendant to a reduced sentence under this section.
5. The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation. Background: The reduction of offense level provided by this section recognizes legitimate societal interests. For several reasons, a defendant who clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for the offense by taking, in a timely fashion, one or more of the actions listed above (or some equivalent action) is appropriately given a lesser sentence than a defendant who has not demonstrated sincere remorse.

The district court stated, in concluding that a reduction for acceptance of responsibility is not in order, that it was “hard pressed to find anything more than a guilty plea, and the commentary suggests that is not enough in and of itself.” Sentencing Transcript at 29.

[192]*192The district court’s view of acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 is unduly narrow. Granted, Paragraph c and Application Note 3 of § 3E1.1 recognize that a defendant is not entitled to this reduction as a matter of right because he or she pled guilty. The district court interprets the above as requiring “some further affirmative act” on the part of the defendant to mandate the reduction. We disagree.

Rather, the reduction is in order if the defendant, by pleading guilty (and/or other actions), “demonstrates a recognition and affirmative responsibility for the offense” and “sincere remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 Background: United States v. Wivell, 893 F.2d 156 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Allen, 886 F.2d 143

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Bluebook (online)
905 F.2d 189, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 8838, 1990 WL 71195, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-john-edward-knight-ca8-1990.