United States v. John David Wilson

553 F.2d 896, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13022
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJune 8, 1977
Docket76-1608
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 553 F.2d 896 (United States v. John David Wilson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. John David Wilson, 553 F.2d 896, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13022 (5th Cir. 1977).

Opinion

GEE, Circuit Judge:

John David Wilson was convicted of possessing, with intent to distribute, 493 pounds of marijuana and with carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) (1971). Appellant’s five-year sentence was suspended, and he was placed on probation for the same number of years and was fined $2,000. He appeals, complaining that the search which revealed the contraband was unconstitutional. We affirm the district court’s holding that the checkpoint at Randado, Texas, is the functional equivalent- of the border and that the search of appellant’s pickup camper was reasonable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3) (1952).

On February 5, 1975, two Border Patrol agents in South Texas were returning a load of illegal aliens to Mexico. As they drove south they noticed a Ford pickup camper stopped at a roadside rest area. They stopped to inquire if the driver needed help. The driver explained that his engine had overheated, but an under-the-hood in *897 spection revealed no signs of overheating. The agents inquired about the citizenship of Wilson, the driver, who replied that he was an American. The agents walked around the pickup and asked appellant to open the back of the camper. He complied. One agent climbed inside, 1 observed a false ply wood flooring, a bedroll, some cardboard boxes and a can which emitted a strong smell of gasoline. The other agent looked inside the cab of the pickup and saw a handgun lying on the front seat. Seeing no aliens and satisfied that appellant was an American citizen, the two Border Patrol agents terminated their encounter with Wilson. Appellant proceeded north on Highway 649, turned right onto Highway 16, and was stopped at a checkpoint one and one-half miles east of Randado, Texas.

A Border Patrol officer manning the Randado checkpoint asked if Wilson was an American citizen, walked to the back of the camper, looked in the window and saw the false plywood floor which covered an area big enough to hide four or five adults. The agent asked Wilson to open the back of the camper. This agent testified that through the open door he observed what appeared to be white bricks of marijuana showing through holes in the cardboard boxes. He testified that he smelled the odor of marijuana after the camper door was opened. 2 A subsequent search of the Ford pickup revealed additional boxes of marijuana stored below the plywood platform, a .38 pistol, a cigarette rolling machine, binoculars and a radio scanner capable of detecting police radio transmissions.

Appellant complains that the first two agents constituted a roving patrol with no articulable reason to inquire about his citizenship, to inspect under his hood, to peer into his pickup or to ask to look in the back of his camper. Realizing that their investigations violated United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975), appellant argues, they allowed appellant to proceed but radioed ahead to alert the Randado checkpoint to the imminent arrival of the suspect pickup. 3 Furthermore, the off-duty officers who had been traveling south before they encountered appellant’s pickup, did in fact alter their course to “follow” the pickup back to the Randado checkpoint. Appellant argues that because of these tactics the two searches constituted one continuing search or, alternatively, that under the fruit-of-the-poison-tree doctrine the illegal first search' invalidated the second search at the checkpoint. Also, appellant disagrees with the trial court’s holding that Randado is the functional equivalent of the border and argues that even if the stop of his pickup at the checkpoint was legal, there was neither probable cause nor consent to search his pickup further after it was stopped. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975).

Whether or not the roving patrol had reasonable suspicion to justify the officers’ inquiries while appellant’s pickup was stopped by the side of the road, the agents at the Randado checkpoint were authorized to stop appellant without relying on any information imparted by their roving colleagues because this is the kind of permanent checkpoint where no suspicion is needed to halt an automobile for a citizenship inquiry. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). 4 Appellant’s pickup was stopped at *898 the checkpoint because he traveled east from Randado on Highway 16, not because the first agents alerted the on-duty officers to watch for a 1974 pickup with a handgun on the front seat and a suspicious looking plywood platform in the back. Nor is it true that appellant was herded into the checkpoint. From his roadside position at the intersection of Highways 649 and 2686, appellant could have traveled east on Highway 2686 or south on Highway 649, neither of which would have carried him to Randado. Proceeding north on Highway 649 as he did, he could have turned left on Highway 2687 or left on Highway 16 at Randado to avoid the checkpoint one mile to the east. Even considering that the first set of officers followed appellant’s pickup at a safe distance, he was leading and was not compelled to take any designated course. Wé therefore conclude that the stop at the Ran-dado checkpoint was legal as a stop at a permanent checkpoint whether or not, the officers had been alerted that the pickup was approaching.

Martinez-Fuerte sanctions only a stop and a citizenship check. The additional search of appellant’s pickup must rest on probable cause, on consent, or on its reasonableness as a search at the functional equivalent of the border. The district court held that the Randado checkpoint is the functional equivalent of the border; because we affirm that holding we do not consider the issues of probable cause or consent. The criteria to be evaluated in determining functional, equivalency are set forth in United States v. Alvarez-Gonzalez: the relative permanence of the checkpoint, the relatively minimal interdiction of domestic traffic, and the capability to monitor international traffic not otherwise practically controllable. 542 F.2d 226, 229 (5th Cir. 1976). Alvarez-Gonzalez incorporates the considerations discussed in United States v. Hart, 506 F.2d 887 (5th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 1053, 95 S.Ct. 2674, 45 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975), reaff’d,

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Bluebook (online)
553 F.2d 896, 1977 U.S. App. LEXIS 13022, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-john-david-wilson-ca5-1977.