United States v. Jerome Warrior

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
• Decided: May 6, 2026
• Docket: 24-3055
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit ___________________________

No. 24-3055 ___________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jerome Warrior

Defendant - Appellant ____________

Appeal from United States District Court for the District of South Dakota - Western ____________

Submitted: January 12, 2026 Filed: May 6, 2026 [Unpublished] ____________

Before SHEPHERD, KELLY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges. ____________

PER CURIAM.

Eligibility is no guarantee of a reduced sentence. Here, the district court1 acted within its discretion by relying on Jerome Warrior’s extensive criminal and disciplinary history in denying one.

1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota. When an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines “changed the calculation of criminal[-]history scores,” Warrior asked the district court to shorten the 168- month sentence he was serving. United States v. Shamburger, 144 F.4th 1088, 1089 (8th Cir. 2025). He passed the first hurdle by proving his eligibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). The retroactive amendment reduced the criminal-history points awarded for committing a federal crime while serving another sentence, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e), which decreased the advisory range from 135–168 months to 121–151 months in prison.

At the next step, however, the district court concluded that he did not deserve a lower sentence. It used its “discretion” to decide that the statutory sentencing factors did not support one “under the particular circumstances of the case.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827; see United States v. Darden, 910 F.3d 1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Chachanko, 162 F.4th 894, 897 (8th Cir. 2025) (explaining that a court may “exercise its discretion” and decline to reduce a sentence).

For starters, he had an “utterly abysmal” prison record that included 17 disciplinary infractions, ranging from fighting to possessing a dangerous weapon. And the crime that sent him there was just as violent. He had been “part of a group . . . that beat [an unarmed man] to death.” His actions included bringing the victim “to the ground” and kicking him “3–4 times in the face with his boot.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Darden, 910 F.3d at 1067 (explaining that courts “must consider . . . the nature and circumstances and seriousness of the offense” when deciding whether to reduce a sentence (citation omitted)).

Those were relevant circumstances to consider. See Darden, 910 F.3d at 1067; United States v. Boyd, 835 F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 2016) (approving consideration of “post-sentencing misconduct”). Balanced against mitigating factors like Warrior’s prison-education efforts, the district court thought that he was too dangerous for an earlier release. In reaching this conclusion, it sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3582(c)(2),

-2- and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. Denton, 821 F.3d 1012, 1013 (8th Cir. 2016).

We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court. ______________________________

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