[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 09-13673 FEB 22, 2011 ________________________ JOHN LEY CLERK D. C. Docket No. 07-00009-CR-T-27-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JERMAINE MICHAEL JULIAN, a.k.a. Kid,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida _________________________
(February 22, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
The issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred when it held that it was required to impose consecutive sentences on a defendant who committed
murder with a firearm in the course of a crime of violence and a drug trafficking
crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). Sentences for the use of a firearm in the course of a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime must run consecutive to any other
sentences, id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), but section 924(j), which applies to the same
conduct that causes death, does not mention a requirement of consecutive
sentencing. Jermaine Michael Julian appeals his consecutive sentences of life
terms of imprisonment on the ground that the district court erred when it held that
sentences under section 924(j) must run consecutively. Julian argues that the
district court had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences because section
924(j) creates a separate offense not governed by the requirement of consecutive
sentences in section 924(c). The United States responds that the prohibition of
concurrent sentences in section 924(c) applies to sentences under section 924(j)
because section 924(j) creates a sentencing factor, not a separate offense. Two of
our sister circuits have adopted the interpretation advanced by the United States,
but we disagree with those decisions. Because Julian’s interpretation of section
924(j) is supported by the plain text of the statute, we vacate Julian’s sentence and
remand for resentencing.
2 I. BACKGROUND
On October 19, 2006, Jermaine Michael Julian, David Jones, and at least one
other individual robbed members of a local gang known as the “Valley Boyz” at a
residence in Bartow, Florida. Julian and the other robbers confronted three
members of the Valley Boyz: Carlton Potts, Prayer Hamilton, and Tyrone
Williams. Julian shot Potts once in the chest. Julian and the other robbers then
stole money, cocaine, and firearms from the residence before they fled. Potts later
died from the gunshot wound.
A confidential informant told police that Julian was involved in the crimes,
and Williams later identified Julian from a set of photographs. When the
authorities arrested Julian, he was in possession of two handguns, including one
linked to the murder of Potts. Julian admitted his involvement in the robbery, but
denied that he had murdered Potts. A federal grand jury indicted Julian for the
murder of Potts and for other offenses. The indictment charged in two counts that
Julian “knowingly and intentionally used a firearm, during and in relation to” a
crime of violence and a drug trafficking crime, “and in the course of using said
firearm . . . did kill Carlton Potts . . . in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Sections 924(c)(1)(A), 924(j)(1) and 1111(a) and 2.” The indictment charged
Jones with aiding and abetting Julian in the two counts of murder. The indictment
3 also charged Julian and Jones with robbery, id. §§ 2, 1951; conspiracy to commit
robbery, id. § 1951; being a felon in possession of a firearm, id. § 922(g)(1);
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, id. § 2; 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(D); possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 18 U.S.C. § 2; 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C); and conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute,
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II), 846. Jones pleaded guilty to all charges and
received a prison sentence of 780 months. See United States v. Jones, No. 08-
12436 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 2008).
At trial, the jury convicted Julian of all eight charges. The district court then
conducted a sentencing phase, and the jury imposed a sentence of life
imprisonment instead of the death penalty for each count of murder.
Julian objected to the recommendation in the presentence investigation
report that he be sentenced to consecutive life sentences for the counts of murder,
but the district court overruled Julian’s objection. The district court ruled that it
was required to impose consecutive sentences based on the provision that “no term
of imprisonment imposed on a person under [subsection (c)] shall run concurrently
with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person.” 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(D)(ii). The district court reasoned that the requirement of consecutive
sentencing applies to “all offenses in which [924(c)(1)] is implicated,” including
4 section 924(j). The court then sentenced Julian to two life sentences on the murder
charges and a total sentence of 115 years for the other crimes and ordered that all
of the sentences run consecutively.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo.” United States v.
Phaknikone, 605 F.3d 1099, 1107 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 643 (2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Julian and the United States present starkly contrasting interpretations of
section 924(j) and its relation to section 924(c). Julian argues that the district court
had the discretion to impose concurrent sentences based on the plain language of
sections 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) and 924(j). The United States argues that section 924(j)
establishes a sentencing factor, not a separate offense, and section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)
required the district court to impose consecutive sentences for an underlying
violation of section 924(c). We agree with Julian.
To resolve this issue, we begin with the text of section 924(c), about which
there is little dispute. Both parties agree that section 924(c) creates an offense and
a mandatory minimum sentence for that offense as follows: “[A]ny person who,
during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or
carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm,
5 shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime” receive a sentence of “not less than five years.” 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(A)(i). Both parties also agree that a criminal who violates section 924(c)
is subject to a higher mandatory minimum sentence if he brandishes or discharges
a firearm or uses a certain type of firearm, such as a machinegun. Id. §
924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii), (c)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). Both parties agree that, for the offense
created by section 924(c), concurrent sentences are prohibited as follows: “[N]o
term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run
concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person.” Id. §
924(c)(1)(D)(ii).
The parties disagree about how to understand section 924(j), which
prescribes as follows sentences for conduct that violates section 924(c) and leads to
death:
A person who, in the course of a violation of subsection (c), causes the death of a person through the use of a firearm, shall— (1) if the killing is a murder (as defined in section 1111) be punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life; and (2) if the killing is manslaughter (as defined in section 1112), be punished as provided in that section.
Id. § 924(j). Julian contends that section 924(j) creates a separate offense and a
punishment that is not governed by the prohibition of concurrent sentences in
section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). The United States argues that section 924(j) creates a
6 sentencing factor, not a separate offense, and is governed by the prohibition of
concurrent sentences.
Julian’s interpretation is supported by the plain language of section 924(j)
and section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Section 924(c) prohibits concurrent sentences, but
this prohibition applies only to “a term of imprisonment imposed on a person under
this subsection.” Id. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii). Section 924(j), not section 924(c),
provided Julian’s sentence. This reading is consistent with decisions of our sister
circuits that have declined to read section 924(o), which punishes “conspir[acies]
to commit an offense under subsection (c),” id. § 924(o), as requiring consecutive
sentences. See United States v. Clay, 579 F.3d 919, 933 (8th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Fowler, 535 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2008).
The United States, quoting United States v. Battle, 289 F.3d 661, 666 (10th
Cir. 2002), urges that “section 924(j)(1) does not establish a crime discrete from
that defined in section 924(c), but merely ‘describes the sentencing factors that
must be proved in order to impose a consecutive sentence of death, life
imprisonment or a term of years[]’” for a violation of section 924(c), but we
disagree. An element is essential to the definition of an offense, but a sentencing
factor guides the discretion of a court in sentencing an offender based on his
characteristics or the manner in which he committed the offense. See Castillo v.
7 United States, 530 U.S. 120, 126, 120 S. Ct. 2090, 2094 (2000). “Elements of a
crime must be charged in an indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . . Sentencing factors, on the other hand, can be proved to a judge at
sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. O’Brien, 130 S.
Ct. 2169, 2174 (2010). See also McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91, 106
S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (1986). The facts that the government must prove for a criminal
to receive a sentence—including a potential sentence of death—under section
924(j) comprise elements, not sentencing factors.
The Supreme Court has addressed twice whether other provisions of section
924(c) establish elements or sentencing factors, and these decisions support our
reading of section 924(j). See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct.
2406 (2002); Castillo, 530 U.S. 120, 120 S. Ct. 2090. In Harris, the Court held that
the provisions of section 924(c) that increase the minimum sentence for criminals
who brandish or discharge a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii), are
sentencing factors, not elements. 536 U.S. at 556, 122 S. Ct. at 2414. Congress
listed the elements of a complete crime in section 924(c) and, after the word
“shall,” enumerated in separate subsections the penalties applicable to criminals
who brandish or discharge a firearm. Id. at 552–53, 122 S. Ct. at 2411–12. These
subsections did “not repeat the elements from the principal paragraph.” Id. at 553,
8 122 S. Ct. at 2412. The Court found significant that Congress has not traditionally
treated the brandishment or discharge of a firearm as an element of an offense. Id.
These provisions instead raise the minimum sentence for a violation of section
924(c) from five years to seven years and ten years, and the Court explained that
these “incremental changes in the minimum . . . are precisely what one would
expect to see in provisions meant to identify matters for the sentencing judge’s
consideration.” Id. at 554, 122 S. Ct. at 2413. In contrast with the sentencing
factors pertaining to brandishment and discharge, the Supreme Court in Castillo
interpreted, as a distinct offense, the provision of section 924(c) that provides
sentences for criminals who use machineguns in the course of violations of section
924(c), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988, Supp. V) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1)(B)(ii)). 530 U.S. at 121, 120 S. Ct. at 2091. Congress included both the
elements of a violation of section 924(c) and the penalty provision for the use of a
machinegun “in a single sentence, not broken up with dashes or separated into
subsections.” Id. at 125, 120 S. Ct. at 2093. The Court also explained that
“[t]raditional sentencing factors often involve either characteristics of the offender,
such as recidivism, or special features of the manner in which a basic crime was
carried out,” and the use of a machinegun is not a “special feature[] of the manner”
in which a firearm offense is committed because “the difference between
9 carrying . . . a pistol and carrying a machinegun . . . is great, both in degree and
kind.” Id. at 126, 120 S. Ct. at 2094. The Court also reasoned that, unlike the
additional sentences of two years and five years given under the brandishment and
discharge provisions, the length of the additional mandatory minimum sentence for
using a machinegun—25 years—suggested that Congress intended the use of a
machinegun to be an element, not a sentencing factor. Id. at 131, 120 S. Ct. at
2096.
Based on the approach of the Court in Harris and Castillo, we conclude that
Congress intended section 924(j) to define a distinct offense, not a sentencing
factor. The Court stated in Harris that sentencing factors are often enumerated in
subsections under a paragraph that defines an offense, 536 U.S. at 552, 122 S. Ct.
at 2412, but Congress placed the punishment for homicides that occur in the course
of violations of section 924(c) in the separate section 924(j). Unlike the provision
for sentencing factors construed in Harris, but like the provision that defines a
distinct offense construed in Castillo, section 924(j) defines a crime and is
followed by subsections that provide sentences. We also do not consider homicide
to be a “special feature” of the way section 924(c) may be violated. See Castillo,
530 U.S. at 126, 120 S. Ct. at 2094. Moreover, an even greater difference in
degree and kind than the distinction between the use of a pistol and the use of a
10 machinegun exists between the use of a firearm without any accompanying
physical injury and the use of a firearm to effect homicide. In Castillo, the Court
also held that a considerable increase in the applicable sentence for the use of a
machinegun suggested that Congress considered the provisions about use of a
machinegun to define a separate offense and not a special subset of violations of
section 924(c). We similarly read section 924(j) to establish, as an element of a
separate offense, a fact—a resultant homicide—that could subject a defendant to
the ultimate punishment: the death penalty.
Another decision of the Supreme Court also supports our reading of section
924(j). See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999). The
Court in Jones held that a provision about increased punishment for serious bodily
injury in the robbery context indicated congressional intent to define an element of
a separate, aggravated form of a basic crime, not a sentencing factor. Id. at
235–36, 119 S. Ct. at 1220–21. We similarly construe the provision about
increased punishment for a homicide to define an element, not a sentencing factor.
The distinction drawn between elements and sentencing factors in decisions
that have interpreted the Fifth and Sixth Amendments also supports our
interpretation that section 924(j) defines elements of a separate offense. Other than
provisions that make recidivism the basis for a greater sentence, see Almendarez-
11 Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 1232–33 (1998), the
Sixth Amendment prohibits imposition of a sentence greater than “the maximum [a
criminal] would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury
verdict alone.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2359
(2000). Capital crimes are no different. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589,
122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002). Section 924(j) increases the maximum penalty a
defendant may receive beyond the sentence applicable to a defendant found to have
violated only the elements listed in section 924(c). Life imprisonment is the
maximum sentence a defendant may receive under section 924(c) for using a
firearm in a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense, United States v.
Woodruff, 296 F.3d 1041, 1050 (11th Cir. 2002), but a defendant may receive the
death penalty under section 924(j). The Fifth Amendment also requires the
allegation of each element of an offense in a federal indictment. See Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 2907 (1974). The United States
appreciated these constitutional implications of the distinction between elements
and sentencing factors when it prosecuted Julian. The United States treated as
elements all of the facts necessary to convict Julian under section 924(j) because it
charged these facts in the indictment and proved them to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.
12 Another textual clue in section 924(c)(5) compels us to read section 924(j) to
allow concurrent sentences. “It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that
‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no
clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” Nunnally
v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 451 F.3d 768, 773 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting TRW
Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31, 122 S. Ct. 441, 449 (2001)). Any interpretation
of section 924(j) that would require sentences imposed under that section to run
consecutively would make superfluous section 924(c)(5), a provision that uses
language identical to the language of section 924(j) to prescribe the punishment for
criminals who use armor-piercing ammunition during or in relation to a crime of
violence or drug trafficking crime and cause death. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(5)(B).
Because any crime where “death results from the use of [armor-piercing]
ammunition,” id. § 924(c)(5)(B), is also a crime that “causes the death of a person
through the use of a firearm,” id. § 924(j), section 924(c)(5) would be surplusage if
no difference existed between the sentences that these two provisions prescribed.
The interpretation we adopt gives meaning to both section 924(j) and section
924(c)(5). Unlike section 924(c)(5), which imposes a “term of imprisonment . . .
under [subsection 924(c)],” id. § (c)(1)(D)(ii), and is subject to the prohibition on
concurrent sentences, we do not read section 924(j) to be subject to the prohibition
13 on concurrent sentences.
The United States relies on provisions that require that sentences imposed
for violations of section 924(c) be “in addition to the punishment provided” for the
underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, id. § 924(c)(1)(A), (c)(5),
but this reliance is misplaced. A violation of section 924(c) is an element of the
offense created by section 924(j), and the language quoted by the United States is
part of the penalty provisions of sections 924(c)(1)(A) and 924(c)(5). Section
924(j), which contains separate provisions for punishment, does not contain any
similar language that can be construed as a requirement of consecutive sentences.
“‘[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” United
States v. Saunders, 318 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 300 (1983)).
The United States argues that we must read the consecutive sentencing
requirement of section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) to apply to section 924(j) to avoid the
anomaly that a criminal would have to receive a consecutive sentence for any
violation of section 924(c) except for those violations that cause death, but we
reject that interpretation. Our interpretation of section 924(j) does not prevent a
14 district court from imposing a sentence under section 924(c) that must run
consecutive to a separate sentence imposed under section 924(j). We treat section
924(j) as creating a separate punishment for a crime that results in death, and we
allow district courts to run concurrently sentences for crimes of violence and drug
trafficking crimes that are predicates for a conviction under section 924(c), see
United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941, 945 (11th Cir. 1993). The main point of
section 924(j) is to extend the death penalty to second-degree murders that occur in
the course of violations of section 924(c). The heading of the section of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 that added section 924(j)
supports this interpretation: “Death Penalty for Gun Murders During Federal
Crimes of Violence and Drug Trafficking Crimes,” Pub. L. 103-322, § 60013. See
ASX Inv. Corp. v. Newton, 183 F.3d 1265, 1268 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999).
We are unpersuaded by the argument of the United States that the imposition
of sentences under both section 924(c) and section 924(j) would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. “If the statutes under which the
defendant was sentenced specifically authorize cumulative punishments for the
same offense, a court may impose cumulative punishment without running afoul of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.” United States v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300, 1304 (11th
Cir. 1990). We have held that the imposition of a sentence under both section
15 924(c) and a separate statute that increases the maximum sentence for a crime
when a dangerous weapon is used does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
because Congress intended to impose cumulative punishments. See United States
v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Martin, 961
F.2d 161, 164 (11th Cir. 1992). Section 924(j), like the statutes interpreted in
Dowd and Martin, potentially increases the sentence for a crime when the criminal
uses a firearm. Section 924(c) provides that a criminal shall receive a sentence “in
addition to,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), any other sentence, and it is “irrelevant for
Double Jeopardy purposes” that proof of a violation of section 924(j) “always
proves a violation of § 924(c).” Dowd, 451 F.3d at 1252 (quoting United States v.
Singleton, 16 F.3d 1419, 1425 (5th Cir. 1994)).
We are unpersuaded by the decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits that
sentences imposed under section 924(j) must run consecutively based on section
924(c)(1)(D)(ii). United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 837 (8th Cir. 2010);
Battle, 289 F.3d at 668; United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 769 (8th Cir. 2001),
vacated on other grounds, Allen v. United States, 536 U.S. 953, 122 S. Ct. 2653
(2002). Both of those courts held that section 924(j) is a sentencing factor for
section 924(c) and not a distinct offense, Battle, 289 F.3d at 666; Allen, 247 F.3d
at 769, and we have explained above why we reject that reading of those
16 provisions. Neither court addressed the implications of its interpretation of section
924(j) under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments; neither court discussed the
distinctions the Supreme Court drew between sentencing factors and elements in
Harris and Castillo; and neither court considered that its interpretation of section
924(j) would render section 924(c)(5) surplusage.
IV. CONCLUSION
We VACATE Julian’s two consecutive life sentences and REMAND for
further proceedings.