FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey Parkhurst was convicted at trial of attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity and was sentenced to one hundred thirty-two months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Parkhurst challenges his conviction and sentence. We affirm both.
I. Background
From January . to July 2015, Jeffrey Parkhurst posted a series of internet advertisements on Craigslist’s “casual encounters” section. On July 20, for example, Parkhurst posted the following ad:
Gentleman Lookin For Young Son— m4m1 (springfield)
Tryin to find a very young white boy in order to spend some quality time together... .he would be a little fella . kinda thin built. not too tall. clean kept. little to no body hair . average to good looking . (easy on the eyes lol) a little white guy who is friendly and fun to be around.. .sense of humor helps.. .18 or slightly older (younger the better). . .must like to have a good time(not just sensual speaking).. .prefer you to be a virgin . as far as guys are concerned . as I am myself one.. .like to do many different things that are fun .... must enjoy being close . being touched . massaged . rubbed all over with warming oil in a dim lit room and made to feel very erotic and sexy... .nothing ever forced on you...goal is only to make you feel so good you will not want it to end ... .ever lol... .we can try about anything you have ever wondered about...you only need to ask!... Me ?... just an older discrete white guy that’s your age at heart and built like a teenager who just needs a discrete little friend to spend good times with.. .a reply only cost ya a little time and may be the best thing you have done in a long time....be safe...be cool...be happy!!! Not looking for older guys so don’t waste your time or mine . thank you!
(ellipses in original).2
One week later, Decatur Police Detective Todd Koester discovered Parkhurst’s advertisement and responded using an undercover persona of 15-year-old “Kacy Lillard.” Kacy (Detective Koester) and Parkhurst then exchanged text and email messages for the next eight and a half hours:
• Kacy initiated the interaction, stating, “just wanted to say hi. im probably to[o] young but i am 15 and liek to hang out.”3 Parkhurst responded, “You are only too young if you can’t keep a secret lol. Hi buddy :)”
• Parkhurst stated that he “[w]ould love to give [Kacy] an erotic sensual massage covering every inch of [his] body in a candle lit room with a warming massage oil and supplies to do whatever [he] want[ed] to try.”
• Parkhurst asked Kacy whether he was “cut or uncut .... referring to [Kacy’s] penis.” Upon learning that [513]*513Kacy was “cut,” Parkhurst stated, “Really glad ur cut, so am I.”
• Parkhurst proposed that he and Kacy “experiment and explore together and only try what both of [them] want[ed] to try.”
• Parkhurst expressed that he “[m]ay like to try and suck [Kacy].”
• In response to Kacy’s question, “U think any of its gonna hurt?,” Park-hurst answered, “I’ve been studying up on the subject so I know what to do to prepare you so it won’t hurt ! And I would not hurt you for the world buddy... .1 will be extra careful buddy cause I want both of us to want to do this over and over and not just a one time deal lol.”
Eventually, Parkhurst and Kacy agreed to meet that night. Parkhurst planned to pick Kacy up at his Decatur apartment (where Detective Koester and other officers would be stationed) at 11:30 pm after Kacy’s mother left for work. Parkhurst would take Kacy to a truck stop for dinner, to Parkhurst’s Springfield home for the night, and back to Decatur by 7:30 am the next morning before his mother returned. Kacy messaged that he would need to shower and pack a bag for the night, and Parkhurst responded, “Cool make sure ya clean ur self extra good all over lol and i’ll know if ya do later.” While traveling to Decatur, Parkhurst offered to purchase Kacy some candy, and stated, “[J]ust gotta promise not to eat them all on the way back here lol.” Kacy asked, “Lol I won’t. Y not?,” and Parkhurst responded, “Not my kinda candy! It’s all yours buddy... .I’m pretty much gonna spoil you anyway so get used to it ok ?”
At about 11:30 pm, Parkhurst arrived at the Decatur address Detective Koester had provided, and the police promptly arrested and interviewed him. Detective Koester asked how old Parkhurst had believed Kacy was, and Parkhurst answered, “I assumed I was—well, at one point you said you were sixteen. So I assumed I was talking to a fifteen or sixteen year old.” Parkhurst added, however,' that he had believed Kacy may have been lying about his age given the multiple reported ages. Parkhurst acknowledged that he had implicitly referenced oral sex in his conversation with Kacy, and when asked whether someone reviewing Parkhurst’s exchanges with Kacy could reasonably conclude that Parkhurst had intended to engage in sexual activity, Parkhurst responded, “Probably.”
In a one-count indictment, the government charged Parkhurst with attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). After a trial, a jury found Parkhurst guilty, and the district court sentenced him to one hundred thirty-two months’ imprisonment and fifteen years of supervised release. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Parkhurst appeals both his conviction and his sentence. He requests a new trial by challenging the admission of parts of Detective Koester’s testimony and the government’s use of certain emails during cross-examination and in closing arguments. Parkhurst seeks resentencing based on the trial court’s use of an obstruction enhancement. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s evidentiary rulings, United States v. Williams, 272 F.3d 845, 856 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted), and sentence-enhancement decisions, United States v. Vasquez-Hernandez, 834 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2016).
A. Detective Koester’s Testimony
Detective Koester served at trial as a dual fact-expert witness, discussing both [514]*514his interactions (as Kacy) with Parkhurst and his experience involving internet crimes against children. Parkhurst challenges as unreliable two particular portions of Detective Koester’s testimony: his understanding of Parkhurst’s (1) “candy” comments, and (2) July 20 Craigslist ad. Lastly, Parkhurst contends that Detective Koester’s dual fact-expert witness role confused the jury. We consider each argument in turn.
1. “Candy” Conversation
Parkhurst first challenges the admissibility of Detective Koester’s testimony regarding a candy-related conversation he had (as Kacy) with Parkhurst. During direct examination, Detective Koester described his understanding of the conversation:
Q: Okay. And then the rest of that portion of the conversation talks about your preference of candy, hard or chewy, et cetera. And then at 8:44 p.m., tell us about this portion of the conversation.
A: He responds at 8:44 saying, “Cool, just gotta promise not to eat them all on the way back here, LOL.”
Q: And then your reaction?
A: At 8:50 I respond, “LOL, I won’t. Why not?”
Q: And what does he say?
A: “Not my kind of candy. It’s all yours, buddy.”
Q: And what do you interpret that portion of the conversation to mean?
A: At that point, I’m thinking he doesn’t want this 15-year-old kid to eat a lot of candy because it’s gonna interfere with the sexual activity that’s supposed to take place.
Defense: Objection, speculation.
Court: Overruled. He can—he’s testifying as to what he understood the conversation in which he is a part of [sic ]. Overruled.
A: So, I’m thinking that he doesn’t want this kid to eat all this candy and get full because of the sexual activity that’s gonna take place; he doesn’t want him to be sick.
(internal quotation marks added). Park-hurst asserts that this was expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and argues that the testimony lacked the necessary discussion of “methodology, expertise, or scientific method.” The government, however, contends that this was lay-witness testimony, subject to Rule 701’s less-strict standards.
Under Rule 701, “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. We review decisions to admit lay-opinion testimony pursuant to Rule 701 for abuse of discretion. Yancick v. Hanna Steel Corp., 653 F.3d 532, 547 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Rule 702 expert testimony, on the other hand, is based on a witness’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, and must be based on sufficient facts and reliable principles and methods. Fed. R. Evid. 702. The standard of review is also different: We review de novo whether the court applied the required Rule 702 framework, and for an abuse of discretion the court’s decision to admit or exclude the expert testimony. United States v. Pansier, 576 F.3d 726, 737-38 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Taken together, the government’s examination, Detective Koester’s answers, [515]*515and the district court’s ruling made clear that Detective Koester’s testimony about the “candy” conversation was based on his perception of the conversation at the time it occurred—classic Rule 701 lay-witness testimony. The government, for example, inquired about Detective Koester’s “reactions” to Parkhurst’s messages, and Detective Koester explained his view of the conversation “at that point.” And the district court cleared up any confusion regarding the basis for Detective Koester’s answers when the court overruled Parkhurst’s speculation objection, clarifying that the detective was testifying about his understanding of the conversation at the time he was participating in it. As such, this testimony need only satisfy Rule 701’s requirements. The district court held that it did, and we see no abuse of discretion in admitting it.
2. July 20 Craigslist Advertisement
Detective Koester was qualified as an expert without objection and gave expert testimony on the ways in which child predators use certain key words in Craigslist advertisements to evade detection,4 basing his awareness on years of experience in investigating online child abuse and on relevant training.5 Detective Koester then testified about his particular understanding of Parkhurst’s July 20 Craigslist ad:
Q: Now, I believe your testimony yesterday discussed certain parts of advertisements that you look for that are indicative to you, based on your training and experience, of individuals who may be seeking a minor. What parts of [Parkhurst’s] ad struck you [when you first saw it on July 27]?
A: Well, the first line, “very young white boy, a little fella.” The “18 or slightly older,” right in parentheses after that, “younger the better,” that struck me as something that somebody—okay, Pm complying with Craigslist rules by putting 18 or slightly older, but I’m—
Defense: Objection, speculation.
Government: Your Honor, this witness has been qualified as an expert and can testify to his training and experience and why this ad struck him.
Court: The objection’s overruled actually for the reasons [the government] states. He’s been qualified as an expert in online investigations. He’s able to testify as to ... his experience and give his expert opinion.
A: The—in parentheses right after the “18 or slightly older” where it says ■ “the younger the better,” that’s a way for people to get around the Craigslist terms and conditions basically without saying younger. That’s just a hint to. people reading' it. “Prefer you to be a virgin.” Built—basically him describing himself as built like a teenager. Those are the main things that struck me.
Q: Okay. Now, you had testified that the “18 or slightly older” but in paren[516]*516theses “younger the better” was, in your opinion, a way to get around the Craigslist terms of use; is that right?
A: Correct.
Parkhurst argues that Detective Koes-ter’s expert testimony was inadmissible under Rule 702 because the court did not determine whether Detective Koester’s investigative methods “ha[d] been tested, ... subjected to peer review and publication, whether there [was] a known rate of error, [or] whether there [was a] general acceptance in the field in evaluating the reliability of the proffered testimony.” See Fed. R. Evid. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). He also asserts that this testimony constituted an opinion about Parkhurst’s subjective motivations in violation of Rule 704(b), imputing to Parkhurst the nefarious intent of targeting minors with his advertisement.
At the outset, “[Ejxpert testimony must be helpful to the jury to be admissible.” United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2012). Detective Koester first described Craigslist’s “flagging” function that identifies and blocks improper uses of Craigslist features by scrutinizing the words users include in their advertisements. He then presented and interpreted various “[k]ey words”—such as “young,” “fresh,” and “barely used”—that, in his experience, individuals use to target minors without running afoul of Craigslist’s regulations. Finally, he highlighted which words in Parkhurst’s advertisement appeared, based on his expertise, to constitute such key words. We see no appreciable difference between this testimony and that of narcotics officers describing “code words” for drugs that we have previously deemed helpful to the jury. See United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 423 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an FBI agent’s expert testimony about the meaning of the words “six, “nine,” “five dollar,” and “fifty-five” within a conversation was helpful); United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 689-88 (7th Cir. 2002) (concluding that DEA agents’ interpretations of “it,” them,” and “both” as referring to methamphetamine shipments was helpful). Detective Koester’s key-word testimony helped the jury apply to the evidence alternative theories of which they ordinarily may not have been aware. See Ceballos, 302 F.3d at 687-88; see also United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir. 2012) (“What might seem like innocuous conduct to an untrained jury, might, to the trained eye, be indicative of criminal activity.”).
Parkhurst’s focus on scientific-reliability factors is misplaced. Detective Koester’s expert testimony was based on his extensive training and experience in over twenty-five investigations involving internet crimes against children. Training and experience are proper foundations for expert testimony. Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment (citations omitted) (“the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on the basis of experience. In certain fields, experience is the predominant, if not sole, basis for a great deal of reliable expert testimony”); see also Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 156, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999) (“[N]o one denies that an expert might draw a conclusion from a set of observations based on extensive and specialized experience.”). We have repeatedly allowed such expert testimony without requiring “scientific methodologies”' or “peer review.” See United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 555-56 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing cases); see also id. at 556 (“[T]he Daubert factors ... ought not be considered a definitive check list suitable for the evaluation of all kinds of evidentiary submissions involving specialized knowledge.... [W]e have not[517]*517ed specifically that genuine expertise may be based on experience or training.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, district courts ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony of investigating law-enforcement officers may review factors such as the officer’s years of experience and number of investigations. See id. (citations omitted). The district court in this case did just that, and, in light of Detective Koester’s extensive experience investigating internet crimes against children, it was not an abuse of the court’s discretion to qualify Detective Koester as an expert witness or to admit his expert testimony regarding Craigslist advertisements.6
Parkhurst’s contention that Detective Koester’s testimony violated Rule 704(b) meets the same fate. Normally, “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). We have explained, however, that,
when a law enforcement official states an opinion about the criminal nature of a defendant’s activities, such testimony should not be excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is made clear, either by the court expressly or in the nature of the examination, that the opinion is based on the expert’s knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant’s mental processes.
United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Winbush, 580 F.3d 503, 512 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Although an expert may not testify or opine that the defendant actually possessed the requisite mental state, he may testify in general terms about facts or circumstances from which a jury might infer that the defendant intended to [commit the charged crime].”). What matters is the degree to which the expert refers to the specific defendant’s intent; expert testimony is proper as long as it leaves for the jury the ultimate conclusion that the defendant intended to commit the charged crime. Id. (citation omitted). Here, the government’s examination made it clear that Detective Koester’s testimony regarding the July 20 Craigslist advertisement was based on his background knowledge of criminal activities on Craigslist and not on Parkhurst’s mindset. The government asked Detective Koester what about the advertisement had stood out to him, “based on [his] training and experience.”7 He then identified and [518]*518interpreted various words in Parkhurst’s advertisement that, based on his experience, resembled “[k]ey words” that other individuals have used to target minors without violating Craigslist’s regulations. Detective Koester never mentioned Park-hurst’s “intent” or “mindset,” and he never directly testified that Parkhurst intentionally sought to sexually entice minors— which is what our precedent prohibits. See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 715 F.3d 1032, 1038 (7th Cir. 2013) (expert testimony admissible where officer’s testimony was not based on “some special familiarity with the workings of [the defendant’s] mind”) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 513 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the expert testimony because the officers testified that their opinions were based on their knowledge of ‘common practices in the drug trade’ and not on ‘some special familiarity with the workings of [the defendant’s] mind.’ ”) (citations omitted); United States v. Blount, 502 F.3d 674, 679-80 (7th Cir. 2007) (approvingly noting that the testifying officer “never referred to [the defendant’s] ‘intent’ or ‘intentions’ ” and holding that the officer’s expert testimony “did not transgress Rule 704(b)’s limitations”); Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242 (no Rule 704(b) violation where an expert testified “that a certain pattern of conduct evinces a particular kind of criminal activity”). No reasonable juror could have believed that Detective Koester’s testimony was based on some special knowledge of Parkhurst’s intent. Considering the examination as a whole, the testimony did not violate Rule 704(b).
3. Dual Role
As a final matter, Parkhurst claims that Detective Koester’s dual role as a fact-expert witness confused the jury. However, we routinely uphold the practice of presenting dual fact-expert witnesses, “particularly where experienced law enforcement officers were involved in the particular investigation at issue.” York, 572 F.3d at 425 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Lightfoot, 224 F.3d 586, 589 (7th Cir. 2000) (“there is nothing wrong with having a police officer testify both as a fact witness and an expert witness”) (citation omitted). True, there are “inherent dangers with this kind of dual testimony,” such as jury confusion, id. (citations omitted), but this “potential for prejudice ... can be addressed by means' of appropriate cautionary instructions and by examination of the witness that is structured in such a way as to make clear when the witness is testifying to facts and when he is offering his opinion as an expert.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 654 (7th Cir. 2002)). These precautions tell the jury what it needs to know to determine how much weight to give the testimony and the opposing counsel what he needs to know to cross-exam[519]*519ine the witness effectively. United States v. Moreland, 703 F.3d 976, 983-84 (7th Cir. 2012).
Contrary to Parkhurst’s assertions, the district court and government took appropriate precautions against the potential for jury confusion. The district court instructed the jury as follows:
You have heard witnesses, [including] ... Detective Todd Koester, who, in some instances, gave opinions and testimony about certain subjects, specifically, ... online investigations involving minors. You do not have to accept these ■witnesses’ opinions or testimony. You should judge these witnesses’ opinions and testimony the same way you judge the testimony of any other witness. In deciding how much weight to give to these opinions and testimony, you should consider the witnesses’ qualification, how they reached their opinions or conclusions, and the factors I have described for determining the believability of testimony.
While it is advisable that trial courts distinctly instruct jurors to not give the witness’s lay testimony any extra weight simply because the witness is an expert, we have previously deemed acceptable instructions nearly identical to this one. See Moreland, 703 F.3d at 984. Furthermore, as described in more detail above, the government’s examination made clear the basis for Detective Koester’s answers— that is, whether a given answer was fact testimony regarding the investigation in this case (i.e., Rule 701 testimony) or expert testimony derived from his experience in similar investigations (i.e., Rule 702 testimony). This is all we require of the examining party. See id. at 983-84; see also id. at 983 (“Telling the jury that a witness is both a lay witness and an expert witness and will be alternating between the two roles is potentially confusing—and unnecessary.”). As such, Detective Koester’s dual testimony was unproblematic.
B. Parkhurst’s Emails
Parkhurst next argues that the government inappropriately questioned him about email communications with other individuals who had responded to his casual-encounter advertisements.8 He additionally argues that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring to stricken evidence related to these communications during its closing arguments.
1. Evidentiary Rulings
Parkhurst first argues that the district court incorrectly ruled that Parkhurst had “opened the door” to cross-examination on his emails. During direct examination, however, Parkhurst discussed his internet advertisement and associated communications, and asserted that he only wanted to [520]*520interact with of-age individuals, ie., those eighteen years or older:
Q: Okay ... when you posted your ad, what were you hoping to accomplish?
A: I was hoping to meet someone of age and develop a relationship with them.
[[Image here]]
Q: When you were emailing back and forth with Detective Koester’s undercover fake personality!;,] Kacy, what were you hoping to accomplish? Be' honest.
A: If this person was actually of age, I was hoping to meet up with him [to start a sexual relationship].
[[Image here]]
Q: Okay. And even after you knew that the person maybe was under 18, you continued to talk?
A: Correct.
Q: Why?
A: It was a—it was somebody to talk to. I mean, it was pleasant. It was— like I said, I’m lonely, you know. Somebody was carrying on a conversation.
[[Image here]]
Q: When you had this conversation, ... what did you. hope was going to happen?
A: I was hoping this person was 18 or older, like my ad said.
[[Image here]]
Q: Did you ever intend to force or persuade someone under the age of 18 to have sex with you?
A: Not at all.
Q: Did you want to have sex with somebody under the age of 18?
A: Not at all.
Q: What, what was your ultimate goal from all these ad posts that you put up?
A: To be with someone between 18 and 25.
The district court held that Parkhurst’s testimony had “opened the door” for the government to question Parkhurst about the emails—particularly those in which he had conversed with purported minors:
As soon as the defendant began to stress the fact he was looking for [“]of age[”]—and he repeated that multiple times in his answers—that certainly began heavily knocking on the door, if not opening it... .So, based upon the cumulative nature of both his answers and stressing [“]of age[”] and your question where you pursued what he would do with conversations with people underage, the door has been opened. The government may use the [emails] that I’ve reviewed ... to cross-examine the defendant. ... I can tell you that when you asked your client—when you headed for that e-mail communication section ... you not only opened the door, you basically drove a truck through it... .1 find that [the emails] are not improperly prejudicial, and they are, in fact, probative so they can be admitted. But, of course, extrinsic evidence is not admissible, so you can cross-examine him about those.
The government then proceeded to cross-examine Parkhurst with the emails, using them to discredit the notion that Park-hurst had only wanted to interact with of-age individuals:
Q: Okay. And so you told Detective - Koester that you had never talked to anybody that you believed to be 15?
A: Correct.
[[Image here]]
Q: That’s not true, though, is it, Mr. Parkhurst?
[521]*521A: Well, you really don’t know How old anybody is on Craigslist.
Q: The question that Detective Koester asked you is, Did you ever talk to anyone that you believed was 15 years old on Craigslist, and you said, “No, never.”
A: Correct.
Q: Correct? But that is not true. You did talk to people ... other than Kacy that you believed were 15 and other minor ages, correct?
A: I wasn’t sure of their age.
[[Image here]]
Q: Based on reviewing Government’s Exhibit 19D ... [d]id you have a conversation with a person that portrayed themselves to be a 15-year-old?
A: Someone that portrayed theirself [sic.] as 15, yes.
Q: Okay. And your response when that person asked you if they had to be over 18 was “not if [you] can keep a secret”; is that right?
Defense Attorney: Objection, extrinsic evidence.
District Court: No, this is proper impeachment.
A: Correct.
Q: So, when I asked you earlier if you had a conversation with someone who you believed to be 15, and you said you didn’t know what their age was, you certainly knew enough to tell them to keep a secret, correct?
A: Correct.
[[Image here]]
Q: And [Exhibit 19D] is an e-mail transaction with, an individual who identifies himself as Hunter, correct?
A: .... Correct.
Q: And the exhibit that you just reviewed now, I believe, is 19B; is that correct?
A: Correct.
Q: That is a different individual, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: What did you believe his age to be?
A: Well, he said he was 14.
(internal quotation marks added). The government did not move to enter the emails into evidence, and so the district court did not admit them.9
Parkhurst asserts that the district court erred by allowing the government to impeach him about his email communications with other individuals purporting to be minors, arguing that they were not in evidence. We review the district court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Kohli, 847 F.3d 483, 492 (7th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).
“It. is well-settled that when a criminal defendant elects to testify in his own defense, he puts his credibility in issue and exposes himself to cross-examination, including the possibility that his testimony will be impeabhed.” Id. (citation omitted). As illustrated above, Parkhurst testified multiple times that he was only interested in interacting with of-age individuals. These repeated assertions put his credibility in issue and thus opened the door for the government to question the truthfulness of his testimony—particularly, by inquiring about his conversations with purported minors. See id. Parkhurst’s claim that the district court allowed the govem[522]*522ment to use the emails as extrinsic evi-dénce conflates cross-examination of an issue with use of extrinsic evidence. See United States v. Sanders, 614 F.3d 341, 344-45 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he rules of evidence make a distinction between cross-examination as to an issue and the use of extrinsic evidence regarding it”). While “extrinsic . evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness[,] ... the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of ... the witness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). (emphasis added). The government did not seek to enter the emails to impeach Parkhurst; instead, it cross-examined him about his interactions with purported minors and accepted his answers without contradiction. Cf. Kohli, 847 F.3d at 493 (identifying the same distinction regarding the related “collateral evidence rule”); Simmons, Inc. v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 762 F.2d 591, 605 (7th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Glickenhaus & Co. v. Household Int’l, Inc., 787 F.3d 408, 425 n.12 (7th Cir. 2015) (describing the collateral evidence rule as “now incorporated into Rule 608(b)”). In sum, the district court correctly found that Parkhurst had opened the door to his emails and that the government had appropriately impeached him; it was within the court’s discretion to admit Park-hurst’s testimony given that he had waded into the emails with his eyes open.
2. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Parkhurst next argues that the government committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument by mentioning a previously-stricken line of testimony regarding another child, Hunter. The government had the following exchange with Parkhurst during cross-examination:
Q: Now, the individual who identified himself as Hunter in Government’s Exhibit 19D, you actually continued and had a text message conversation with him; is that right?
A: Correct.
Q: Would it surprise you to know that Detective Koester found the individual last night?
A: No.
Q: And he was actually 15.
A: Okay.
Defense Attorney: Objection, move to strike, but too late now.
District Court: Well, sustained. The jury will disregard that question and that answer.
Later, during closing arguments, the government reviewed the evidence tailored to Parkhurst’s sexually-explicit interactions with Kacy (Detective Koester). Parkhurst’s counsel responded in part by referring to both Parkhurst’s testimony regarding his desire to exclusively interact with of-age individuals and his email exchanges with purported adults. During its rebuttal argument, the government highlighted the inconsistencies in Parkhurst’s testimony regarding the emails:
Let’s compare what the defendant says to what the evidence shows. He says to Detective Koester, I never talked to anyone who I believed to be 15 years old. But you saw that when I cross-examined him and showed him the emails in Government Exhibit 19, that group, he was talking to a 15-year-old named Hunter. He was talking to a 14-year-old. He said he was hoping to meet somebody of age, he was not interested in anyone under 18, and only looking for people 18 to 25. But you saw on cross-examination that an experienced 23-year-old, an experienced 20-year-old he [523]*523rejected. Too much experience. But an experienced 16-year-old, that was fine,
(emphasis added). Parkhurst made no objection.
Parkhurst argues that the government’s rebuttal argument relied on the previously-stricken testimony regarding Hunter’s real age.10 “Improper prosecuto-rial comments during closing arguments are reviewed under a prosecutorial misconduct framework.” United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 764 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “This analysis requires, first a determination that prosecutors acted improperly, and second a conclusion that the improper conduct prejudiced the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted). The government’s allusion to Hunter in rebuttal was not improper because it was not in reference to the stricken testimony, as Parkhurst asserts. Rather, the statement was based on Parkhurst’s testimony regarding his own email exchanges with Hunter—which, as described above, the government appropriately elicited after Parkhurst had opened the door to impeachment through his email interactions. This testimony about Hunter was separate and apart from the stricken testimony about Hunter’s real age.
In any event, Parkhurst cannot show that the government’s alleged misconduct prejudiced him. “When gauging prejudice, we consider the remarks in light of the entire record to determine if the defendant was deprived of a fair trial.” Id. at 766 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]here the defendant fails to object to the remarks at the time they were made, the plain error standard ... requires that the defendant establish not only that the remarks- denied him a fair trial, but also that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different absent the remarks.” United States v. Sandoval, 347 F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Parkhurst cannot meet this standard, given the plethora of unchallenged evidence regarding Parkhurst’s interactions with Kacy (Detective Koester). In his email and text messages with Kacy, for example, Parkhurst, upon learning that Kacy was purportedly fifteen years old, responded that Kacy was “only too young if [he could not] keep a secret.” Later, in his post-arrest statement to Detective Koester, Parkhurst explained that he had thought Kacy may have been lying about his age but had still assumed he was talking to a fifteen- or sixteen-year-old. Despite that assumption, Parkhurst had then made sexually-explicit offers, asking Kacy whether he was “cut or uncut”; expressing that he “may like to try and suck [Kacy]” and proposing that they “experiment and explore together”; explaining that Park-hurst knew “what to do to prepare [Kacy] so it [would not] hurt”; making clear that Parkhurst “want[ed] both of them to do this over and over”; and, finally, arranging and attempting to pick up Kacy at his Decatur apartment to take him back to [524]*524Parkhurst’s Springfield home. This evidence alone was sufficient to support Park-hurst’s conviction. Considering the record as a whole, Parkhurst cannot show that the government’s alleged misconduct prejudiced him.
C. Parkhurst’s Sentence
Lastly, Parkhurst argues that the sentencing court erred by enhancing his mandatory-minimum ten-year sentence to eleven years based on the court’s finding that he had obstructed the proceeding by asserting his innocence during trial. Park-hurst, however, has waived this challenge, as he only cursorily identifies it in his opening brief, failing to present any legal authority or make any supporting arguments. See United States v. Beavers, 756 F.3d 1044, 1059 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Perfunctory, undeveloped arguments without discussion or citation to pertinent legal authority are waived.” (quoting Mahaffey v. Ramos, 588 F.3d 1142, 1146 (7th Cir. 2009))).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.