NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0001n.06
Case No. 24-5528
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED Jan 03, 2025 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF JEFFREY LEE JUSTICE, ) KENTUCKY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; KETHLEDGE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Jeffrey Lee Justice moved to reduce his sentence after the
Sentencing Commission retroactively amended the Guidelines. The district court denied his
motion. Because it did not abuse its discretion in doing so, we affirm.
In 2016, Justice responded to a Craigslist “personals” ad created by an undercover
Kentucky law enforcement officer. After some back-and-forth emailing and text messaging, the
officer told Justice that he took care of two girls, ages eight and fourteen. Justice asked to engage
in sexual acts with the girls. The officer agreed, and they arranged to meet at a gas station in
Louisville. Justice drove from his home in Indiana to the gas station, where law enforcement
officers arrested him. No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
A federal grand jury indicted Justice on two counts. Count One charged him with crossing
state lines to have sex with a child under twelve. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Count Two charged
him with crossing state lines to have sex with a minor. See id. § 2423(b).
Justice and the government reached a plea agreement under Criminal Rule 11(c)(1)(C),
which requires the court to impose the parties’ agreed-to sentence if it accepts the plea agreement.
Justice agreed to plead guilty to Count Two, which carried a 30-year statutory maximum. In
exchange, the government agreed to dismiss Count One, sparing Justice the 30-year statutory
minimum under that count. They settled on a sentence of 240 months (20 years) in prison, five
months above the Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months.
In 2018, the district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed a 240-month sentence,
finding it appropriate under the relevant sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In 2023, the Sentencing Commission retroactively amended one of the criminal-history
Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual App. C., Amdt. 821 (Part A) (Nov.
2023); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d), (e)(2) & cmt. 7. Under the amendment, defendants no longer receive
two criminal-history points for committing an offense while serving another sentence. They
instead receive one point if they already have at least seven points and no points if they have six
or fewer. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2023).
Had this amendment been in effect in 2018, it would have lowered Justice’s Guidelines
range. Justice traveled to have sex with a child while on probation for another conviction. Under
the Guidelines in effect at his sentencing, he received two points on top of the six he already had
from past convictions. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2018). But under the amended Guidelines, he would
have received no additional points and would have faced a lower Guidelines range of 168 to 210
months.
2 No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
Justice relied on this change to move for a sentencing reduction, as federal law permits.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He asked for a 215-month sentence, which would have left in place
the same five-month variance above the amended Guidelines range that the district court originally
imposed. After acknowledging Justice’s eligibility for a reduction, the district court denied
Justice’s motion, leaving his 240-month prison sentence in place. This appeal followed.
District courts follow two steps in deciding whether to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010). They first ask whether a
retroactive Guidelines amendment lowered the defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 826; U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10. If it did, the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. The
court then must consider whether the § 3553(a) factors justify reducing the defendant’s sentence
and whether doing so would endanger the public. Id. at 827–28; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(i)–
(ii). In making this decision, the court may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(iii). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion
and apply a form of reasonableness review that resembles our review of sentences on direct appeal.
See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 115 (2018); United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d
323, 331 (6th Cir. 2010); cf. United States v. Smithers, 960 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2020).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Justice’s motion for a reduced
sentence. The court correctly determined that Justice was eligible for a reduced sentence,
calculated Justice’s new Guidelines range, and stated that it had considered the parties’ arguments,
the § 3553(a) factors, and public safety. The court observed that Justice “traveled with the
expectation that he would meet children for sexual contact” and found that the “nature and
circumstances” of this conduct “are troubling.” R.66 at 1. It also determined that a reduced
sentence “would fail appropriately to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”
3 No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
R.66 at 1. Justice’s conviction, as “context and the record” established, followed nearly three
decades of criminal activity and several other convictions for criminal recklessness, disorderly
conduct, intimidation, invading privacy, possessing drugs, and firing a gun into a dwelling.
Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 117 (quotation omitted). The court also emphasized the significant
benefit that Justice had received from the dismissal of Count One, which carried a 30-year
mandatory minimum sentence. On this record, the court reasonably concluded, and adequately
explained, that the § 3553(a) factors and public safety did not justify reducing Justice’s sentence.
Justice counters that the court did not adequately explain its decision because it did not
“thorough[ly] analy[ze]” each § 3553(a) factor in its two-page order—what Justice fairly labels a
filled-in “form” order. Appellant’s Br. 16. But, as in many things, form follows function. The
function of the federal courts’ sentencing reduction authority is not to start anew. It is to allow
courts to adjust a sentence after the fact due to reductions in the Guidelines and due to proof that
the defendant would not otherwise be a threat to the public safety. We have previously upheld
similar filled-in form orders where, as here, the court considered the parties’ arguments and offered
a “reasoned basis” for its decision. Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 118 (quotation omitted); see, e.g.,
United States v.
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0001n.06
Case No. 24-5528
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED Jan 03, 2025 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF JEFFREY LEE JUSTICE, ) KENTUCKY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; KETHLEDGE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Jeffrey Lee Justice moved to reduce his sentence after the
Sentencing Commission retroactively amended the Guidelines. The district court denied his
motion. Because it did not abuse its discretion in doing so, we affirm.
In 2016, Justice responded to a Craigslist “personals” ad created by an undercover
Kentucky law enforcement officer. After some back-and-forth emailing and text messaging, the
officer told Justice that he took care of two girls, ages eight and fourteen. Justice asked to engage
in sexual acts with the girls. The officer agreed, and they arranged to meet at a gas station in
Louisville. Justice drove from his home in Indiana to the gas station, where law enforcement
officers arrested him. No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
A federal grand jury indicted Justice on two counts. Count One charged him with crossing
state lines to have sex with a child under twelve. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c). Count Two charged
him with crossing state lines to have sex with a minor. See id. § 2423(b).
Justice and the government reached a plea agreement under Criminal Rule 11(c)(1)(C),
which requires the court to impose the parties’ agreed-to sentence if it accepts the plea agreement.
Justice agreed to plead guilty to Count Two, which carried a 30-year statutory maximum. In
exchange, the government agreed to dismiss Count One, sparing Justice the 30-year statutory
minimum under that count. They settled on a sentence of 240 months (20 years) in prison, five
months above the Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months.
In 2018, the district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed a 240-month sentence,
finding it appropriate under the relevant sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In 2023, the Sentencing Commission retroactively amended one of the criminal-history
Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Guidelines Manual App. C., Amdt. 821 (Part A) (Nov.
2023); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d), (e)(2) & cmt. 7. Under the amendment, defendants no longer receive
two criminal-history points for committing an offense while serving another sentence. They
instead receive one point if they already have at least seven points and no points if they have six
or fewer. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (2023).
Had this amendment been in effect in 2018, it would have lowered Justice’s Guidelines
range. Justice traveled to have sex with a child while on probation for another conviction. Under
the Guidelines in effect at his sentencing, he received two points on top of the six he already had
from past convictions. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) (2018). But under the amended Guidelines, he would
have received no additional points and would have faced a lower Guidelines range of 168 to 210
months.
2 No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
Justice relied on this change to move for a sentencing reduction, as federal law permits.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He asked for a 215-month sentence, which would have left in place
the same five-month variance above the amended Guidelines range that the district court originally
imposed. After acknowledging Justice’s eligibility for a reduction, the district court denied
Justice’s motion, leaving his 240-month prison sentence in place. This appeal followed.
District courts follow two steps in deciding whether to reduce a sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826–27 (2010). They first ask whether a
retroactive Guidelines amendment lowered the defendant’s Guidelines range. Id. at 826; U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.10. If it did, the defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction. Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. The
court then must consider whether the § 3553(a) factors justify reducing the defendant’s sentence
and whether doing so would endanger the public. Id. at 827–28; U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(i)–
(ii). In making this decision, the court may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(iii). We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion
and apply a form of reasonableness review that resembles our review of sentences on direct appeal.
See Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 115 (2018); United States v. Curry, 606 F.3d
323, 331 (6th Cir. 2010); cf. United States v. Smithers, 960 F.3d 339, 344 (6th Cir. 2020).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Justice’s motion for a reduced
sentence. The court correctly determined that Justice was eligible for a reduced sentence,
calculated Justice’s new Guidelines range, and stated that it had considered the parties’ arguments,
the § 3553(a) factors, and public safety. The court observed that Justice “traveled with the
expectation that he would meet children for sexual contact” and found that the “nature and
circumstances” of this conduct “are troubling.” R.66 at 1. It also determined that a reduced
sentence “would fail appropriately to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”
3 No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
R.66 at 1. Justice’s conviction, as “context and the record” established, followed nearly three
decades of criminal activity and several other convictions for criminal recklessness, disorderly
conduct, intimidation, invading privacy, possessing drugs, and firing a gun into a dwelling.
Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 117 (quotation omitted). The court also emphasized the significant
benefit that Justice had received from the dismissal of Count One, which carried a 30-year
mandatory minimum sentence. On this record, the court reasonably concluded, and adequately
explained, that the § 3553(a) factors and public safety did not justify reducing Justice’s sentence.
Justice counters that the court did not adequately explain its decision because it did not
“thorough[ly] analy[ze]” each § 3553(a) factor in its two-page order—what Justice fairly labels a
filled-in “form” order. Appellant’s Br. 16. But, as in many things, form follows function. The
function of the federal courts’ sentencing reduction authority is not to start anew. It is to allow
courts to adjust a sentence after the fact due to reductions in the Guidelines and due to proof that
the defendant would not otherwise be a threat to the public safety. We have previously upheld
similar filled-in form orders where, as here, the court considered the parties’ arguments and offered
a “reasoned basis” for its decision. Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 118 (quotation omitted); see, e.g.,
United States v. Harvey, 996 F.3d 310, 314–15 (6th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); United States v.
Navarro, 986 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2021); Curry, 606 F.3d at 331. The court met that modest
obligation here.
Justice claims that the district court should not have considered the benefits he received
from his plea agreement. But that is mistaken. “The district court can consider the benefits the
defendant gained by entering a Type–C agreement when it decides whether a reduction is
appropriate.” Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. 675, 689 (2018).
4 No. 24-5528, United States v. Justice
Justice faults the court for concluding that he poses a danger to the public. The court, he
says, overlooked that he has received only one infraction in his six years in prison and that the
conditions on his supervised release would provide adequate safeguards. Even so, the court acted
within its discretion in concluding that his criminal conduct and criminal history, including his
prior conviction for shooting into a dwelling, indicate that he would endanger the public if released
sooner.
Justice argues that, through it all, the court has left him with an unduly long sentence. But
the court reasonably concluded that Justice’s 240-month sentence remained appropriate given the
benefits he received from his plea agreement, the need to protect the public, the serious nature of
his offense, and the other § 3553(a) factors.
We affirm.