United States v. Jefferys

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: April 2, 2025
• Docket: 23-7649
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

23-7649 United States v. Jefferys

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 2nd day of April, two thousand twenty-five.

Present: MICHAEL H. PARK, MYRNA PÉREZ, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 23-7649

DEVONE JEFFERYS,

Defendant-Appellant. * __________________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Jillian S. Harrington, Law Office of Jillian S. Harrington, Monroe Township, NJ.

FOR APPELLEE: Ryan C. Harris, Amy Busa, for Carolyn Pokorny, Acting United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New

York (Matsumoto, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Devone Jefferys originally received an aggregate prison term of 224

months for offenses related to a robbery committed in July 2015. On remand in light of United

States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), the district court resentenced him to an “equivalent”

sentence of 224 months. App’x at 67. Jefferys now challenges his sentence as procedurally and

substantively unreasonable. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

I. Procedural Reasonableness

“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to calculate (or

improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the Sentencing Guidelines as

mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous

facts, or fails adequately to explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60,

66 (2d Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, when a defendant fails to object to an

alleged sentencing error before the district court, we will ordinarily consider any later objections

forfeited on appeal unless the defendant can meet the plain-error standard.” United States v.

Davis, 82 F.4th 190, 196 (2d Cir. 2023). To show plain error, a defendant must establish that

“(1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3)

the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected

2 the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258,

262 (2010) (quotation marks omitted).

At sentencing, Jefferys failed to object to the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis. He now

argues on appeal that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court “failed

to adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors,” the “extreme hardships experienced by inmates

during the COVID-19 pandemic,” his “genuine efforts at rehabilitation,” and his “acceptance of

responsibility.” Appellant’s Br. at 16, 19. We disagree.

The district court gave “respectful consideration to the guidelines and all of the factors set

forth at 18 U.S. Code Section 3553(a) (1) through (7).” App’x at 65. It “considered the

COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the prison population.” Id. at 41. It “commend[ed]”

Jefferys for his “efforts” to “better himself in terms of learning and availing himself of educational

opportunities and training opportunities” and “tutor[ing] other inmates on the GED.” Id. And

it noted that Jefferys expressed “remorse for his conduct during the robbery.” Id. at 65. Still,

the district court explained that “[n]one of that diminishes from the gravity of the conduct,” which

it deemed “among some of the worst conduct I have seen during a robbery like this.” Id. at 47.

Jefferys thus fails to show any procedural error—let alone plain error—in the district court’s

analysis.

II. Substantive Reasonableness

“We review the substantive reasonableness of a district court’s sentence under a deferential

abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Gates, 84 F.4th 496, 504-05 (2d Cir. 2023)

(quotation marks omitted). “A sentence is substantively unreasonable when it cannot be located

3 within the range of permissible decisions, because it is shockingly high, shockingly low, or

otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56, 68 (2d Cir.

2023) (quotation marks omitted). We “vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness only

in exceptional cases.” Davis, 82 F.4th at 200 (quotation marks omitted).

Jefferys acknowledges that his sentence is “below the revised Sentencing Guidelines range

of 235-293 months.” Appellant’s Br. at 28. Still, he argues that the sentence is substantively

unreasonable because the district court failed to account for the “tragic circumstances” of his

childhood, his “accomplishments during his incarceration,” his “acceptance of responsibility,” and

the “deplorable conditions” that he endured during the pandemic. Id. But as discussed above,

the district court considered his rehabilitation efforts and COVID-19 experience. It also

considered at length his “personal characteristics, family history and circumstances,” including the

“tragic and sympathetic” loss of his parents, his “very challenging” upbringing, his “modest

financial circumstances,” and the fact that he “has experienced depression” and “entertained self-

harm.” App’x at 62-63, 66. Indeed, the district court “consider[ed] everything that was

submitted on [his] behalf.” Id. at 71.

Ultimately, the district court imposed its sentence in recognition of the fact that “the

circumstances remain very serious and the criminal history remains serious.” App’x at 67. As

detailed at resentencing, Jefferys perpetrated a “night of horror,” “committing sexual abuse during

an attempted robbery and [an] abduction.” Id. at 61, 66. Accompanied by two others, Jefferys

broke into an apartment to steal “heroin and money.” Id. at 49. Once inside the apartment,

Jefferys “restrained two of the victims using duct tape” and “pointed his gun at [a] pregnant

woman’s stomach and threatened to shoot her and the baby.” Id. He then took another victim

4 “into the basement courtyard,” where he “forced her at gunpoint to perform oral sex on him and

then vaginally raped her.” Id. at 50. Moreover, Jefferys has “several prior criminal convictions

that count towards hi[s] criminal history score for purposes of resentencing,” including an

“incident of domestic violence” during which he “struck [a female victim] in the face, punched

her, elbowed her and head-butted her.” Id. at 54-55. Given the “extremely serious” nature of

Jefferys’s offense, id. at 60, and the district court’s “very wide latitude to decide the proper degree

of punishment,” United States v. DiMassa, 117 F.4th 477, 482 (2d Cir. 2024) (quotation marks

omitted), we find no abuse of discretion in the sentence.

* * *

We have considered Jefferys’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court