United States v. Jamie Ewings

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 2, 2026
• Docket: 25-4501
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4501

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMIE EWINGS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, District Judge. (1:25-cr-00141-TDS-1)

Submitted: February 20, 2026 Decided: March 2, 2026

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Eugene E. Lester, III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, Karla E. Painter, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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PER CURIAM:

Jamie Ewings pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to a single-count

criminal information charging her with theft of government property, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 641. The district court sentenced Ewings to 13 months’ imprisonment, below her

advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

Ewings’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),

stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Ewings’s

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and whether Ewings’s sentence of imprisonment is

procedurally and substantively reasonable. Although notified of her right to do so, Ewings

has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.

Counsel first questions whether Ewing’s guilty plea is valid. Because Ewings did

not attempt to withdraw her guilty plea or otherwise challenge the knowing and voluntary

nature thereof in the district court, we review the district court’s acceptance of Ewings’s

guilty plea for plain error only. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir.

2016). “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an

error was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the

error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court conducted a

thorough Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy and that Ewings’s guilty plea was knowing,

voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Ewings is thus not entitled to

relief from her guilty plea.

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Counsel next questions whether Ewings’s 13-month sentence is procedurally and

substantively reasonable. “We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) using an abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of ‘whether [the sentence is]

inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Nance,

957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Gall v. United States,

552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). In performing that review, we first “evaluate procedural

reasonableness, determining whether the district court committed any procedural error,

such as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to consider the § 3553(a)

factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id.

If “the district court has not committed procedural error,” we then assess the

substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id. Our substantive reasonableness review

“takes into account the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the sentencing

court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied the standards

set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Any sentence that is within

or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively]

reasonable. Such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Louthian,

756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).

We are satisfied that Ewings’s sentence of imprisonment is procedurally reasonable.

The district court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, thoroughly considered the

§ 3553(a) factors, provided a meaningful explanation for its chosen sentence, and

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extensively addressed defense counsel’s arguments for a lower sentence. See Gall, 552

U.S. at 49-51.

We also conclude that nothing in the record rebuts the presumption of substantive

reasonableness afforded to Ewings’s below-Guidelines 13-month sentence of

imprisonment. See Louthian, 756 F.3d at 306. The district court emphasized that Ewings

stole more than $200,000 from a government program intended to help people in need

during the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court also stressed the need to deter others

from engaging in similar theft schemes. Against the aggravating facts of this case, the

district court weighed the mitigating facts, including Ewings’s family life, her lack of

criminal history, her education and work history, her use of some government funds to

actually help others, and her agreement to pay restitution. After considering the

aggravating and mitigating facts in the context of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court

reasonably arrived at a sentence of 13 months. See United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669,

679 (4th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that “district courts have extremely broad discretion when

determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors”). We therefore conclude

that Ewings’s sentence of imprisonment is substantively reasonable.

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We thus affirm the district court’s judgment.

This court requires that counsel inform Ewings, in writing, of the right to petition the

Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Ewings requests that a petition

be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may

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move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state

that a copy thereof was served on Ewings.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED