United States v. James Horton

321 F.3d 476, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4099, 2003 WL 932464

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: March 10, 2003
• Docket: 01-4681
• Status: Published

Opinions

Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge WILKINS wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge KING joined. Judge MICHAEL wrote a dissenting opinion.

OPINION

WILKINS, Chief Judge:

James Horton appeals his convictions for kidnapping resulting in death, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(1) (West 2000), and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(c) (West 2000). Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

In late November 1998, Stephen Satcher visited his cousin Daniel Staneil and asked Staneil to help him bring some “bodies” from Maryland to North Carolina in exchange for a quantity of cocaine. J.A. 69. Staneil in turn asked his friend, Horton, if he would assist, and Horton agreed. Once Staneil and Horton arrived in Maryland, Satcher informed them that the person whose body they were to dispose of was Jovita Dickerson, the still-living mother of Satcher’s child. Staneil and Horton then agreed to assist in kidnapping Dickerson.

On the afternoon of December 4, 1998, Horton, Satcher, and Staneil drove to a parking lot in Bowie, Maryland, and waited for Dickerson to emerge from her workplace. Horton, armed with a toy firearm, forced Dickerson into her vehicle and held her there while Satcher drove them to Satcher’s stepfather’s house in Cheverly, Maryland. When Staneil arrived, he found Horton, Satcher, and Dickerson in the basement; Dickerson was on her knees bent over a couch with her hands tied behind her back. Stancil immediately returned upstairs, where he heard choking sounds coming from the basement. Horton joined Stancil upstairs a few minutes later and reported that Satcher had tried to choke Dickerson.

After Satcher and Stancil were unsuccessful in a second attempt to kill Dickerson, Satcher instructed Horton to “finish her off.” Id. at 117. Horton then went down to the basement for two to three minutes, after which he returned upstairs and said he “was finished.” Id. at 118. He and Satcher then carried Dickerson from the basement and placed her in the trunk of her vehicle. Stancil later stated that at that point “she looked dead.” Id. at 194. Stancil and Horton then drove the vehicle to North Carolina, where they stayed in a hotel for the night. The next morning, after determining that their victim was in fact dead, they set the vehicle on fire in a field in Wake County with Dickerson’s body still in the trunk. Dickerson’s vehicle and her body were discovered later the same morning.

II.

The Federal Kidnapping Act establishes criminal penalties for a person who “unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or otherwise any person ... when ... the person is willfully transported in interstate ... commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary if the person was alive when the transportation began.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a).¹

A.

Horton argues that “the transportation” of Dickerson commenced when her body was put in the trunk of her vehicle at Satcher’s stepfather’s house in Cheverly, Maryland, and therefore no violation of § 1201(a)(1) occurred because Dickerson was already dead at that point. He further alleges that the jury instructions given by the district court wrongfully precluded him from presenting this defense.²

We review de novo the correctness of jury charges regarding the elements of an offense. See United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 923 (4th Cir.1997). In so doing, we must give the applicable statute its plain meaning. See United States Nat’l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 454, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993). And, in order to determine the plain meaning of a statute, we must consider its “language, structure, and purpose.” United States v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 858 (4th Cir.1998). If after such consideration we are left with a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty” in the meaning of the statute, the rule of lenity requires us to adopt the construction most favorable to the defendant. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The statutory language in question here is ambiguous when viewed outside the context of the purpose of the statute. It is apparent that “the transportation” in § 1201(a) refers to the only transportation previously referenced in the statute, namely interstate transportation. However, the statutory language does not clarify whether, when a kidnapper moves his victim after abducting her and then stops at some point before transporting her out of the state, “the transportation” includes only the last leg of the journey or all of the movement from the scene of the abduction across the state border. Nor does the structure of the statute suggest the correct interpretation.

We therefore turn to the purpose of the statute. The Federal Kidnapping Act was promulgated to address an increasing number of interstate kidnappings and the problem of kidnappers taking their victims across state lines, to places where state law enforcement officers had no authority to investigate the crimes and pursue the criminals. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 462-63, 66 S.Ct. 233, 90 L.Ed. 198 (1946). Congress’ authority to address this problem falls under its power to prevent the misuse of channels of interstate or foreign commerce. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150, 91 S.Ct. 1357, 28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir.1993); cf. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 438-39, 45 S.Ct. 345, 69 L.Ed. 699 (1925) (holding that prohibition on interstate transportation of stolen automobiles is within Commerce Clause power in part because it helps prevent criminals from using channels of interstate commerce to move stolen property outside of the jurisdiction of state law authorities and to conceal their crimes). Congress amended the statute in 1972, expanding its scope. See Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, Pub.L. No. 92-539, § 201, 86 Stat. 1070 (1972). As the statute was amended, interstate transportation of the victim became “merely a basis for federal jurisdiction rather than an integral part of the substantive crime.” United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 176 (4th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see S.Rep. No. 92-1105 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4316, 4317-18. As a result of that change, courts have held that a defendant need not even realize he has left the state of abduction in order for the interstate transportation element to be satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1536-38 (11th Cir.1988); see also United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1067 (4th Cir.1994) (“Numerous cases have held that criminal statutes based on the government’s interest in regulating interstate commerce do not generally require that an offender have knowledge of the interstate nexus of his actions.”).

The statute was again amended in 1998 to provide that the interstate element is satisfied when a person is willfully transported in interstate commerce “regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary if the person was alive when the transportation began.” Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub.L. No. 105-314, § 702(a), 112 Stat. 2974, 2987 (1998). Prior to the amendment, courts had held that the government was required to prove that the kidnapping victim was alive when the victim crossed a state line. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 508 F.2d 1271, 1273 (4th Cir.1975). It is apparent that in passing the 1998 amendment, Congress recognized the difficulty of proving the exact events that took place once a kidnapper was “on the move” with his victim, and sought to relieve the burden on the government of proving these events.

Consideration of the purposes behind § 1201 and its amendments demonstrates the incorrectness of Horton’s interpretation of the statute. There is no basis for the proposition that interruptions between the commencement of movement of the victim and the crossing of a state line affect when the interstate transportation commenced, even when the path from the place of abduction to the state line is not straight. Were we to rule otherwise, we would thwart Congress’ attempt to relieve the government from proving the specific events that occurred during a kidnapper’s movement of his victim. We would force the government in every federal kidnapping case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the kidnappers did not kill their victim during a significant pause in their travel or on a circuitous path to the state line. This would be at odds with Congress’ goal of preventing kidnappers from misusing interstate commerce channels to avoid responsibility for their kidnappings.

Consider the following hypothetical: The government introduces evidence showing only that Kidnapper grabbed Victim and drove off with her and that her body was found two days later in a neighboring state. Certainly this is the quintessential case that the federal kidnapping statute is designed to address. Horton’s interpretation, however, could prevent a successful prosecution in such a case because the government could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Kidnapper did not stop somewhere within the state where the abduction occurred, kill Victim, and then transport her body to the neighboring state to dispose of it.

Of course, the longer the pauses, or the more changes of direction or changes' in the kidnapper’s plans that occur during the transportation from the point of abduction to the state line, the easier it would be to say — from a purely linguistic standpoint — that there may have been multiple transportations rather than a single interstate transportation and therefore that the first leg of the transportation was not part of “the transportation” to which the statute refers. But again, making application of the statute depend on these factors would not serve the purpose of preventing kidnappers from misusing interstate commerce channels to prevent state law enforcement authorities from bringing them to justice.³ We therefore conclude that the district court correctly charged the jury that “the transportation” of Dickerson began when she was willfully moved from the place of her abduction.⁴

B.

Citing United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir.1978), Horton next argues that the district court violated his right to due process by instructing the jury concerning a statutory presumption allowing the jury to infer that Dickerson was transported out of the state if she was not released within 24 hours after she was abducted. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(b) (West 2000) (creating presumption). We need not decide whether this instruction was erroneous because any error was harmless. Even without the instruction, there was no reasonable basis in the record for the jury to find that the interstate transportation element was not satisfied. See United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 699-701 (4th Cir.2000) (holding that an error that “effectively withdraws] an element of the offense from the jury’s consideration” is harmless when the record could not support a reasonable finding that the element was not satisfied).

III.

Finally, with regard to the conspiracy charge, Horton contends that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that in order to convict, it would have to find either (1) that Dickerson was alive when her transportation across state lines began, or (2) that when the conspiracy to kidnap Dickerson began, Horton had intended to carry Dickerson across state lines. Again, we need not decide whether the refusal to provide this instruction constituted error because any error was harmless. In convicting Horton on the § 1201(a) charge, the jury necessarily determined that Dickerson was alive when the interstate transportation began, i.e., when she was moved from the place of her abduction. See id. at 699-700 (explaining that error that “effectively withdraws] an element of the offense from the jury’s consideration” is harmless if jury necessarily made the required finding anyway or if the record could not support a reasonable finding that the element was not satisfied).

IV.

In sum, we affirm Horton’s convictions for the reasons stated.

AFFIRMED.

1 . Section 1201(a), in its entirety, states:

(a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when—

(1) the person is willfully transported in interstate or foreign commerce, regardless of whether the person was alive when transported across a State boundary if the person was alive when the transportation began;

(2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States;

(3) any such act against the person is done within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States as defined in section 46501 of title 49;

(4) the person is a foreign official, an internationally protected person, or an official guest as those terms are defined in section 111 6(b) of this title; or

(5)the person is among those officers and employees described in section 1114 of this title and any such act against the person is done while the person is engaged in, or on account of, the performance of official duties,

shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment.

2 . Horton argues that the district court erred by (1) giving a jury instruction that would allow conviction if the jury found that he kidnapped Dickerson, transported her within Maryland, killed her, and then transported her body outside the state; and (2) refusing to instruct the jury that it must acquit unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt either that the conspirators intended to carry Dickerson alive across state lines or that Dickerson was actually alive during the commencement of her transportation across state lines.

Horton also argues that the district court responded incorrectly to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations, inquiring, "[A]l what ... point does transportation in this case begin [ ]?” J.A. 419 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court instructed the jury that "[a] defendant transports a victim when he willfully moves her. Therefore, transportation commences with the movement of the victim, at any point during the kidnapping.” Id. at 435 (internal quotation marks omitted). Horton argues that the court should have responded by stating that "[i]f, after ... Dickerson was kidnapped, but before transportation is initiated which carries her across state lines ... Dickerson dies, then there cannot be any interstate transportation of the victim.” Id. at 481.

3 . The dissent concludes that, under our interpretation, the statute would apply in the hypothetical case of a kidnapper who seizes his victim in one state, transports her within that state, and then kills and buries her, only to return one month later and move the body to another state. See post, at 482-483. We do not find this outcome as troubling as the dissent does, however. We see no reason why Congress would not have intended the statute to reach such a misuse by a kidnapper of interstate commerce channels to cover up his trail by moving evidence of his crime into a different state’s jurisdiction.

4 . Horton contends that the Government's interpretation would make surplusage of the language “if the person was alive when the transportation began” because in any interstate transportation of a kidnapping victim, the victim would be alive when the transportation began. That misconstrues the requirements of the statute. If, for example, Victim goes to Kidnapper’s house voluntarily, after which Kidnapper holds her against her will in an attempt to obtain a ransom for her safe release, that would meet the non-jurisdictional elements of § 1201(a). See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (making it a federal crime to "unlawfully ... confine[ ] ... and hold[ ] ... any person” when one of five jurisdictional requirements is satisfied); United States v. Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1466 (10th Cir.1993) (stating that a kidnapping is complete when the victim is unlawfully seized and detained); United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 238 (4th Cir.1983) (same). If Kidnapper subsequently killed Victim at his house prior to transporting her body to another state, the interstate jurisdictional element would not be satisfied because Victim would not have been alive when the transportation began.