DLD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-3105 ___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES COLE, Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-91-cr-00570-002) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 22, 2024
Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2024) _________
OPINION * _________
PER CURIAM
James Cole, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. orders denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
and his motion to reconsider that ruling. The Government moves for summary
affirmance. We grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm.
In 1993, Cole was convicted of conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the
intent to distribute, heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; and possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The convictions
arose from Cole’s leadership role in a largescale, violent drug trafficking operation in the
Philadelphia area. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Cole was
unsuccessful on direct appeal and in various post-judgment proceedings.
At issue here is Cole’s most recent motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 In the motion, he sought early release from his life sentence on the
ground that he now meets the age and sentence requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)
because he is seventy years old and has served thirty years in custody. Cole alternatively
sought early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because, he argued, his age, medical
1 This was Cole’s third motion for “compassionate release” in recent years. In September 2020, he sought compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds that his age and medical conditions placed him at heightened risk of serious illness if he were to contract COVID-19. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that even if these factors constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the sentencing concerns set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. In December 2022, Cole filed another motion for compassionate release based on his medical conditions. The District Court again denied relief, explaining that nothing material had changed since his last motion, and that the § 3553(a) factors still outweighed the risks posed by his medical conditions.
2 conditions (arthritis and diabetes), rehabilitative efforts, and time already spent in custody
constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting release. The District Court
denied the motion, explaining that (1) § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) does not apply to him; and (2)
even if his age, medical conditions, and rehabilitative efforts constituted “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the sentencing concerns set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. Cole moved for reconsideration, but the
District Court denied relief. He appealed. 2
The “compassionate release” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 allows a district court
to reduce a prisoner’s sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction,” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), or, alternatively, the prisoner meets the age and sentence
demands of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Before granting compassionate release, a district court
must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1), as well
as the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review both the District Court’s order denying Cole’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion and its order denying reconsideration thereof. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize the filing of a motion for reconsideration in a criminal matter, the Supreme Court has held that the timely filing of such a motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8–9 (1976); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413– 14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We review both orders for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). 3 deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).
The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying Cole’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. First, the District Court correctly concluded that Cole was not
eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) because that provision applies only to
prisoners who had been sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), the “three strikes”
provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that the district court may modify a
prison term if, among other things, the defendant has served at least 30 years of a
sentence imposed under section 3559(c)). Second, the District Court reasonably
concluded that release was not warranted under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in light of the §
3553(a) factors. As the District Court explained, given Cole’s leadership role in a
notoriously violent criminal enterprise, early release from his life sentence would not
protect the safety of the community, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), or reflect the seriousness of the
underlying crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(A).
The District Court also acted within its discretion in denying Cole’s motions for
reconsideration. Although Cole argued that the District Court had not sufficiently
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DLD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________
No. 23-3105 ___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES COLE, Appellant
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal No. 2-91-cr-00570-002) District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond ____________________________________
Submitted on Appellee’s Motion for Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 February 22, 2024
Before: JORDAN, PORTER, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2024) _________
OPINION * _________
PER CURIAM
James Cole, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. orders denying his motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
and his motion to reconsider that ruling. The Government moves for summary
affirmance. We grant the Government’s motion and will summarily affirm.
In 1993, Cole was convicted of conspiring to distribute, and to possess with the
intent to distribute, heroin and cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848; and possessing
cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The convictions
arose from Cole’s leadership role in a largescale, violent drug trafficking operation in the
Philadelphia area. He was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. Cole was
unsuccessful on direct appeal and in various post-judgment proceedings.
At issue here is Cole’s most recent motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). 1 In the motion, he sought early release from his life sentence on the
ground that he now meets the age and sentence requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii)
because he is seventy years old and has served thirty years in custody. Cole alternatively
sought early release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because, he argued, his age, medical
1 This was Cole’s third motion for “compassionate release” in recent years. In September 2020, he sought compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) on the grounds that his age and medical conditions placed him at heightened risk of serious illness if he were to contract COVID-19. The District Court denied the motion, concluding that even if these factors constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the sentencing concerns set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. In December 2022, Cole filed another motion for compassionate release based on his medical conditions. The District Court again denied relief, explaining that nothing material had changed since his last motion, and that the § 3553(a) factors still outweighed the risks posed by his medical conditions.
2 conditions (arthritis and diabetes), rehabilitative efforts, and time already spent in custody
constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting release. The District Court
denied the motion, explaining that (1) § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) does not apply to him; and (2)
even if his age, medical conditions, and rehabilitative efforts constituted “extraordinary
and compelling reasons” under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), the sentencing concerns set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) counseled against release. Cole moved for reconsideration, but the
District Court denied relief. He appealed. 2
The “compassionate release” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3582 allows a district court
to reduce a prisoner’s sentence if “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction,” § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), or, alternatively, the prisoner meets the age and sentence
demands of § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii). Before granting compassionate release, a district court
must consider “the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable.” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Those factors include “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(1), as well
as the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, . . . to provide just punishment for the offense,” “to afford adequate
2 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review both the District Court’s order denying Cole’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion and its order denying reconsideration thereof. Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly authorize the filing of a motion for reconsideration in a criminal matter, the Supreme Court has held that the timely filing of such a motion tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal. See United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8–9 (1976); United States v. Vicaria, 963 F.2d 1412, 1413– 14 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). We review both orders for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). 3 deterrence to criminal conduct,” and “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).
The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying Cole’s
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) motion. First, the District Court correctly concluded that Cole was not
eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) because that provision applies only to
prisoners who had been sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), the “three strikes”
provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(ii) (stating that the district court may modify a
prison term if, among other things, the defendant has served at least 30 years of a
sentence imposed under section 3559(c)). Second, the District Court reasonably
concluded that release was not warranted under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) in light of the §
3553(a) factors. As the District Court explained, given Cole’s leadership role in a
notoriously violent criminal enterprise, early release from his life sentence would not
protect the safety of the community, see § 3553(a)(2)(C), or reflect the seriousness of the
underlying crimes, see § 3553(a)(2)(A).
The District Court also acted within its discretion in denying Cole’s motions for
reconsideration. Although Cole argued that the District Court had not sufficiently
addressed each of his arguments, the record reflects that it had. See Dist. Ct. Order 2,
ECF No. 747. Moreover, Cole did not provide any legal or factual support for his
contention that the District Judge who adjudicated his compassionate-release motion
improperly reassigned the case to a different district judge; rather, the docket report
indicates that the Chief Judge reassigned the case at random pursuant to the court’s
standard practice upon a judge’s retirement. Order, ECF No. 759; see also E.D. Pa. Rule
4 50.1(d). Lastly, to the extent that Cole challenged the District Court’s finding that his
medical conditions were “stable and well-managed in the prison environment,” Order 3,
ECF No. 747, the District Court reasonably determined that even if they were not, the
sentencing factors counseled against releasing Cole.
We have considered Cole’s arguments on appeal and conclude that they are
meritless. Accordingly, because this appeal does not present a substantial question, see
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), we grant the
Government’s motion and summarily affirm. 3
3 The Government’s requests for leave to file its motion for summary affirmance out of time and to be excused from filing a brief are granted. 5