United States v. James Austin Fraley, Sr.

538 F.2d 626, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 7765

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: July 30, 1976
• Docket: 75-1521
• Status: Published

Opinions

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Senior Circuit Judge:

An indictment charging appellee Fraley, under 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a), with obstructing the communication of information of a suspected crime from a possible witness to a Special Agent of the United States Department of Agriculture was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the statute did not fit Fraley’s conduct. This conclusion, educed from the law’s legislative history, is now appealed by the Government.

The facts, undisputed on the motion to dismiss, were these. On the evening of December 16, 1974, Special Agent Sheldon Goodrich, Office of Investigation, United States Department of Agriculture, an investigator within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a), visited Mrs. Isabell Geesaman, an employee of the Fraley Meat Packing Company of Thurmont, Maryland, at her home in Catoctin Furnace, Maryland, in order to interview her concerning apprehended violations of Federal meat inspection laws by the Fraley company. Told of her rights, Mrs. Geesaman sought and obtained consent to a telephone call for advice. After a call, she made certain admissions concerning alleged violations. Questioning was interrupted by a loud banging on Mrs. Geesaman’s back door, announcing the coming of the defendant-appellee James Austin Fraley, Sr., president of the Fraley company, and his son, the vice-president.

Fraley, Sr., said: “We are honest people trying to make a living, why don’t you leave us alone.” “You get out of here and get out of town right now. Don’t even come through this town again. You have two minutes to get out of here or you ain’t never going to get out.” Agent Goodrich identified himself as a Federal officer and asked Fraley, Sr., if he were threatening him. Fraley, Sr., replied, “You’re damned right I am. I have a shotgun out there and you better get out of here right now.” In the face of cooler counsel by his son, Fraley, Sr., persisted: “I don’t pare who he is, if he does not get out of here now he is never going to get out.” After Agent Goodrich left the house and walked to his car, Fraley, Sr., had the last word: “Your 120 seconds are almost up, you better get in that car and get out of here.”

The indictment condenses these facts and relates them to 18 U.S.C. § 1510(a), which provides for the punishment of:

“(a) Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery, misrepresentation, intimidation, or force or threats thereof to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator; . . .

The burden of this enactment at once emerging is to keep unobstructed the “communication of information . . . to a criminal investigator.” Its primary subject of protection is the transmission of the words of a prospective informant or witness; it is the “giving” of information for which security is sought. Quite distant from its purpose is the concept of shielding informants or witnesses from harm, physical or otherwise — this objective is entrusted to the second paragraph of Section 1510(a).¹ Moreover, the communicatee’s safety is not a regard of the statute save insofar as that person’s ability to receive the information may be impaired by injury or restraint.

Notably, although the factual statement includes a recital of threats of physical attack upon the investigator, that is not the indictment offense. The core of the imputation of crime is the obstructing, delaying and preventing of the transmittal of information, the verbal assault upon the investigator simply describing the means of committing the crime.

Unlike the District Judge we find in the legislative history no ground for limiting the statute’s scope merely to safeguarding informants and witnesses against intimidation or injury interfering with the furnishing of information to a Federal investigator. There is general language in the House Report No. 658, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1967, p. 1760, so summarizing the legislation when it was proposed, but this is fully countered in this introduction:

“Purposes of the Bill

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to amend chapter 73, title 18, United States Code (relating to obstruction of the administration of justice), by adding a new section prohibiting the obstruction of Federal criminal investigations.”

Consultation with the law’s history is, it seems to us, a needless exploration, for the statute itself speaks with vigor and clarity to its end — the free channeling of information to Federal agents. Precedent generally vindicating our exposition is United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 648, 81 S.Ct. 1278, 1281, 6 L.Ed.2d 575 (1961) wherein it is observed:

“Having concluded that the provisions of [the statute] are clear and unequivocal on their face, we find no need to resort to the legislative history of the Act.”

It follows that the judgment of dismissal must be vacated and the case remanded for trial.

So Ordered.

1 . “Whoever injures any person in his person or property on account of the giving by such person or by any other person of any such information to any criminal investigator—

“Shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”