United States v. Jabar Sellers

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMay 25, 2023
Docket22-4265
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Jabar Sellers (United States v. Jabar Sellers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Jabar Sellers, (4th Cir. 2023).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-4265 Doc: 17 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-4265

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JABAR MARKEITH SELLERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00120-1)

Submitted: April 28, 2023 Decided: May 25, 2023

Before WYNN, RICHARDSON, and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Wesley P. Page, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. William S. Thompson, United States Attorney, Ryan A. Keefe, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-4265 Doc: 17 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Jabar Markeith Sellers pled guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The district court calculated Sellers’

advisory imprisonment range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2021) at 30

to 37 months and sentenced Sellers to 37 months’ imprisonment and 3 years of supervised

release. On appeal, Sellers challenges his sentence, arguing that the 37-month prison term

is substantively unreasonable and that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a

search condition as a special condition of supervised release. We affirm.

“We review the reasonableness of a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) using an

abuse-of-discretion standard, regardless of whether the sentence is inside, just outside, or

significantly outside the Guidelines range.” United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212

(4th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). “A sentence that is within or below a properly calculated

[Sentencing] Guidelines range is presumptively [substantively] reasonable.” United

States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“On appeal, such a presumption can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is

unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id. (cleaned up). *

Sellers argues that his prison term is unreasonable because it is greater than

necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing in light of the circumstances he faced

growing up that were not accounted for by the Guidelines’ imprisonment range. In

* We have confirmed after review of the record that Sellers’ sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Provance, 944 F.3d 213, 215, 218 (4th Cir. 2019).

2 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4265 Doc: 17 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 3 of 5

imposing the prison term, the district court properly relied on Sellers’ offense conduct, his

history and characteristics, and the needs for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness

of his offense conduct, to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment, and to

afford deterrence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). In assigning weight to concerns

stemming from Sellers’ criminal conduct and history of recidivism and weighing those

concerns more heavily than concerns stemming from his upbringing, the district court did

not abuse its discretion, and we reject Sellers’ argument to the contrary. See United

States v. Rivera-Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 105 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating it was within district

court’s discretion to accord more weight to host of aggravating factors in defendant’s case

and decide that sentence imposed would serve § 3553 factors on the whole); United

States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad

discretion when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a) factors.”).

Although the 37-month prison term results from the district court’s rejection of Sellers’

request for a downward variance to 24 months’ imprisonment, the court, we conclude, did

not abuse its discretion in determining that the within-Guidelines prison term was justified

by § 3553(a) factors relevant to Sellers’ case. See United States v. Diosdado-Star, 630

F.3d 359, 366-67 (4th Cir. 2011) (affirming substantive reasonableness of variance

sentence six years greater than Guidelines range because it was based on district court’s

examination of relevant § 3553(a) factors); see also United States v. Angle, 598 F.3d 352,

359 (7th Cir. 2010) (“All that matters is that the sentence imposed be reasonable in relation

to the ‘package’ of reasons given by the [district] court.”). Sellers fails to overcome the

presumption that his within-Guidelines prison term is substantively reasonable.

3 USCA4 Appeal: 22-4265 Doc: 17 Filed: 05/25/2023 Pg: 4 of 5

Sellers also challenges the imposition of the search condition as a special condition

of supervised release, arguing that it produces a greater deprivation of liberty than

necessary and is not reasonably related to his history or characteristics.

“We review the imposition of special conditions of supervised release for abuse of

discretion, recognizing that district courts have broad latitude in this space.” United

States v. Hamilton, 986 F.3d 413, 419 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A district court may impose a discretionary condition of supervised release if the condition

is “reasonably related” to various enumerated sentencing factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1);

see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B), (C), (D). The condition also must “involve[] no greater

deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary,” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2), and be

“consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,”

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).

Sellers does not dispute, and the record supports, that the search condition is

consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines’ policy statements. See United States v. Neal,

810 F.3d 512, 520-21 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v.

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Related

United States v. Angle
598 F.3d 352 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
United States v. Diosdado-Star
630 F.3d 359 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Jeffery
631 F.3d 669 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Agustin Rivera-Santana
668 F.3d 95 (Fourth Circuit, 2012)
United States v. Eric William Kingsley
241 F.3d 828 (Sixth Circuit, 2001)
United States v. Tyree Neal, Sr.
810 F.3d 512 (Seventh Circuit, 2016)
United States v. Jon Provance
944 F.3d 213 (Fourth Circuit, 2019)
United States v. Larry Nance
957 F.3d 204 (Fourth Circuit, 2020)
United States v. Dawn Bennett
986 F.3d 389 (Fourth Circuit, 2021)
United States v. Paul Hamilton, Jr.
986 F.3d 413 (Fourth Circuit, 2021)

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United States v. Jabar Sellers, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-jabar-sellers-ca4-2023.