United States v. Isaac

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: April 12, 2024
• Docket: 22-2758
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22-2758-cr United States v. Isaac

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of April, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges, JED S. RAKOFF, District Judge. * _____________________________________

United States of America,

Appellee,

v. 22-2758

Dexter Isaac,

Defendant-Appellant,

* Judge Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. Micheline Hammouda, AKA Micheline Gay, AKA Micheline Francois, AKA Micheline Massey, AKA Micheline Desrosiers,

Defendant. † _____________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Dexter Isaac, pro se, Victorville, CA.

FOR APPELLEE: David C. James, Nina C. Gupta, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Sterling Johnson, Jr., Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the October 4, 2022 order of the district court

is AFFIRMED.

* * *

† The Clerk’s office is directed to amend the caption as reflected above.

2 Appellant Dexter Isaac filed a motion for compassionate release under 18

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). After the district court denied his motion, he moved

several months later for reconsideration of that denial; in that motion he raised

new arguments in support of release. The district court denied the motion as

untimely and otherwise without merit. Isaac appealed. As explained below,

treating Isaac’s second motion as a new request for a sentence reduction rather

than an untimely motion for reconsideration, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying relief on the merits. We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the

issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to

AFFIRM.

I. Background

The charges in this case stemmed from a 1997 murder-for-hire scheme in

which Isaac agreed to murder his co-defendant’s husband in exchange for, among

other things, the rights to the co-defendant’s Long Island home. Isaac waited at

the victim’s home and then shot him in the head as he left his building. He then

moved into the Long Island home. While detained pretrial, Isaac sought to

3 prevent witnesses from testifying and instructed his ex-girlfriend to destroy

evidence.

A jury convicted Isaac of seven counts, including one conspiratorial and one

substantive count of murder-for-hire, 18 U.S.C. § 1958, and one count of using a

firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The district court

sentenced Isaac to a cumulative term of life plus sixty months, as required by

statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). We affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. See

generally United States v. Isaac, 14 F. App’x 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (summary order).

In 2020, Isaac moved for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1). He cited several underlying medical conditions that heightened his

vulnerability to COVID-19 as extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release

and argued that he had rehabilitated in prison.

The district court denied his motion, concluding that Isaac had not

demonstrated sufficiently extraordinary or compelling reasons to justify a

sentence reduction, as required for relief under § 3582(c)(1). As relevant here, the

court determined that Isaac failed to show that his facility could not “reasonably

protect him from COVID-19 or manage his medical conditions.” App’x 148.

4 Over ten months later, Isaac moved for reconsideration. In addition to

again citing the risks presented by COVID-19 and arguing that his sentence was

unusually long, he now argued that he was also penalized for going to trial and

would not have received a life sentence under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines

after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).

The district court denied the motion. Among other things, the court

reasoned that the motion was untimely under the rules governing reconsideration,

but even assuming it was not, Isaac had still not presented extraordinary and

compelling reasons for a sentence reduction because he was vaccinated and the

pandemic was waning in seriousness. Isaac’s sentence was also not unusually

long, nor had he suffered a trial penalty because the sentence was statutorily

mandated. And because Booker did not apply retroactively, it was irrelevant to

Isaac’s sentence. Isaac appealed.

II. Discussion

Isaac’s motion for reconsideration was untimely if construed strictly as a

motion for reconsideration. See E.D.N.Y. Loc. Crim. R. 49.1(d). But in light of

our obligation to construe pro se submissions liberally, see Chinniah v. FERC, 62

F.4th 700, 702 (2d Cir. 2023), we recognize that it also could have been treated as a

5 new request for compassionate release, despite its caption. We thus review the

order on appeal as a denial of an independent motion for sentence reduction rather

than as an untimely motion for reconsideration of the district court’s prior order.

A district court may, in an exercise of its discretion, reduce a defendant’s

term of imprisonment by granting a motion brought under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)—the “compassionate release” provision—if (1) the defendant has

exhausted administrative remedies, (2) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors favor a

sentence reduction, and (3) the defendant’s circumstances are extraordinary and

compelling. United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 71 (2d Cir. 2021). We review the

denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371,

374 (2d Cir. 2021). Under this deferential standard, we will affirm unless the

district court has made a legal or factual error, or has otherwise issued a ruling

outside “the range of permissible decisions.” Keitt, 21 F.4th at 71.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Isaac failed

to show extraordinary and compelling circumstances, a sufficient basis to affirm.

See id. at 73. The court permissibly determined that Isaac’s argument for

extraordinary and compelling circumstances had become less persuasive due to

the waning of the pandemic and Isaac’s own vaccination. Although Isaac cites

6 decisions where judges exercised their discretion differently, those do not

demonstrate that the district court’s decision here fell outside of the range of what

is permissible. See id. at 71.

In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Isaac’s

argument that his sentence was unusually long, and that the court should grant a

sentence reduction because he was sentenced prior to the United States Supreme

Court’s decision in Booker. Isaac’s life sentence was driven by a statutory

minimum, not a Guidelines calculation or the sentencing court’s exercise of

discretion. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a).

We have considered Isaac’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court